Dietz v. Spangenberg et al
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER regarding level of review. The Court will conduct a de novo review of the Summary Judgment Order in ruling on Defendants Objections 12 Attachs. 16, 17; the parties shall submit supplemental briefs (Written Opinion). Signed by Judge Ann D. Montgomery on 03/08/2013. (TLU)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Michael S. Dietz, Trustee,
Civil No. 11-2600 ADM/JJG
Erich L. Spangenberg, Audrey E.
Spangenberg, Christian Spangenberg, Stephen
Peary, FPX, LLC, FP Tech Holdings, LLC,
TechDev Holdings, LLC, Acclaim Financial
Group, LLC, NMPP, Inc. and Walter Gates,
Michael S. Dietz, Esq., Scott J. Hoss, Esq., John C. Beatty, Esq., and Christopher D. Nelson,
Esq., Dunlap & Seeger, P.A., Rochester, MN, on behalf of Plaintiff.
Timothy R. Thornton, Esq., Kevin M. Decker, Esq., and Leah Ceee O. Boomsma, Esq., Briggs &
Morgan, P.A., Minneapolis, MN, on behalf of Defendants Audrey E. Spangenberg; Christian
Spangenberg; TechDev Holdings, LLC; and Acclaim Financial Group, LLC.
Michelle Kriedler Dove, Esq., and Lewis A. Remele, Esq., Bassford Remele, Minneapolis, MN,
on behalf of Defendants Erich Spangenberg and NMPP, Inc.
Richard D. Anigian, Esq., Haynes and Boone, LLP, Dallas, TX, on behalf of FP Tech Holdings,
LLC and FPX, LLC.
Elizabeth Wiley, Esq., The Wiley Law Firm PC, Austin, TX, on behalf of Defendant Stephen
Peter J. Schwingler, Esq., and Todd A. Noteboom, Esq., Leonard Street and Deinard, P.A.,
Minneapolis, MN, on behalf of Defendants Audrey E. Spangenberg; Erich Spangenberg;
Christian Spangenberg; TechDev Holdings, LLC; Acclaim Financial Group, LLC; NMPP, Inc.;
and Stephen Peary.
Larry Ricke, Esq., and R. John Wells, Esq., Ricke & Sweeney, P.A., St. Paul, MN, on behalf of
Defendant Walter J. Gates, III, P.A.
On February 20, 2013, the undersigned United States District Judge heard oral argument
on the issue of what level of review, if any, this Court should accord to Bankruptcy Court Judge
Dennis D. O’Brien’s October 1, 2012 Order Denying Motions for Summary Judgment [Docket
No. 12] Attach. 12 (“Summary Judgment Order”). All Defendants have filed Objections [Docket
No. 12] Attachs. 16, 17, to the Summary Judgment Order and argue the District Court must
review the Summary Judgment Order de novo. The Plaintiff insists no review is warranted. For
the reasons set forth below, the Court will review the Summary Judgment Order de novo.
Plaintiff Michael Dietz (“Trustee”) is the Chapter 7 bankruptcy trustee for Firepond, Inc.
(“Firepond”), a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Mankato, MN. Am.
Compl. [Docket No. 12] Attach. 14 ¶¶ 1, 30.
Defendants Erich and Audrey Spangenberg are husband and wife. Id. ¶ 5. Between
them, they are alleged to largely own and control all of the corporate Defendants. Id. ¶¶ 8-13,
15-20, 22-26. Defendant Christian Spangenberg is the Spangenbergs’ son and allegedly owns
1% of one of the corporate Defendants. Id. ¶¶ 6, 14. Defendant Stephen Peary allegedly served
as an officer and general counsel for Firepond and was an employee of corporate Defendants FP
Tech Holdings, LLC (“FP Tech”) and FPX, LLC (“FPX”). Id. ¶¶ 27-29. For the purposes of
this Order, the Spangenbergs, corporate Defendants, and Peary are collectively referred to as the
Defendant Walter Gates, III, P.A. (“WJG”) is a professional association located in
Mankato, Minnesota that conducted a foreclosure sale of Firepond’s assets. Id. ¶¶ 21, 142, 147,
Defendant FP Tech is the only Defendant to have filed a proof of claim against the
Firepond bankruptcy estate. See In re Firepond, Inc., Case No. 09-bk-32103 (Bankr. D. Minn.)
Claim No. 6 (listing claim for $9,337,643 of which $9,185,643 is claimed as secured and
$152,000 is claimed as unsecured).
The Trustee alleges the Spangenbergs and corporate Defendants, with the assistance of
Peary, acquired a controlling interest in the common stock of Firepond, installed themselves and
their designees as members of the Firepond board of directors, and formed corporate defendant
FP Tech to acquire all of Firepond’s secured debt for a fraction of the amount owed. Am.
Compl. ¶¶ 30-82, 89-104, 129, 134-141. Thereafter, the Spangenberg Defendants improperly
declared a default on the secured debt and orchestrated a flawed foreclosure sale conducted by
WJG to foreclose on all of Firepond’s assets. Id. ¶¶ 107-116, 119, 142-151, 156-159. The assets
were then transferred to FPX, a company allegedly formed by Audrey and Erich Spangenberg to
continue the Firepond business. Id. ¶¶ 133, 152-54, 160-63. The Amended Complaint alleges
claims for fraudulent transfer, preferential transfer, turnover, and equitable subordination under
§§ 548, 547, 542, and 510 of the Bankruptcy Code, respectively. Id. ¶¶ 185-245. The Amended
Complaint also asserts common-law claims for breach of fiduciary duty; conversion, veil
piercing/alter ego liability, and punitive damages. Id. ¶¶ 246-X.1 Defendants deny the Trustee’s
The three paragraphs following ¶ 281 of the Amended Complaint are not enumerated
but instead are prefaced with an “X.” The citation pertains to all three of the paragraphs labeled
“X.” The Amended Complaint also includes a claim under § 105 of the Bankruptcy Code;
however this claim was previously dismissed by the Bankruptcy Court and is not at issue in these
proceedings. See Order, Aug. 3, 2011 [Docket No. 2] Attach. 8; Order, Aug. 3, 2011 [Docket
No. 2] Attach 9.
C. Procedural History
This case began in Bankruptcy Court and was assigned to Bankruptcy Judge Dennis D.
O’Brien. On September 8, 2011, after Defendants demanded a jury trial and stated they did not
consent to a bankruptcy judge conducting the trial, the case was transferred to District Court.
See Order, Oct. 24, 2011 [Docket No. 4] at 1-2.2 This Court determined the transfer was
premature due to the early stage of the proceeding, and remanded the case to Bankruptcy Court
until it was trial ready. Id. at 2-3.
In February of 2012, the Trustee filed a motion in Bankruptcy Court to amend the
Complaint to add punitive damages and veil-piercing claims, and a motion to compel the
Spangenberg Defendants to file documents under seal and modify their attorney-client privilege
log. The Bankruptcy Court held a hearing on the Trustee’s motions. See Thornton Aff. [Docket
No. 44] Ex. 1 (Hr’g Tr., Mar. 22, 2012). During the hearing, Judge O’Brien stated, “I don’t
think I should be getting involved in making final, non-appealable rulings with respect to
shaping the scope of what is going to be the evidence and for that matter getting [sic] a little
ahead of myself here, but also making final orders supposedly that are non-appealable that deal
with the scope of the complaint.” Id. at 20:22-21:4. Based on this concern, Judge O’Brien
stated he would continue the motions, and instructed the parties to file motions for summary
judgment with the Bankruptcy Court: “So what I am going to do, then, you bring a motion for
summary judgment. This is going to be continued. I am going to then continue it pending
Defendants’ motions to transfer were based solely on their Seventh Amendment right to
a jury trial and their lack of consent to the Bankruptcy Court conducting the trial. See
Spangenberg Defs.’ Mot. Transfer [Docket No. 2] Attach. 12; Def. WJG’s Mot. Transfer
[Docket No. 2] Attach. 13. The Spangenberg Defendants specifically stated that Stern v.
Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594 (2011), did “not have a direct impact on [their] Motion” to transfer.
Spangenberg Defs.’ Mot. Transfer at 2 n.1.
referral upstairs and I am going to transfer the case saying it’s ready to be tried except for these
two things . . . .” Id. at 33:18-25. Thereafter, the Spangenberg Defendants, WJG, and the
Trustee each filed a summary judgment motion in Bankruptcy Court. See Pl.’s Mot. Summ. J.
[Docket No. 10] Attach. 6; WJG’s Mot. Summ. J. [Docket No. 10] Attach. 11; Spangenberg
Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J. [Docket No. 10] Attach. 12.
On October 1, 2012, Bankruptcy Judge O’Brien denied all three of the summary
judgment motions, finding that disputed issues of fact precluded judgment as a matter of law.
Summ. J. Order at 4. The disputed issues of fact included: whether the Spangenberg Defendants
held a security interest in the collateral foreclosed upon by Defendant FP Tech; whether a default
existed by Firepond at the time of the foreclosure; whether Firepond was damaged as a result of
Defendants’ actions; and whether the foreclosure sale was conducted in a competent and
professional manner. Id. at 4-7. The Summary Judgment Order concluded: “the motions for
summary judgment are denied, and to the extent they involve related proceedings, this order
constitutes a report and recommendation of denial.” Id. at 7.
Judge O’Brien also issued separate orders granting the Trustee leave to amend the
Complaint and ordering the Spangenberg Defendants to file documents under seal and amend
their attorney-client privilege log. See Orders, Oct. 1, 2012 [Docket No. 12] Attachs. 10, 11.
These orders did not include the “recommendation” language found in the Summary Judgment
Order. See generally id. The Bankruptcy Court then transferred the case back to District Court
as “trial ready.” Order, Oct. 1, 2012 [Docket No. 12] Attach. 13.
On October 15, 2012, the Spangenberg Defendants and Defendant WJG filed Objections
[Docket No. 12] Attachs. 16, 17, to the Bankruptcy Court’s Orders and requested a de novo
review by the District Court. The Trustee responded that Defendants are not entitled to a review
of the Bankruptcy Court’s Orders, because the Orders are non-final, and because Defendants
consented to the Bankruptcy Court’s hearing and deciding the motions. Pl.’s Resp. [Docket No.
In November 2012, this Court held a status conference at which all parties agreed that the
issue of whether and under what standard the District Court must review the Summary Judgment
Order is a threshold issue in ruling on the Objections. Thereafter, the parties submitted further
briefing and orally argued this limited issue.
D. Parties’ Positions
The Defendants argue the Bankruptcy Court lacked jurisdiction over the Trustee’s claims
and had no authority to decide them because the claims are traditional actions at common law
that are not necessarily resolved by ruling on a creditor’s proof of claim in bankruptcy. Thus,
Defendants argue the Summary Judgment Order is void ab initio, and the issues should be
visited afresh or reviewed de novo in District Court.
The Trustee responds that no review of the Summary Judgment Order is warranted, and
the matter should proceed to trial. The Trustee argues the Bankruptcy Court’s denial of
summary judgment is an interlocutory order, and thus not reviewable. He also contends that all
of the claims in this suit except for the breach of fiduciary duty claim are core proceedings which
Judge O’Brien had the authority to finally adjudicate. Finally, the Trustee argues that even if the
Bankruptcy Court lacked the judicial authority to hear and decide these proceedings, the
Defendants consented to litigating them in Bankruptcy Court because they did not object to the
Bankruptcy Court’s authority over these matters until after Defendants’ summary judgment
motions had been denied.
A. Bankruptcy Court Jurisdiction
Bankruptcy Court jurisdiction is derived from 28 U.S.C. §§ 1334 and 157(a). Section
1334 vests district courts with jurisdiction of all cases under the Bankruptcy Code and all civil
proceedings that arise under, arise in, or are related to cases under the Bankruptcy Code. 28
U.S.C. § 1334(a)-(b). Section § 157(a) allows a district court to refer any or all cases and
proceedings within this jurisdictional grant to the district’s bankruptcy judges. All such cases
and proceedings in this district are referred to the district’s bankruptcy judges pursuant to Local
Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 1070-1 (D. Minn.). Here, there is no dispute that the Trustee’s
claims are, at a minimum, “related to” the Firepond bankruptcy case.3 Therefore, the Bankruptcy
Court has jurisdiction over these proceedings.
Contrary to Defendants’ arguments, the Supreme Court’s decision in Stern v. Marshall,
131 S. Ct. 2594 (2011) does not change this result. Stern did not pertain to a bankruptcy court’s
subject matter jurisdiction; rather, it delineated “the allocation of the authority as between the
district court and the bankruptcy court to enter final judgments.” Empire State Bldg. Co. v. N.Y.
Skyline, Inc. (In re N.Y. Skyline, Inc.), 471 B.R. 69, 79 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2012). As the Stern
Court recognized, that allocation “does not implicate questions of subject matter jurisdiction.”
Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2607.
A proceeding is “related to” a case under the Bankruptcy Code if “the outcome . . .
could conceivably have any effect on the estate being administered in bankruptcy.” In re Titan
Energy, Inc., 837 F.2d 325, 330 (8th Cir. 1988). The outcome of these proceedings could
conceivably have an effect on the Firepond bankruptcy estate because the Trustee seeks damages
and equitable relief that could impact the amount of estate property available to creditors and
may affect the allowance of FP Tech’s proof of claim.
B. Level of Review
The level of review applied to a bankruptcy court’s factual and legal conclusions depends
upon whether the bankruptcy court has judicial authority to enter final orders and judgments in a
particular proceeding. Keats v. Council on Occupational Educ., Inc., Civ. No. 3:12-MC-0018-H,
2012 WL 6084646, at *1 (W.D. Ky. Dec. 6, 2012). If the bankruptcy court has such authority,
its orders and judgments in that proceeding are reviewed by the district court “under the usual
limited appellate standards. That requires marked deference to, among other things, the
bankruptcy judge[’s] findings of fact.” Stern. at 2611 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 158(a) and Fed. R.
Bankr. P. 8013).4
If, however, the bankruptcy court lacks judicial authority to enter final orders or
judgments in a bankruptcy proceeding, the bankruptcy court must submit proposed findings of
fact and conclusions of law to the district court unless all parties consent to the bankruptcy
court’s entry of final orders and judgments. 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(1)-(2). Absent that consent, the
district court reviews de novo any portion of the bankruptcy judge’s proposed findings of fact
and conclusions of law to which a party timely and specifically objects. 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(1);
Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9033(d).
Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 8013 states that, on appeal, a bankruptcy court’s
findings of fact “shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous.”
A bankruptcy court has authority to enter final orders or judgments in a bankruptcy
proceeding if the proceeding is a “core” proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 157 and also satisfies the
test for constitutionality announced by the Supreme Court in Stern. See Stern, 131 S. Ct. at
2618. Core proceedings under § 157 are proceedings that arise under the Bankruptcy Code or
arise in a case under the Bankruptcy Code, and include but are not limited to the matters listed in
§ 157(b)(2). See 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(1)-(2).
In Stern, the Supreme Court held that the allocation of authority to bankruptcy judges
under § 157 exceeds the limits of Article III of the Constitution “in one isolated respect.” 131 S.
Ct. at 2620. Specifically, the Supreme Court held that a bankruptcy court’s authority to enter
final judgment in counterclaims by the estate against persons filing claims against the estate –
proceedings described as “core” under § 157(b)(2)(C) – is not constitutional if the “state law
counterclaim . . . is not resolved in the process of ruling on [the] creditor’s proof of claim.” Id.
The Supreme Court reasoned that such claims resemble traditional actions at common law, and
the responsibility for deciding those actions “rests with Article III judges in Article III courts.”
Id. at 2609. Thus, in determining whether a bankruptcy court has authority to finally adjudicate
a core bankruptcy proceeding, “the question is whether the action at issue stems from the
bankruptcy itself or would necessarily be resolved in the claims allowance process.” Id. at 2618.
If the answer is “yes” to either of these prongs, a bankruptcy court has authority to enter final
orders or judgments in the core proceeding, which are reviewed under the limited and deferential
appellate standards. See id. at 2611. If the answer to both prongs of the inquiry is “no,” a
bankruptcy court may still hear the proceeding and propose findings of fact and conclusions of
law.5 However, unless all parties consent to the bankruptcy court’s final adjudication of the
proceeding, the district court must finally decide it. See id. at 2607-08, 2620.
A bankruptcy court lacks authority to enter final orders or judgments in proceedings that
are not core but are merely “related to” a case under the Bankruptcy Code. In those proceedings,
a bankruptcy judge must “submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law to the district
court, and any final order or judgment shall be entered by the district judge after considering the
bankruptcy judge’s proposed findings and conclusions and after reviewing de novo those matters
to which any party has timely and specifically objected.” 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(1).
C. Trustee’s Claims
Turning to the Trustee’s claims in this litigation, the Court finds the Bankruptcy Court
has the judicial authority to issue final orders and judgments as to some of the claims, but lacks
the authority to finally adjudicate others.6 For example, the Bankruptcy Court clearly has
authority to enter a final order or judgment in the Trustee’s preference and fraudulent transfer
claims against FP Tech. Those claims, sounding under §§ 547 and 548 of the Bankruptcy Code,
respectively, are listed as core claims under 28 U.S.C. §§ 157(b)(2)(F) and (H). Moreover, FP
A bankruptcy court’s retention of a non-core proceeding until all pre-trial matters within
the bankruptcy court’s judicial authority are completed promotes judicial economy by utilizing
the bankruptcy court’s expertise in the law of fraudulent and preferential transfers and the
Bankruptcy Code’s avoidance remedies. Kelley v. Hofer (In re Petters Co., Inc.), 440 B.R. 805,
810 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2010). Withdrawal or transfer of the case to the district court before the
pre-trial proceedings have been completed “forgoe[s] the services of a bankruptcy court ready,
willing and able to do its job.” Heller Ehrman LLP v. Arnold & Porter, LLP (In re Heller
Ehrman LLP), 464 B.R. 348, 358 (N.D. Cal. 2011).
In determining whether a proceeding is one which the bankruptcy court has authority to
finally adjudicate, each cause of action is considered a separate “proceeding.” Christensen v. St.
Paul Bank for Coops. (In re Fulda Indep. Co-op), 130 B.R. 967, 973 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1991).
Tech has filed a proof of claim in Firepond’s bankruptcy case, and so the Trustee’s claims for
preferential and fraudulent transfers against FP Tech will necessarily be resolved in the claims
allowance process. See Langenkamp v. Culp, 111 S. Ct. 330, 331 (1990) (“[T]he creditor’s
claim and the ensuing preference action by the trustee [are] integral to the restructuring of the
debtor-creditor relationship . . . .”); Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 109 S. Ct. 2782, 2799
(1989) (holding that whether a fraudulent conveyance action arises as part of the claims
allowance process depends upon whether the creditor has filed a proof of claim); Katchen v.
Landy, 86 S. Ct. 467, 475-76 (1966) (finding preference claim is necessarily resolved in claims
allowance process); 11 U.S.C. § 502(d) (stating “the court shall disallow any claim of any entity
. . . that is a transferee of a transfer avoidable under section . . . 547 [or] 548 . . . of this title”).
However, this lawsuit also includes non-core claims over which the Bankruptcy Court
lacks the authority to enter a final order. For example, the conversion claim is a non-core claim
as to all Defendants with the possible exception of FP Tech, because the conversion claim is a
purely state-law claim against entities that have not filed proofs of claim in the bankruptcy case.
As such, the conversion claim is not a proceeding that “stems from the bankruptcy itself or
would necessarily be resolved in the claims allowance process.” Id. at 2618. The Trustee’s
breach of fiduciary duty claims are also non-core, as the Trustee conceded at oral argument.
The Trustee next argues Defendants consented to the Bankruptcy Court’s final
adjudication of any non-core claims by failing to object to the Bankruptcy Court’s authority after
remand and in their summary judgment briefing. However, at the March 22, 2012 Bankruptcy
Court hearing, Defendants’ counsel stated he was prepared to argue his position on the effect of
Stern on these proceedings. Hr’g Tr., Mar 22, 2012 at 21:7-12. Judge O’Brien responded: “I
have my ideas [on] how to handle them. I will get to that too.” Id. at 21:13-14. Later in the
hearing, Judge O’Brien instructed the parties to file their summary judgment motions in the
Bankruptcy Court and informed them he would refer the motions to this Court as a
recommendation. Id. at 33:18-24. Under these circumstances, Defendants’ conduct cannot be
inferred as consent to the Bankruptcy Court’s entry of final orders in these proceedings.7
D. Interrelated Claims Require De Novo Review
The Bankruptcy Court’s authority to finally adjudicate some claims and not others in this
lawsuit raises the potential for two separate review standards: the limited and deferential appeal
standards for the Trustee’s core claims, and de novo review for the non-core claims. However,
the claims over which the Bankruptcy Court does have final authority are so factually
intertwined with those which the Bankruptcy Court may not finally decide that separate review
The Court also rejects the Trustee’s argument that a district court’s de novo review
under § 157(c)(1) applies only to a bankruptcy court’s entry of final orders and does not apply to
the non-final Summary Judgment Order. Judge O’Brien specifically intended that his ruling on
the dispositive motions be reviewed by the district court if it determined that the motions
involved non-core proceedings: “to the extent that [the summary judgment motions] involve
related proceedings, this order constitutes a report and recommendation of denial.” Summ. J.
Order at 7 (emphasis added). This approach is consistent with other courts’ views as to how a
bankruptcy judge might handle a dispositive motion in a proceeding over which the bankruptcy
judge lacks final adjudicative authority. See O’Connell v. Terranova (In re Adelphi Institute,
Inc.), 112 B.R. 534, 539 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (noting a bankruptcy court’s power to “make proposed
rulings upon any dispositive motions” in non-core proceedings); Kelley v. Eide Bailly, LLP (In
re Petters Co., Inc.), 480 B.R. 346, 355 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2012) (finding the bankruptcy court
was not required to submit a report and recommendation to the district court because the motion
was not potentially dispositive).
Moreover, this Court has discretion to review interlocutory bankruptcy orders and will do
so here because the Bankruptcy Court has completed all pre-trial work as to all of the Trustee’s
claims, and thus the Summary Judgment Order leaves the Bankruptcy Court with no further role
in these proceedings. See In re M&S Grading, Inc., 526 F.3d 363, 368 (8th Cir. 2008)
(recognizing district court’s discretion to hear appeals from interlocutory orders and stating
finality of a bankruptcy court order is determined in part by “the extent to which . . . the order
leaves the bankruptcy court nothing to do but execute the order”).
standards would be costly and counterproductive. All of the Trustee’s claims, both core and
non-core, pertain to the allegedly wrongful acquisition of Firepond’s secured debt and
foreclosure of Firepond’s assets. See generally Am. Compl. Several key fact issues, including
the value of Firepond’s assets at the time of the bankruptcy filing and the validity of FP Tech’s
security interest in Fireponds assets, are potentially dispositive of core claims as well as non-core
claims. Applying the appellate standards of review to the core claims while reviewing the noncore claims de novo would be an imprudent use of judicial resources and could lead to
inconsistent results. Thus, this Court will review the Summary Judgment Order de novo as to all
matters to which Defendants have objected. Cf. French v. Johnson Law Group (In re
Kohlenberg), Adv. No. 10-3390, 2012 WL 3292854, at *4 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio Aug. 10, 2012)
(submitting proposed findings and fact and conclusions of law on interrelated core and non-core
claims “in the interest of judicial efficiency and economy”); Blackwell v. Zollino (In re
Blackwell), 267 B.R. 724, 731 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2001) (finding claims not necessarily within
the ambit of the Seventh Amendment were “sufficiently intertwined as a factual matter” to
require submission of all common factual issues to a jury).
E. Additional Briefing
At oral argument on the standard of review issue, both parties expressed a desire to
submit additional briefing in the event that the Court determined that a de novo review of the
Summary Judgment Order was warranted. Therefore, the Court will allow each party to submit
supplemental briefs not to exceed 5,000 words, to be filed on or before April 25, 2013, and
supplemental response briefs not to exceed 2,000 words, to be filed on or before May 10, 2013.
At that time, the Court will determine whether to hold oral argument or take the matters under
Based upon the foregoing, and all the files, records, and proceedings herein, IT IS
The Court will conduct a de novo review of the Summary Judgment Order in
ruling on Defendants’ Objections [Docket No. 12] Attachs. 16, 17; and
The parties shall submit supplemental briefs in accordance with the briefing
schedule set forth in Section III.E., above.
BY THE COURT:
s/Ann D. Montgomery
ANN D. MONTGOMERY
U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated: March 8, 2013.
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?