Edeh v. Equifax Information Services, LLC et al
Filing
151
MEMORANDUM, OPINION and Order: Defendant's Objection/Appeal of Discovery Rulings 125 132 is DENIED in part, and GRANTED in part, as set forth herein; Defendant's Motion to Strike 129 is DENIED AS MOOT; and the Order of November 21, 2012 123 is AFFIRMED in part and MODIFIED in part, such that the portion of the order regarding Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Discovery Responses to Plaintiff's Interrogatory No. 15 and Document Production Request No. 16 106 is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE, as set forth herein. (Written Opinion) Signed by Judge Susan Richard Nelson on 4/29/13. (jmf)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Samuel N. Edeh,
Civil No. 11-CV-2671 (SRN/JSM)
Plaintiff,
v.
ORDER
Equifax Information Services, LLC,
Defendant.
Samuel N. Edeh, 619 East Center Street, Apartment 1, Rochester, Minnesota, 55904,
Pro Se
Andrew T. Shern and Christopher G. Angell, Murnane Brandt, PA, 30 East 7 th Street,
Suite 3200, St. Paul, Minnesota 55101; J. Anthony Love and Brian J. Olson, King &
Spalding, LLP, 1180 Peachtree Street, Atlanta, Georgia 30309, for Defendant
________________________________________________________________________
SUSAN RICHARD NELSON, United States District Court Judge
This matter is before the Court on Defendant Equifax Information Services LLC’s
[“Equifax’s”] appeal from a November 21, 2012 order (“the Order”) issued by Magistrate
Judge Janie S. Mayeron. (Def.’s Obj./Appeal [Doc. Nos. 125 & 132].) Defendant
challenges Magistrate Judge Mayeron’s decision compelling Defendant to produce
discovery in response to Plaintiff’s Interrogatory No. 15 and Document Production
Request Nos. 16 & 45. (Id. at 2-3.)
Plaintiff filed a response to Defendant’s Objections [Doc. No. 127], and
subsequently filed an amended response four days later [Doc. No. 128]. Defendant
moves to strike Plaintiff’s Amended Response [Doc. No. 129], arguing that it is an
unauthorized pleading and should not be considered by the Court. Plaintiff filed a
response in opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Strike [Doc. No. 131].
The Court’s review of decisions of the Magistrate Judge on nondispositive matters
is limited to determining whether the Order is clearly erroneous or contrary to law. D.
Minn. L. R. 72.2(a). This Court pays great deference to a magistrate judge’s
determinations. See Reko v. Creative Promotions, Inc., 70 F. Supp.2d 1005, 1007 (D.
Minn. 1999) (“The standard of review applicable to an appeal of a magistrate judge’s
order on a nondispositive issue is extremely deferential.”). Defendant has failed to
establish that Magistrate Judge Mayeron’s decisions are either clearly erroneous or
contrary to law. However, as to the timing of the production of financial material, the
Court defers ruling on this issue until after the Court reaches a decision on whether
Plaintiff may amend to assert a claim for punitive damages. Therefore, the Court affirms
the Order in all other respects, subject to the modification that Plaintiff’s motion to
compel the production of financial information (requested in Interrogatory No. 15 and
Document Request No. 16) is denied without prejudice. Accordingly, Defendant’s
Objections are denied in part, and granted in part. In light of this ruling, the Court also
denies as moot Defendant’s Motion to Strike.
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I.
DISCUSSION 1
A.
Past Complaints
As noted in the Order, Document Request No. 45 seeks all complaints in any
litigation against Equifax in the last five years alleging that Equifax violated the FCRA by
reporting an inaccurate balance on a consumer credit file, by failing to provide an
accurate address or telephone number for the source of information reported on a
consumer credit file, or violated 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b), 15 U.S.C. 1681i(a) and 15 U.S.C.
§ 1681g(a). (Order at 24 [Doc. No. 123].) While Defendant objected on grounds of
overbreadth, burden, and relevance, Magistrate Judge Mayeron found that information
regarding past complaints as to § 1681i(a) violations was relevant to the issue of whether
Equifax’s conduct against Plaintiff was willful. (Id.) Because the only remaining claim
is the § 1681i(a) claim regarding the report of an inaccurate balance on a consumer credit
file, the magistrate judge limited Defendant’s production to complaints bearing on this
claim. (Id.)
Equifax objects to Magistrate Judge Mayeron’s ruling, arguing that the production
of § 1681i complaints is unduly burdensome. (Def.’s Obj. at 4 [Doc. No. 125].) It
estimates that over 2,000 consumer complaints have been filed against it in a five-year
period and that it will be required to manually search through each and every pleading
1
The Court incorporates by reference the factual background contained in the
Order.
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document in order to comply with this discovery request. (Id.) While Defendant argues
that this is a time-consuming and costly undertaking, it suggests that Plaintiff could
search through public records using Westlaw or Pacer and obtain the same information
himself. (Id.)
The Court finds that Magistrate Judge Mayeron’s ruling is neither clearly
erroneous nor contrary to law. Defendant cites authority for the proposition that similar
discovery requests have been denied on grounds of burden outweighing benefit. (Id. at 56) (citing Mattingly v. Credit Mgmt., LP, No. Civ. A05CV00080 RPM MJW, 2005 WL
3271683, at *1 (D. Colo. June 7, 2005); Apodaca v. Discover Fin. Servs., No. 04-cv00717-MCA-WDS (D. N.M. Feb. 10, 2005) [Doc. No. 49].) Defendant also cites to
authority in other contexts, in which courts have denied a motion to compel a corporate
party to produce prior complaints. (Id. at 8-10) (citations omitted). Plaintiff, however,
cites contrary authority in which courts have found evidence of prior lawsuits relevant to
assessing the question of willfulness, as Magistrate Judge Mayeron found here. (Pl.’s
Resp. at 2 [Doc. No. 127]) (citing Donnelly v. NCO Fin. Sys., Inc., 263 F.R.D. 500, 50405 (N.D. Ill. 2009)). The court in Donnelly noted that to be discoverable under Rule 26,
the information need not itself be admissible, but must only be relevant and reasonably
likely to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Donnelly, 263 F.R.D. at 505. The
Donnelly court concluded that the information was relevant to the defendant’s knowledge
of the applicable statute and its actions in regard to the statute. Id. Finding that the likely
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benefit of the discovery outweighed the burden, the court granted the plaintiff’s motion to
compel. Id. Plaintiff also cites additional authority, in other contexts, in which corporate
discovery of previous lawsuits or claim files has been ordered, despite the apparent
burdensomeness of production. (Pl.’s Resp. at 3 [Doc. No. 127]) (citations omitted).
As noted in the Donnelly opinion, Rule 26 contemplates a liberal scope of
discovery regarding any non-privileged matter that is relevant to a party’s claim or
defense. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b). Discovery need not be admissible at trial if the discovery
appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Id. Should
Defendant consider the evidence inadmissible at trial, Defendant is free to bring a motion
in limine at that time. Finding Magistrate Judge Mayeron’s ruling neither clearly
erroneous nor contrary to law, the Court affirms the ruling and denies Defendant’s appeal
on this ground.
B.
Financial Information
As the Order indicates, Interrogatory No. 15 requests Equifax’s net income for the
preceding 24 quarters. (Order at 20 [Doc. No. 123].) Similarly, Request for Production
of Documents No. 16 seeks copies of Equifax’s quarterly profit and loss statements for
each of the preceding 24 quarters. (Id.) While Equifax objected to these requests on
grounds of breadth, burdensomeness, relevance, and confidential/proprietary information,
Magistrate Judge Mayeron held that this information is relevant to the issue of punitive
damages. (Id.) However, Magistrate Judge Mayeron placed a time limitation on the
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requested material, requiring Defendant to produce its responses for fiscal years 2010 and
2011 through the present. (Id. at 21.)
In its Objections, Equifax contends that it does not maintain this information in the
form in which Plaintiff has requested it and “[a]sking Equifax to produce such
information is tantamount to asking it to completely rework the organization of its
financial records.” (Def.’s Obj. at 15 [Doc. No. 125].) Equifax further contends that it
will likely require additional accounting and database consultants to capture this data.
(Id.) In addition, Equifax notes that the requested information is highly sensitive in the
context of the competitive consumer credit reporting industry. (Id.)
A defendant’s net worth is a relevant consideration in the award of punitive
damages. See Schaub v. VonWald, 638 F.3d 905, 926 (8th Cir. 2011) (noting that while
evidence of a defendant’s net worth is not a prerequisite to a punitive damages award, it is
a factor that may be considered in assessing an award); Grabinski v. Blue Springs Ford
Sales, Inc., 136 F.3d 565, 570 (8th Cir. 1998) (finding that a defendant bears the burden
of introducing evidence of net worth at trial for purposes of minimizing a punitive
damages award). The Court therefore finds that the relevance and benefit of the
information outweighs the burden of production. However, both Edeh and Equifax cite
authority for the proposition that discovery of this type of sensitive and proprietary
information is best deferred until such time as the court determines whether the plaintiff
may maintain a viable punitive damages claim. See Chesapeake Appalachia LLC v.
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Mountain V Oil & Gas Inc., No. 2:11-cv-00207, 2012 WL 4045729, at *4 (S.D. W. Va.
Sept. 13, 2012); DeMarco v. Lapay, No. 2:09-cv-190-TS-PMW, 2012 WL 1119212, at
*1-2 (D. Utah April 3, 2012); Courtice v. Midland Credit Mgmt., No. 1:08-cv-00719 (D.
N.M. May 5, 2009 [Doc. No. 80].) The Court construes Defendant’s reliance on this
authority as an alternative request from Defendant that the Court delay ruling on this
discovery until it has determined whether the Complaint may be amended to include a
claim for punitive damages. (Def.’s Obj. at 16 [Doc. No. 125]) (stating, “This line of
cases emphasizes the sensitive nature of the information in the determination that
financial records should not be discoverable until necessary.”)
The Court agrees with this approach. Since Defendant’s financial records are
relevant to a possible punitive damages claim that may be the subject of a future motion
to amend, any potential discovery of the requested financial records will be deferred until
after such a motion is decided. Accordingly, the Court modifies Magistrate Judge
Mayeron’s Order only to the extent that it requires the immediate production of this
information. The Order is thus modified to reflect that Plaintiff’s motion to compel
Defendant’s financial information requested in Interrogatory No. 15 and Document
Request No. 16 is denied without prejudice. As to this discovery, Defendant’s appeal on
is therefore granted.
C.
Motion to Strike
In its Motion to Strike [Doc. No. 129] Defendant moves to strike Plaintiff’s
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Amended Response to Defendant’s Objections [Doc. No. 128]. Defendant contends that
the untimeliness argument raised by Plaintiff in the Amended Response is without legal
merit and that the Amended Response was improperly submitted without leave of court.
(Def.’s Mem. Supp. of Mot. to Strike at 2-5 [Doc. No. 130].)
In the Amended Response, Plaintiff argues that Defendant’s Objections were filed
two days after the December 5, 2012 deadline and therefore should not be considered by
the Court. (Pl.’s Am. Resp. at 2 [Doc. No. 128].) However, as Defendant correctly
asserts, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(d) permits a party effecting electronic service
pursuant to Rule 5(b)(2)(E), to add three days to the time period in question. Fed. R. Civ.
P. 6(d). As Defendant’s Objections were electronically served and filed on December 7,
2012, they are timely.2
In addition, Equifax is correct that a party may not file an unsolicited legal
memorandum without the court’s prior permission. D. Minn. L. R. 7.1(i). Plaintiff did
not seek the Court’s permission in filing his Amended Response to Defendant’s
Objections. Plaintiff is therefore reminded that should he wish to file additional
memoranda in the future that are not contemplated by the Local Rules, he must seek the
2
Moreover, even if the Objections were filed two days late, the Court would not
consider a two-day delay in filing objections at all analogous to Plaintiff’s seven-month
delay in seeking leave to file a third-amended complaint. (See Pl.’s Am. Resp. at 2 [Doc.
No. 128]) (arguing that it would be unfair for the Court to consider a late-filed
objection/appeal when the Magistrate Judge denied Plaintiff’s motion to file a thirdamended complaint in the appealed Order based on untimeliness).
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Court’s permission. In any event, based on the Court’s rulings on Defendant’s
Objections, set forth herein, the Court denies Defendant’s Motion to Strike as moot.
III.
ORDER
Based on the foregoing, and all the files, records and proceedings herein, IT IS
HEREBY ORDERED that:
1.
Defendant’s Objection/Appeal of Discovery Rulings [Doc. Nos. 125 & 132]
is DENIED in part, and GRANTED in part, as set forth herein;
2.
Defendant’s Motion to Strike [Document No. 129] is DENIED AS
MOOT; and
3.
The Order of November 21, 2012 [Doc. No. 123] is AFFIRMED in part
and MODIFIED in part, such that the portion of the order regarding
Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Discovery Responses to Plaintiff’s
Interrogatory No. 15 and Document Production Request No. 16 [Doc. No.
106] is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE, as set forth herein.
Dated:
April 29, 2013
s/Susan Richard Nelson
SUSAN RICHARD NELSON
United States District Court Judge
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