Gatten v. Life Time Fitness, Inc.
Filing
40
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 19 ) is DENIED.(Written Opinion). Signed by Judge Donovan W. Frank on 3/29/13. (BJS)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Theresa Gatten,
Civil No. 11-2962 (DWF/JSM)
Plaintiff,
v.
MEMORANDUM
OPINION AND ORDER
Life Time Fitness, Inc.,
Defendant.
_______________________________________________________________________
James H. Kaster, Esq., and Sofia B. Andersson-Stern, Esq., Nichols Kaster, PLLP,
counsel for Plaintiff.
Jaime N. Cole, Esq., and Patrick R. Martin, Esq., Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak &
Stewart, P.C., counsel for Defendant.
_______________________________________________________________________
INTRODUCTION
This matter is before the Court on a Motion for Summary Judgment brought by
Defendant Life Time Fitness, Inc. (“Life Time”) (Doc. No. 19). For the reasons set forth
below, the Court denies the motion.
BACKGROUND
Life Time employed Plaintiff Theresa Gatten (“Gatten”) from September 2007
through January 2011, in various positions at its Lakeville and Savage clubs. (Doc.
No. 22, Cole Decl. ¶ 4, Ex. A (Gatten Dep.) at 33-35.) In the summer of 2008, Gatten
became pregnant, and in April 2009, she delivered a stillborn son. (Doc. No. 27,
Andersson-Stern Aff. ¶ 3, Ex. A.) Gatten took six weeks off from work and returned on
June 8, 2009. (Id.) In December 2009, Life Time promoted Gatten to the Life Spa
Department Head (“Department Head”) position at the Savage location. (Gatten Dep. at
34.)
As Department Head, Gatten generally led and managed team members and the
daily operations of the Life Spa. (Id. at 45-47, Ex. 6.) These responsibilities included:
(1) meeting or exceeding monthly and annual department product and service goals;
(2) monitoring revenue, refunds, money transactions, and credit cards; (3) overseeing
department budget and participating in annual planning; (4) monitoring profit and loss
statements; (5) completing payroll and ensuring labor costs were within the budget;
(6) reporting weekly and monthly revenue totals and projections; and (7) maintaining
inventory and supplies. (Id.) Gatten was also tasked with making sure team members
she supervised received and completed training. (Id. at 36, Ex. 2 at 17.) As part of the
training for her new position, Gatten completed a 2-3 day training course, and received
help from Erin Yearneau (formerly, Erin Hein) (Life Spa Regional Lead), Chris Aamot
(Life Spa National Manager), and Mel Arnold (Life Spa National Lead). (Gatten Dep.
at 49-52; Cole Decl. ¶ 6, Ex. C (Yearneau Dep.) at 21.)
In February 2010, Joe Liotine became the new General Manager at the Savage
club. (Gatten Dep. at 59; Cole Decl. ¶ 5, Ex. B (Liotine Dep.) at 22.) During the first
weekly Department Head meeting with Liotine, all persons present introduced
themselves and shared information such as family information and their fitness regimen.
2
(Gatten Dep. at 59.) Gatten shared about her family, including the loss of her son, and
became emotional. (Id. at 59-60.) Gatten testified that at her first “one-on-one meeting”
with Liotine, Michelle Bjornberg (the club’s Business Administrator) was also present.
(Id. at 61.) Gatten recalls that, at this meeting, Liotine brought up the birth of her
stillborn son, and that Liotine expressed concern that the loss of her son was affecting her
performance. (Id.) Liotine testified at his deposition that during this meeting with Gatten
and Bjornberg, he suggested that Gatten attempt to focus on business with her team, and
to attempt to keep personal issues separate. (Liotine Dep. at 92-93.) Liotine explained to
Gatten that some team members had complained that Gatten often brought up the issue of
her stillborn son with team members and that Gatten often became emotional at work.
(Id. at 43-44, 92-95.) Gatten became very emotional during this meeting. (Id. at 94-95.)
Liotine explained that team members were uncomfortable when Gatten became
emotional talking about her son. (Gatten Dep. at 62.) Liotine offered Gatten access to
the Employee Assistance Program (“EAP”). (Liotine Dep. at 93.) 1
Life Time submits that team members continued to complain about Gatten’s
tendency to become emotional on the job and her resulting problems with performance.
(Liotine Dep. at 59-60; Cole Decl. ¶ 9, Ex. F (LeJeune Dep.) at 16; Cole Decl. ¶ 8, Ex. E
(Bjornberg Dep.) at 36.) Life Time claims that Gatten had difficulty fulfilling her
1
Liotine also testified during his deposition that Gatten was often very emotional
and cried in the administrative office, and that he spent time listening to Gatten’s
personal issues. (Liotine Dep. at 36, 42-43.) Liotine also testified that Gatten was
missing about two days of work per week. (Id. at 46.)
3
responsibilities as a Department Head, such as managing profit and loss statements,
maintaining inventory, and ensuring her team was trained. Aamot communicated with
Liotine about Gatten’s performance issues. (Cole Decl. ¶ 7, Ex. D (Aamot Dep.) at
21-26.) Gatten maintains that she performed well in the spa as a Department Head,
consistently met her revenue goals, and received a positive evaluation. (Andersson-Stern
Decl. ¶ 3, Exs. B, C, D.)
In June 2010, Gatten became pregnant again. (Id. ¶ 3, Ex. A.) Gatten told Liotine
about the pregnancy. (Id.) A few weeks later, Gatten miscarried. (Id.) In August 2010,
Gatten became pregnant again, and she told Liotine about the pregnancy. (Id.)
Life Time submits that Gatten’s performance continued to suffer, and on
August 11, 2010, Liotine placed Gatten on a Performance Improvement Plan (“PIP”).
(Liotine Dep. at 66, 122-34 & Exs. 7, 9-11, 13.) Gatten was given until September 30 to
improve her performance before being terminated. (Liotine Dep. at 123.) Gatten submits
that the PIP was not warranted and that she believed she was already accomplishing
many of the items listed, although she did acknowledge areas that could be improved.
(Gatten Dep. at 91, 111.) As part of the PIP, Gatten was required to have a one-on-one
meeting with Liotine every week. (Andersson-Stern Decl. ¶ 3, Ex. F.) Gatten claims that
this did not occur, and that when she did meet with Liotine, he would bring up her
miscarriages within the discussion of her poor performance. (Gatten Dep. at 109-10.)
Gatten also testified that Liotine brought to her attention that “these miscarriages and [her
stillborn son] are causing these PIPs and [Gatten’s] performance in the spa.” (Id. at 110.)
4
Gatten claims that she worked hard during her PIP, and that around September 20, 2010,
Liotine told Gatten that she was passing her PIP. (Gatten Dep. at 131-32.)
Specifically with respect to training, Life Time submits evidence that Gatten failed
to ensure that a new team member, Tammi Wilson, received training by June 2010,
which was against the company’s policy. (Id. at 113-15.) Via an e-mail dated
July 1, 2010, Aamot notified Gatten that Wilson needed to be trained and directed Gatten
to schedule Wilson’s training “ASAP.” (Liotine Dep., Ex. 5.)
Life Time submits that Gatten’s performance continued to suffer, and that by
September 29, 2010, Life Time had decided that Gatten would no longer be a Department
Head. (Doc. No. 23, Liotine Decl. ¶ 8.) For example, as of September 24, Wilson had
still not received the required training. (Aamot Dep. at 59-65.) Liotine claims that after
he learned that Wilson had not been trained, he wanted to terminate Gatten’s employment
and sent an e-mail to Chris Fazi, the Regional General Manager, to this effect. (Liotine
Decl. ¶ 8, Ex. B.) The September 29, 2010 e-mail to Fazi read: “It is time for us to
review PIP and move forward. I can post for the position on Friday afternoon.” (Id.)
On September 30, the last day of her PIP and the day on which the September
inventory had to be completed, Gatten suffered a miscarriage. (Gatten Dep. at 130-31.)
Gatten claims that she told Liotine. (Andersson-Stern Decl. ¶ 3, Ex. A.) Liotine disputes
that he was told about this miscarriage. (Liotine Dep. at 85-86, 169-70.) Gatten claims
that Liotine told her she could go home, so long as she was back before midnight to finish
her inventory. (Andersson-Stern Decl. ¶ 3, Ex. A.) Gatten also told Yearneau that she
5
was miscarrying, and Yearneau told Gatten to go home and that she would help complete
the inventory. (Yearneau Dep. at 30.) Gatten returned to work on October 1 to make
sure inventory reports were complete. (Gatten Dep. at 131.)
On October 4, 2010, Gatten’s first full day back to work after her miscarriage,
Liotine called Gatten to “prep” her on her PIP before they met with Fazi. (Gatten Dep.
at 131-32.) When Gatten’s PIP expired, Fazi and Liotine met with Gatten.
(Andersson-Stern Decl. ¶ 3, Ex. H (Fazi Dep.) at 18-19; Gatten Dep. at 132-34.) Gatten
was told that she had failed to meet the leadership objectives of her PIP. (Fazi Dep. at
33.) Fazi offered Gatten a position as an Assistant Department Head in St. Louis Park,
or, in the alternative, she could voluntarily leave the company. (Fazi Dep. at 18.) Gatten
went on short-term disability leave. (Gatten Dep. at 137-38.) Gatten took leave from
mid-October until the beginning of January 2011, at which time Gatten resigned. (Gatten
Dep. at 143-44.)
In this action, Gatten alleges two counts against Life Time: (1) sex discrimination
in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964; and (2) sex discrimination in
violation of the Minnesota Human Rights Act (“MHRA”). (Doc. No. 1, Compl.
¶¶ 25-26.) Life Time now moves for summary judgment. (Doc. No. 19.)
DISCUSSION
I.
Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment is proper if there are no disputed issues of material fact and
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The
6
Court must view the evidence and the inferences that may be reasonably drawn from the
evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Enter. Bank v. Magna Bank
of Mo., 92 F.3d 743, 747 (8th Cir. 1996). However, as the Supreme Court has stated,
“[s]ummary judgment procedure is properly regarded not as a disfavored procedural
shortcut, but rather as an integral part of the Federal Rules as a whole, which are designed
‘to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action.’” Celotex
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327 (1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 1).
The moving party bears the burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of
material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Enter. Bank, 92 F.3d
at 747. The nonmoving party must demonstrate the existence of specific facts in the
record that create a genuine issue for trial. Krenik v. County of Le Sueur, 47 F.3d 953,
957 (8th Cir. 1995). A party opposing a properly supported motion for summary
judgment “may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but must set
forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256 (1986).
II.
Motion for Summary Judgment
Gatten brings sex discrimination claims pursuant to Title VII and the MHRA.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a); Minn. Stat. § 363A.08, subd. 2. 2 Title VII makes it an
“unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to discriminate against any
2
The Court analyzes claims under Title VII and the MHRA using the same
principles. Hanenburg v. Principal Mut. Life Ins. Co., 118 F.3d 570, 574, n.4 (8th
(Footnote Continued on Next Page)
7
individual . . . because of such individual’s . . . sex.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). The
Pregnancy Discrimination Act amended Title VII’s prohibition on sex discrimination to
include discrimination based on “pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions.”
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k). The MHRA defines “sex” to include “pregnancy, childbirth, and
disabilities related to pregnancy or childbirth.” Minn. Stat. § 363A.03, subd. 42.
A Title VII plaintiff may avoid summary judgment by presenting either direct or
indirect evidence of discrimination. See Fjelsta v. Zogg Dermatology, PLC, 488 F.3d
804, 809-10 (8th Cir. 2007). Direct evidence shows a specific link between the alleged
discriminatory animus and the challenged employment decision that is sufficient to
support a finding by a reasonable fact finder that an illegitimate criterion motivated the
employment decision. See id. at 809. When analyzing indirect evidence, the Court
applies the burden-shifting framework promulgated in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). See Fjelsta, 488 F.3d at 801; Griffith v. City of Des Moines,
387 F.3d 733, 736-37 (8th Cir. 2004). At the summary judgment stage, the issue is
whether the plaintiff has sufficient evidence that unlawful discrimination was a
motivating factor in the adverse employment action. Roberts v. Park Nicollet Health
Servs., 528 F.3d 1123, 1127 (8th Cir. 2008).
Here, Plaintiff alleges that she has both direct and indirect evidence of
discrimination. For purposes of this motion, the Court considers Plaintiff’s indirect
(Footnote Continued From Previous Page)
Cir. 1997).
8
evidence. Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, if Gatten is able to establish a
prima facie case of discrimination, the burden shifts to Life Time to produce a legitimate,
non-discriminatory reason for the adverse employment action. Wierman v. Casey’s Gen.
Stores, 638 F.3d 984, 993 (8th Cir. 2011). If Life Time is able to articulate such a reason,
the burden then shifts back to Gatten to produce evidence sufficient to create a genuine
issue of material fact showing that the proffered reason is merely a pretext for
discrimination. Id. Again, the issue is whether Gatten can produce sufficient evidence
that unlawful discrimination was a motivating factor in Life Time’s employment
decision. Id. (citing Roberts, 528 F.3d at 1127).
A.
Prima Facie Case
To establish a prima facie case of gender discrimination, a plaintiff must show that
she: (1) is a member of a protected class; (2) was qualified for her job; (3) suffered an
adverse employment action; and (4) that the alleged facts that give rise to an inference of
discrimination. Norman v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., 606 F.3d 455, 460-61 (8th Cir. 2010).
For purposes of its motion for summary judgment, Life Time argues that Gatten cannot
establish a prima facie case of pregnancy discrimination because she fails to meet the
second and fourth elements—that Gatten was qualified for her position and that she has
alleged facts that give rise to an inference of gender discrimination.
To satisfy the qualification element, Gatten need only prove that she was qualified
for her position. Arnold v. Nursing and Rehab. Cent. at Good Shepherd, LLC, 471 F.3d
843 (8th Cir. 2006), abrogated on other grounds by Torgerson v. City of Rochester, 643
9
F.3d 1031, 1032 (8th Cir. 2011). The Court first concludes that because Gatten was hired
as a Department Head and held that position for over ten months, the second element is
satisfied. See also Slattery v. Swiss Reinsurance Am. Corp., 248 F.3d 87, 91 (2d Cir.
2001) (“[W]here discharge is at issue and the employer has already hired the employee,
the inference of minimal qualification is not difficult to draw . . . ”).
The Court next turns to the fourth element—inference of discrimination. Life
Time argues that Gatten’s pregnancy and September 30 miscarriage had nothing to do
with her demotion. Life Time submits that the evidence demonstrates, as a matter of law,
that the bases for her PIP were real, that by late September, Gatten had failed to correct
her performance lapses, and in particular that Life Time had decided to demote Gatten
prior to her miscarriage on September 30. In support of the latter contention, Life Time
relies on Liotine’s September 29 e-mail: “It is time for us to review PIP and move
forward. I can post for the position on Friday afternoon.” (Liotine Decl. ¶ 8, Ex. B.)
Life Time submits that this e-mail negates Gatten’s contention that her demotion
stemmed from her September 30 miscarriage.
Gatten submits that she was placed on a PIP and terminated under circumstances
giving rise to an inference of discrimination. First, Gatten points to comments made by
Liotine regarding Gatten’s miscarriages. Second, Gatten submits that the timing of
Gatten’s PIP and termination is suspicious. For example, Gatten points out that Liotine
placed her on a PIP a few days after learning that she was pregnant and only one month
after learning of her June miscarriage. In addition, Gatten points out that she was
10
removed as Department Head on her first full day back at work after her September 30
miscarriage. Gatten disputes that the bases for the PIP were real and argues instead that
the reason for the PIP was her miscarriages. Gatten also submits that she fixed the issues
identified in her PIP, and that Liotine told her that she was passing the PIP just over a
week before her termination.
Viewing the record evidence in the light most favorable to Gatten, the Court
concludes that a reasonable jury could conclude that Gatten was placed on a PIP and
removed as a Department Head under circumstances giving rise to an inference of
discrimination. In particular, both the comments made by Liotine regarding Gatten’s
miscarriages in the context of her performance problems, as well as the temporal
proximity of those comments to her being placed on a PIP and, ultimately, her removal as
Department Head, could lead a reasonable juror to infer discriminatory intent.
Accordingly, the Court concludes that Gatten meets the requirements for establishing a
prima facie case of pregnancy discrimination.
B.
Legitimate, Nondiscriminatory Reason and Pretext
Life Time submits that Gatten failed to adequately perform her job as Department
head—specifically, that Gatten cried often and was not able to otherwise complete her
required job responsibilities. Life Time submits evidence that team members complained
about her performance and that Gatten, herself, has admitted that she was aware that she
needed to improve in certain areas. Life Time further submits that after receiving her
PIP, Gatten continued to fall short on her job performance and was, generally, unable to
11
manage the spa. Life Time relies heavily on Gatten’s failure to properly train her team
members despite orders and company policy to do so. Based on this evidence, the Court
concludes that Life Time has articulated legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for
placing Gatten on a PIP and for removing her as Department Head.
Gatten therefore must provide evidence of pretext—that Life Time’s reason for the
adverse employment actions was pretext for pregnancy discrimination. A plaintiff may
succeed at the pretext stage by showing sufficient evidence that a prohibited reason
motivated the employer. Roberts, 528 F.3d at 1127. Gatten argues that she has pointed
to substantial evidence of pretext and that pregnancy discrimination actually motivated
Life Time’s decision for Gatten’s PIP and demotion. Specifically, Gatten points to
evidence that: Liotine would bring up Gatten’s miscarriages when discussing her job
performance; Gatten was placed on a PIP days after Liotine learned she was pregnant and
was removed as Department Head on her first full day back after her September
miscarriage; and Liotine told Gatten that she was passing the PIP shortly before her
termination. Gatten also submits additional evidence that Liotine did not intend to
terminate Gatten at the end of her PIP.
The Court concludes that, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Gatten,
there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Life Time’s decision to place
Gatten on a PIP and to remove her as a Department Head was motivated by Gatten’s
alleged performance deficiencies or whether Gatten’s pregnancies and miscarriages were
a motivating factor in these employment decisions. Based on the evidence, a reasonable
12
jury could conclude that Life Time’s decisions were motivated by discriminatory intent.
The Court notes, however, that this is not to say that a jury would necessarily find that
Life Time was motivated by discriminatory animus. Life Time has submitted evidence
that, if believed by a jury, could very well demonstrate serious job performance issues on
Gatten’s part. The jury could also reasonably conclude that Gatten was placed on a PIP
and removed as Department Head because of her performance deficiencies.
In short, there are also factual disputes regarding the role that Gatten’s pregnancies
and miscarriages played, if any at all, in Life Time’s employment decisions. These
factual disputes, however, cannot be resolved on a motion for summary judgment, and
the Court therefore concludes that the record evidence in this case is enough to create
issues for trial. The Court strongly cautions Gatten, however, from equating a narrow
victory at this stage with a victory at trial.
ORDER
Based upon the foregoing, and the files, records, and proceedings herein, IT IS
HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. [19])
is DENIED.
Dated: March 29, 2013
s/Donovan W. Frank
DONOVAN W. FRANK
United States District Judge
13
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?