Karsjens et al v. Minnesota Department of Human Services et al

Filing 1080

ORDER. 1. This matter is STAYED in its entirety. 2. The parties shall meet and confer to discuss the status of the case and contact the Court to arrange a telephone status conference within ninety days of this order. (Written Opinion). Signed by Judge Donovan W. Frank on 5/3/2017. (BJS)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA

Kevin Scott Karsjens, David Leroy Gamble,
Jr., Kevin John DeVillion, Peter Gerard
Lonergan, James Matthew Noyer, Sr.,
James John Rud, James Allen Barber,
Craig Allen Bolte, Dennis Richard Steiner,
Kaine Joseph Braun, Christopher John
Thuringer, Kenny S. Daywitt, Bradley Wayne
Foster, Brian K. Hausfeld, and all others
similarly situated,

Civil No. 11-3659 (DWF/TNL)

Plaintiffs,
v.

ORDER

Emily Johnson Piper, Kevin Moser, Peter
Puffer, Nancy Johnston, Jannine
Hébert, and Ann Zimmerman,
in their official capacities,
Defendants.

Daniel E. Gustafson, Esq., Karla M. Gluek, Esq., David A. Goodwin, Esq., Raina
Borrelli, Esq., and Eric S. Taubel, Esq., Gustafson Gluek PLLC, counsel for Plaintiffs.
Scott H. Ikeda, Adam H. Welle, and Aaron Winter, Assistant Attorneys General,
Minnesota Attorney General’s Office, counsel for Defendants.

INTRODUCTION
This matter is before the Court on the parties’ case status briefs submitted in
response to the Court’s March 14, 2017 Order. (See Doc. Nos. 1072, 1074-79.) In that
order, the Court directed the parties to establish a briefing schedule on four issues:

(1) whether this case should remain stayed, in whole or in part, pending further appeal;
(2) whether the other stayed cases in the District with substantially similar claims should
remain stayed pending further appeal; (3) the next steps in this case on remaining Phase
One claims if these claims are not stayed; and (4) the next steps in this case on Phase Two
claims if these claims are not stayed. (Doc. No. 1072.) The parties have filed opening
and response briefs on these issues. (Doc. Nos. 1074-79.) For the reasons set forth
below, the Court will stay this case in its entirety and review the propriety of continuing
the stay in ninety days.
BACKGROUND
I.

General Background
The Court has recited the factual background underlying Plaintiffs’ claims in prior

orders. (See generally Doc. No. 966.) In short, Plaintiffs’ Third Amended Complaint
asserts a class action on behalf of committed individuals residing at the Minnesota Sex
Offender Program (“MSOP”) to challenge Defendants’ implementation of the Minnesota
Civil Commitment and Treatment Act, Minnesota Statute Chapter 253D, and operation of
MSOP. (See generally Doc. No. 635.) 1

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Plaintiffs’ Third Amended Complaint, filed on October 28, 2014, asserts the
following thirteen claims: (I) Minnesota Statute § 253D is facially unconstitutional;
(II) Minnesota Statute § 253D is unconstitutional as applied; (III) Defendants have failed
to provide treatment in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution and the Minnesota Constitution; (IV) Defendants have failed to provide
treatment in violation of the MCTA; (V) Defendants have denied Plaintiffs the right to be
(Footnote Continued on Next Page)
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II.

Procedural Background
Pursuant to the Court’s November 7, 2014 Final Pretrial Order, trial in this matter

was split into two phases. (Doc. No. 647.) The Court explained:
Phase One will be comprised of the presentation of evidence and argument
on the following issues: (1) whether Minnesota Statute Chapter 253D is
unconstitutional on its face and as applied; (2) whether the treatment
provided is constitutionally and/or statutorily infirm; (3) whether the
treatment program complies with court-ordered treatment; (4) whether
confinement is tantamount to unconstitutional punitive detention; and
(5) whether less restrictive alternatives to confinement are constitutionally
required.
...
Phase Two shall be comprised of the presentation of evidence and argument
on the following issues: (1) whether confinement conditions constitute
unconstitutional restrictions on freedom of speech, religion, and
association; (2) whether confinement procedures constitute unconstitutional
searches and seizures; (3) whether the treatment program and its

(Footnote Continued From Previous Page)
free from punishment in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution and the Minnesota Constitution; (VI) Defendants have denied Plaintiffs the
right to less restrictive alternative confinement in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment
to the United States Constitution and the Minnesota Constitution; (VII) Defendants have
denied Plaintiffs the right to be free from inhumane treatment in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and the Minnesota Constitution;
(VIII) Defendants have denied Plaintiffs the right to religion and religious freedom in
violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution;
(IX) Defendants have unreasonably restricted free speech and free association in violation
of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and the Minnesota Constitution;
(X) Defendants have conducted unreasonable searches and seizures in violation of the
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and the Minnesota Constitution;
(XI) Defendants have violated court ordered treatment; (XII) individual Defendants have
breached Plaintiffs’ contractual rights; and (XIII) individual Defendants have tortiously
interfered with contractual rights and have intentionally violated Minn. Stat. § 253B.03,
subd. 7. (Doc. No. 635 at 59-84.)
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implementation constitutes a breach of contract, tortious interference with
contract, and intentional violation of Minnesota Statute Section 253B.03(7).
(Id. at 2.) Trial proceedings in Phase One commenced on February 9, 2015 and
concluded on March 18, 2015. (See Doc. Nos. 839; 908.) On June 17, 2015, the Court
issued its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order, granting Plaintiffs’ request
for declaratory relief with respect to Counts I and II of their Third Amended Complaint.
(Doc. No. 966 at 75.) The Court determined that it did not need to address Counts III, V,
VI, and VII “because any remedy fashioned will address the issues raised in the
remaining Phase One Counts.” (Id. at 65.) The Court noted that its “determination that
the MSOP and its governing civil commitment statutes are unconstitutional concludes
Phase One of this case.” (Id. at 5.) The Court also reiterated that “Counts VIII, IX, and
X, will be tried in the second phase of trial (‘Phase Two’).” 2 (Id. at 76.) On October 29,
2015, the Court issued a First Interim Relief Order directing injunctive relief to remedy
the court’s findings of unconstitutionality. (Doc. No. 1035.)
On October 29, 2015, Defendants appealed the Court’s June 17, 2015 and
October 29, 2015 Orders. (Doc. No. 1036.) On January 3, 2017, the Eighth Circuit
issued an opinion “revers[ing] the district court’s finding of a constitutional violation and
vacat[ing] the injunctive order.” Karsjens v. Piper, 845 F.3d 394, 411 (8th Cir. 2017). It

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On August 10, 2015, Counts IV, XI, XII, and XIII were dismissed with prejudice.
(Doc. No. 1005.)
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remanded the case to this Court “for further proceedings on the remaining claims in the
Third Amended Complaint.” Id. The Eighth Circuit declined to rehear the case en banc.
See Karsjens v. Piper, No. 15-3485, Entry ID: 4503853 (8th Cir. Feb. 22, 2017). As
noted in Plaintiffs’ March 31, 2017 case status brief, Plaintiffs plan to file a petition for
writ of certiorari with the United States Supreme Court prior to a May 23, 2017 deadline.
(Doc. No. 1074 at 4.)
The Court has yet to rule on seven remaining claims. The following claims remain
in Phase One: Count III (Fourteenth Amendment Failure to Provide Treatment); Count V
(Fourteenth Amendment Freedom from Punishment); Count VI (Fourteenth Amendment
Denial of Less Restrictive Alternatives); and Count VII (Fourteenth Amendment Freedom
From Inhumane Treatment). The following claims remain in Phase Two: Count VIII
(First and Fourteenth Amendment Religious Freedom); Count IX (First Amendment Free
Speech and Association); Count X (Fourth Amendment Search and Seizure).
III.

Individual Cases
On July 24, 2012, the Court granted Plaintiffs’ Amended Motion for Class

Certification in this case, certifying the following class: “All patients currently civilly
committed in the Minnesota Sex Offender Program pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 253B.”
(Doc. No. 203 at 11.) On October 27, 2014, then-Chief Judge Michael J. Davis issued an
order staying “[a]ll current and future civil rights cases brought by an individual or group
of individuals who has or have been civilly committed to the MSOP that are sufficiently

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related to [Karsjens] . . . pending resolution of the [Karsjens] litigation, or until further
order of the Court.” (Doc. No. 634 at 20-21.) In its caption, this order identified
seventy-four such cases. (See id.) On August 20, 2015, Chief Judge John R. Tunheim
issued another order staying such cases, noting that “[t]he Karsjens litigation remains
ongoing and unresolved.” (Doc. No. 1011 at 22.) In its caption, this order identified
eighty-three such cases, including many of the cases that had previously been stayed.
(See generally id.; Doc. No. 634.)
On April 14, 2016, Chief Judge Tunheim lifted the stays previously imposed in
sixteen individual cases. (Doc. No. 1064.) The order explained:
Notwithstanding the continuing litigation in Karsjens, the undersigned finds
it appropriate to lift the stays previously imposed in the above-entitled
matters. The claims in these cases were not integral to Judge Donovan W.
Frank’s liability and relief orders in Karjsens. As a result, it is unlikely that
the claims in these cases will be affected by the Eighth Circuit’s ultimate
ruling in the Karsjens claims on appeal. Further, because it is unclear at
this juncture whether or when a Phase II trial in Karsjens might occur, any
similarity between the above-entitled cases and Karsjens and the possibility
of inconsistent rulings is outweighed by the prejudice to the Plaintiffs in the
above-entitled matters of continuing to stay these cases pending subsequent
litigation in Karsjens.
(Doc. No. 1064 at 6 (footnote omitted).) Unless a stay has been otherwise lifted by
separate order in an individual case, the previous District-wide stay orders remain in
effect for cases not identified in Chief Judge Tunheim’s April 14, 2016 Order.

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DISCUSSION
I.

Phase One
The parties agree that the Court should stay any remaining Phase One issues at this

time. The parties disagree, however, on the next step if the Court decides to address the
remaining Phase One claims at this time. Defendants argue that the remaining Phase One
claims should be dismissed because the Eighth Circuit’s opinion disposes of these claims.
According to Defendants, the Eighth Circuit implicitly decided the remaining Fourteenth
Amendment claims in Defendants’ favor. Plaintiffs dispute this position and argue that
they are entitled to a complete analysis and ruling on Counts III, V, VI, and VII.
The Court agrees that staying the remainder of Phase One is proper in light of
Plaintiffs’ intention to file a petition for certiorari with the United States Supreme Court.
The Court declines to take a position at this time on the status of Counts III, V, VI, and
VII in light of the Eighth Circuit’s opinion.
II.

Phase Two
The parties disagree about the proper next step in Phase Two. Plaintiffs argue that

Phase Two should be stayed while Defendants urge the Court to permit Phase Two to
move forward. The parties also disagree over the next steps if Phase Two is not stayed.
Plaintiffs ask the Court to permit additional discovery whereas Defendants object to
additional discovery and seek permission to file a renewed summary judgment motion on
the Phase Two counts. The Court will first address whether to stay Phase Two.

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A.

Legal Standard

“[T]he power to stay proceedings is incidental to the power inherent in every court
to control the disposition of the causes on its docket with economy of time and effort for
itself, for counsel, and for litigants.” Cottrell v. Duke, 737 F.3d 1238, 1248 (8th Cir.
2013) (quoting Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936)). A stay determination
implicates a court’s “power to coordinate the business of the court efficiently and
sensibly.” Landis, 299 U.S. at 255. In exercising this power, the court retains “broad
discretion to stay proceedings when doing so is appropriate to control its docket.”
Daywitt v. Minn., 2016 WL 3004626, at *5 (D. Minn. May 24, 2016).
Notwithstanding this discretion, the party requesting a stay “bears the burden of
establishing its need.” Kreditverein der Bank Austria Creditanstalt fur Niederosterreich
und Bergenland v. Nejezchleba, 477 F.3d 942, 945 n.3 (8th Cir. 2007). Specifically, the
proponent “must make out a clear case of hardship or inequity in being required to go
forward, if there is even a fair possibility that the stay for which he prays will work
damages to some one else.” Landis, 299 U.S. at 255.
In evaluating a stay, a court should consider multiple relevant factors including
“maintaining control of its docket, conserving judicial resources, and the important
interest of providing for the just determination of cases pending before the court.”
Daywitt, 2016 WL 3004626, at *5. A stay may be warranted where the matter implicates
“rights which are inextricably tied to [a] pending . . . claim in [another court].” See

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Kemp v. Tyson Seafood Grp., Inc., 19 F. Supp. 2d 961, 965 (D. Minn. 1998) (concluding
that all of the relevant factors “but particularly the interests of judicial economy” justified
a stay). Ultimately, the stay determination “calls for the exercise of judgment, which
must weigh competing interests and maintain an even balance.” Landis, 299 U.S. at
254-55.
The Supreme Court has stated that “[e]specially in cases of extraordinary public
moment, the individual may be required to submit to delay not immoderate in extent and
not oppressive in its consequences if the public welfare or convenience will thereby be
promoted.” Id. at 256. In “weighty and unusual” cases such as those involving “novel
problems of far-reaching importance to the parties and the public,” a stay request “will
not always fit within the mould appropriate to an application for such relief in a suit upon
a bill of goods.” Id. Even in such cases, however, a stay must be “kept within the bounds
of moderation.” Id. To moderate the effect of a stay, a court may impose a stay of
limited duration after which the status of the case will be reviewed. See Kemp,
19 F. Supp. 2d at 966 (ordering that the parties contact the court within sixty days of its
order to prevent the case from “languish[ing] in an indefinite [s]tay”).
B.

Discussion

Plaintiffs argue that the remaining claims in both Phase One and Phase Two
should be stayed “[u]ntil the Supreme Court either hears Plaintiffs’ case or denies
Plaintiffs’ petition for certiorari.” (Doc. No. 1074 at 4.) With respect to Phase Two,

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Plaintiffs suggest that the Court’s resolution of the remaining claims would “benefit from
guidance on the standard of review for as-applied claims.” (Id. at 6.) Plaintiffs contend
that “[a] decision from the Supreme Court on this issue ‘would [] settle the issue here or
guide this Court in further disposition of the matter,’ thus rendering a stay appropriate.”
(Id. at 6 (quoting United States v. Brennan, 134 F. Supp. 42, 54 (D. Minn. 1955).)
Plaintiffs also suggest that the facts underlying Plaintiffs’ Phase Two claims may be
impacted by a Supreme Court decision in Plaintiffs’ favor. For example, Plaintiffs point
out that the Court’s original injunctive relief order would result in the movement of more
individuals to less restrictive alternative facilities which could affect the facts underlying
their First and Fourth Amendment claims. In short, Plaintiffs argue, “[s]taying
Counts VII, IX, and X is the most efficient use of judicial resources and increases the
likelihood of just and consistent decisions for all similar cases pending in this district.”
(Doc. No. 1078 at 4.)
Defendants, on the other hand, argue that the Court should not stay Phase Two at
this time because Plaintiffs have not met their burden to show hardship absent a stay.
Defendants suggest that Plaintiffs’ appeal will have no effect on the First and Fourth
Amendment claims involved in Phase Two. According to Defendants, “[a]llowing
Plaintiffs to delay Phase Two is unjust, needlessly requires Defendants and the Court to
continue to expend resources on numerous other cases brought by individual MSOP
clients, and risks inconsistent decisions.” (Doc. No. 1075 at 10.) Defendants identify

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approximately sixty-nine pending individual cases that involve claims related to Phase
Two. Defendants argue that it is unfair and will result in significant hardship to require
Defendants to repeatedly litigate these issues after they were already subject to discovery.
In particular, Defendants contend that a stay “would needlessly require the Court to rule
upon similar or identical issues, delay resolving the class’ First and Fourth Amendment
claims, and unfairly require Defendants to continue to litigate dozens of individual cases.”
(Id. at 12.)
The Court concludes that staying Phase Two is proper at this time. In light of the
parties’ agreement that Phase One should be stayed and based on Plaintiffs’ intention to
seek further appellate review, a stay will ensure that this case proceeds with “economy of
time and effort for [the Court], for counsel, and for [the] litigants.” See Cottrell, 737 F.3d
at 1248 (quoting Landis, 299 U.S. at 254). Although Phase One and Phase Two involve
distinct constitutional claims, the claims in both phases are inextricably related. See
Kemp, 19 F. Supp. 2d at 965. For example, in analyzing Plaintiffs’ First Amendment
freedom of speech and association claims in Count IX at the summary judgment stage, the
Court concluded that “considering Plaintiffs’ claims with respect to restrictions on their
ability to freely associate and speak and in light of all of Plaintiffs’ allegations regarding
their conditions of confinement, . . . Plaintiffs have presented sufficient evidence to
support a claim.” (Doc. No. 828 at 36 (emphasis added).) Likewise, with respect to
Count X, the court held that “[c]onsidering Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment claim in

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conjunction with other evidence presented by Plaintiffs surrounding the punitive nature of
their confinement, the Court determines that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to
whether the search policies in this case are reasonable and appropriate.” (Id. at 38-39
(emphasis added).) Because the punitive nature of the program was integral to the
Court’s original constitutional determinations in Phase One, the Court agrees that
Plaintiffs’ further appeal of Phase One issues will likely impact the Court’s ultimate
analysis of Plaintiffs’ Phase Two claims. The Court also agrees with Plaintiffs that the
possibility of changed factual circumstances following appeal weighs in favor of a stay.
Although continuing to stay Phase Two may not be appropriate going forward
depending on the timing of a possible Supreme Court decision, the Court discerns little
hardship to either party if Phase Two is temporarily stayed until the status of Phase One
becomes clearer. In particular, the Court does not agree with Defendants that they will
face hardship in being required to litigate numerous individual cases raising issues similar
to Plaintiffs’ Phase Two claims. First, the majority of the individual cases identified by
Defendants raising First and Fourth Amendment claims are in fact currently stayed.
Thus, Defendants are not presently litigating or defending these cases at all. Second, the
Court is not persuaded that the class-wide claims in Phase Two challenging MSOP
policies and practices will necessarily resolve the individual cases raising First and Fourth
Amendment claims. The Court agrees that any individual cases raising
sufficiently-related claims challenging MSOP policies and practices should be stayed

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pending the Court’s determination of Phase Two issues in this case in order to avoid
inconsistent rulings. To the extent any such cases are not currently stayed under the
District-wide stay orders, Defendants may of course seek to stay those cases individually.
See, e.g., Daywitt, 2016 WL 3004626 (evaluating the State defendants’ request to stay
another MSOP case raising religious freedom claims).
The Court notes that it is not evaluating the typical circumstance in which a party
requests a stay pending the resolution of related legal issues by a different court in a
separate case. See, e.g., Landis, 299 U.S. at 249 (“The controversy hinges upon the
power of a court to stay proceedings in one suit until the decision of another, and upon the
propriety of using such a power in a given situation.”); see also Kemp, 19 F. Supp. 2d
961; Daywitt, 2016 WL 3004626. Rather, the Court is considering whether to stay the
second phase of this case in light of the impending appeal of this Court’s conclusion in
the first phase of litigation. In its June 17, 2015 Order, the Court explained that its
“determination that the MSOP and its governing civil commitment statutes are
unconstitutional concludes Phase One of this case.” (Doc. No. 966 at 5.) That precise
determination has since been reversed by the Eighth Circuit and may be subject to further
appellate review by the United States Supreme Court. In these circumstances, the
relevant factors of docket control, conservation of judicial resources, and the just
resolution of pending cases all weigh in favor of a stay. See Daywitt, 2016 WL 3004626,
at *5.

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In this “weighty and unusual” case involving “novel problems of far-reaching
importance to the parties and the public,” see Landis, 299 U.S. at 256, the Court is
persuaded that staying Phase Two for a moderate length of time is the most fair,
equitable, and efficient course. The Court will stay this matter in its entirety for ninety
days. After this time, the parties shall meet and confer and contact the Court to schedule
a telephone status conference to discuss next steps. The Court declines to take a position
at this time regarding the next steps in Phase Two once the stay is ultimately lifted.
III.

Individual Cases
To the extent any cases in the District raise substantially similar claims to Karsjens

Phase One or Phase Two, it is this Court’s opinion that those cases should be or remain
stayed. It is, of course, up to each individual judge’s discretion to impose or lift a stay in
light of subsequent developments. In light of this Court’s determination that this case
should remain stayed in its entirety at this time, however, the Court suggests that all
sufficiently related cases also remain stayed.
ORDER
Based upon the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
1.

This matter is STAYED in its entirety.

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2.

The parties shall meet and confer to discuss the status of the case and

contact the Court to arrange a telephone status conference within ninety days of this
order.
Dated: May 3, 2017

s/Donovan W. Frank
DONOVAN W. FRANK
United States District Judge

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