Karsjens et al v. Minnesota Department of Human Services et al
Filing
598
ORDER. IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants' request for a jury trial for Phase One 589 is DENIED and Plaintiffs' request for a bench trial for Phase One 590 is GRANTED. (Written Opinion.) Signed by Judge Donovan W. Frank on 09/09/2014. (RLB)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Kevin Scott Karsjens, David Leroy Gamble,
Jr., Kevin John DeVillion, Peter Gerard
Lonergan, James Matthew Noyer, Sr.,
James John Rud, James Allen Barber,
Craig Allen Bolte, Dennis Richard Steiner,
Kaine Joseph Braun, Christopher John
Thuringer, Kenny S. Daywitt, Bradley Wayne
Foster, Brian K. Hausfeld, and all others
similarly situated,
Civil No. 11-3659 (DWF/JJK)
Plaintiffs,
v.
ORDER
Lucinda Jesson, Dennis Benson, Kevin
Moser, Tom Lundquist, Nancy Johnston,
Jannine Hébert, and Ann Zimmerman,
in their individual and official capacities,
Defendants.
Daniel E. Gustafson, Esq., David A. Goodwin, Esq., Karla M. Gluek, Esq., and Raina
Borrelli, Esq., Gustafson Gluek PLLC, counsel for Plaintiffs.
Aaron Winter, Ricardo Figueroa, Adam H. Welle, Nathan A. Brennaman, and Scott H.
Ikeda, Assistant Attorneys General, Minnesota Attorney General’s Office, counsel for
Defendants.
INTRODUCTION
This matter is before the Court on Defendants’ request for a jury trial (Doc.
No. 589) and Plaintiffs’ request for a bench trial (Doc. No. 590) for the first phase of trial
(“Phase One”) scheduled to begin on February 9, 2015. For the reasons discussed below,
the Court denies Defendants’ request and grants Plaintiffs’ request.
BACKGROUND
At the August 21, 2014 Scheduling Conference, the Court proposed bifurcating
the proceedings into phased bench and jury trials, based on the nature of the issues
presented, in order to promote efficiency and expediency. (Doc. No. 593.) Following the
Scheduling Conference, the Court ordered the parties to file simultaneous briefs on
whether the Seventh Amendment provides a right to a jury trial on the issues proposed
for Phase One. (Doc. No. 586.) The parties filed briefs on August 29, 2014 (Doc.
Nos. 589, 590) and response memoranda on September 2, 2014 (Doc. Nos. 594, 595).
DISCUSSION
I.
The Scope of Phase One
The Court proposes that the following issues be addressed in Phase One:
(1) whether the civil commitment statute is unconstitutional on its face; and (2) whether
the civil commitment statute is unconstitutional as applied. These systemic constitutional
issues encompass the nature and duration of civil confinement, including the following
nonexhaustive list of sub-issues: whether periodic independent reviews are provided;
whether risk or dangerousness is evaluated during reviews; whether less restrictive
alternatives are required; whether the treatment provided is constitutionally infirm;
whether the systemic conditions of confinement are unconstitutional; and whether the
reduction in custody and discharge procedure is constitutionally infirm. Phase One will
not include inquiry into individual class member cases and, therefore, will not reach
issues of damages or individual injunctive relief. Phase One will also not foreclose a
2
number of issues, including issues related to qualified immunity and individual
circumstances.
II.
The Seventh Amendment Right to a Jury Trial for Phase One
A.
Legal Standard
The Seventh Amendment provides that “[i]n suits at common law, where the value
in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved. . . .”
U.S. Const. amend. VII. “Suits at common law” refer to suits in which legal rights are to
be ascertained and determined, in contrast to those where equitable rights alone are
recognized, and equitable remedies are administered. Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg,
492 U.S. 33, 41 (1989); see also City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. 687, 719
(1999) (holding that “[i]t is settled law that the Seventh Amendment does not apply” in
“suits seeking only injunctive relief” or “suits seeking only equitable relief”).
“The law is well settled that whether plaintiffs are entitled to a jury trial cannot be
determined solely on the basis of allegations contained in the complaint,” but must be
resolved “by an appraisal of the basic nature of the claims or issues presented, and the
type of relief sought.” Klein v. Shell Oil Co., 386 F.2d 659, 663 (8th Cir. 1967); see also
In re Vorpahl, 695 F.2d 318, 322 (8th Cir. 1982) (providing that “[t]he right to a jury trial
under the Seventh Amendment depends on the nature of the issue to be tried”).
Specifically, courts must apply a two-part test to determine whether a Seventh
Amendment right to a jury trial exists: (1) whether the action before it is comparable “to
18th-century actions brought in the courts of England prior to the merger of the courts of
3
law and equity”; and (2) whether the remedy sought “is legal or equitable in nature.”
Chauffers, Teamsters & Helpers, Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 565 (1990).
B.
Application of the Seventh Amendment to Phase One Issues
To determine whether the Phase One issues are within the ambit of the Seventh
Amendment, the Court must apply the two-part test. First, the Court must determine
whether the causes of action are analogous to those that would be tried to a jury “prior to
the merger of the courts of law and equity.” In the Second Amended Complaint,
Plaintiffs allege that the civil commitment statute is unconstitutional on its face and as
applied under the federal and state constitutions. For example, in Count I, Plaintiffs
allege that Defendants’ failure to provide Plaintiffs with treatment that is reasonably
related to the purpose of their civil commitment violates the Fourteenth Amendment to
the United States Constitution, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and Article 1 of the
Minnesota Constitution. (Doc. No. 301 at 58.) In Count IV, Plaintiffs allege that denial
of Plaintiffs’ rights to less restrictive alternative placements violates the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and
Article 1 of the Minnesota Constitution. (Id. at 64.) Similarly, in Count IX, Plaintiffs
allege that enforcement of the civil commitment statute violates Plaintiffs’ constitutional
rights. (Id. at 72.)
Defendants characterize these claims as primarily legal in nature. (Doc. No. 589
at 5.) Defendants correctly point out that the Supreme Court has held that “a [Section]
1983 suit seeking legal relief is an action at law within the meaning of the Seventh
Amendment.” (Id. (citing City of Monterey, 526 U.S. at 709-11).) However, Plaintiffs
4
dispute the characterization of the relief sought as primarily “legal” and instead contend
that the relief sought is primarily “equitable.” (Doc. No. 594 at 3.) The Court finds that
the relief sought in these claims is predominantly equitable in nature with respect to the
Phase One issues being considered by the Court.
The Court next examines whether the remedy sought “is legal or equitable in
nature.” First, although Plaintiffs admit that they seek legal relief in the form of
monetary damages, Plaintiffs also concede that “they are not seeking damages at this
point on the Phase One issues.” (Id. at 4.) Second, as Plaintiffs contend, and the Court
agrees, “[m]erely requesting damages does not lead to a blanket Seventh Amendment
right to a jury trial on all issues presented in the case.” (Id. at 2); see also Klein, 386 F.2d
at 663 (noting that “the form of relief sought by a plaintiff is not necessarily
determinative of the method of trial”). Finally, Plaintiffs assert claims for declaratory
and injunctive relief in their Second Amended Complaint for the alleged constitutional
violations, which neither party disputes are equitable in nature. Plaintiffs maintain that
the “equitable relief is at the heart of Plaintiffs’ claims” and that, “[g]iven the equitable
nature of Plaintiffs’ claims, any damages are incidental” to the principal challenge to the
constitutionality of the civil commitment statute and request for declaratory and
injunctive relief. (Doc. No. 594 at 3.) The Court finds that the remedy sought in these
claims is primarily equitable in nature.
Moreover, in cases involving both legal and equitable claims, the Supreme Court
has recognized that courts may resolve the equitable claim prior to the legal claim even
though the results might be dispositive of the issues involved in the legal claim. See
5
Katchen v. Landry, 382 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1966); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 39(a)
(providing that a jury trial may be denied on some issues if “the court upon motion or of
its own initiative finds that a right of trial by jury of some or all of those issues does not
exist under the Constitution or statutes of the United States”). The claims proposed for
Phase One, however couched, assert predominantly equitable claims, seek predominantly
equitable remedies, and rest entirely on equitable principles. Although Plaintiffs also
seek legal relief in the form of monetary damages, such issues would be addressed in the
second phase of trial. Thus, the Court concludes that a bench trial is appropriate in Phase
One and is consistent with the Seventh Amendment.
In sum, the Court determines that the Seventh Amendment does not require a trial
by jury for Phase One. Instead, the Court concludes that a bench trial adjudicating the
Phase One systemic constitutional issues is consistent with the parties’ Seventh
Amendment right to a jury trial. The broad substantive due process challenge to the
constitutionality of the Minnesota Sex Offender Program involves the type of liability
issues that are “of course, routinely reserved without question for the Court.” City of
Monterey, 526 U.S. at 753 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). In the
event that the Phase One systemic issues incidentally relate to any individual claims for
damages, such individual claims will be reserved for trial by jury.
6
ORDER
Based upon the foregoing, and the files, records, and proceedings herein, IT IS
HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants’ request for a jury trial for Phase One (Doc.
No. [589]) is DENIED and Plaintiffs’ request for a bench trial for Phase One (Doc.
No. [590]) is GRANTED.
Dated: September 9, 2014
s/Donovan W. Frank
DONOVAN W. FRANK
United States District Judge
7
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?