Meehan v. Thompson
Filing
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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER denying 12 Motion for Summary Judgment. (Written Opinion.) Signed by Judge Donovan W. Frank on 07/02/2013. (rlb)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Kathleen Meehan,
Civil No. 12-17 (DWF/SER)
Plaintiff,
v.
MEMORANDUM
OPINION AND ORDER
Officer Scott Thompson,
in his individual and official
capacities as a police officer
for the City of Edina,
Defendant.
_______________________________________________________________________
Andrew M. Irlbeck, Esq., and Paul Applebaum, Esq., counsel for Plaintiff.
Daniel R. Olson, Esq., Jonathan P. Norrie, Esq., and Mark P. Hodkinson, Esq., Bassford
Remele, PA, counsel for Defendant.
_______________________________________________________________________
INTRODUCTION
This matter is before the Court on Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment
(Doc. No. 12). For the reasons set forth below, the Court denies Defendant’s motion.
BACKGROUND
On April 28, 2011, Edina Police Officers were dispatched to the scene of an
accident, approximately 10 blocks from Plaintiff’s home. (Doc. No. 16, Thompson Decl.
¶ 3; Doc. No. 22, Irlbeck Aff. ¶ 3, Ex. 2 (“Plaintiff Dep.”) at 45.) At about 10:43 p.m.,
Officer Scott Thompson (“Defendant”) arrived at the scene. (Thompson Decl. ¶ 3.)
Plaintiff also went to the scene of the accident as a passenger in a car driven by her
friend, “Kitty,” as Kitty’s daughter was the individual involved in the accident. (Plaintiff
Dep. at 39-42, 45.)
When they arrived at the scene of the accident, Plaintiff and Kitty exited their
vehicle and approached Kitty’s daughter, but were ordered back into Kitty’s car by law
enforcement. (Id. at 47-48.) After performing field sobriety tests, Kitty’s daughter took a
preliminary breath test (“PBT”) which indicated a blood alcohol concentration (“BAC”)
of .11; Kitty’s daughter was arrested for driving while intoxicated. (Id. at 48-49;
Thompson Decl. ¶ 6.)
Ultimately, Kitty, too, performed field sobriety tests, took a PBT (which indicated
a BAC of .18), and was also arrested for driving while intoxicated. (Thompson Decl. ¶
7.)
Having not brought her own phone, Plaintiff called her husband on Kitty’s phone.
(Id. at 51.) While she was on the phone with her husband, Defendant approached
Plaintiff, who was still seated in the passenger seat of Kitty’s car. (Id. at 52; Doc. No. 17,
Kuske Decl. ¶ 6, Ex. A (“DVD”) at 22:56:30.) The facts surrounding the interaction that
ensued between Plaintiff and Defendant are in dispute.
Plaintiff claims that Defendant asked Plaintiff if she had been drinking, to which
Plaintiff replied “yes.” (Plaintiff Dep. at 52.) Plaintiff then asked if she could walk to
Lund’s, which Defendant would not permit. (Thompson Decl. ¶ 9; DVD at 22:57:15.)
As heard on the video, Defendant then told Plaintiff: “I’m not going to repeat myself.
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You need a sober adult to come take care of you or I’m taking you to detox. That’s the
end of it.” (DVD at 22:57:20; see Thompson Decl. ¶¶ 8-9.) Plaintiff relayed this message
to her husband, along with her location, via Kitty’s cell phone. (DVD at 22:57:30.)
At Defendant’s request, Plaintiff then exited the vehicle. 1 (Id. at 22:58:18.) The
interaction between Plaintiff and Defendant after she exited the vehicle was not captured
on camera. Plaintiff claims that Defendant told Plaintiff that he was “going to put [her]
through a field sobriety test.” (Plaintiff Dep. at 56-57.) Plaintiff then allegedly stated: “I
don’t understand why I have to take one, I’m not driving.” (Id.) Plaintiff claims that
Defendant replied by ordering Plaintiff to “[g]et up against the [squad] car.” (Id. at 57.)
When Plaintiff “asked him why,” Defendant allegedly responded: “Get up against the car
or I’ll put you against the car.” (Id. at 57.) Plaintiff testified that: “I went up against the
car, his ugly black boot came between my legs, shoved them apart, I was frisked, and
then he put me in the back of the squad.” (Id. at 58.) Defendant denies ever having
frisked Plaintiff. (Thompson Decl. ¶ 12.) Plaintiff claims that Defendant had not asked
her to submit to a PBT. (Plaintiff Dep. at 57.)
Once she was in the squad car, Plaintiff called her husband again. (Id. at 60.)
Shortly thereafter, Defendant got in the car and repeated to Plaintiff that he was giving
her the opportunity to find a safe and sober driver, which Plaintiff claims to have again
1
Defendant claims that Plaintiff was not cooperative and refused to exit the vehicle.
(Thompson Decl. ¶ 9.) Defendant further testified that he asked Plaintiff multiple times
to find someone to pick her up. (Irlbeck Aff. ¶ 6, Ex. 6, Thompson Dep. at 27.)
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repeated to her husband over the phone. (Id.) Mr. Meehan did not feel comfortable to
drive himself because he had been drinking as well. (Irlbeck Aff. ¶ 5, Ex. 4, T. Meehan
Dep. at 32.)
While waiting for Mr. Meehan to arrange for a sober ride, Defendant allegedly
stated: “I’ve lost my patience with you. I’m taking you to detox,” which was nearly 10
miles away. (Plaintiff Dep. at 61-62.) According to Plaintiff, Defendant waited less than
four minutes for Plaintiff’s sober ride to arrive. 2 (See DVD at 23:05:50-23:09:18.)
Defendant testified that he waited six or seven minutes from the time he put Plaintiff in
the squad car to the time he drove away, about half of which she spent on the phone with
her husband. (Irlbeck Aff. ¶ 6, Ex. 6, Thompson Dep. at 41.)
Defendant testified that at the scene, he looked up Plaintiff’s address information
and learned that she lived “approximately a mile to a mile and a quarter,” from the scene,
and acknowledged that it was only “a couple minutes away.” (Id. at 31-32.) Defendant
further represented that he did not suspect Plaintiff of any criminal activity at the time of
the incident. (Id. at 33-34.) Defendant claims that Plaintiff was a danger to herself and
that he took her to detox because:
Well, first I noticed the signs of alcohol influence. So I could smell her
breath. I could listen to her speech that was slurred in my estimation. I
questioned her judgment in terms of getting into the car in the first place
with a driver who turned out to be intoxicated at a .18. I questioned her
2
Approximately four and a half minutes after Defendant drove away, Mr. Meehan
approached one of the officers on the scene and inquired as to Plaintiff’s whereabouts.
(DVD at 23:13:54.) Mr. Meehan eventually learned from Kitty that his wife had been
taken to detox. (Id. at 23:14:00-23:14:30.)
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judgment into getting into a car to drive up to a police scene with a person
who’s intoxicated while she was also. And she wasn’t cooperating with me
in terms of, excuse me, getting – getting a ride. So when I put all those
circumstances together, I didn’t feel like she was caring for herself. That’s
how I felt that night.
(Id. at 28-29.)
Defendant claims that, “[b]ased on the totality of the circumstances, particularly
[Plaintiff’s] apparent intoxication, lack of cooperation and inability to arrange for a ride,
and the level of the driver’s intoxication, I felt that she was a danger to herself or others
and, without a sober, responsible person there to assume care of her, decided my only
other alternative was to take her to detox.” (Thompson Decl. ¶ 13.) At detox, Plaintiff
was administered a breathalyzer, at which time her BAC result was .082. (Irlbeck Aff.
¶ 6, Ex. 5 at I.)
Plaintiff’s Complaint in this matter asserts the following causes of action:
(1) Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (2) Battery; and (3) False Imprisonment. (Doc. No. 1,
Compl. ¶¶ 21-28.) Defendant now moves for summary judgment with respect to all of
Plaintiff’s claims. (Doc. No. 12.)
DISCUSSION
I.
Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment is proper if there are no disputed issues of material fact and
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The
Court must view the evidence and the inferences that may be reasonably drawn from the
evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Enter. Bank v. Magna Bank
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of Mo., 92 F.3d 743, 747 (8th Cir. 1996). However, as the Supreme Court has stated,
“[s]ummary judgment procedure is properly regarded not as a disfavored procedural
shortcut, but rather as an integral part of the Federal Rules as a whole, which are designed
‘to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action.’” Celotex
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327 (1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 1).
The moving party bears the burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of
material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Enter. Bank, 92 F.3d
at 747. The nonmoving party must demonstrate the existence of specific facts in the
record that create a genuine issue for trial. Krenik v. County of Le Sueur, 47 F.3d 953,
957 (8th Cir. 1995). A party opposing a properly supported motion for summary
judgment “may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but must set
forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256 (1986).
II.
Motion for Summary Judgment
A.
§ 1983 Claim
Plaintiff asserts her § 1983 claim against Defendant, presumably in his individual
capacity. 3 Specifically, Plaintiff claims that:
3
It is well-established that a governmental entity cannot be held liable under § 1983
on a respondeat superior theory. See Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691
(1978) (concluding that “Congress did not intend municipalities to be held liable unless
action pursuant to official municipal policy of some nature caused a constitutional tort”).
To the extent Plaintiff may assert her § 1983 claim against Defendant in his official
capacity, or against the City of Edina, Count I is properly dismissed.
6
By illegally detaining Plaintiff without probable cause or a reasonable
suspicion of criminal activity, frisking her without a reasonable suspicion
that she was armed, refusing to take her home or let her walk home, and by
having her committed to the Chicago Avenue detox center, Defendant acted
with specific intent to deprive Plaintiff of her right to be free from
excessive and unjustified force, illegal search and seizure, and false arrest.
(Compl. ¶ 21.)
Defendant asserts that he is entitled to qualified immunity on the § 1983 claim.
The doctrine of qualified immunity protects state actors from civil liability when their
“conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a
reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
The defense provides “ample room for mistaken judgments” as it protects “all but the
plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S.
335, 341, 343 (1986). To overcome the defense of qualified immunity, a plaintiff must
show that: (1) the facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, demonstrate
the deprivation of a constitutional or statutory right; and (2) the right was clearly
established at the time of the deprivation. Parrish v. Ball, 594 F.3d 993, 1001 (8th Cir.
2010) (citation omitted). The Court has discretion to decide which qualified immunity
prong to consider first. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009).
Plaintiff first claims that her detention and transport to detox were unlawful under
the Fourth Amendment. The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable seizures.
Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394–95 (1989). A Fourth Amendment seizure occurs
when an officer, “by means of physical force or show of authority, terminates or restrains
[an individual’s] freedom of movement, through means intentionally applied.”
7
v. Cal., 551 U.S. 249, 254 (2007) (internal quotations and citations omitted) (emphasis in
original); see also Gardner v. Bd. of Police Comm’rs, 641 F.3d 947, 951 (8th Cir. 2011).
A seizure occurs if “in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a
reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave.” United States v.
Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980); see also California v. Hodari, 499 U.S. 621, 628
(1991) (noting that the test in Mendenhall has been adopted by the Supreme Court in later
cases).
To the extent Plaintiff contends that she was unlawfully detained and transported
to detox, the Court concludes that Defendant is not entitled to qualified immunity
notwithstanding the discretion accorded him by Minnesota statute.
Minnesota Statute Section 253B.05 states, in relevant part:
A peace or health officer or a person working under such officer’s
supervision, may take a person who is believed to be chemically dependent
or is intoxicated in public into custody and transport the person to a
treatment facility. If the person is intoxicated in public or is believed to be
chemically dependent and is not in danger of causing self-harm or harm to
any person or property, the peace or health officer may transport the person
home . . . .
Minn. Stat. § 253B.05, subd. 2.
There is no dispute that Plaintiff was not free to leave the scene and that her
constructive arrest and transport to detox constituted a seizure. Pursuant to the statute, if
Plaintiff was intoxicated in public, Defendant had the discretion to take her into custody
and transport her to detox. Construing the record in the light most favorable to Plaintiff,
however, there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether a reasonable officer in
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Defendant’s position would have believed that Plaintiff presented a threat to herself or
others. 4 Contra Winters v. Adams, 254 F.3d 758, 764 (8th Cir. 2001) (finding seizure
reasonable for community caretaking purposes where a “possibly intoxicated individual”
behind the wheel of a parked car may have driven the vehicle, thereby “potentially
harming himself and other citizens”); United States v. King, 990 F.2d 1552, 1560 (10th
Cir. 1993) (“In the course of exercising this non-investigatory [community caretaking]
function, a police officer may have occasion to seize a person . . . in order to ensure the
safety of the public and/or the individual, regardless of any suspected criminal activity.”).
A reasonable jury could find that Defendant’s decision to transport Plaintiff to
detox, after waiting only a few minutes for her ride to arrive, was objectively
unreasonable under the circumstances. Viewing the facts in Plaintiff’s favor, a
fact-finder could also reasonably conclude that Plaintiff was not in danger of causing
self-harm or harm to others, and that the decision to take her to detox more than 10 miles
away, as opposed to driving her home a few blocks away, was objectively unreasonable.
Importantly, public drunkenness is not a crime in Minnesota, as specifically set forth by
statute. Minn. Stat. § 340A.902 (“No person may be charged with or convicted of the
offense of drunkenness or public drunkenness.”). Questions of fact exist as to whether a
reasonable officer in Defendant’s position would have believed that transporting Plaintiff
to detox constituted a violation of her constitutional right to be free from unreasonable
4
Plaintiff contends that she was cooperative with Defendant, and that she displayed
no indicia of intoxication; Defendant, however, claims that Plaintiff was uncooperative
(Footnote Continued on Next Page)
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detention, a right which was clearly established at the time of the incident. As such,
Defendant is not entitled to qualified immunity in this respect.
Plaintiff further claims that Defendant had no reasonable, articulable suspicion of
criminal activity to frisk Plaintiff; she thus claims that she was subjected to excessive
force by Defendant. Where there has been a seizure, the Court evaluates whether an
officer’s actions constitute excessive force under an objective-reasonableness test.
Graham, 460 U.S. at 397. Id. at 397. In determining whether the use of force is
“reasonable” under the Fourth Amendment, a court must balance “the nature and quality
of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests” against the
government’s interests at stake. Id. at 396 (citation omitted). The reasonableness of the
use of force must be judged from the “perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene,
rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” See id. The proper application of the
Fourth Amendment “requires careful attention to the facts and circumstances of each
particular case, including the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an
immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively
resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.” Id. The question is whether the
“totality of the circumstances” justify a particular seizure. Id. (citing Tennessee v.
Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8–9 (1985)).
(Footnote Continued From Previous Page)
and discernibly intoxicated.
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The Court’s decision on the excessive force claim turns on the question of
whether, taking the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, Plaintiff was subjected to
excessive force so as to violate a constitutional right and, if so, whether that right was
clearly established at the time. Defendant argues that he did not deprive Plaintiff of a
clearly established constitutional right at the time of the incident because the frisk caused
not even a de minimis injury. In support, Defendant argues that prior to Chambers v.
Pennycook, 641 F.3d 898 (8th Cir. 2011), a section 1983 plaintiff alleging excessive
force had to demonstrate more than de minimis injury to defeat qualified immunity. 5
Here, Plaintiff claims to have suffered no physical harm. The rule however, “should
focus instead on whether the force applied is reasonable from the perspective of a
reasonable officer on the scene at the time the force is used.” Id. at 906. By his own
admission, Defendant did not suspect Plaintiff of any crime at all. Nor does it appear that
Defendant thought Plaintiff was armed or otherwise feared for his safety in any way.
Contra Winters, 254 F.3d at 765 (finding officers’ use of force objectively reasonable
where appellee was behaving erratically and violently). As such, a jury could find that
use of any force was objectively unreasonable under the circumstances and thus deprived
Plaintiff of a clearly established constitutional right. See United States v. Carrasco, 236
F. Supp. 2d 1283, 1291-92 (D. N.M. 2002) (finding pat-down search of a passenger in a
5
Defendant argues that prior to Chambers, it was not clearly established “whether
an excessive force claim requires some minimum level of injury,” thus entitling
Defendant to qualified immunity. 641 F.3d at 904, 908.
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vehicle constitutionally impermissible under Terry and its progeny despite argument that
officers were acting in a community caretaker function).
Genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether Defendant’s actions—in
detaining, frisking and transporting Plaintiff to detox—were objectively reasonable under
the circumstances. Taking the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, a reasonable
juror could conclude that Defendant’s actions were objectively unreasonable under the
circumstances, and therefore, that he deprived Plaintiff of a constitutional right by
detaining Plaintiff and utilizing excessive force. In addition, the Court concludes that
these rights were clearly established at the time of the deprivation. Thus, Defendant is not
entitled to qualified immunity, and summary judgment on Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim is not
warranted.
B.
Battery Claim
Plaintiff also alleges a battery claim against Defendant, as well as the City of
Edina pursuant to the doctrines of respondeat superior and agency. Battery is “an
intentional, unpermitted offensive contact with another.” Johnson v. Morris, 453 N.W.2d
31, 40 (Minn. 1990).
Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s battery claim is barred by the doctrine of official
immunity. Under Minnesota law, public officials are automatically entitled to official
immunity from state law claims when their duties require the exercise of discretion, so
long as the officer is not guilty of a willful or malicious wrong. See id. at 41–42. Police
officers are generally classified as discretionary officers. Id. at 42. Here, there is no
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question that Defendant’s actions required the exercise of discretion. See, e.g., Pletan v.
Gaines, 494 N.W.2d 38, 41 (Minn. 1992). Accordingly, to defeat official immunity,
Plaintiff must establish malice or willfulness. See, e.g., Mumm v. Mornson, 708 N.W.2d
475, 490 (Minn. 2006) (“Official immunity prevents a public official charged by law with
duties which call for the exercise of his judgment or discretion from being held
personally liable for damages, unless the official has committed a willful or malicious
act.”) (internal quotations omitted). Malice requires an officer’s “intentional doing of a
wrongful act without legal justification or excuse.” Rico v. State, 472 N.W.2d 100, 107
(Minn. 1991).
Here, as explained above with respect to Plaintiff’s excessive force claim, viewing
the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, a reasonable juror could find that
Defendant did in fact frisk Plaintiff, and that Defendant knew or should have known that
his actions in frisking Plaintiff—whom he, by his own admission, did not suspect of
criminal activity—were without legal justification. Accordingly, the Court concludes
that Defendant is not entitled to official immunity. Thus, the motion for summary
judgment with respect to Plaintiff’s battery claim is properly denied.
C.
False Imprisonment Claim
Plaintiff also asserts a false imprisonment claim against Defendant and the City of
Edina on the same theories articulated above. The common law regarding false
imprisonment states that an individual may not, without legal justification, be confined
against her or his will. Gleason v. Metro. Council Transit Operations, 563 N.W.2d 309,
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319 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997) (citing Kleidon v. Glascock, 10 N.W.2d 394, 397 (1943) (false
imprisonment is any imprisonment that is not legally justifiable)).
Defendant again asserts the defense of official immunity on this claim. Because
Plaintiff has raised a viable argument that Defendant’s actions in taking her to detox were
malicious or willful, and because a reasonable juror could find that Plaintiff’s seizure was
objectively unreasonableness, fact issues remain with respect to Plaintiff’s claim for false
imprisonment. Accordingly, summary judgment on the false imprisonment claim is
denied.
CONCLUSION
Considering all of the facts as they are presented in the record, including the video
of the incident, and taking them in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the Court is
persuaded that there are genuine issues of material fact as to whether Defendant’s
conduct violated Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from excessive force and
unreasonable seizure. A reasonable juror could conclude that the detention and seizure of
Plaintiff occurred without legal justification and that Defendant’s frisk of Plaintiff and
use of force was excessive under the circumstances. If a jury were to believe Plaintiff’s
version of the facts, the jury could reasonably conclude that Plaintiff’s detention and the
force used against her were unreasonable and were therefore unlawful.
For the reasons that the Court denies summary judgment on Plaintiff’s claims
under § 1983, the Court similarly concludes that summary judgment is inappropriate on
Plaintiff’s false imprisonment and battery claims. The Court notes, however, that success
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here does not necessarily mean success at trial and encourages the parties to engage in
full and frank settlement discussions.
ORDER
Based upon the foregoing, and the files, records, and proceedings herein, IT IS
HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. [12])
is DENIED.
Dated: July 2, 2013
s/Donovan W. Frank
DONOVAN W. FRANK
United States District Judge
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