Ellis et al v. Minneapolis, City of et al

Filing 18

ORDER denying 15 Plaintiffs' Motion to Alter, Amend or Vacate Judgment and to Amend Complaint (Written Opinion). Signed by Judge Ann D. Montgomery on 09/26/2012. (TLU) (cc: Andrew Ellis, Harriet ellis) Modified text on 9/26/2012 (jz).

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Andrew Ellis and Harriet Ellis,
Plaintiffs,

MEMORANDUM OPINION
AND ORDER
Civil No. 12-57 ADM/SER

v.
City of Minneapolis, a municipal
corporation, John and Jane Does 1-10,

Defendants.
______________________________________________________________________________
Andrew Ellis and Harriet Ellis, pro se.
Kristin R. Sarff, Esq., and Sara J. Lathrop, Esq., City Attorney’s Office, Minneapolis, MN, on
behalf of Defendants.
______________________________________________________________________________
I. INTRODUCTION
This matter is before the undersigned United States District Judge for a ruling on the
Motion to Alter, Amend, [or] Vacate Judgment and to Amend Complaint [Docket No. 15] filed
by Plaintiffs Andrew Ellis and Harriet Ellis (collectively the “Ellises”). For the reasons stated
below, the Ellises’ Motion is denied.
II. ANALYSIS
The Court dismissed this case with prejudice in its August 15, 2012 Order [Docket No.
13]. The Ellises now timely move to amend or alter the judgment, pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 59. Specifically, the Ellises contend that the Court erred by not mentioning a
letter they submitted, by failing to grant their request to amend their complaint, by dismissing
their case with prejudice, and by finding their claims time-barred. See generally Pls.’ Mem. in
Support of Mot. to Alter, Amend, Vacate Judgment [Docket No. 16].
Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits a motion to alter or amend a

judgment if filed no later than 28 days after the entry of judgment. District courts have broad
discretion in determining whether to grant a Rule 59(e) motion. Innovative Home Health Care,
Inc. v. P.T.-O.T. Assocs. of the Black Hills, 141 F.3d 1284, 1286 (8th Cir. 1998). Such motions
are to be granted sparingly because of the judicial interest in finality and the conservation of
scarce judicial resources. Pa. Ins. Guar. Ass’n v. Trabosh, 812 F.Supp. 522, 524 (E.D.Pa. 1992).
A motion to amend serves “the limited function of correcting manifest errors of law or fact or to
present newly discovered evidence.” United States v. Metro. St. Louis Sewer Dist., 440 F.3d
930, 933 (8th Cir. 2006) (citation and internal quotations omitted).
The Ellises’ main argument is that this Court erred by not addressing a letter they
submitted, in which they thank the Court for cancelling oral argument, suggest they would still
like to have oral argument once they find an attorney, and state that they “would also like to ask
for [the Court’s] permission to amend [their] complaint.” July 30, 2012 Letter [Docket No. 12].
When not requested under Rule 15(a)(1) as a matter of course, a party may amend a complaint
“only with the opposing party’s written consent or the court’s leave.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2).
“The court should freely give leave when justice so requires.” Id. Parties do not have an
absolute right to amend their pleadings. United States ex rel. Lee v. Fairview Health Sys., 413
F.3d 748, 749 (8th Cir. 2005). A district court may deny the motion for leave to amend if
compelling reasons exist, including futility of the amendment. Hammer v. City of Osage Beach,
MO, 318 F.3d 832, 844 (8th Cir. 2003).
First, the Ellises’ letter did not constitute a motion for amending their pleadings. “A
letter is not a motion.” Mortensen v. Nevens, No. 2:10-cv-2263, 2011 WL 772885, at *1 (D.
Nev. Feb. 25, 2011). According to the Local Rules, any motion to amend a pleading must

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include “a copy of the proposed amended pleading” and “a version of the proposed amended
pleading that shows . . . how the proposed amended pleading differs from the operative
pleading.” L.R. 15.1(b). The Ellises’ July 30, 2012 Letter did not include any of these required
documents, and even their current motion only includes a copy of the proposed amended
pleading without a version showing the redactions and changes. See Aff. of Ellis [Docket No.
17] Att. 1. No motion for leave to amend the pleadings was properly before this Court.
Second, even if the Court had interpreted the July 30, 2012 Letter as a motion for leave to
amend a complaint, the Court would have denied it because if its futility. Counts One, Two, and
Six of the Ellises’ Complaint were dismissed with prejudice because they were time-barred and
because they were insufficiently pleaded. August 15, 2012 Order 5. Count Six was also
dismissed because it was barred by the doctrine of res judicata and the Rooker-Feldman doctrine,
as well as the Ellises’ lack of standing to bring such a claim. Id. at 7–8. Count Three of the
Ellises’ Complaint was dismissed because it was barred by the statute of limitations and because
as a matter of law the City Defendants could not be liable. Id. at 8–9. Counts Four and Five of
the Ellises’ Complaint were dismissed because they were barred by res judicata and the RookerFeldman doctrine. For all these reasons, amendment of the Ellises’ Complaint would have been
futile; this Court would have denied such a motion had it been properly made.
Furthermore, the Ellises’ Letter did not need to be addressed. The Ellises’ July 30, 2012
Letter came a week after the Court had already cancelled the hearing on the motion to dismiss
per the Ellises’ request. In a July 19, 2012 Letter, the Ellises stated that they did not plan to
attend the hearing. July 19, 2012 Letter [Docket No. 10]. The Court promptly cancelled the
hearing and took the matter under advisement, relying on the parties’ voluminous 86 pages of

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briefing. The Ellises July 30, 2012 Letter, therefore, did not need to be addressed. The Court
had already cancelled the hearing and taken it under advisement, so the Ellises’ request for a
rescheduled oral argument was moot.
The Ellises’ other arguments are similarly without merit. The Ellises claim that the Court
erred by finding many of its claims time-barred, but nothing in the record or in the Ellises’
Motion establish that these claims were not time-barred. Additionally, although the Ellises state
that they disagree with the Court’s decision to dismiss their case with prejudice, they offer no
reasoning, case law, or argument as to why this finding is incorrect.
For these reasons, the Court is convinced no manifest errors of law or of fact exist here,
and no newly discovered evidence has been offered to warrant a different outcome. The Rule
59(e) motion, therefore, warrants dismissal.
III. CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, and all the files, records, and proceedings herein, IT IS
HEREBY ORDERED that: Plaintiffs’ Motion to Alter, Amend, [or] Vacate Judgment and to
Amend Complaint [Docket No. 15] is DENIED.
BY THE COURT:

s/Ann D. Montgomery
ANN D. MONTGOMERY
U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated: September 26, 2012.

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