Walker v. Peterson et al

Filing 33

ORDER - Defendants' motion for partial summary judgment 22 is GRANTED.Count 1 of the amended complaint 15 is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE AND ON THE MERITS except as to the excessive-force claim against defendant Ricardo Muro.Count 2 of the amen ded complaint is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE AND ON THE MERITS except as to the battery claim against Muro. Counts 3 through 7 of the amended complaint are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE AND ON THE MERITS. (Written Opinion). Signed by Judge Patrick J. Schiltz on 07/03/13. (bjs)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
WILLIAM DEMONE WALKER,

Case No. 12-CV-0824 (PJS/TNL)

Plaintiff,
v.

ORDER

LUCAS PETERSON, individually and in his
official capacity; TIM DOLAN, the City of
Minneapolis Chief of Police, individually and
in his official capacity; CITY OF
MINNEAPOLIS; and RICARDO MURO,
individually and in his official capacity,
Defendants.

Kenneth U. Udoibok, UDOIBOK, TUPA & HUSSEY PLLP, for plaintiff.
Tracey N. Fussy, MINNEAPOLIS CITY ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, for defendants.
In an eight-count amended complaint, plaintiff William Demone Walker raises claims of
excessive force, assault, battery, false arrest and illegal imprisonment, intentional infliction of
emotional distress, and deliberate indifference to medical needs against defendants Ricardo Muro
and Lucas Peterson; a negligence claim against defendants Tim Dolan and the City of
Minneapolis; and a failure-to-supervise claim against the City of Minneapolis. ECF No. 15.
This matter is before the Court on defendants’ motion for partial summary judgment. ECF
No. 22. In that motion, defendants seek summary judgment on each of Walker’s claims except
the battery and excessive-force claims brought against Muro. ECF No. 24. In response, Walker
has voluntarily waived all claims brought against Peterson, Dolan, and the City of Minneapolis,
see ECF No. 27 at 15, leaving Muro as the only remaining defendant in this case.

On July 1, 2013, the Court conducted a hearing on the claims for which Muro has moved
for summary judgment.1 The parties are familiar with the facts of this case, so they will not be
recounted here.
A. Deliberate Indifference to Medical Needs
Walker contends that, after he suffered injuries due to Muro’s alleged use of excessive
force, Muro refused his requests to receive medical attention. Although the standards governing
claims of deliberate indifference to medical needs are fuzzy in some respects, the Eighth Circuit
has made clear that plaintiffs alleging deliberate indifference “‘must place verifying medical
evidence in the record to establish the detrimental effect of delay in medical treatment . . . .’”
Laughlin v. Schriro, 430 F.3d 927, 929 (8th Cir. 2005) (quoting Crowley v. Hedgepeth, 109
F.3d 500, 502 (8th Cir. 1997)). See also Johnson v. Adams, 452 Fed. Appx. 708, 709 (8th Cir.
2012) (per curiam) (noting that there is “little practical difference” in analysis whether deliberateindifference claim is brought by pretrial detainee under the Fourteenth Amendment or a prisoner
under the Eighth Amendment). A plaintiff who offers “no evidence establishing that any delay in
treatment had a detrimental effect . . . fail[s] to raise a genuine issue of fact on an essential
element of his claim.” Laughlin, 430 F.3d at 929. See also Washington v. City of University
City, 500 Fed. Appx. 558, 559 (8th Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (citing Laughlin); Washington v.
Symmes, 297 Fed. Appx. 549, 550 (8th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (same).
Simply put, there is no verifying medical evidence in the record showing that Walker’s
injuries — a cut on his chin, a bruised back, and a broken cheek bone — were exacerbated in any
1

Defendants also moved for summary judgment on the issue of negligent infliction of
emotional distress. Walker did not plead such a claim, however, and he confirmed at the
summary-judgment hearing that he is not bringing such a claim.
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way by Muro’s alleged indifference to his medical needs. Moreover, it is highly unlikely that any
such evidence could be introduced in this case. Police were on the scene for only a few hours,
see Walker Dep. 45:8 [ECF No. 25-1 at 46], and Muro was at the scene for about 30 minutes.
Thus the police generally — and Muro specifically — could not have delayed treatment of
Walker’s injuries for very long (and Walker in fact went to a hospital and received treatment on
the same day that he was injured, id. at 46:3-5). Moreover, Walker opted to forgo treatment for
the most serious of his injuries — the broken cheek bone — for almost a year and a half, id.
at 57:17-20, belying any possible contention that a failure to receive immediate treatment for that
injury was to his detriment.
Without evidence that the delay in treatment had any detrimental effect on any of his
injuries, Walker cannot succeed on his deliberate-indifference claim. That claim is therefore
dismissed.
B. False Arrest and Illegal Imprisonment
Walker also alleges that he was detained and handcuffed (and therefore falsely arrested
and illegally imprisoned) by Muro during the search of the residence. Walker’s claim, however,
is directly foreclosed by Michigan v. Summers, in which the Supreme Court held that “a warrant
to search for contraband founded on probable cause implicitly carries with it the limited authority
to detain the occupants of the premises while a proper search is conducted.” 452 U.S. 692, 705
(1981). “An officer’s authority to detain incident to a search is categorical; it does not depend on
the ‘quantum of proof justifying detention or the extent of the intrusion to be imposed by the
seizure.’” Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 98 (2005) (quoting Summers, 452 U.S. at 705 n.19).

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Walker does not contend that the police lacked probable cause to search the residence, or
that the search warrant was otherwise invalid. Moreover, even assuming that Muro was
responsible for handcuffing and detaining Walker (an assumption that is not well supported by
the record), Walker conceded at the summary-judgment hearing that Muro was at the scene for
approximately 30 minutes. Thus, at most, Muro personally could have been responsible for
detaining Walker during only the first half hour of the search of the residence. A detention of
that length would have been eminently reasonable given the circumstances. Muro was a member
of a SWAT team that had been called in to secure the residence because law-enforcement
officers had probable cause to believe that guns (including an assault rifle) and drugs would be
found at the residence. Thus, the potential for danger — and the need to detain all occupants —
was very high throughout the duration of the search. See Muehler, 544 U.S. at 100-02 (finding
that a 2- to 3-hour detention in handcuffs during a search was reasonable under similar
circumstances). In light of Summers and its progeny, Walker’s claims of illegal arrest and false
imprisonment are dismissed.
C. Assault and Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
As explained above, Muro has not moved for summary judgment on Walker’s battery or
excessive-force claims. Walker conceded at the summary-judgment hearing that his claims of
assault and intentional infliction of emotional distress are entirely redundant with those surviving
claims. He therefore agreed to dismiss his claims of assault and intentional infliction of
emotional distress. Accordingly, those claims are dismissed.

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ORDER
Based on the foregoing, and on all of the files, records, and proceedings herein, IT IS
HEREBY ORDERED THAT:
1.

Defendants’ motion for partial summary judgment [ECF No. 22] is GRANTED.

2.

Count 1 of the amended complaint [ECF No. 15] is DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE AND ON THE MERITS except as to the excessive-force claim
against defendant Ricardo Muro.

3.

Count 2 of the amended complaint is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE AND ON
THE MERITS except as to the battery claim against Muro.

4.

Counts 3 through 7 of the amended complaint are DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE AND ON THE MERITS.

Dated: July 3 , 2013

s/Patrick J. Schiltz
Patrick J. Schiltz
United States District Judge

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