Redding v. Thomas

Filing 21

ORDER Denying 2 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, filed by Lawrence Christopher Redding (Written Opinion). Signed by Senior Judge David S. Doty on 5/3/2012. (PJM) (cc: Lawrence Christopher Redding) Modified on 5/3/2012 (akl).

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Civil No. 12-1041(DSD/LIB)
Lawrence Christopher Redding,
Petitioner,
ORDER

v.
J.C. Thomas, Warden,
Respondent.

Lawrence
Christopher
Redding,
05489-041,
Federal
Correctional Institution Allenwood, Box 3000, White Dee,
PA 17887, pro se.
Erika R. Mozangue, Gregory G. Brooker, United States
Attorney’s Office, 300 South Fourth Street, Suite 600,
Minneapolis, MN 55415, counsel for respondent.

This matter is before the court upon the pro se application
under 28 U.S.C. 2241 for a writ of habeas corpus by petitioner
Lawrence Christopher Redding.

Based on a review of the file,

record and proceedings herein, and for the following reasons, the
application is denied.

BACKGROUND
On November 12, 1992, a jury found petitioner guilty of three
counts

of

felon

in

possession

§§ 922(g) and 924(e)(1).

of

a

firearm

under

18

U.S.C.

The court found Redding to be an armed

career criminal based on three aggravated robbery convictions in
Minnesota and two robbery and one armed-robbery conviction in

Illinois.

See United States v. Redding, 16 F.3d 298, 302 (8th Cir.

1994). The court sentenced petitioner to 327 months on each count,
to be served concurrently, under the Armed Career Criminal Act
(ACCA), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). Petitioner appealed, and the Eighth
Circuit affirmed his convictions and sentence. Redding, 16 F.3d at
303.
Petitioner then moved to vacate his convictions under 28
U.S.C. § 2255.
affirmed.
1997).

The court denied the motion, and the Eighth Circuit

Redding v. United States, 105 F.3d 1254, 1255 (8th Cir.

Petitioner next moved to reduce his sentence under 18

U.S.C. § 3582 in 2001 and 2005.
denied both motions.

See ECF Nos. 97, 100.

The court

See ECF Nos. 99, 105.

On June 22, 2011, petitioner filed the instant application in
the District of Oregon, where he was then incarcerated.

The

government moved to transfer the application to the District of
Minnesota

because it

seeks

conviction and sentence.

to

challenge

the

validity

of

the

On April 26, 2012, the Oregon court

transferred the application to the District of Minnesota.

The

court now addresses the application.

DISCUSSION
“A

petitioner

who

seeks

to

challenge

his

sentence

or

conviction generally must do so in the sentencing court through
§ 2255 and cannot use § 2241 to challenge the conviction without

2

first showing that § 2255 would be inadequate or ineffective.”
Abdullah v. Hedrick, 392 F.3d 957, 959 (8th Cir. 2004).

A remedy

under § 2255 is not inadequate or ineffective merely due to a
procedural barrier or because it is time barred. Hill v. Morrison,
349 F.3d 1089, 1091 (8th Cir. 2003).

Specifically, § 2255 is not

inadequate or ineffective simply because a petitioner has already
filed a § 2255 motion or has been denied permission to file a
second motion.

United States v. Lurie, 207 F.3d 1075, 1077 (8th

Cir. 2000).
Here, petitioner seeks relief under the theory that Begay v.
United States, 553 U.S. 137 (2008), announced a new, retroactive
rule of constitutional law.1

Petitioner states the he “is innocent

of his enhanced sentence under the ACCA” based on his underlying
Minnesota and Illinois convictions. Pet’r’s Appl. 6–7, ECF No. 2.
In short, petitioner attacks the validity of his sentence, making
the present application a § 2255 motion.
A second or successive motion must be certified by a panel of
the Eighth Circuit to contain newly discovered evidence or “a new
rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral
review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable.”
U.S.C. § 2255(h).

28

In the present case, petitioner did not receive

1

The Eighth Circuit is “inclined to agree” that Begay applies
retroactively on collateral review when, as here, application of
the ACCA increased the statutory maximum penalty. See Sun Bear v.
United States, 644 F.3d 700, 703 (8th Cir. 2011) (en banc).
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a certification from the Eighth Circuit to file a second § 2255
motion.

Therefore, denial is warranted.

The court notes that denial is further warranted because Begay
was

decided

more

than

application for relief.

one

year

before

he

filed

28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(3).

the

present

Indeed, it was

filed more than one year after the Supreme Court decided Johnson v.
United States, 130 S. Ct. 1265 (2010) (decided March 2, 2010), the
most recent opinion of the Court discussing violent felonies under
the ACCA.

CONCLUSION
Accordingly, based on the above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
1.

The application under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 for a writ of

habeas corpus [ECF No. 2] is denied;
2.

Because the court treats the instant application as a

motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, the court grants a certificate of
appealability under 28 U.S.C. § 2253.
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.

Dated:

May 3, 2012
s/David S. Doty
David S. Doty, Judge
United States District Court

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