Soo Line Railroad Company v. Werner Enterprises
Filing
181
ORDER denying 166 Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law (Written Opinion). Signed by Senior Judge David S. Doty on 1/20/2015. (PJM)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Civil No. 12-1089(DSD/JSM)
Soo Line Railroad Company, a
Minnesota corporation, doing
business as Canadian Pacific,
Plaintiff,
ORDER
v.
Werner Enterprises,
Defendant.
Timothy R. Thornton, Esq. and Briggs & Morgan, P.A., 80
South Eighth Street, Suite 2200, Minneapolis, MN 55402,
counsel for plaintiff.
Anthony J. Novak, Esq. and Larson King, LLP, 30 East
Seventh Street, Suite 2800, St. Paul, MN 55101, counsel
for defendant.
This matter is before the court upon the motion for judgment
as a matter of law or for a new trial by plaintiff Soo Line
Railroad Company, doing business as Canadian Pacific.
Based on a
review of the file, record, and proceedings herein, and for the
following reasons, the court denies the motion.
BACKGROUND
This property-damage dispute arises out of a March 31, 2012,
collision between a truck owned by defendant Werner Enterprises
(Werner) and a train operated by Canadian Pacific.
The truck was
driven by nonparty Dale Buzzell, an employee of Werner.
Canadian
Pacific filed suit on May 3, 2012, seeking compensation for post-
collision
cleanup
costs
nuisance, and trespass.
on
state-law
theories
of
negligence,
On March 31, 2014, the court granted
summary judgment to Werner on the nuisance and trespass claims.
ECF No. 106.
At the same time, the court ruled that regulations
under the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Act of 1984 (FMCSA) did not
preempt Werner’s state-law arguments rooted in the common-law
doctrine of sudden incapacitation.
Id. at 4-6.
The remaining claims proceeded to a jury trial from October
14-21, 2014.
At trial, Werner offered testimony from medical
experts that Buzzell suffered an acute cardiac event which rendered
him incapacitated moments before colliding with the train.
After
Werner rested, Canadian Pacific moved for judgment as a matter of
law.1
The court took the motion under advisement.
On October 21,
2014, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Werner.
Canadian
Pacific now renews its motion for judgment as a matter of law and
in the alternative moves the court for a new trial.
DISCUSSION
I.
Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law
Judgment as a matter of law is appropriate only when all of
the evidence, viewed in a light most favorable to the prevailing
party,
“points
one
way
and
is
1
susceptible
of
no
reasonable
Werner also moved for judgment as a matter of law after
Canadian Pacific rested and before the jury returned its verdict.
The court denies those motions as moot.
2
inference sustaining [the prevailing party’s] position.”
Racicky
v. Farmland Indus., Inc., 328 F.3d 389, 393 (8th Cir. 2003).
The
court gives the jury’s verdict substantial deference, but the jury
cannot be afforded “the benefit of unreasonable inferences, or
those at war with undisputed facts.”
McAnally v. Gildersleeve, 16
F.3d 1493, 1500 (8th Cir. 1994) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The court must “assume as true all facts which the prevailing
party’s evidence tended to prove, ... and deny the motion, if in
light of the foregoing, reasonable jurors could differ as to the
conclusion that could be drawn from the evidence.”
Walsh v. Nat’l
Computer Sys., Inc., 332 F.3d 1150, 1158 (8th Cir. 2003) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
Canadian Pacific first argues that Werner failed to prove its
sudden incapacitation theory by a preponderance of the evidence.
The court
disagrees.
Having
heard
the
expert
testimony and
observed the evidence presented at trial, the court is satisfied
that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find that
Buzzell became incapacitated moments before hitting the train, and
as a result, could not have avoided the accident.
In particular,
Dr. Mackey-Bojack and Dr. Koponen testified that they examined
slides taken from Buzzell’s heart, and that in their opinion those
slides revealed an acute thrombus which cut off blood flow to
3
Buzzell’s brain.
supported
Moreover, evidence presented at trial also
a finding
that
Buzzell
did not
make
any avoidance
maneuvers before the collision.
Canadian Pacific also challenges the jury’s determination that
Buzzell was not negligent in failing to report fatigue to his DOT
licensing physician and to Werner.
Werner responds that the jury
could have reasonably inferred that Buzzell did not experience any
fatigue that would require reporting.
medical
records
that
listed
At trial, Werner challenged
Buzzell
as
experiencing
fatigue.
Specifically, Werner noted in part that DOT regulations only
restrict
drivers
complaints
importance.
of
with
fatigue
sleep
were
disorders,
either
and
outdated
that
or
of
Buzzell’s
minimal
Accepting as true the evidence presented by Werner,
the court finds that the jury’s determination was not the product
of unreasonable inferences.
As a result, Canadian Pacific is not
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
II.
Motion for New Trial
The court shall grant a new trial “only if the verdict was
against the great weight of the evidence” and doing so is necessary
to “prevent a miscarriage of justice.”
Jacobs Mfg. Co. v. Sam
Brown Co., 19 F.3d 1259, 1266 (8th Cir. 1994) (internal quotation
marks omitted). A contrary standard “would destroy the role of the
jury as the principal trier of the facts, and would enable the
4
trial judge to disregard the jury’s verdict at will.”
White v.
Pence, 961 F.2d 776, 780 (8th Cir. 1992) (citation and internal
quotations marks omitted).
Canadian Pacific first argues that a new trial is warranted
because the court did not instruct the jury that a violation of the
FMCSA constitutes negligence per se.
“A district court has broad
discretion in drafting jury instructions.”
F.3d 983, 987 (8th Cir. 1997).
Pittman v. Frazer, 129
“In reviewing a substantive
challenge to jury instructions, the pertinent query is whether the
instructions, taken as a whole and viewed in light of the evidence
and applicable law, fairly and adequately submitted the issues in
the case to the jury.”
151 F.3d 765,
771
Horstmyer v. Black & Decker (U.S.), Inc.,
(8th Cir. 1998)
(internal
quotation
marks
omitted).
Canadian
following
Pacific
instruction:
requested
“Violation
that
of
the
a
court
federal
provide
regulation
the
is
negligence per se, unless the violator proves by a preponderance of
the evidence that the federal regulatory violation was an act of
God.”2
The court declined and instead instructed the jury as
2
Canadian Pacific proposed this instruction at the charge
conference, after the deadline set by the court’s pretrial order.
See ECF No. 110, at 3 (requiring proposed instructions to be
submitted two weeks before trial).
Moreover, Canadian Pacific
provides no explanation for why Werner should be limited to the
“act of God” defense in showing excuse or justification. The court
is not aware of any case providing such a limitation.
See
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 288A(2) (1965) (providing a non(continued...)
5
follows:
Violation of a traffic law or regulation is negligence,
unless there is evidence tending to show ... [t]he person
had a reasonable excuse or justification for breaking the
law ....
The burden of showing an excuse or
justification is upon the violator. However, the burden
of proving negligence remains upon the party asserting
that claim.
ECF No. 159, at 31.
“[i]n
order
for
The court further instructed the jury that
Werner
Enterprises
to
prove
excuse
or
justification, it must show by a preponderance of the evidence that
Dale Buzzell became suddenly incapacitated and could not have
prevented the collision through the exercise of reasonable care.”
Id. at 21.
Under the doctrine of negligence per se, the violation of a
statute
or
regulation
“constitutes
conclusive
evidence
of
negligence unless [the violation is] excusable or justifiable under
the circumstances of the case.”
Pigman v. Nott, 233 N.W.2d 287,
288 (Minn. 1975) (citation omitted). “The burden of proving excuse
or justification is on the person violating the statute.”
Id.
Under Minnesota law, however, violation of a traffic statute “shall
not be negligence per se but shall be prima facie evidence of
negligence only.”
Minn. Stat. § 169.96(b).
As a result, one who
violates a Minnesota traffic statute need only produce “evidence
tending to show a reasonable ground for such violation.”
2
(...continued)
exhaustive list of excuses for statutory violations).
6
Olson v.
Duluth, M. & I.R. Ry. Co., 5 N.W.2d 492, 496 (Minn. 1942); see also
Demmer v. Grunke, 42 N.W.2d 1, 5 (Minn. 1950) (explaining that the
violator must produce evidence of justification, and when such
evidence is presented, the opposing party maintains the burden of
proof).
Canadian Pacific argues that the exception for Minnesota
traffic statutes does not apply to a regulatory violation under the
FMCSA. The court disagrees. The violation of a federal regulation
constitutes negligence per se in some contexts and evidence of
negligence in others.
See Gray v. Badger Min. Corp., 676 N.W.2d
268, 275 (Minn. 2004) (discussing the effect of breaching a federal
regulatory duty to warn). Indeed, Minnesota courts have previously
declined
to
negligence
hold
per
that
se,
a
noting
violation
that
it
of
FMCSA
“would
be
regulations
is
anomalous
to
differentiate between traffic violations occurring under Minnesota
law and those occurring under federal law.” Ruhland v. Smith, Nos.
C7-91-668, C4-91-675, 1991 WL 257962, at *3 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec.
10, 1991).
As a result, the court properly rejected Canadian
Pacific’s proposed instruction.3
3
Moreover, although the court’s instruction did not use the
phrase “negligence per se,” it mirrored the substance of Canadian
Pacific’s request in many ways.
For instance, the instruction
placed the burden of proving excuse or justification upon Werner,
rather that merely requiring Werner to produce evidence tending to
show excuse or justification. ECF No. 159, at 31. As a result,
Canadian Pacific fails to show how the court’s instruction caused
it prejudice. See Gasper v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 270 F.3d 1196,
(continued...)
7
Canadian Pacific next reasserts arguments that the court
disposed of on summary judgment.
Specifically, Canadian Pacific
argues that a new trial is warranted because (1) the FMCSA preempts
state-law standards of care, and as a result, does not permit noncompliance due to reasonable excuse or justification; and (2) the
court committed error by not allowing the trespass and nuisance
claims to be submitted to a jury.
As stated, these arguments were
considered on summary judgment, and Canadian Pacific does not offer
any compelling reason for the court to reconsider its previous
decisions.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, based on the above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that
Canadian Pacific’s motion for judgment as a matter of law or for a
new trial [ECF No. 166] is denied.
Dated:
January 20, 2015
s/David S. Doty
David S. Doty, Judge
United States District Court
3
(...continued)
1200 (8th Cir. 2001) (“A new trial is granted only if any alleged
error was prejudicial.”).
8
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?