Soo Line Railroad Company v. Werner Enterprises

Filing 78

ORDER overruling 75 OBJECTION TO MAGISTRATE JUDGE DECISION to District Judge (Written Opinion). Signed by Senior Judge David S. Doty on 7/17/2013. (PJM)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Civil No. 12-1089(DSD/JSM)
Soo Line Railroad Company,
a Minnesota corporation doing
business as Canadian Pacific,
Plaintiff,
ORDER

v.
Werner Enterprises,
Defendant.

This

matter

is

before

the

court

upon

the

objection

by

plaintiff Soo Line Railroad Company d/b/a Canadian Pacific (CP) to
Magistrate Judge Janie S. Mayeron’s June 4, 2013, order denying the
motion for leave to amend the complaint.

After a review of the

report, and based on the file, record and proceedings herein, the
court overrules the objection.

BACKGROUND
This property-damage dispute arises out of the collision
between a truck owned by defendant Werner Enterprises (Werner) and
a train operated by CP.

The background of this matter is fully set

forth in the court’s previous orders, and the court summarizes only
those facts relevant to resolving the present objection.
CP filed suit on May 3, 2012, seeking reimbursement from
Werner for post-collision cleanup costs based on theories of
respondeat superior, vicarious liability and negligence.

The

magistrate judge issued a scheduling order establishing August 1,
2012, as the deadline for amendment to the pleadings.
12.

See ECF No.

CP moved to amend its complaint on August 1, 2012, and claims

for nuisance and trespass were added on August 16, 2012.
Nos. 16, 32.

See ECF

Thereafter, CP moved for summary judgment, and the

court denied the motion on January 28, 2013.

ECF No. 45.

On April 11, 2013, CP again moved to amend the complaint.1
The magistrate judge denied the motion for leave to amend on June
4, 2013, finding that (1) CP failed to show good cause under Rule
16

for

non-compliance

with

the

court’s

scheduling

order,

(2) amendment would cause undue delay and prejudice to Werner under
Rule 15 and (3) the proposed amendment was futile under Rule 15.
CP objects.

DISCUSSION
I.

Standard of Review
A district court ordinarily reviews a magistrate judge’s

denial of a motion to amend under a clearly erroneous or contrary
to law standard.2

See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A); Fed. R. Civ. P.

1

CP seeks to add references to the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act (RCRA) in its nuisance and trespass claims and to the
background section of the Amended Complaint.
Specifically, CP
alleges that Werner violated RCRA, and that such a violation
provides the requisite wrongful conduct for its nuisance and
trespass claims. See Pl.’s Mem. Supp. Mot. Amend 7-9, ECF No. 58.
2

A motion to amend that is denied as futile, however, is
(continued...)
2

72(a); D. Minn. L.R. 72.2(a). “A finding is clearly erroneous when
although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on
the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction
that a mistake has been committed.” Chakales v. Comm’r of Internal
Revenue, 79 F.3d 726, 728 (8th Cir. 1995) (citations and internal
quotation marks omitted).

“A decision is contrary to law when it

fails to apply or misapplies relevant statutes, case law or rules
of procedure.”

Knutson v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Minn., 254

F.R.D. 553, 556 (D. Minn. 2008) (citations and internal quotation
marks omitted).
II.

Motion for Leave to Amend
CP objects to the magistrate judge’s finding that leave to

amend was improper under both Rule 16 and Rule 15 standards.

The

court examines both arguments.
A.

Rule 16

Under Rule 16, a pretrial scheduling order “may be modified
only for good cause and with the judge’s consent.”

Fed. R. Civ. P.

(...continued)
subject to a de novo review. See U.S. ex rel. Joshi v. St. Luke’s
Hosp. Inc., 441 F.3d 552, 555-56 (8th Cir. 2006).
Because the
court finds that the magistrate judge did not commit clear error in
denying the motion (1) under Rule 16 for non-compliance with the
court’s scheduling order or (2) under Rule 15 for undue delay and
prejudice, it need not reach the futility analysis. See, e.g., In
re. 2007 Novastar Fin. Inc., Sec. Litig., 579 F.3d 878, 884 (8th
Cir. 2009) (“[W]e need not reach the question of futility here
because we can affirm the ... denial of leave to amend on [an]
alternate basis ....” (citation omitted)).
3

16(b)(4).

“The primary measure of good cause is the movant’s

diligence in attempting to meet the order’s requirements.” Sherman
v. Winco Fireworks, Inc., 532 F.3d 709, 716-17 (8th Cir. 2008)
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

The magistrate

judge denied the motion for leave to amend under Rule 16, finding
that CP was not diligent and had not shown good cause for its noncompliance with the scheduling order.
CP responds that good cause is present, as it moved to amend
shortly after the court denied its motion for summary judgment. As
the magistrate judge correctly noted, however, the current motion
is not based on any newly-discovered evidence.

Moreover, CP has

not shown that the motion was unable to have been brought prior to
the court’s disposition of the motion for summary judgment.

As a

result, CP has not demonstrated that the magistrate judge committed
clear error in denying the motion on Rule 16 grounds.
B.

Rule 15

CP next argues that amendment is proper under Rule 15.

And

although leave to amend under Rule 15 is liberally granted, it is
not an absolute right, and “undue delay, bad faith, or dilatory
motive,

repeated

failure

to

cure

deficiencies

by

amendments

previously allowed, undue prejudice to the non-moving party, or
futility of the amendment may be grounds to deny [the] motion.”
Doe v. Cassel, 403 F.3d 986, 991 (8th Cir. 2005) (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted).

4

The magistrate judge also denied the motion to amend under
Rule 15, finding that CP unduly delayed in seeking leave to amend
and that amendment would unduly prejudice Werner.

Specifically,

the magistrate judge found that “CP’s own unjustifiable lack of
diligence and significant delay in bringing this motion ... created
the prejudice.”

ECF No. 74, at 23.

The magistrate judge further

noted that the prejudice stemmed from the already-passed discovery
deadlines.

CP responds that no additional discovery would be

required if amendment were allowed.

Pl.’s Objection 11-12.

Even

if true, however, CP cannot show a valid reason for their undue
delay.

As a result, the court finds that CP has not demonstrated

that the magistrate judge committed clear error in denying the
motion for leave to amend.

Therefore, the objection to the

magistrate judge’s order is overruled.

CONCLUSION
Accordingly, based on the above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that
plaintiff’s objection [ECF No. 75] to the magistrate judge’s order
is overruled.
Dated:

July 17, 2013
s/David S. Doty
David S. Doty, Judge
United States District Court

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