Karlen v. Jones Lang LaSalle America's Inc.

Filing 51

ORDER: Plaintiff's Motion for Attorneys' Fees and Costs 40 is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. Plaintiff's request for attorneys' fees is GRANTED in the amount of $20,000. Plaintiff's request for costs is GRANTED in the amount of $2,018.22. (Written Opinion) Signed by Judge Joan N. Ericksen on July 17, 2013. (CBC)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Todd Karlen,
Plaintiff,
v.

Civil No. 12-1102 (JNE/JJG)
ORDER

Jones Lang LaSalle America’s, Inc.,
Defendant.
Plaintiff Todd Karlen (“Karlen”) brought this suit against his former employer, Jones
Lang LaSalle America’s, Inc. (“JLLA”), alleging nonpayment of commissions and bonuses, as
well as failure to reimburse him for work-related expenses. He asserted claims under Minnesota
Statutes § 181.03 and § 181.13, as well as under theories of breach of contract, unjust enrichment
and promissory estoppel. JLLA moved for summary judgment. On May 23, 2013, the Court
granted JLLA’s motion with respect to Karlen’s claims for nonpayment of a 2011 bonus,
nonpayment of commissions allegedly owed for leasing revenue resulting from a lease executed
with H&M, nonpayment of commissions allegedly owed for the leasing of basement space to
Primebar, and JLLA’s failure to reimburse Karlen for various work-related expenses. Karlen
waived his unjust enrichment and promissory estoppel claims. The Court granted summary
judgment in favor of Karlen on Karlen’s claim that JLLA failed to pay him commissions related
to Primebar’s lease of first-floor space. Judgment was entered on May 24, 2013, ordering JLLA
to pay Karlen $72,503.54, representing commissions owed and applicable statutory damages
under Minnesota Statutes §§ 181.03 and 181.13. 1 The Court ordered Karlen’s attorney to submit
a bill of costs representing the costs and fees associated with Karlen’s one successful claim. On
1

Of this amount, $34,521 represented the commission payments JLLA owed to Karlen.
This amount was doubled pursuant to Minnesota Statutes § 181.03, and a penalty of $3,461.54
was imposed pursuant to Minnesota Statutes § 181.13(a).
1

June 6, 2013, Karlen moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d) for an order awarding
attorneys’ fees and costs under Minnesota Statutes § 181.171, subdiv. 3. JLLA opposed portions
of Karlen’s motion, and the Court permitted Karlen to reply to JLLA’s objections. Karlen filed
his Reply Memorandum on July 5, 2013.
Karlen seeks costs in the amount of $2,018.22 and attorneys’ fees of $48,548.31. 2 Under
Minnesota Statutes § 181.171, subdiv. 3, “the court shall order an employer who is found to have
committed a violation to pay the aggrieved party reasonable costs, disbursements, witness fees,
and attorney fees.” “[T]he district court has discretion in determining the amount of a fee
award,” Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437 (1983), and in determining the fee amount that
is reasonable, the Court must make findings or otherwise “concisely explain why it felt the hours
claimed are reasonable or unreasonable,” Milner v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 748 N.W.2d 608, 622
(Minn. 2008).
“The most useful starting point for determining the amount of a reasonable fee is the
number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate.”
Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433. This calculation, however, “does not end the inquiry.” Id. at 434.
“There remain other considerations that may lead the district court to adjust the fee upward or
downward, including the important factor of the ‘results obtained.’” Id. These considerations
include “the time and labor required; the nature and difficulty of the responsibility assumed; the
amount involved and the results obtained; the fees customarily charged for similar legal services;
the experience, reputation, and ability of counsel; and the fee arrangement existing between
counsel and the client.” Milner, 748 N.W.2d at 621; see also Hensley, 461 U.S. at 430 n.3
(listing factors to consider in determining the reasonableness of a fee award). “Minnesota courts
2

JLLA does not object to the lodestar amount of $350 per hour, nor does JLLA dispute the
costs of $2,018.22 or the fees related to Plaintiff’s initial flat fee.
2

consider the results obtained critical to the award.” Milner, 748 N.W.2d at 622 (internal
quotation marks omitted). This factor “is particularly crucial where a plaintiff is deemed
‘prevailing’ even though he succeeded on only some of the claims for relief.” Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted). The Court may also consider “the significance of the legal issues on
which the plaintiff prevailed” and the “the overall relief obtained.” Id. at 623; see also Holt v.
Swenson, 90 N.W.2d 724, 729 (Minn. 1958) (stating that factors to include in determining the
reasonableness of attorney’s fees are “the amount involved,” the “time necessary,” and “the
difficulties of the propositions involved,” among other things).
The Court has reviewed the parties’ submissions and acknowledges that both parties have
attempted to calculate the number of hours reasonably spent litigating the one successful claim
asserted in this lawsuit. But as explained above, such a calculation is only a starting point.
Other factors should be considered that may result in an upward or downward adjustment of the
calculated fee. In light of those factors, the Court concludes that the requested attorneys’ fees of
$48,548.31 must be reduced. Karlen achieved only narrow success in his lawsuit, prevailing on
only one part of one of his claims; JLLA prevailed on the vast majority of the claims. Karlen
asserted claims related to: commissions for the lease of approximately 17,000 square feet to
H&M; commissions for the lease of approximately 10,000 square feet to Primebar (only
approximately sixty percent of which was related to the first-floor lease); a bonus payment of
nearly $20,000; and expenses of $134.83. JLLA prevailed on all but the portion of Karlen’s
claim related to the first-floor space leased to Primebar. Ultimately, it was found that JLLA
owed Karlen $34,521 in unpaid commissions for Primebar’s lease of that space. When
considering the number of claims asserted and the amount of money Karlen sought, Karlen’s
success and the relief he obtained in this lawsuit were very limited.

3

The purpose of fee-shifting statutes is to encourage the prosecution of meritorious claims.
See Perdue v. Kenney A. ex rel. Winn, 599 U.S. 542, 130 S. Ct. 1662, 1672 (2010) (“[A]
‘reasonable’ fee is a fee that is sufficient to induce a capable attorney to undertake the
representation of a meritorious . . . case.”); Marquart v. Lodge 837, Int’l Ass’n of Machinists &
Aerospace Workers, 26 F.3d 842, 851 (8th Cir. 1994) (explaining that in civil rights cases, the
“twin policies promoted by fee-shifting” are “[t]o encourage the vigorous enforcement of federal
rights without encouraging frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless litigation”). At the time
Karlen brought his lawsuit in April 2012, none of his claims were meritorious. JLLA asserted—
and Karlen did not dispute—that Karlen was only entitled to the first half of his earned
commissions when a lease was executed and JLLA had received payment from the property
owner; Karlen was entitled to the second half when the tenant opened in the leased space and
JLLA had received payment from the property owner. When Karlen commenced this lawsuit, he
was not yet entitled to either of those payments, which were subsequently delivered in June and
October 2012, when the above payment conditions were met. Thus, at the time Karlen brought
suit, his claim that he was entitled to these payments was factually and legally unsupported.
JLLA sent Karlen three checks representing the commissions Karlen earned for the
Primebar lease, largely in accordance with JLLA’s policy for the payment of such commissions. 3
Had JLLA simply issued the checks to Karlen, without the involvement of any of the lawyers,
JLLA would likely have been entirely successful in defeating all of Karlen’s claims. It was only
because of the communications between the attorneys after the checks had been issued that
3

The checks were dated May 4, 2012; June 1, 2012; and October 5, 2012. The record
before the Court on summary judgment revealed that the June and October checks were issued in
accordance with JLLA’s policy for payments of commissions; the May check was issued
prematurely due to a mistake by JLLA’s legal department. There was no evidence that any of
the payments to Karlen were delayed.

4

Karlen had any successful claims at all in this lawsuit. 4 In effect, the attorneys representing both
parties needlessly increased the cost of resolving this dispute. As Karlen’s counsel points out,
fee awards “are critical in preserving access to the courts for working people who are victims of
employment-related statutory violations.” Pl.’s Mem. Supp. 8 (ECF No. 41). Here, however,
Karlen was not a victim of an employment-related statutory violation at the time he commenced
this action. Had he not prematurely brought a lawsuit and had the lawyers not already been
involved when JLLA issued the checks, it is likely that there would have never been any
statutory violations at all.
Consideration of the time, labor and skill required for the prosecution of Karlen’s
successful claim also supports a reduction of the requested fee. Karlen prevailed only on his
claim that JLLA failed to pay him the commissions he had earned for the first-floor lease to
Primebar. JLLA never disputed that Karlen earned commissions for this space, nor did the
parties appear to dispute the amount of these commissions. The parties also did not dispute that
JLLA had, in fact, issued checks to Karlen that represented payment of these commissions. The
only question with respect to these commission payments was whether or not JLLA had imposed
conditions on Karlen’s use of the checks that JLLA issued to him after he brought suit. The facts
relevant to this issue were confined to the email communications between the attorneys in which
they discussed the legal implications of cashing the checks. At summary judgment, Karlen
asserted that JLLA’s attorney had indicated that his cashing of the checks would result in a

4

As made clear by the parties’ submissions in connection with the current fee petition,
after Karlen received the checks from JLLA, his attorney inquired as to whether the cashing of
those checks constituted any sort of legal waiver of claims. This inquiry spurred a series of
communications between the attorneys, resulting in JLLA’s imposition of conditions on the
cashing of the checks. It was only because of these conditions and communications, which
occurred after Karlen brought suit, that Karlen succeeded at all in this litigation.
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waiver of some of his claims in his lawsuit, and JLLA did not dispute this assertion. 5 The Court
ultimately found that the conditions—however reasonable JLLA might have considered them to
be—altered the method or procedures for payment and thus constituted a violation of the
applicable Minnesota statutes. See Minn. Stat. § 181.03. Once the Court found that JLLA had
failed to pay the commissions owed to Karlen, JLLA did not dispute the application of the
relevant Minnesota statutes or the computation of statutory penalties. Overall, the underlying
facts related to Karlen’s successful claim were largely undisputed, and the only relevant issue
was one of law. Further, that one legal issue was not particularly significant or complex.
Successful prosecution of this claim did not necessitate significant amounts of time, discovery,
research or legal skill.
In consideration of the factors discussed above, including the degree of success, the
overall relief obtained, the significance of the legal issue on which Karlen prevailed, and time
necessary to pursue the successful claim, the Court finds that attorneys’ fees of $20,000 are
reasonable in this case. See Milner, 748 N.W.2d at 624 (“The district court may ‘identify
specific hours that should be eliminated’ or the district court ‘may simply reduce the award to
account for the limited success.’” (citation omitted)); Hensley, 461 U.S. at 440 (“[W]here the
plaintiff achieved only limited success, the district court should award only that amount of fees
that is reasonable in relation to the results obtained.”).
In addition to attorneys’ fees and costs, Karlen also requests in his memorandum an
award of prejudgment interest. His June 6, 2013 motion, however, seeks only an order for
attorneys’ fees and costs. The motion itself makes no reference to prejudgment interest, nor does
5

JLLA appears now to dispute that it had imposed conditions on Karlen’s use of the
checks, but JLLA made no such argument in its summary judgment briefs—JLLA instead
asserted that it had issued the checks and that Karlen’s reason for not cashing those checks was
irrelevant. See Def.’s Reply Br. 11 (ECF No. 30).
6

Karlen ask the Court to alter or amend the judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
59(e). On June 24, 2013, JLLA filed a notice of appeal. Because there is nothing in the current
motion that would allow the Court to construe it as a Rule 59(e) motion and a notice of appeal
has already been filed, this Court is now without jurisdiction to alter or amend the judgment so as
to award prejudgment interest. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4).
Based on the files, records, and proceedings herein, and for the reasons stated above, IT
IS ORDERED THAT:
1. Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and Costs [Docket No. 40] is GRANTED IN
PART and DENIED IN PART.
2. Plaintiff’s request for attorneys’ fees is GRANTED in the amount of $20,000.
3. Plaintiff’s request for costs is GRANTED in the amount of $2,018.22.
Dated: July 17, 2013
s/Joan N. Ericksen
JOAN N. ERICKSEN
United States District Judge

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