Carpenter v. Willems et al
Filing
33
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER. IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the City's Motion to Dismiss 2 is DENIED in part and GRANTED in part as follows: To the extent Plaintiff asserts a claim for violation of procedural due process, the motion is denied; to the extent Plaintiff asserts a claim for violation of substantive due process, the motion is granted.(Written Opinion). Signed by Chief Judge Michael J. Davis on 1/24/13. (GRR)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Ryan William Carpenter,
Plaintiff,
v.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
AND ORDER
Civil No. 12‐1334 (MJD/SER)
Eric Willems, individually and in
his official capacity, and the City
of St. Paul, a municipal corporation,
Defendants.
___________________________________________________________________
Robert D. Boedigheimer, Boedigheimer Law Firm, P.A., Counsel for
Plaintiff.
Lawrence J. Hayes, Jr., Assistant City Attorney, Counsel for Defendants.
___________________________________________________________________
This matter is before the Court on Defendants’ motion to dismiss pursuant
to Rule 12 (b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
I.
Factual Allegations
Plaintiff was hired by the City of St. Paul for its COMET Project in October
2008 as an IS Info Tech I/business analyst on a temporary, part‐time basis.
(Complaint ¶ 4.) His original schedule was half‐days, five days per week. (Id. ¶
4.) The COMET Project Director is Defendant Willems. (Id. ¶ 5.)
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Plaintiff later began working full‐time, and began to receive benefits,
including health insurance. (Id. ¶ 7.) From 2009 through 2011, he worked more
than 1040 hours per year. (Id. ¶ 10.) At all material times, Plaintiff also paid
union dues to AFSCME. (Id. ¶ 12.) In January 2011, he was told that he would
be working “out of title” with duties and responsibilities similar to that of an IS
Systems Consultant I. (Id. ¶ 14.)
On January 9, 2012, without any prior notice, Plaintiff was informed that
his employment had been terminated. (Id. ¶ 17.) Plaintiff inquired as to his
rights, to which Defendant Willems replied he had no rights. (Id.) Prior to
January 9, 2012, Plaintiff was provided no notice that his employment would be
terminated. (Id. ¶ 18.)
In his Complaint, Plaintiff asserted three claims against Defendants
Willems, the City of St. Paul and AFSCME: violation of constitutional rights
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, failure to provide notice of termination in violation
of the Labor Management Relations Act (“LMRA”), 29 U.S.C. § 185, and failure
by AFSCME to file a grievance on his behalf in violation of the LMRA. Plaintiff
has moved to voluntarily dismiss AFSCME as a defendant, and has moved to
voluntarily dismiss Counts II and III. The Court granted the motions and the
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only claim remaining is Count I, violation of Section 1983 claim asserted against
Defendants Eric Willems and the City of St. Paul (collectively referred to herein
as the “City”).
II.
Standard
Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), a party may move the Court to dismiss a
claim if, on the pleadings, a party has failed to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted. In reviewing a motion to dismiss, the Court takes all facts
alleged in the complaint to be true. Zutz v. Nelson, 601 F.3d 842, 848 (8th Cir.
2010).
To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face. Thus, although a complaint need not include detailed factual
allegations, a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds of his
entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.
Id. (citations omitted).
When considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court may
consider any document that is incorporated in the complaint by reference.
Moses.com Sec., Inc. v. Comprehensive Software Sys., Inc., 406 F.3d 1052, 1063, n.
3 (8th Cir. 2005) (court found that examination of a press release was proper in
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considering motion to dismiss “even though it was not expressly part of the
pleadings, because it was incorporated into the pleadings by reference‐the
complaint specifically mentioned it as a ground for [plaintiff]’s claims against
[defendants]).
III.
Section 1983 Claim
In Count I, Plaintiff asserts that he was a public employee as defined by
Minnesota Statute § 179A.03, Subd. 14, and that he was deprived of his protected
property interest in employment when the City terminated his employment
without prior notice and an opportunity to meaningfully respond before
termination, as provided in the City’s Civil Service Rules.
To state a claim for violation of procedural due process, Plaintiff must
show that he had a property interest in his employment and that state action
deprived him of that protected interest. Phillips v. State, 725 N.W.2d 778, 782
(Minn. Ct. App. 2007). “A property interest in continued employment cannot
arise from a unilateral expectation; rather, an individual must have a legitimate
claim of entitlement to it.” Geddes v. Northwest Missouri State Univ., 49 F.3d
426, 429 (8th Cir. 1995). Such legitimate claims “are created and their dimensions
are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent
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source such as state law‐rules or understandings that secure certain benefits and
that support claims of entitlement to those benefits.” Roth 408 U.S. at 577.
The City argues that Plaintiff did not have a protected property interest in
his employment, as he was a provisional employee. In support, the City has
submitted a form, signed by Plaintiff and dated March 25, 2010, entitled
“Information for Provisional Employees.” (Hayes Aff. Ex. 1.) As discussed
above, the Court may only consider documents referenced in the Complaint
when addressing a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The
“Information for Provisional Employees” was not referenced in the Complaint,
therefore the Court will not consider it when determining the merits of the
instant motion.1
The Court has reviewed the Complaint and finds that Plaintiff has
sufficiently alleged a protected property interest in his employment with the
City, and that he was deprived of that interest by the City.
In Count I, Plaintiff also asserts that he was denied substantive due process
when he was terminated without prior notice, an opportunity to be heard and
1
The City’s argument that Plaintiff was a provisional employee, and therefore had no
protected property interest in his employment with the City, is one that should be included in a
motion for summary judgment.
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without a hearing. Plaintiff asserts this claim arises under the contractual
agreements provided in the CBA.
To establish a substantive due process violation, Plaintiff must
demonstrate that he possessed a right arising under the Fourteenth Amendment
and that the City deprived Plaintiff of that right within the meaning of the Due
Process Clause. Ganley v. Minneapolis Park and Recreation Bd., 491 F.3d 743,
749 (8th Cir. 2007). “To meet this burden, the appellants ‘must demonstrate that
the government action complained of is truly irrational, that is something more
than ... arbitrary, capricious, or in violation of state law.‘” Id. (quoting Klein v.
McGowan, 198 F.3d 705, 710 (8th Cir. 1999)).
In reviewing the Complaint, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to
include any allegations which demonstrate outrageous or truly irrational
behavior by a state actor. Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to
state a claim for violation of substantive due process.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the City’s Motion to Dismiss [Doc. No. 2] is
DENIED in part and GRANTED in part as follows: To the extent Plaintiff asserts
a claim for violation of procedural due process, the motion is denied; to the
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extent Plaintiff asserts a claim for violation of substantive due process, the motion
is granted.
Date: January 24, 2013
s/ Michael J. Davis
Michael J. Davis, Chief Judge
United States District Court
Civil No. 12‐1334
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