St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Company v. Abhe & Svodoba, Inc.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER. 1. St. Paul Fire's Motion for Summary Judgment and to Strike Certain Claims (Doc. No. 69 ) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART, as follows: a. St. Paul Fire's Motion for Summary Judgment regarding the war ranty of express seaworthiness is DENIED; b. St. Paul Fire's Motion for Summary Judgment regarding collateral estoppel is DENIED; c. St. Paul Fire's Motion for Summary Judgment regarding ASI's negligence claim is DENIED; d. St. Paul Fi re's Motion to Strike ASI's demand for a jury trial is GRANTED; and e. St. Paul Fire's Motion to Strike ASIs claim for attorney fees is DENIED. 2. ASI's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 84 ) is GRANTED. The Court finds that the P&I Policy does not contain an expressed warranty of seaworthiness. (Written Opinion). Signed by Judge Donovan W. Frank on 5/24/2017. (BJS)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
St. Paul Fire & Marine
Civil No. 12-1482 (DWF/FLN)
OPINION AND ORDER
Abhe & Svoboda, Inc.,
Daniel A. Haws, Esq., and John Paul J. Gatto, Esq., HKM Law Group, and James W.
Carbin, Esq., and P. Ryan McElduff, Esq., Duane Morris LLP, counsel for Plaintiff.
Christopher L. Lynch, Esq., and Thomas C. Mielenhausen, Esq., Barnes & Thornburg
LLP, counsel for Defendant.
The plaintiff-insurer filed a complaint seeking a declaration that it was not
obligated to cover the defendant-insured’s claim for damages arising from its barge
sinking. The plaintiff moved for summary judgment and to strike certain claims. (Doc.
No. 69.) The defendant moved for partial summary judgment. (Doc. No. 84.) For the
reasons outlined below, the Court grants in part and denies in part the plaintiff’s motion,
and the Court grants the defendant’s motion.
Plaintiff St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Company (“St. Paul Fire”) filed a
complaint seeking a declaration that it was not obligated to cover the losses of Defendant
Abhe & Svodoba, Inc. (“ASI”). ASI is a Minnesota company that repairs and paints
“industrial structures, communication towers, dams, bridges and other infrastructure.”
(ASI.’s Partial MSJ Br. at 2.) 1
In May 2010, ASI was hired to repair and paint Pell Bridge over the Narragansett
Bay in Rhode Island. (Id.) In August 2010, ASI chartered two “dumb” 2 barges from
Sterling Equipment, Inc. As part of the charter, ASI was required to have the barges
professionally surveyed and to repair anything identified by the survey. As relevant here,
the survey found that barge SEI-34 (the “Barge”) had “numerous small wastage pinholes
about the deck.” (Doc. No. 109 ¶ 16, Ex. 15.) The survey did not recommend any
repairs. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Abhe & Svoboda, Inc., 798 F.3d 715, 717 (8th
In May 2011, ASI applied to St. Paul Fire for insurance for the Barge (and other
ships). St. Paul Fire issued a Marine Hull (generally, the “Hull Policy”) and Protection
The Court cites to ASI’s Brief for Partial Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 99) as
“ASI’s Partial MSJ Br.”; St. Paul’s Opposition Brief for Partial Summary Judgment
(Doc. No. 127) as “Pl.’s Partial MSJ Opp.”; ASI’s Reply Brief (Doc. No. 142) as “ASI’s
Reply”; St. Paul Fire’s Opening Brief for Summary Judgment and to Strike Certain
Claims (Doc. No. 102) as “Pl.’s Strike Br.”; ASI’s Opposition Brief (Doc. No. 132) as
“ASI’s Strike Opp.”; and St. Paul Fire’s Reply Brief (Doc. No. 136) as “Pl.’s Strike
A dumb barge means the barge did not have a motor or other means of propulsion.
and Indemnity Policy (generally, the “P&I Policy”) effective July 1, 2011, through
July 1, 2012. On October 29, 2011, a severe nor’easter rolled through the Newport area.
During the storm, the Barge sank.
Shortly after the sinking, the Coast Guard informed ASI that the Coast Guard
would federalize the wreck if ASI did not remove the wreck by a certain deadline. ASI
notified St. Paul Fire. ASI then contacted Donjon Marine Co., Inc.—a marine salvage
company—to negotiate a contract to remove the sunken barge. Before the contract was
finalized, St. Paul Fire took over the negotiations for the final version. On December 9,
2011, Donjon raised the Barge along with any equipment still attached to it, but Donjon
refused to collect any equipment that had fallen off. With the Coast Guard’s deadline
quickly approaching, ASI hired a second company to remove the equipment.
Donjon was not fully paid for its work and filed for arbitration. In the arbitration,
ASI counterclaimed for the added removal costs caused by Donjon abandoning the
project. ASI tendered the defense of the arbitration, but St. Paul Fire denied coverage.
ASI ultimately prevailed in the arbitration and recovered some of its costs.
On June 20, 2012, while the arbitration with Donjon was ongoing, St. Paul Fire
filed a complaint seeking declaratory relief. (See Doc. No. 1.) ASI filed four
counterclaims, including one that alleged St. Paul Fire negligently negotiated the salvage
contract with Donjon.
On February 28, 2014, St. Paul Fire moved for summary judgment on a number of
grounds, including that ASI violated its duty of utmost good faith by failing to disclose
the survey of the Barge. On April 29, 2014, Judge Paul A. Magnuson granted summary
judgment for St. Paul Fire finding that the insurance policy was void ab initio due to
ASI’s failure to disclose the survey. (Doc. No. 143 at 7-9.) ASI appealed. (Doc.
No. 145.) The Eighth Circuit concluded that a genuine issue of material fact remained
regarding whether St. Paul Fire actually relied on ASI’s failure to disclose the survey.
(Doc. No. 152 at 11.) The Eighth Circuit remanded the case for further proceedings.
On remand, the parties identified the remaining issues from their motions. Left
from ASI’s motion for partial summary judgment is whether the P&I Policy contained an
express warranty of seaworthiness. Left from St. Paul Fire’s motion are the following
issues: (1) if the P&I Policy contained an express warranty of seaworthiness, then
whether the Barge was seaworthy; (2) whether ASI is collaterally estopped from seeking
damages from St. Paul Fire because the arbitrator already found those damages were not
recoverable from Donjon; (3) assuming that St. Paul Fire negligently negotiating the
Donjon contract, whether St. Paul Fire could be the legal cause of ASI’s damages from
Donjon breaching the contract; (4) whether ASI is entitled to a jury for any of its claims;
and (5) whether ASI can seek its attorney fees for defending this action.
Summary judgment is appropriate if the “movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Courts must view the evidence, and the inferences that may be
reasonably drawn from the evidence, in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.
Weitz Co., LLC v. Lloyd’s of London, 574 F.3d 885, 892 (8th Cir. 2009). However,
“[s]ummary judgment procedure is properly regarded not as a disfavored procedural
shortcut, but rather as an integral part of the Federal Rules as a whole, which are designed
‘to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action.’” Celotex
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327 (1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 1).
The moving party bears the burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of
material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Enter. Bank v. Magna
Bank, 92 F.3d 743, 747 (8th Cir. 1996). The nonmoving party must demonstrate the
existence of specific facts in the record that create a genuine issue for trial. Krenik v. Cty.
of Le Sueur, 47 F.3d 953, 957 (8th Cir. 1995). A party opposing a properly supported
motion for summary judgment “may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his
pleading, but must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.”
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256 (1986).
The Barge had both Hull and P&I insurance. According to the parties, ASI’s
losses could be covered by the P&I Policy, but not the Hull Policy. St. Paul Fire has
moved for summary judgment seeking an order finding that that coverage is unavailable
under the P&I Policy because ASI breached a warranty to keep the Barge seaworthy.
ASI has moved for partial summary judgment seeking an order that the P&I Policy does
not contain an express or implied warranty of seaworthiness. Thus, both motions require
the Court to first examine whether the P&I Policy contains a warranty of seaworthiness.
As an initial matter, hull insurance contains an implied warranty of seaworthiness,
while P&I insurance does not. See L & L Marine Serv., Inc. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 796
F.2d 1032, 1035 (8th Cir. 1986); see also (Pl.’s Partial MSJ Opp. 21 (“St. Paul has never
argued that the implied Seaworthiness Warranties appl[ies] to the P&I coverage.”)). The
implied warranty of seaworthiness contains two parts. First, the owner warrants that the
ship is seaworthy at the time the hull policy attaches. And second, the owner warrants
that “the Owner, from bad faith or neglect, will not knowingly permit the vessel to break
ground in an unseaworthy condition.” L & L Marine Serv., 796 F.2d at 1035. The Eighth
Circuit has held that the implied warranty requires the owner to exercise ordinary
diligence. Id. at 1035-36. In other words, the insurer will not be liable for losses arising
from an owner negligently allowing a ship to sail in an unseaworthy condition. Id. Other
circuits, however, have applied more stringent tests than mere negligence. See id. at 1035
(noting that the Fifth Circuit applied the more stringent knowingly standard).
In addition, the insurance agreement contained an express warranty of
seaworthiness. The provision provided:
Warranted at the inception of this policy the vessel shall be in a seaworthy
condition and thereafter, during the currency of this policy, [ASI] shall
exercise due diligence to keep the vessel seaworthy, and in all respects fit,
tight, and properly manned, equipped and supplied.
(Doc. No. 90, ¶ 8, Ex. D (“Insurance Agreement”) at ASI052182.) ASI argues that the
express seaworthiness warranty applies to the Hull Policy and not to the P&I Policy.
St. Paul Fire argues that the express warranty must apply to the P&I Policy because the
Hull Policy already contains an implied warranty.
“Disputes arising under marine insurance contracts are governed by state law,
unless an established federal admiralty rule addresses the issue raised.” Assicurazioni
Generali S.P.A. v. Black & Veatch Corp., 362 F.3d 1108, 1111 (8th Cir. 2004) (citing
Wilburn Boat Co. v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 348 U.S. 310, 316-21 (1955)). Here, both
parties appear to agree that Minnesota law governs the interpretation of the insurance
contract. See id. (concluding that state law governed the interpretation of the marine
insurance contract). Under Minnesota law, “[w]hile the insured bears the initial burden
of demonstrating coverage, the insurer carries the burden of establishing the applicability
of exclusions.” Midwest Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wolters, 831 N.W.2d 628, 636 (Minn.
2013). Once an exclusion is established, however, “the burden of proof shifts back to the
insured.” Id. (quotation marks omitted).
“Interpretation of an insurance policy is a question of law.” Travelers Indem. Co.
v. Bloomington Steel & Supply Co., 718 N.W.2d 888, 894 (Minn. 2006). Courts must
interpret policy language “according to both plain, ordinary sense and what a reasonable
person in the position of the insured would have understood the words to mean.”
Wolters, 831 N.W.2d at 636 (quotation marks omitted). “If the language of an insurance
contract is unambiguous, it must be given its plain and ordinary meaning. But if the
language is ambiguous, it will be construed against the insurer, as drafter of the contract.”
Bloomington Steel, 718 N.W.2d at 894 (internal citation omitted). Language in an
insurance policy should be deemed ambiguous only when “it is susceptible to two or
more reasonable interpretations,” Wolters, 831 N.W.2d at 636, and courts should decline
to find ambiguity where it does not exist, see Engineering & Construction Innovations,
Inc. v. L.H. Bolduc Co., 825 N.W.2d 695, 706 (Minn. 2013).
The insurance agreement is a compilation of a number of form-document sets, as
outlined in the table of contents:
(Insurance Agreement at ASI052164.) The express warranty of seaworthiness is part of
the Special Conditions forms, which is organized with the Hull Policy (OMOH0124).
Separately, the P&I Policy includes a subsection of special conditions. This subsection
contains only one term: a warranty that a particular person will pilot a particular tug boat.
Additionally, ASI avers that the form numbering indicates to which policy the
form applies. That is, the “OMOH” forms apply to the Hull Policy and the “OMPI”
forms apply to the P&I Policy. 3 Thus, ASI argues, that because the Special Conditions is
marked as an OMOH form, the Special Conditions—and therefore the express warranty
of seaworthiness—applies to only the Hull Policy.
Further, when St. Paul Fire wanted to carryover conditions from the Hull Policy to
the P&I Policy, St. Paul Fire explicitly incorporated those provisions. For example, the
P&I Policy states, “The navigation limits in this policy covering the hull, machinery, etc.
of the vessel named herein are considered incorporated herein.” (Insurance Agreement at
ASI062196.) The Schedule of Vessels, which follows the Hull Policy, is also
incorporated by reference into the P&I Policy. The P&I Policy, however, does not
explicitly incorporate the warranty of seaworthiness. Thus, based on the separate
special-condition sections, the form numbering, and the lack of incorporation, the Court
concludes that the warranty of seaworthiness contained in the Hull Policy does not apply
to the P&I Policy.
St. Paul Fire’s arguments to the contrary are unpersuasive. First, St. Paul Fire
relies on St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co. v. Belle of Hot Springs, 844 F.2d 550 (8th
Cir. 1988), where the Eighth Circuit found that the seaworthiness warranty applied to a
P&I policy. See id. at 551 & 553. St. Paul Fire argues that Belle is indistinguishable
from this case. But when the Court asked for a copy of the insurance agreement in Belle,
St. Paul Fire was unable to find one. (Doc. No. 182.) Additionally, many of the forms
here postdate Belle. Indeed, the Special Conditions are from 2005—well after Belle was
“OMGE” forms would then appear to apply to the whole insurance agreement.
Thus, based on ASI’s argument, the Punitive Damages Exclusion would apply to both.
(See ASI’s Partial MSJ Br. at 5.)
decided in 1988. Thus, the Court finds that Belle does not demand that the Court find
that the P&I Policy contains an express warranty of seaworthiness.
Second, St. Paul Fire argues that if the express provision does not apply to the P&I
Policy, then the express provision is meaningless because the Hull Policy already
contains an implied warranty of seaworthiness. But even if the implied and express
warranties required ASI to engage in the same conduct, an express clause is not
meaningless merely because it memorializes an implied term. See 11 Williston on
Contracts § 31:7 (4th ed. 2017) (noting that when a contract is silent, only reasonable
terms will be implied). For example, a court will not interpret a written contract for
goods differently even though there are similar implied terms codified in the Uniform
Commercial Code. See U.C.C. § 1-303(e) (noting that express terms trump trade usage).
Likewise, the Court here will not interpret the express contract provisions differently
because some analogous rule also exists in the common law. The Court therefore
concludes that the existence of an implied warranty of seaworthiness does not require the
Court to interpret the express warranty of seaworthiness as applying to the P&I Policy.
Accordingly, the Court grants ASI’s motion for partial summary judgment and denies
St. Paul Fire’s motion for summary judgment barring coverage on the basis that the
Barge was not seaworthy.
In the alternative, St. Paul Fire argues that ASI is collaterally estopped from
seeking damages because an arbitrator already found that ASI could not recover those
damages from Donjon (the business hired to raise the barge). (Pl.’s Strike Memo. at 28.)
The parties seem to agree that Minnesota law applies. Under Minnesota law, collateral
estoppel applies when:
(1) [T]he issue was identical to one in a prior adjudication; (2) there was a
final judgment on the merits; (3) the estopped party was a party or in privity
with a party to the prior adjudication; and (4) the estopped party was given
a full and fair opportunity to be heard on the adjudicated issue.
State v. Lemmer, 736 N.W.2d 650, 659 (Minn. 2007). The party seeking estoppel has the
burden. Virsen v. Rosso, Beutel, Johnson, Rosso & Ebersold, 356 N.W.2d 333, 337
(Minn. Ct. App. 1984).
Here, St. Paul Fire has failed to prove all of the elements of collateral estoppel.
While St. Paul Fire appears to have established that ASI is seeking the same damages
here as it sought in the arbitration, St. Paul Fire has not shown that the issue of whether
ASI can recover those damages is the same in both cases. In other words, St. Paul Fire
has failed to show that ASI’s damages from Donjon’s breach would be the same as ASI’s
damages from St. Paul Fire’s breach of the insurance agreement. Because St. Paul Fire
failed to demonstrate that collateral estoppel is appropriate, the Court denies Plaintiff’s
motion for summary judgment seeking collateral estoppel.
ASI’s Claim for Negligence
St. Paul Fire also moves for summary judgment for ASI’s negligence claim. ASI
alleges that St. Paul Fire negligently negotiated the Donjon contract. St. Paul Fire’s
negligence allegedly injured ASI because the poorly worded contract allowed Donjon to
abandon the project and undertake a lengthy arbitration. St. Paul Fire argues that it is
entitled to summary judgment because ASI cannot establish causation. That is, St. Paul
Fire argues that ASI cannot show that Donjon would have completed the project if the
contract had been worded differently. (See Pl.’s Strike Memo. at 33.)
“The analysis of a maritime tort is guided by general principles of negligence
law.” Consol. Aluminum Corp. v. C.F. Bean Corp., 833 F.2d 65, 67 (5th Cir. 1987).
Under admiralty law, the defendant’s negligence is actionable only if it was the “legal
cause” of the plaintiff’s injury. Donaghey v. Ocean Drilling & Expl. Co., 974 F.2d 646,
649 (5th Cir. 1992). A party’s actions are a legal cause if they are a substantial factor in
bringing about the injury. Id. “The term ‘substantial factor’ means more than ‘but for the
negligence, the harm would not have resulted.’” Id. Generally, causation is a question of
fact left for the factfinder. See, e.g., Lubbers v. Anderson, 539 N.W.2d 398, 402 (Minn.
1995). Summary judgment is appropriate, however, when “reasonable minds can arrive
at only one conclusion.” Id.
Here, St. Paul Fire argues that even if the Court were to find that St. Paul Fire
breached a duty to ASI by negligently negotiating the Donjon contract, ASI cannot show
that such a breach caused ASI any damages. The Court, however, concludes that a
question of material fact remains regarding whether the poorly worded contract
contributed to Donjon’s decision to breach its agreement. It could be the case that the
contract did not factor into Donjon’s decision, but St. Paul Fire does not cite any
evidence to show that Donjon would have acted the same way regardless of the contract.
Thus, the Court denies St. Paul Fire’s motion for summary judgment for ASI’s claim for
Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike ASI’s Jury Demand
St. Paul Fire has also moved to strike ASI’s request for a jury because juries are
generally not allowed in admiralty cases. ASI does not appear to dispute this general
statement of law. Instead, ASI argues that it is entitled to a jury for its common-law
negligence claim. (Def.’s Strike Opp. at 50.) ASI’s negligence claim (for the poorly
worded contract) is an alternative theory for ASI’s claim that St. Paul Fire breached the
insurance agreement by failing to enforce the salvage contract against Donjon.
(See id. at 48).
Generally, claims in admiralty do not carry with them a right to a jury trial. 14A
Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Edward H. Cooper, Fed. Prac. & Proc. § 3672
(4th ed. 2017). An issue arises, however, when a plaintiff has elected to proceed in
admiralty, but the defendant brings common-law counterclaims that carry with them the
right to a jury. Id. To resolve this issue, courts have held that when “[t]he defendant’s
counterclaims arise out of the same contract as the plaintiff’s claims and involve the same
operative facts, the plaintiff’s [admiralty] designation trumps defendant’s jury demand,
and the entire case will be tried to the court without a jury.” Am. S.S. Owners Mut. Prot.
& Indem. Ass’n, Inc. v. Lafarge N. Am., Inc., Civ. No. 06-3123, 2008 WL 2980919, at *2
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 1, 2008) (noting that this rule is applied in the “distinct majority of
decisions”). Here, ASI’s breach-of-contract claim is based on the same insurance policy
under which St. Paul Fire brought its declaratory-judgment action in admiralty. Thus,
St. Paul Fire’s election to proceed in admiralty supersedes any right of ASI’s to have its
breach-of-contract claim tried to a jury. And because ASI’s negligence claim is just an
alternative theory of liability based on the same conduct, ASI is not entitled to a jury for
its negligence claim. See id. But see In re Lockheed Martin Corp., 503 F.3d 351, 359-60
(4th Cir. 2007) (concluding that an insurer cannot use a declaratory judgment brought in
admiralty to usurp the insured’s right to a jury trial for its breach-of-contract claim). The
Court therefore grants St. Paul Fire’s motion to strike Plaintiff’s request for a jury trial.
Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike ASI’s Claim for Attorney Fees.
St. Paul Fire has also moved to strike ASI’s claim for attorney fees because the
claim is barred under admiralty law. ASI argues that Minnesota law applies, and that
under Minnesota law, an insured can recover attorney fees from successfully defending
an insurer’s declaratory-judgment action.
“Disputes arising under marine insurance contracts are governed by state law,
unless an established federal admiralty rule addresses the issue raised.” Assicurazioni
Generali S, 362 F.3d at 1111. Here, the Court concludes that there is no established
federal rule that bars insureds from recovering attorney fees. At most, there is a circuit
split, and the Eighth Circuit has not addressed the issue. Compare Am. Nat. Fire Ins. Co.
v. Kenealy, 72 F.3d 264, 271 (2d Cir. 1995) (finding that admiralty law clearly
establishes that attorney fees are not recoverable by the insured), with All Underwriters v.
Weisberg, 222 F.3d 1309, 1315 (11th Cir. 2000) (concluding that state law applied to the
issue of whether the insured could recover attorney fees). As a result, in the absence of
established federal precedent, the Court will apply Minnesota law. See N.Y. Marine &
Gen. Ins. Co. v. Cont’l Cement Co., LLC, 761 F.3d 830, 840 (8th Cir. 2014) (noting that a
single circuit’s decision did not establish a federal rule).
The Minnesota Supreme Court has concluded that in certain circumstances an
insurer will have to pay the insured’s attorney fees from successfully defending a
declaratory judgment in which the insurer sought to avoid coverage. Atl. Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Judd Co., 380 N.W.2d 122, 125 (Minn. 1986); see also Milwaukee Mut. Ins. Co. v. Val
Pro, Inc., Civ. No. 12-1658, 2013 WL 6388669, at *4 (D. Minn. Dec. 6, 2013). Whether
the insured can recover the attorney fees turns on the policy language. XL Specialty Ins.
Co. v. Miller, Civ. No.03-1128, 2004 WL 1701039, at *2 (D. Minn. July 28, 2004).
Here, St. Paul Fire must cover the “[c]osts and expenses, incurred with [St. Paul Fire’s]
approval, of investigating and/or defending any claim or suit against [ASI] arising out of
a liability or an alleged liability of [ASI] covered by this policy.” (Doc. No. 88, Ex. A,
1711.) Courts have awarded attorney fees based on similar policy language. See, e.g.,
Val Pro, Inc., Civ. No. 12-1658, 2013 WL 6388669, at *3 (noting that a “long line of
cases” in Minnesota have held that an insured can recover attorney fees when the insurer
has a duty to pay defense costs). Thus, ASI can recover its attorney fees if it successfully
defends this declaratory-judgment action. See id. at *4. The Court therefore denies
St. Paul Fire’s motion to strike ASI’s claim for attorney fees.
Based on the files, records, and proceedings herein, and for the reasons stated
above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
St. Paul Fire’s Motion for Summary Judgment and to Strike Certain Claims
(Doc. No. ) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART, as follows:
St. Paul Fire’s Motion for Summary Judgment regarding the
warranty of express seaworthiness is DENIED;
St. Paul Fire’s Motion for Summary Judgment regarding
collateral estoppel is DENIED;
St. Paul Fire’s Motion for Summary Judgment regarding
ASI’s negligence claim is DENIED;
St. Paul Fire’s Motion to Strike ASI’s demand for a jury trial
is GRANTED; and
St. Paul Fire’s Motion to Strike ASI’s claim for attorney fees
ASI’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Doc. No. ) is
GRANTED. The Court finds that the P&I Policy does not contain an expressed
warranty of seaworthiness.
Dated: May 24, 2017
s/Donovan W. Frank
DONOVAN W. FRANK
United States District Judge
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