Vang v. Prataya et al

Filing 45

ORDER denying 16 Motion to Dismiss. The hearing on November 29, 2012, at 9:30 a.m. is CANCELLED. (Written Opinion) Signed by Judge Joan N. Ericksen on November 21, 2012. (CBC)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Panyia Vang,
Plaintiff,
v.

Civil No. 12-1847 (JNE/SER)
ORDER

Thiawachu Prataya et al.,
Defendants.
Asserting claims under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1595 and 2255 (2006 & Supp. V 2011), Panyia
Vang brought this action against Thiawachu Prataya and Chong Neng Xiong. After Vang had
amended her complaint, Prataya and Xiong filed an Answer. 1 Approximately two months later,
Prataya and Xiong filed a Motion to Dismiss. For the reasons set forth below, the Court denies
the motion.
The parties presented matters outside the pleadings in connection with the motion. The
Court excludes the matters outside the pleadings and considers the motion under Rule 12(b)(6) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d). In ruling on such a motion, a
court accepts the facts alleged in the complaint as true and grants all reasonable inferences in
favor of the plaintiff. Crooks v. Lynch, 557 F.3d 846, 848 (8th Cir. 2009). Although a pleading
is not required to contain detailed factual allegations, “[a] pleading that offers ‘labels and
conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
555 (2007)). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,

1

The Complaint and the Amended Complaint are similar. Based on the numbered
paragraphs to which Prataya and Xiong specifically responded, it appears that Prataya and Xiong
answered the Complaint.
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accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Twombly,
550 U.S. at 570).
Without specifically addressing the Amended Complaint’s allegations or claims, Prataya
and Xiong assert that the Amended Complaint should be dismissed because Vang failed to allege
facts that state plausible claims, failed to show how she was damaged, failed to prove violations
of Title 18 of the United States Code, failed to disclose evidence that supports her allegations of
sexual assault, failed to allege her true age, and failed to allege that Prataya and Xiong have been
convicted of the crimes underlying her claims. Having reviewed the Amended Complaint, the
Court concludes that Vang alleged sufficient facts that state plausible claims for relief. Insofar as
Prataya and Xiong assert that the Amended Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can
be granted, the Court denies their motion.
Prataya and Xiong also maintain that the Amended Complaint should be dismissed for
failure to join a party under Rule 19. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(7). They bear the burden of
demonstrating why an absent person should be joined. See Disabled in Action of Pa. v. Se. Pa.
Transp. Auth., 635 F.3d 87, 97 (3d Cir. 2011). They have not satisfied their burden. The Court
declines to dismiss the Amended Complaint for failure to join a party under Rule 19.
Based on the files, records, and proceedings herein, and for the reasons stated above, IT
IS ORDERED THAT:
1.

Prataya and Xiong’s Motion to Dismiss [Docket No. 16] is DENIED.

2.

The hearing on November 29, 2012, at 9:30 a.m. is CANCELLED.

Dated: November 21, 2012
s/Joan N. Ericksen
JOAN N. ERICKSEN
United States District Judge

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