Hall v. Ramsey County et al
Filing
53
ORDER granting in part consistent with this order 42 Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiff's federal constitutional claims are dismissed with prejudice and plaintiff's state law claims are dismissed without prejudice.(Written Opinion). Signed by Senior Judge David S. Doty on 8/14/2014. (PJM)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Civil No. 12-1915(DSD/LIB)
Marc Hall,
Plaintiff,
ORDER
v.
Ramsey County; Eric Earl Anderson,
individually and in his official
capacity; Roy Irving, individually
and in his official capacity; Melissa
Jimenez, individually and in her
official capacity and Jodi Leifeld,
individually and in her official capacity,
Defendants.
Stephen C. Fiebiger, Esq. and Stephen C. Fiebiger Law
Office, 2500 West County Road 42, Suite 190, Burnsville,
MN 55337, counsel for plaintiff.
C. David Dietz, Esq., Kyle M. Thomas, Esq. and Office of
the Ramsey County Attorney, 121 Seventh Place East, Suite
4500, St. Paul, MN 55101, counsel for defendants.
This matter is before the court upon the motion for summary
judgment by defendants Ramsey County, Eric Earl Anderson, Roy
Irving,
Melissa
Jimenez
and
Jodi
Leifeld
(collectively,
defendants). Based on a review of the file, record and proceedings
herein, and for the following reasons, the court grants the motion
in part.
BACKGROUND
This civil-rights dispute arises out of the detention of
plaintiff Marc Hall on August 7 and August 8, 2011.
On the evening
of August 7, the Eagan Police Department responded to a call after
Hall crashed his bicycle into the garage door of a home.
Aff. Ex. 1, at 2.
Dietz
At the scene, Eagan Police Officer Tom Nelson
observed that Hall smelled strongly of alcohol.
Id.
Hall refused
a preliminary breath test and Nelson took Hall to the Ramsey County
Detox Center (Detox).
Id.
Nelson turned Hall over to the staff at
Detox and declined to pursue any charges.
Id.
Hall was admitted
to Detox at 10:44 p.m, went through the intake process and went to
sleep.
Id. Ex. 2, at 4-5; Hall Dep. 48:2-4.
At approximately 5:20 a.m. on August 8, Hall complained of
knee pain to Leifeld, a nurse at Detox.
Leifeld Dep. 22:4-6.
Hall
was able to walk but was unable to put his full weight on his leg.
Hall Dep. 50:14-20.
Hall informed Leifeld that he thought his leg
was broken and requested medical treatment.
Id. at 51:10-12.
Leifeld told Hall to wait until Detox processed those patients that
were set to be discharged around 5:30 a.m.
23:22.
Leifeld did not examine Hall’s leg.
Leifeld Dep. 22:14Id. at 24:19-21.
Thereafter, at approximately 5:30 a.m., Hall called 911 from
the Detox pay phone and requested medical treatment.
18:16-25.
Moses Dep.
The 911 dispatcher phoned Detox and informed an aide
that Hall had called 911.
A Detox nurse then informed Hall that
his telephone privileges were suspended and that he would be put
into seclusion if he called 911 again.
then placed another telephone call.
2
Hall Dep. 52:18-53:2.
Id. at 53:4-5.
Hall
Hall alleges
that he was calling an attorney that he had found in the yellow
pages and was not dialing 911.
Id. at 63:4-64:3.
Leifeld called
Anderson, Irving and Jimenez (collectively, Aides) to place Hall in
a seclusion room.
The Aides hung up the phone and led Hall down
the hallway towards the seclusion room. Id. at 64:15-19. Anderson
and Irving escorted Hall by his wrists and forearms.
67:18; Anderson Dep. 65:2-4.
Irving.
Id. at 66:25-
Jimenez walked behind Anderson and
Anderson Dep. 65:5-6.
During the escort, Anderson and Irving lost their grip on
Hall, and, during the ensuing struggle, pinned Hall against the
wall.
Hall Dep. 64:20-21; Irving Dep. 30:1-2.
Hall alleges that
Anderson twisted and yanked his arm behind him and that Hall heard
a popping sound. Hall Dep. 85:19-20, 92:19-21. While Anderson was
allegedly twisting Hall’s arm, Irving pinned him against the wall
with his shoulder. Irving Dep. 43:4-9. Irving and Anderson allege
that they pinned Hall against the wall to regain control of him.
Id. at 45:8-10
After regaining control of Hall, the Aides led Hall to the
seclusion room, where Anderson and Irving performed a take-down
maneuver and placed Hall face-first onto a mat on the floor.
Dep. 100:15-16.
Hall
In the seclusion room, Hall fell asleep until
approximately 7:30 a.m. See Fiebiger Aff. Ex. 18. Detox employees
checked on Hall approximately every fifteen minutes.
7:30 a.m., Hall was let out of the seclusion room.
3
See id.
At
Barrett Dep.
60:3-8.
Hall was then assessed and a Detox nurse noted that Hall
complained of right elbow pain, left leg pain and left pectoral
pain.
Keeling Dep. 30:10-12.
Hall was taken to Regions Hospital (Regions) around 11:30
a.m., where he was seen by Dr. Cullen Hegarty.
16:22-17:3.
See Hegarty Dep.
Dr. Hegarty ordered x-rays on Hall’s elbow and leg.
The elbow x-ray displayed a nondisplaced fracture of the elbow.
Id. at 30:7-8.
the fibula.
The knee x-ray showed a nondisplaced fracture of
Id. at 27:2-10.
Dr. Hegarty placed Hall’s arm in a
sling and immobilized his left leg.
Id. at 28:19-29:7.
Hall was
released from Regions at 3:30 p.m.
On
February
27,
2013,
Hall
filed
an
amended
complaint,
alleging claims for excessive force, denial of medical care and
denial of due process under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and state-law claims
for
assault,
battery,
false
imprisonment
and
negligence.
Defendants move for summary judgment.
DISCUSSION
I.
Standard of Review
“The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows
that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed. R. Civ.
P. 56(a); see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).
A fact is material only when its resolution affects the outcome of
4
the case.
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248
(1986). A dispute is genuine if the evidence is such that it could
cause a reasonable jury to return a verdict for either party.
See
id. at 252.
On a motion for summary judgment, the court views all evidence
and inferences in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party.
See id. at 255.
The nonmoving party, however, may not rest upon
mere denials or allegations in the pleadings but must set forth
specific facts sufficient to raise a genuine issue for trial.
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324.
See
A party asserting that a genuine dispute
exists — or cannot exist — about a material fact must cite
“particular parts of materials in the record.”
56(c)(1)(A).
Fed. R. Civ. P.
If a plaintiff cannot support each essential element
of a claim, the court must grant summary judgment because a
complete
failure
of
proof
regarding
an
essential
necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.
element
Celotex, 477 U.S.
at 322-23.
II.
Section 1983
Section 1983 is not an independent source of rights, and a
successful claim must demonstrate a deprivation of a specific
right, privilege or immunity.
(8th
Cir.
1986).
constitutional
excessive
rights
force
In
this
were
during
Morton v. Becker, 793 F.2d 185, 187
the
case,
Hall
violated
by
escort
to
5
alleges
defendants
the
that
his
(1)
using
seclusion
room,
(2) denying him due process by placing him in the seclusion room
and (3) denying him medical care for his injured leg.
Defendants
“Qualified
respond
immunity
discretionary
that
protects
functions
...
qualified
government
from
immunity
officials
liability
for
applies.
performing
civil
damages
insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person
would have known.”
Crutcher-Sanchez v. Cnty. of Dakota, 687 F.3d
979, 984 (8th Cir. 2012) (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted). Violation of a clearly established right means “that the
unlawfulness was apparent in light of preexisting law.”
Chambers
v. Pennycook, 641 F.3d 898, 908 (8th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted).
The qualified immunity analysis has two components: whether the
government official violated the plaintiff’s rights and whether the
right was clearly established.
232 (2009).
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223,
Hall’s claims fail because he cannot demonstrate a
violation of a constitutional right.
A.
Excessive Force
Hall first alleges that defendants used excessive force while
transporting him to the seclusion room.
Because defendants were
not law enforcement officers and the alleged excessive force
occurred in the context of the Detox facility rather than in a
criminal setting, the constitutional basis for the claim is the
substantive due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
6
See
Lanman v. Hinson, 529 F.3d 673, 680-81 (6th Cir. 2008) (“[W]hen a
plaintiff is not in a situation where his rights are governed by
the particular provisions of the Fourth or Eighth Amendments, the
more generally applicable Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment provides the individual with protection against physical
abuse by officials.” (citation omitted)). To establish a violation
of his substantive due process rights, Hall “must demonstrate both
that the official[s’] conduct was conscience-shocking, and that the
official[s] violated one or more fundamental rights that are deeply
rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition, and implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty, such that neither liberty nor justice
would exist if they were sacrificed.”
Norris v. Engles, 494 F.3d
634, 637-38 (8th Cir. 2007) (emphasis in original) (citations and
internal quotation marks omitted).
Defendants argue that summary judgment is warranted because
their actions, even taken in the light most favorable to Hall, were
not conscience-shocking.
The court agrees.
“[I]n a due process
challenge to executive action, the threshold question is whether
the behavior of the governmental officer is so egregious, so
outrageous, that it may fairly be said to shock the contemporary
conscience.”
Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 847 n.8
(1998).
Whether
conscience-shocking
conduct
has
occurred is tested by an appraisal of the
totality of facts in a given case. That which
may, in one setting, constitute a denial of
7
fundamental
fairness,
shocking
to
the
universal sense of justice, may, in other
circumstances, and in the light of other
considerations, fall short of such denial.
Norris, 494 F.3d at 638 (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted).
Here,
the
incident.
court
has
reviewed
See Dietz Aff. Ex. 3.
the
security
video
of
the
The video shows the Aides
escorting Hall down the hallway and placing him face-down on the
mat in the seclusion room.
Hall appears uncooperative as he drags
his feet and resists the Aides’ escort.
Moreover, the amount of
force used by the Aides is not obviously excessive or malicious and
does not appear to present a reasonably foreseeable risk of bodily
injury to Hall.
Moreover, the incident arose after Hall disobeyed
Leifeld’s orders to cease using the telephone while the other
patients were being discharged.
In other words, the escort and
subsequent force was “a good faith effort to maintain or restore
discipline.”
Gottlieb ex rel. Calabria v. Laurel Highlands School
Dist., 272 F.3d 168, 173 (3d Cir. 2001) (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted); cf. id. at 172-73 (“In determining
whether the constitutional line has been crossed, a court must look
to such factors as the need for the application of force, the
relationship between the need and the amount of force that was
used, the extent of injury inflicted, and whether force was applied
in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline or
maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm.”
8
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
As a result, no
reasonable jury could find that the amount of force used on Hall
was conscience-shocking, and summary judgment on the excessive
force claim is warranted.
B.
Hall
Denial of Medical Care
next argues
that defendants
demonstrated deliberate
indifference to his medical needs by refusing to provide medical
care for his leg injury.
As a detainee rather than a prisoner,
Hall’s “right to medical care arises under the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment.”
Jackson v. Buckman, No. 13-1165,
2014 WL 2898459, at *3 (8th Cir. June 27, 2014) (citation omitted).
Although the claim is rooted in the Fourteenth Amendment, the court
applies “the deliberate-indifference standard that governs claims
brought by convicted inmates under the Eighth Amendment.”
Id.
(citations omitted). Under that standard, Hall must show “(1) that
[he] suffered [from] objectively serious medical needs and (2) that
the ... officials actually knew of but deliberately disregarded
those needs.”
(8th
Cir.
Fourte v. Faulkner Cnty., Ark., 746 F.3d 384, 387
2014)
(first
and
second
alterations
in
original)
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
“Deliberate
indifference
than
is
more
than
negligence,
more
even
gross
negligence, and mere disagreement with treatment decisions does not
rise to the level of a constitutional violation.”
and internal quotation marks omitted).
9
Id. (citations
“Deliberate indifference
may be found where medical care [is] so inappropriate as to
evidence intentional maltreatment.”
Id. (alteration in original)
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Defendants argue that Hall did not have an objectively serious
medical need for treatment.
The court agrees.
“A serious medical
need is one that has been diagnosed by a physician as requiring
treatment, or one that is so obvious that even a layperson would
easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.”
Coleman
v. Rahija, 114 F.3d 778, 784 (8th Cir. 1997) (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted).
Here, despite Hall’s reports of leg
pain, he was able to walk and move with little difficulty, and Hall
did not appear to Leifeld to require immediate medical attention.
See Hall Dep. 50:14-27; Leifeld Dep. 25:4-5.
Moreover, Hall alleges only a six-hour delay in - and not a
complete denial of - treatment of his leg injury.
“When [a
detainee] alleges that a delay in medical treatment constituted a
constitutional
deprivation,
the
objective
seriousness
of
the
deprivation should also be measured by reference to the effect of
delay in treatment.”
Coleman, 114 F.3d at 784 (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted).
Thus, Hall “must present
medical evidence to show that any treatment delay had a detrimental
effect” on the injury.
Thomsen v. Ross, 368 F. Supp. 2d 961, 973
(D. Minn. 2005) (citation omitted).
Here, Hall has presented no
such evidence of a detrimental effect caused by the delay, arguing
10
only that the delay caused “unnecessary pain and suffering.”
Opp’n 35.
Mem.
Such generalized arguments are insufficient to show a
detrimental effect from the delay.
See Coleman, 114 F.3d at 784
(noting that a detainee’s “failure to place verifying medical
evidence in the record to establish the detrimental effect of delay
in medical treatment precludes a claim of deliberate indifference
to medical needs.” (citation omitted)).
As a result, summary
judgment on the deliberate indifference claim is warranted.
C.
Denial of Due Process
Hall
next
argues
that
he
was
denied
due
defendants placed him in the seclusion unit.
procedural
due
process
violation,
a
process
when
“To set forth a
plaintiff,
first,
must
establish that his protected liberty or property interest is at
stake ....
Second, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant
deprived him of such an interest without due process of law.”
Gordon v. Hansen, 168 F.3d 1109, 1114 (8th Cir. 1999) (per curiam)
(citations omitted).
Here, Hall argues that he was placed in
seclusion
of
as
a
form
constitutionally-protected
punishment,
liberty
in
contravention
interest.
Cf.
of
Martinez
his
v.
Turner, 977 F.2d 421, 423 (8th Cir. 1992) (“Pretrial detainees are
presumed innocent and may not be punished.” (citation omitted)).
As a threshold matter, it is unclear whether the standards
governing
pretrial detainees
apply
to
Hall, as he
arrested and was not facing criminal charges.
11
was
never
Even if such
standards apply, however, Hall has not created a genuine issue of
material fact as to whether his placement in the seclusion unit was
punitive.
Indeed, whether a “particular restriction or condition
accompanying pretrial detention is punishment turns on whether
[the]
restriction
or
condition
is
legitimate governmental objective.”
reasonably
related
to
[a]
Whitfield v. Dicker, 41 F.
App’x 6, 7 (8th Cir. 2002) (unpublished per curiam) (citation
omitted).
Here, Hall requested medical treatment from Leifeld and
called 911 during the time other patients were being discharged.
See Leifeld Dep. 22:14-23:22.
Moreover, after Hall was told that
his telephone privileges were suspended, he again attempted to
place a telephone call.
See Hall Dep. 63:4-64:18.
Such actions
were disruptive to Detox’s discharge process, and maintaining
“order within [an] institution [is a] permissible nonpunitive
objective[].”
Whitfield, 41 F. App’x at 7 (citation omitted).
Moreover, only if “the restriction or condition is arbitrary or
purposeless ... [does] the action [become] a punishment that
violates Due Process if inflicted upon detainees.”
Smith v.
Copeland, 892 F. Supp. 1218, 1227 (E.D. Mo. 1995) (citation and
internal
quotation
marks
omitted).
Here,
Hall’s
temporary
seclusion was not arbitrary or purposeless, as it served the
purpose of maintaining order within Detox during patient discharge.
As a result,
no reasonable jury could find that such an action was
12
punitive,
and
summary
judgment
on
the
due
process
claim
is
warranted.1
III.
Remaining State Law Claims
As already explained, summary judgment on the § 1983 claims —
the only claims for which this court’s original jurisdiction
existed — is warranted.
Thus, the court must now consider whether
to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state-law
claims.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); Johnson v. City of Shorewood,
Minn., 360 F.3d 810, 819 (8th Cir. 2004).
“[I]n the usual case in
which all federal-law claims are eliminated before trial, the
balance of factors to be considered under the pendent jurisdiction
doctrine — judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity —
will point toward declining to exercise jurisdiction over the
remaining state-law claims.”
Dodson v. Univ. of Ark. for Med.
Scis., 601 F.3d 750, 756 (8th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (citations
and internal quotation marks omitted).
Based on consideration of
the pendent jurisdiction factors, the court does not exercise its
1
Hall also alleges a due process claim against Ramsey County
for maintaining an “official policy and practice that authorized
individual defendants and staff to use physical holds, restraint
and the seclusion room on [Hall] at the Detox Center.” Am. Compl.
¶ 44. As already explained, summary judgment is warranted on the
constitutional claims against the individual defendants. For these
same reasons, summary judgment is warranted on the derivative claim
against Ramsey County.
13
discretion to take supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law
claims.
Therefore, the court dismisses Hall’s remaining state law
claims without prejudice.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, based on the above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
1.
The motion for summary judgment [ECF No. 42] is granted
in part, consistent with this order;
2.
Hall’s federal constitutional claims are dismissed with
prejudice;
3.
Hall’s state law claims are dismissed without prejudice.
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.
Dated:
August 14, 2014
s/David S. Doty
David S. Doty, Judge
United States District Court
14
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