Young v. Roy

Filing 13

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER adopting Report and Recommendations re 9 Report and Recommendation. (Written Opinion). Signed by Judge John R. Tunheim on December 5, 2013. (DML) CC: Young. (kt)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
RICHARD DIX YOUNG, III,

Civil No. 12-1963 (JRT/FLN)
Petitioner,

v.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND
ORDER ADOPTING REPORT &
RECOMMENDATION OF
MAGISTRATE JUDGE

TOM ROY, Minnesota Commissioner of
Corrections,
Respondent.

Richard Dix Young, III, #190500, Minnesota Correctional Facility – Lino
Lakes, 7525 Fourth Avenue, Lino Lakes, MN 55014, pro se.
Peter R. Marker, Assistant Ramsey County Attorney, RAMSEY
COUNTY ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, 50 Kellogg Boulevard, Suite 315, St.
Paul, MN 55102, for respondent.

On August 10, 2012, petitioner Richard Dix Young, III filed a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Pet., Aug. 10, 2012, Docket No. 1.) In a
Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) dated February 21, 2013, United States
Magistrate Judge Franklin L. Noel recommended that the Court deny Young’s petition.
(R&R, Feb. 22, 2013, Docket No. 9.) Young has filed timely objections to the R&R.
(Objection to R&R (“Objections”), Mar. 8, 2013, Docket No. 10.) The Court reviews de
novo those portions of the R&R to which Young objects. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C);
D. Minn. LR 72.2. Because the majority of Young’s objections focus on potential errors
of state law, which are not reviewable in federal habeas proceedings, and because the

26&LH

federal claims Young raises are without merit, the Court overrules Young’s objections
and adopts the R&R of the Magistrate Judge.

BACKGROUND
As the R&R noted, the facts of the present case are undisputed and the procedural
history is relatively simple. In 2009, Young fired a gun into a vehicle three or four times
from close range. (Resp’t’s App. at 13, Sept. 14, 2012, Docket No. 7.) Young missed his
intended target but hit the vehicle’s other occupant in the mouth, causing significant
injuries. (Id. at 13-15.) In December 2009, Young pled guilty to second degree assault
and attempted first degree assault in the state district court for Ramsey County,
Minnesota. (Id. at 74-75.) The plea agreement provided that Young’s sentences for the
two crimes would run consecutively. (Id. at 75.) At the plea hearing, however, Young’s
attorney stated that “the sentence would be consecutive if permitted under the
Guidelines.” (Id. at 2.)
At sentencing, the trial court stated that the plea agreement “calls for consecutive
sentencing, which is permissive in this case.” (Id. at 19.) The court noted that the plea
agreement clearly contemplated consecutive sentences and found that “consecutive
sentencing is consistent with the seriousness of the offenses.” (Id. at 22, 26.) The trial
court sentenced Young to 67.5 months for the attempted first degree assault conviction
and 57 months for the second degree assault conviction, for a total sentence of 124.5
months. (Id. at 26-28.)

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In November 2010, Young filed a motion in the trial court seeking to correct his
sentence pursuant to Minnesota Rule of Criminal Procedure 27.03, subd. 9, which allows
the trial court to “at any time correct a sentence not authorized by law.” (Resp’t’s App. at
30.) Young argued that his sentences must run concurrently because at the time of his
offense attempted first degree assault was not included in the Minnesota Sentencing
Guideline’s list of offenses eligible for permissive consecutive sentencing. (Id. at 31.)
While the trial court agreed that the applicable version of the Guidelines did not authorize
Young’s consecutive sentences, the court concluded that the sentence was nonetheless
permissible under Minnesota caselaw. (See id. at 56-57.) Thus, the trial court denied the
motion. (Id. at 55.)
Young appealed, arguing that his consecutive sentences were not authorized, but
the Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed. See Young v. State, No. A11-317, 2011 WL
2623454 (Minn. Ct. App. July 5, 2011). The Court of Appeals concluded, like the trial
court, that although the then-existing Guidelines did not authorize consecutive sentences
for Young’s crimes, the sentence was authorized by caselaw. Id. at *1. Young also
argued that his sentence was not authorized because it “constituted a departure from the
sentencing guidelines and the district court failed to state on the record the grounds for
the departure.” Id. at *2. While Young’s argument was primarily grounded in Minnesota
state law, Young asserted that the imposition of consecutive sentences “implicates
[Young]’s right to a jury trial on sentencing enhancement.” (Resp’t’s App. at 49.)
Because Young did not admit any aggravating factors to support consecutive sentences
and a jury did not find such factors, Young contended that his sentence violated the
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constitutional principles set forth in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), and
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). The Court of Appeals did not refer to the
federal cases cited by Young but rejected Young’s argument on the basis that the
consecutive sentences were authorized by Minnesota caselaw.

Young, 2011 WL

2623454, at *2.
The Minnesota Supreme Court denied Young’s petition for review on
September 28, 2011, (Respondent’s App. at 206), and Young timely filed the present
petition in this Court on August 10, 2012.

ANALYSIS
I.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Court must analyze the present petition within the framework provided by the

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), which “imposes a
highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings and demands that state-court
rulings be given the benefit of the doubt.” Renico v. Lett, 130 S. Ct. 1855, 1862 (2010)
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Specifically, AEDPA provides that:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody
pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect
to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings
unless the adjudication of the claim—
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined
by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State
court proceeding.
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28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). A federal court may grant habeas relief under the “contrary to”
clause of § 2254(d) only if a state court “applies a rule that contradicts the governing law
set forth in [Supreme Court] cases” or if a state court “confronts a set of facts that are
materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the Supreme Court] and nevertheless
arrives at a result different from [Supreme Court] precedent.” Williams v. Taylor, 529
U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000).

A federal court may grant habeas relief under the

“unreasonable application” clause of § 2254(d) only if the state court’s application of
federal law is “objectively unreasonable,” which is “a substantially higher threshold for
obtaining relief than de novo review.” Renico, 130 S. Ct. at 1862 (internal quotation
marks omitted). If “fairminded jurists could disagree” as to the correctness of the state
court’s ruling, the federal court may not grant habeas relief. See Harrington v. Richter,
131 S. Ct. 770, 786 (2011).

II.

YOUNG’S OBJECTIONS
Young’s petition sets forth two grounds for relief: (1) that his “conviction obtained

by guilty plea was unlawful” because he was to receive consecutive terms “if permitted
by [the Guidelines],” yet the Guidelines did not authorize such a sentence, and he
nonetheless received consecutive terms; and (2) that his sentence was an unauthorized
upward departure based on facts that were not stipulated or proven at trial, in violation of
the Sixth Amendment. (Pet. at 5-6). The R&R rejected Young’s first ground, finding
that Young made no attempt to explain why his conviction, as opposed to his sentence, is
unlawful. (R&R at 8-9.) The R&R also rejected Young’s second ground, concluding
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that it was largely an attack on the Minnesota courts’ application of Minnesota law,
which the federal courts cannot review, (id. at 11-12), and that regardless of whether the
sentence was authorized by Minnesota law, the Supreme Court held in Oregon v. Ice, 555
U.S. 160 (2009), that the Sixth Amendment does not require a jury to find the facts that
lead to the imposition of consecutive sentences, (R&R at 12-13).
Young’s objections to the R&R largely rehash the arguments that he made in his
memoranda in support of his petition. The objections fall into two categories: (1) that his
sentence was unlawful because it was not authorized by the state sentencing guidelines;
and (2) that his sentence violates Apprendi and Blakely and deprives him of Due Process
and of his Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial.1 He contends that Ice is distinguishable
because it was based on an Oregon sentencing system that differs from Minnesota’s. (Id.
at 6-7.) Having considered Young’s objections and conducted a de novo review, the
Court will deny Young’s petition for the reasons articulated in the R&R.2

1

Young states in his objections that his “plea was not made freely after the prosecution
fals[e]ly stated his sentence is permissive,” (Objections at 5), which does not fit into the two
categories outlined above. At no point in his direct appeal or his initial petition to this Court has
Young argued that his plea was invalid for any reason. The only remedy Young has sought is
resentencing, as opposed to withdrawal of the plea. To the extent that Young intends to raise
such a claim, the Court is unable to consider whether Young’s plea was involuntary due to
misinformation from the prosecution because he did not present this claim to the state courts.
See Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004) (holding that a state prisoner must “fairly present
his claim in each appropriate state court . . . thereby alerting that court to the federal nature of the
claim” prior to seeking a federal writ of habeas corpus). Additionally, the Court typically will
not entertain arguments that were not first made to the Magistrate Judge. See, e.g., Ridenour v.
Boehringer Ingelheim Pharms, Inc., 679 F.3d 1062, 1067 (8th Cir. 2012) (“[Plaintiff] was
required to present all of his arguments to the magistrate judge, lest they be waived.”).
2

Young’s arguments are not perfectly clear and he often blends together largely
unrelated concepts and doctrines. For example, Young argues that the Minnesota Court of
(Footnote continued on next page.)

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First, much of Young’s petition and objections are devoted to arguing that his
consecutive sentences were unlawful because the state sentencing guidelines did not
authorize them and the Minnesota courts erroneously relied on inapposite caselaw to
justify the sentence. Regardless of whether Young’s argument has merit, this Court
cannot grant relief on these grounds. “[I]t is not the province of a federal habeas court to
reexamine state-court determinations on state-law questions.

In conducting habeas

review, a federal court is limited to deciding whether a conviction violated the
Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 6768 (1991); see also Evenstad v. Carlson, 470 F.3d 777, 782 (8th Cir. 2006) (“Like the
district court, we lack authority to review the Minnesota state courts’ interpretation and
application of state law . . . .”). Even if Young is correct that the Minnesota courts erred
in concluding that the consecutive sentences were authorized by caselaw, Young has not
explained how that error goes beyond an error of state law and implicates the
Constitution or other federal law.3
____________________________________
(Footnote continued.)

Appeals did not honor “Blakely, Apprendi, or the Constitution” when it acknowledged that the
Guidelines did not authorize consecutive sentences but justified the sentence on the basis of
caselaw. (Objections at 3-4.) And Young believes that if he was “to receive a sentence outside
of the [Guidelines], due process of law should have afforded him a trial by jury.” (Id. at 4-5.)
The Court recognizes, as Young notes, that Young “is not a legal expert,” (id. at 3), and the
Court has therefore attempted to interpret his arguments liberally.
3

To the extent that Young attempts to raise a Due Process claim, (see Objections at 3;
Mem. in Supp. at 3, Aug. 10, 2012, Docket No. 1-2), the Court finds multiple impediments to
relief. The potential claim, which is not developed in Young’s filings, would likely be based on
Hicks v. Oklahoma, in which the Supreme Court held that when a state creates a “substantial and
legitimate expectation” regarding sentencing, an “arbitrary deprivation” of such entitlement may
(Footnote continued on next page.)

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Second, Young’s claims regarding Blakely, Apprendi, and the Sixth Amendment
fail. In Ice, the Supreme Court analyzed an Oregon statute that allowed for consecutive
sentences only if the judge found certain aggravating factors. See 555 U.S. at 163. The
Ice Court held that the Oregon statute did not violate the Sixth Amendment even though
it allowed judges, not juries, to find the specific facts that lead to longer prison sentences
than would be served in the absence of those facts. See id. at 164. Young attempts to
distinguish Ice by arguing that:
[I]n Ice, the sentencing statute required the trial judge to make specific
findings of fact to support the imposition of the consecutive sentences.
Unlike the Oregon statute, in Minnesota, the Guidelines simply do not
permit consecutive sentencing unless the offense is on the list, and thus
doing so constitutes a departure.
(Mem. in Supp. at 11 (citation omitted) (emphasis in original).) However, the Court
concludes that in light of Ice, the Minnesota courts’ rejection (or disregard) of Young’s
Sixth Amendment claims was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly
established federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). In addition to upholding the Oregon
statute that required specific judicial fact-finding to impose consecutive sentences, Ice
confirmed that there is no Sixth Amendment violation when states “entrust to judges’
____________________________________
(Footnote continued.)

violate the Fourteenth Amendment. See 447 U.S. 343, 346 (1980). For one, Young has not
presented this claim to the Minnesota courts either in his direct appeal or via collateral
proceedings, and this Court therefore cannot review the claim. See Baldwin, 541 U.S. at 29.
Additionally, even if the claim were properly before the Court, and even if the Minnesota courts
erroneously applied Minnesota law in this case, it is not clear that the error rose to the level of an
“arbitrary deprivation.” Cf. Chambers v. Bowersox, 157 F.3d 560, 565 (8th Cir. 1998) (“We
reject the notion that every trial error, even every trial error occurring during the sentencing
phase of a capital case, gives rise to a claim under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.”). The decision reached by the state courts in this case was not without support.

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unfettered discretion the decision whether sentences for discrete offenses shall be served
consecutively or concurrently.” See 555 U.S. at 163-64. Because the Sixth Amendment
does not require juries to find the facts that lead to the imposition of consecutive
sentences, the Sixth Amendment is not implicated in this case regardless of whether the
trial judge’s decision to impose consecutive sentences was contrary to Minnesota law and
regardless of whether it constituted a departure from the Minnesota sentencing
guidelines. At most, Young has identified an error of state law, for which the Court
cannot grant relief in these proceedings.

III.

CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
Because the Minnesota Court of Appeals’ rejection of Young’s claims was not

contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established law, the Court
overrules Young’s objections and adopts the R&R. Additionally, the Court finds that
reasonable jurists would not disagree with its resolution of Young’s constitutional claims.
The Court therefore will not grant a certificate of appealability, which may only issue
where a petitioner has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.
See Copeland v. Washington, 232 F.3d 969, 977 (8th Cir. 2000); see also 28 U.S.C.
§ 2253(c)(2).

ORDER
Based on the foregoing, and all the files, records, and proceedings herein, the
Court OVERRULES Young’s objections [Docket No. 10] and ADOPTS the Report and

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Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge dated February 21, 2013 [Docket No. 9].
Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
1.

Young’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus [Doc. No. 1] is DENIED. The

action is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
2.

The Court does NOT certify for appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c) the

issues raised in Young’s petition.

LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.

DATED: December 5, 2013
at Minneapolis, Minnesota.

____s/
____
JOHN R. TUNHEIM
United States District Judge

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