Taylor v. Smith et al

Filing 15

ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS. Denying as moot 14 Motion to expand the record filed by Eric Vandell Taylor; Overruling 13 Motion to Alter/Amend/Correct Judgment filed by Eric Vandell Taylor; Granting 10 Motion to Amend Pleadings filed by Eric Vandell Taylor; Adopting 12 Report and Recommendation (Written Opinion). Signed by Senior Judge David S. Doty on 6/10/2013. (PJM) cc: Eric Vandell Taylor on 6/10/2013 (jam).

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Civil No. 12-2011(DSD/JJG)
Eric Vandell Taylor,
Petitioner,
ORDER

v.
Michelle Smith, Warden and
MCF-Stillwater,
Respondents.

Eric Vandell Taylor, 169755, MCF-Stillwater, 970 Picket
Street North, Bayport, MN 55003, pro se.
Peter R. Marker, Ramsey County Attorney’s Office, 50
Kellogg Boulevard West, Suite 315, St. Paul, MN 55102,
counsel for respondents.

This matter is before the court upon the objection1 by pro se
petitioner Eric Vandell Taylor to the April 24, 2013, report and
recommendation of Magistrate Judge Jeanne J. Graham. Based on a de
novo review of the file, record and proceedings herein, and for the
following reasons, the court overrules the objection and adopts the
report and recommendation in its entirety.

1

Taylor moved “to alter or amend the judgment entered in this
case on April 24, 2013 in order to correct manifest errors of law
and fact.” ECF No. 13, at 1. Given Taylor’s pro se status, the
court construes this as an objection to the magistrate judge’s
report and recommendation.

BACKGROUND
The background of this action is fully set forth in the
magistrate

judge’s

summarizes

only

objection.

On August 20, 2009, Taylor was arrested and charged

with two

counts

report

those

of

and

facts

criminal

recommendation,
necessary

to

sexual conduct,

and

resolve

in

the

court

Taylor’s

violation

Minnesota Statutes § 609.342, subdivision 1(b), 1(g).

of

State v.

Taylor, No. A10-1940, 2012 WL 1149323, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. Apr.
9, 2012).

Taylor demanded a speedy trial on September 9, 2009.

Id. at *2.
The trial was twice postponed.

The first delay resulted from

a backlog at the DNA analysis laboratory.
occurred

when

a

state

unavailable to testify.

witness
Id.

was

out

Id.
of

The second delay
the

country

and

During the delay and prior to trial,

the victim made additional allegations against Taylor. Id. On May
21, 2010, the criminal complaint was amended to include additional
incidences of sexual assault.

Id.

On May 24, 2010, Taylor was tried and convicted of one count
of first-degree criminal sexual conduct and sentenced to 360 months
in prison.

Id.

Taylor appealed, arguing in part that the

conviction should be overturned based on his Sixth Amendment right
to a speedy trial.

The Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed the

conviction on April 9, 2012.

Id. at *6.

Court denied review on June 27, 2012.

2

The Minnesota Supreme

On August 16, 2012, Taylor filed a petition for writ of habeas
corpus, alleging that he was deprived of his Sixth Amendment right
to a speedy trial.2

ECF No. 1.

DISCUSSION
The

court

reviews

the

magistrate judge de novo.

report

and

in his

of

the

See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Fed. R.

Civ. P. 72(b)(3); D. Minn. LR 72.2(b).
arguments

recommendation

objection.

Rather,

Taylor raises no new
Taylor

argues

that the

magistrate judge incorrectly balanced the factors set forth in
Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972).3

2

Initially, Taylor also argued that he was deprived of a
unanimous verdict, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Taylor later moved to amend his petition to remove that argument,
so as to not present a “mixed petition” containing exhausted and
non-exhausted claims.
See ECF No. 10.
The magistrate judge
recommended granting the motion to amend and analyzed only the
speedy trial claim.
3

To reach the Barker analysis, the length of the delay must
be presumptively prejudicial. United States v. Summage, 575 F.3d
864, 875 (8th Cir. 2009).
If the delay is not presumptively
prejudicial, the court may conclude that no speedy trial violation
occurred without analyzing the Barker factors. Id. It is unclear,
however, whether the delay of eight or nine months is presumptively
prejudicial. Compare United States v. Jeanetta, 533 F.3d 651, 656
(8th Cir. 2008) (“A delay approaching one year may meet the
threshold for presumptively prejudicial delay requiring application
of the Barker factors.” (citations omitted)), with United States v.
McFarland, 116 F.3d 316, 318 (8th Cir. 1997) (“Only a little over
seven months elapsed between ... indictment and trial, too brief a
delay to trigger review of [the] Sixth Amendment speedy trial
claim.” (citation omitted)).
The court need not reach this
determination, however, because even if the delay was presumptively
prejudicial, the Barker factors weigh in favor of a finding that
(continued...)
3

In analyzing a speedy trial claim under Barker, the court
balances the “[l]ength of delay, the reason for the delay, the
defendant’s

assertion

defendant.”

Id. at 530.

of

his

right,

and

prejudice

to

the

After a de novo review of the record and

the report and recommendation, the court finds that the report of
the magistrate judge correctly resolves the issue of Taylor’s
speedy trial claim.

Therefore, the objection is overruled.

Further, the court determines that Taylor has not made a
“substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right” as
required by 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2).

As a result, the court does

not grant a certificate of appealability.

CONCLUSION
Accordingly, based on the above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
1.

Petitioner’s motion to amend the pleadings [ECF No. 10]

is granted;
2.

Petitioner’s motion to alter or amend the judgment [ECF

No. 13] is construed as an objection to the magistrate judge’s
report and recommendation and is overruled;
3.

The magistrate judge’s report and recommendation [ECF No.

12] is adopted in full;

3

(...continued)
Taylor’s speedy trial rights were not violated.
4

4.

Petitioner’s motion to expand the record [ECF No. 14] is

denied as moot; and
5.

Pursuant

to

28

U.S.C.

§

2253,

the

court

denies

certificate of appealability.
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.
Dated:

June 10, 2013
s/David S. Doty
David S. Doty, Judge
United States District Court

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