Sandusky Wellness Center, LLC v. Medtox Scientific, Inc. et al
ORDER granting 229 Motion to Certify Class and denying 234 Motion to Dismiss/General. IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 1. Plaintiff's renewed motion for class certification 229 is GRANTED, and the Court CERTIFIES a class of "[a]ll pers ons who (1) between February 18, 2012, and February 26, 2012, (2) were sent one or more of the 3,256 transmissions of the telephone facsimile message attached as Exhibit A to the Complaint, which related to lead testing services by or on behalf of MedTox." 2. Defendant's motion to dismiss 234 is DENIED.(Written Opinion) Signed by Judge Patrick J. Schiltz on April 25, 2017. (CLG)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
SANDUSKY WELLNESS CENTER, LLC,
an Ohio limited liability company,
individually and as the representative of
a class of similarly‐situated persons,
Case No. 12‐CV‐2066 (PJS/HB)
MEDTOX SCIENTIFIC, INC., MEDTOX
LABORATORIES, INC., and JOHN
Glenn L. Hara, Brian J. Wanca, Ryan M. Kelly, and Wallace C. Solberg,
ANDERSON + WANCA; Garrett D. Blanchfield, Jr., and Brant D. Penney,
REINHARDT WENDORF & BLANCHFIELD, for plaintiff.
Robert I. Steiner and Geoffrey W. Castello, III, KELLEY DRYE & WARREN LLP;
Jeffrey R. Mulder and Lewis A. Remele, Jr., BASSFORD REMELE, P.A., for
Defendants MedTox Scientific, Inc. and MedTox Laboratories, Inc. (collectively,
“MedTox”) faxed an unsolicited advertisement to plaintiff Sandusky Wellness Center,
LLC (“Sandusky”). In response, Sandusky filed this putative class action under the
Telephone Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”), 47 U.S.C. § 227. Sandusky now moves
to certify a class of 3,256 persons who received the fax, ECF No. 229, and MedTox
moves to dismiss Sandusky’s lawsuit for lack of standing, ECF No. 234. For the reasons
that follow, the Court grants Sandusky’s motion to certify and denies MedTox’s motion
Sandusky is a medical clinic in Ohio. Winnestaffer Dep. 10, 24 [ECF No. 205‐2].
Its owner, Gregg Winnestaffer, is a chiropractor, but the clinic offers more than just
chiropractic services. Id. at 20‐21, 23‐24, 35, 39‐40. During the time period relevant to
this litigation, Dr. Bruce Montgomery, a family practitioner, saw patients at Sandusky
one day per week. Montgomery Dep. 7, 16‐17, 21‐22 [ECF No. 205‐6].
MedTox is a toxicology laboratory in Minnesota. Huffer Decl. ¶ 4 [ECF No. 176].
MedTox provides a lead‐testing service that it markets to pediatricians and other
doctors who work with children. Huffer Dep. 13‐16, 44 [ECF No. 205‐4]; see also
Montgomery Dep. 36 (describing the dangers that lead poses to children). MedTox’s
lead‐testing service requires a doctor to draw only two drops of blood from a patient
(instead of a whole ampule). See ECF No. 205‐1; Montgomery Dep. 38‐40. This makes
MedTox’s lead‐testing service less invasive than many other forms of lead testing.
In February 2012, MedTox faxed a one‐page advertisement to 3,256 healthcare
providers touting its lead‐testing service. Huffer Decl. ¶¶ 7‐10, 16‐17; see also ECF
No. 205‐1 (reproducing the fax advertisement). One of these faxes made its way to
Sandusky. The fax was intended for Montgomery (the part‐time family doctor), see
Huffer Decl. ¶¶ 7‐10, 13‐15, but the fax was not specifically addressed to Montgomery,
see ECF No. 205‐1, and Montgomery never actually saw the fax, see Montgomery Dep.
38. Instead, a Sandusky employee picked up the fax and brought it to Winnestaffer,
who read it and mailed it to his attorney. Winnestaffer Dep. 76‐81, 128. This lawsuit
In this lawsuit, Sandusky claims that MedTox’s unsolicited fax violated the
TCPA because it was sent without “a proper opt‐out notice” and without the recipients’
“permission or invitation.” Am. Compl. ¶¶ 14‐17 [ECF No. 174]. Sandusky claims that
MedTox’s violation of the TCPA harmed it in at least four ways: First, MedTox’s fax
tied up Sandusky’s fax line, preventing Sandusky from receiving other faxes or
processing credit‐card payments (which “run through the fax machine”).
Winnestaffer Dep. 75‐76, 81‐83. Second, MedTox’s fax wasted Sandusky’s paper and
ink. Id. at 74, 76, 83‐84. Third, MedTox forced Sandusky’s employees to waste time
processing, reviewing, and disposing of the unwanted fax. Id. at 76‐77, 84. And fourth,
MedTox’s fax “interrupted the Plaintiff’s and other class members’ privacy interests in
being left alone.” Am. Compl. ¶ 29; see also id. ¶ 3.
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Three years ago, Sandusky moved to certify a class of “persons who were sent
advertisements by fax about products or services offered” by MedTox. ECF No. 162
at 1; see also ECF No. 165 at 8 (proposing a narrower class definition). Senior Judge
David S. Doty denied Sandusky’s motion for class certification on the grounds that the
proposed class was not ascertainable. ECF No. 188 at 7‐10. Judge Doty also questioned
the commonality of the asserted claims and the adequacy of the proposed class
representative and class counsel. Id. at 10 n.4.
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed the
denial of class certification. Sandusky Wellness Ctr., LLC v. MedTox Sci., Inc., 821 F.3d
992, 998 (8th Cir. 2016). The Eighth Circuit held that the proposed class was
ascertainable. Id. at 995‐98. It also held that the proposed class met the commonality
and predominance requirements for class certification. Id. at 998. It then remanded the
case for further proceedings. Id.
On remand, the case was reassigned to the undersigned, ECF Nos. 223, 225, and
Sandusky renewed its motion for class certification, ECF No. 229. MedTox responded
by moving to dismiss the case for lack of standing. ECF No. 234.
A. Standard of Review
The requirement of standing is rooted in the fact that Article III of the United
States Constitution limits the power of federal courts to “cases” or “controversies.” U.S.
Const. art. III, § 2. No “case” or “controversy” exists unless (1) the plaintiff has suffered
a “concrete and particularized” injury; (2) the plaintiff’s injury “is fairly traceable” to
the defendant’s actions; and (3) the plaintiff’s injury is “likely to be redressed by a
favorable decision.” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547‐48 (2016).
A defendant’s motion to dismiss a claim for lack of standing can be treated as
either a “facial attack” or a “factual attack” on jurisdiction. Carlsen v. GameStop, Inc., 833
F.3d 903, 908 (8th Cir. 2016) (citation omitted). When addressing a facial attack, a court
must restrict itself to the face of the pleadings and accept all of the plaintiff’s allegations
as true. Id. When addressing a factual attack, a court may consider matters outside of
the pleadings and weigh the evidence. Id. Here, the Court will construe MedTox’s
motion to dismiss as a factual attack on jurisdiction, and the Court will consider
deposition testimony and other evidence in the record.
MedTox argues that Sandusky lacks standing under the Supreme Court’s recent
decision in Spokeo. But Spokeo simply held that a “bare procedural violation” of a
statutory right—“divorced from any concrete harm”—is not sufficient to establish
Article III standing. Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549. Here, however, Sandusky alleges that
MedTox’s violation of the TCPA created several types of concrete harm. Specifically,
Sandusky alleges that MedTox’s illegal act disrupted Sandusky’s business by tying up
its fax line, wasted Sandusky’s paper and ink, and wasted the time of Sandusky’s
Not surprisingly, the “vast majority” of post‐Spokeo TCPA cases “have concluded
that the invasion of privacy, annoyance and wasted time associated with robocalls is
sufficient to demonstrate concrete injury.” Abante Rooter & Plumbing, Inc. v. Pivotal
Payments, Inc., No. 16‐CV‐05486‐JCS, 2017 WL 733123, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 24, 2017)
(collecting cases). Indeed, most courts find that the receipt of even one unwanted call
“is [generally] enough to clear Article III’s low bar for a concrete injury.” Ung v.
Universal Acceptance Corp., 198 F. Supp. 3d 1036, 1039 (D. Minn. 2016). Similarly,
unwanted faxes harm the plaintiff by “occup[ying] his fax line and machine, us[ing] his
toner and paper, and wast[ing] his time.” Brodsky v. HumanaDental Ins., No.
Because Sandusky suffered a tangible injury, the Court need not decide whether
the intangible injury that Sandusky allegedly suffered when its privacy was invaded by
the unsolicited fax is sufficient to establish standing. Compare Van Patten v. Vertical
Fitness Group, LLC, 847 F.3d 1037, 1042‐43 (9th Cir. 2017) (concluding that the receipt of
an unsolicited call or text from a telemarketer is enough to establish Article III standing
as a nuisance and an invasion of privacy), Potocnik v. Carlson, No. 13‐CV‐2093, 2016 WL
3919950, at *3 (D. Minn. July 15, 2016) (noting that an invasion of privacy can establish
Article III standing even if it would not be actionable “under the common law of any
particular jurisdiction”), and Brodsky v. HumanaDental Ins., No. 1:10‐CV‐03233, 2016 WL
5476233, at *11 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 29, 2016) (stating that “[a] claim under the TCPA for
unwanted fax messages . . . is roughly analogous to a claim at common law for
conversion”), with Fauley v. Drug Depot, Inc., 204 F. Supp. 3d 1008, 1012 (N.D. Ill. 2016)
(holding that the receipt of an unwanted fax by a business cannot establish Article III
standing as an intangible injury because “businesses do not have privacy interests in
seclusion or solitude”).
1:10‐CV‐03233, 2016 WL 5476233, at *11 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 29, 2016); see also Fauley v. Drug
Depot, Inc., 204 F. Supp. 3d 1008, 1011 (N.D. Ill. 2016) (same).
The handful of TCPA cases that MedTox cites to the contrary can easily be
distinguished. For example, in Stoops v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 197 F. Supp. 3d 782
(W.D. Pa. 2016), the plaintiff “purchased at least thirty‐five cell phones . . . for the [sole]
purpose of filing lawsuits under the [TCPA].” Id. at 788. The plaintiff admitted that she
did not use these cell phones for any purpose except to fish for telemarketing calls. The
court concluded that the plaintiff did not suffer a concrete injury when she got exactly
what she sought—telemarketing calls. See id. at 795‐803. Here, by contrast, Sandusky
did not purchase a fax machine for the sole purpose of drumming up TCPA litigation.
Instead, Sandusky used its fax machine for many business purposes, such as to process
credit‐card payments and to send and receive prescriptions and other “pertinent
information.” Winnestaffer Dep. 75‐76, 114‐15.
Two of the cases on which MedTox relies were pleading cases, not standing
cases. In Sartin v. EKF Diagnostics, Inc., No. CV 16‐1816, 2016 WL 3598297 (E.D. La.
July 5, 2016), “the complaint’s only reference to any kind of injury” was a single
sentence stating that the “defendants’ failure to comply with the TCPA’s requirements
‘caus[ed] Plaintiff and Plaintiff Class to sustain statutory damages, in addition to actual
damages, including but not limited to those contemplated by Congress and the [Federal
Communications Commission].’” Id. at *3. Understandably, the court concluded that
this vague and conclusory allegation was insufficient “to withstand dismissal at the
pleading stage.” Id. The court explicitly declined to decide whether a properly pled
“allegation of lost time and opportunity cost would be sufficient to establish standing
to assert a TCPA claim.” Id. at *4. Similarly, in Kostmayer Construction, LLC v. Port Pipe
& Tube, Inc., No. 2:16‐CV‐01012, 2016 WL 6143075 (W.D. La. Oct. 19, 2016), the same
attorneys who had inadequately pleaded standing in Sartin made the “same single
reference to damages” in their complaint. Again, the court dismissed the plaintiff’s
complaint for inadequate pleading. Id. at *2‐3.
In sharp contrast to the vague single‐sentence allegations of harm in Sartin and
Kostmayer Construction, Sandusky’s amended complaint alleges that:
Receiving the Defendants’ junk faxes caused the recipients to lose paper
and toner consumed in the printing of the Defendants’ faxes. Moreover,
the Defendants’ faxes used the Plaintiff’s fax machine. The Defendants’
faxes cost the Plaintiff time, as the Plaintiff and its employees wasted their
time receiving, reviewing and routing the Defendants’ illegal faxes. That
time otherwise would have been spent on the Plaintiff’s business
activities. The Defendants’ faxes unlawfully interrupted the Plaintiff’s
and other class members’ privacy interests in being left alone.
ECF No. 174 ¶ 29. Obviously, Sandusky went far beyond merely alleging that it
“sustain[ed] statutory damages . . . [and] actual damages.” Sartin, 2016 WL 3598297, at
*3; Kostmayer, 2016 WL 6143075 at *2.
The final case on which MedTox relies actually supports Sandusky, not MedTox.
In Supply Pro Sorbents, LLC v. Ringcentral, Inc., No. C 16‐02113, 2016 WL 5870111 (N.D.
Cal. Oct. 7, 2016), the court dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint because the plaintiff
failed to explain how it was injured by the defendant’s addition of a “single line
identifier on the optional cover sheet of a solicited four‐page fax.” Id. at *3 (emphasis
added). But in its order, the court also said that unsolicited faxes “may generally” harm
the recipient by wasting its paper, ink, and time, interrupting its privacy, tying up its
fax line, and “caus[ing] undue wear and tear on [its] fax machine.” Id. Here,
Sandusky challenges MedTox’s sending of an unsolicited fax, and Sandusky alleges
precisely the types of harm that the Supply Pro court intimated would be sufficient to
establish standing. Compare id., with ECF No. 174 ¶¶ 11, 29.2
In short, Sandusky’s allegation that MedTox’s violation of the TCPA disrupted
Sandusky’s business by tying up its fax line, wasted Sandusky’s paper and ink, and
wasted the time of Sandusky’s employees is sufficient to establish standing. The Court
therefore denies MedTox’s motion to dismiss.
MedTox also cites Duqum v. Scottrade, Inc., No. 4:15‐CV‐1537‐SPM, 2016 WL
3683001 (E.D. Mo. July 12, 2016) and Braitberg v. Charter Communications, Inc., 836 F.3d
925 (8th Cir. 2016), but these were both non‐TCPA cases that analyzed whether the
intangible injury experienced when personal data is lost or retained suffices to establish
Article III standing. These cases said nothing about whether the tangible injury
experienced by recipients when a fax is sent in violation of the TCPA suffices to
IV. CLASS CERTIFICATION
Sandusky moves to certify a class of “[a]ll persons who (1) between February 18,
2012, and February 26, 2012, (2) were sent one or more of the 3,256 transmissions of the
telephone facsimile message attached as Exhibit A to the Complaint, which related to
lead testing services by or on behalf of MedTox.”3 Because this proposed class meets
the requirements of Rules 23(a) and 23(b)(3), the Court grants Sandusky’s motion for
A. Standard of Review
The plaintiff bears the “burden of showing that the class should be certified
under Rule 23.” Day v. Celadon Trucking Servs., Inc., 827 F.3d 817, 830 (8th Cir. 2016) .
District judges have “broad discretion to decide whether” to certify a class. Id. (citation
omitted). But district courts must exercise that discretion within the standards set by
Rule 23, which requires a “rigorous analysis” to ensure that class certification is
warranted. Gen. Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 161 (1982).
MedTox proposed, and Sandusky agreed to, this definition of the class, although
MedTox preserved its opposition to any class being certified. The Court expresses its
appreciation to the parties for ironing out their differences regarding the definition of
For a class to be certified, it must meet all four4 criteria of Rule 23(a) and fall
within one of the three categories of Rule 23(b). In this case, Sandusky has moved for
class certification under subsection (b)(3), which adds two requirements to Rule 23(a)’s
four. The Court will address each of these six requirements in turn.
1. Rule 23(a)(1)—Numerosity
The first requirement for class certification under Rule 23(a) is that “the class is
so numerous” that joining all of its members would be “impracticable.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
23(a)(1). Joining all 3,256 members of Sandusky’s proposed class would clearly be
impracticable. See In re Wholesale Grocery Prod. Antitrust Litig., No. 09‐MD‐2090
ADM/TNL, 2016 WL 4697338, at *7 (D. Minn. Sept. 7, 2016) (“The Eighth Circuit has
affirmed the certification of classes with as few as 20 members.”). MedTox does not
2. Rule 23(a)(2)—Commonality
The second requirement for class certification under Rule 23(a) is that “questions
of law or fact” be “common to the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2). The Eighth Circuit
Some circuits have read a fifth requirement of “ascertainability” into Rule 23(a),
requiring the members of the proposed class to be “readily identifiable.” See Sandusky,
821 F.3d at 995‐96 (citing cases from eight other circuits). The Eighth Circuit generally
does not analyze “ascertainability as a separate, preliminary requirement,” but in any
event, the Eighth Circuit has already held that Sandusky’s proposed class “is clearly
ascertainable.” Id. at 996‐98.
has already held that Sandusky’s proposed class meets this commonality requirement.
See Sandusky, 821 F.3d at 998. MedTox is foreclosed from relitigating this issue on
remand. See Thompson v. Comm’r, 821 F.3d 1008, 1011 (8th Cir. 2016) (“[W]hen a case has
been decided by an appellate court and remanded for further proceedings, every
question decided by the appellate court, whether expressly or by necessary implication,
is finally settled and determined, and the court on remand is bound by . . . the
3. Rule 23(a)(3)—Typicality
The third requirement for class certification under Rule 23(a) is that “the claims
. . . of the representative parties”—here, Sandusky—be “typical of the claims . . . of the
class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3). MedTox argues that Sandusky’s claims are not typical of
the claims of the class because “Sandusky is a professional TCPA plaintiff,” and
Sandusky “collects large incentive payments as a result [of] its involvement with such
litigations.” ECF No. 236 at 32.
The Court disagrees. Sandusky is not, in fact, a “professional plaintiff.” Rather,
Sandusky is a legitimate medical clinic, and Sandusky’s owner (Winnestaffer) is a
practicing chiropractor, not a full‐time plaintiff. Morever, even if Sandusky were a
“professional plaintiff” (whatever that means), Sandusky’s claims would still be typical
of the claims of the class. Sandusky received the same fax under the same
circumstances and is bringing the same claims under the same statute as the other
members of the class. Sandusky’s claims are clearly “typical of the claims . . . of the
class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3).
4. Rule 23(a)(4)—Adequacy
The fourth and final requirement for class certification under Rule 23(a) is that
“the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4). This means that both the named class representative (Sandusky)
and the proposed class counsel (Anderson + Wanca) must be willing and able to fairly
and adequately represent the proposed class. See Rattray v. Woodbury Cty., 614 F.3d 831,
835‐37 (8th Cir. 2010).
With respect to the proposed counsel: Anderson + Wanca appears to be both
competent and experienced. It specializes in TCPA litigation. Reliable Money Order, Inc.
v. McKnight Sales Co., 704 F.3d 489, 491 (7th Cir. 2013). It has vigorously litigated this
case from the very beginning. And it has already defeated two motions to dismiss and
prevailed on one appeal to the Eighth Circuit. See ECF Nos. 25, 59, 221‐22.
MedTox makes much of the fact that Anderson + Wanca—acting on Sandusky’s
behalf—rejected an offer of judgment in 2013. See ECF No. 177‐1 at 27‐29; ECF No. 236
at 23‐27. This offer of judgment would have capped MedTox’s total liability at $247,500,
inclusive of attorney’s fees. See ECF No. 177‐1 at 42‐45. MedTox claims that this offer
was very generous to the putative class members and that, in rejecting this offer,
Anderson + Wanca’s put its own interests ahead of the interests of the class. ECF
No. 236 at 23‐27. For its part, Anderson + Wanca claims that MedTox’s offer of
judgment was insufficient “because it represent[ed] a recovery of between 5 and 15
cents on the dollar,” and any attorney’s fees should be based on “the amount made
claimable to the class” rather than the “amount actually claimed by the class.” ECF
No. 239 at 12‐13. The Court expresses no opinion on the merits of MedTox’s offer of
judgment, except to say that, in rejecting that offer, Anderson + Wanca did not
demonstrate that it is incapable of fairly and adequately representing the class.
MedTox also points to two procedural mistakes that Anderson + Wanca made in
the course of litigating this case. See ECF No. 236 at 28‐29. First, Anderson + Wanca
filed an amended complaint several months late. But this was an inadvertent mistake
that Anderson + Wanca promptly corrected after the magistrate judge brought the
mistake to its attention. See ECF Nos. 173, 174. Second, Anderson + Wanca initially
filed a motion to strike instead of a timely opposition to MedTox’s motion to dismiss.
Judge Doty denied Anderson + Wanca’s request for permission to file an untimely
opposition to MedTox’s motion to dismiss. Ultimately, however, Judge Doty denied
MedTox’s motion to dismiss, and thus Anderson + Wanca’s error did not prejudice its
client(s). See ECF No. 59. These procedural errors do not reflect well on
Anderson + Wanca, but they are not serious enough to call into question
Anderson + Wanca’s ability to fairly and adequately represent the proposed class.
With respect to the proposed class representative: The only issue that gives the Court
pause is whether Sandusky will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.
To date, Winnestaffer has shown little interest in or commitment to this litigation.
Among other omissions, he failed to personally appear at the last settlement conference
(he sent a nurse in his place rather than forego a day of vacation), and he appeared to be
completely unprepared for his deposition—to the point that he could not even testify
what the fax said. See Winnestaffer Dep. 74‐75, 137‐40. Given that Winnestaffer
appears to have little interest in protecting his own interests, the Court is hesitant to find
that he will protect the interests of the class.
That said, the main focus of the adequacy inquiry is “to uncover conflicts of
interest between named parties and the class they seek to represent.” Amchem Prods.,
Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 625 (1997). Winnestaffer does not have any kind of a
conflict with members of the class, and it is rare for a class representative who does not
have a conflict to be disqualified on grounds of adequacy. Moreover, TCPA cases are
not known for their legal or factual complexity, and thus there is generally not much for
a class representative to do. See Brown v. Rita’s Water Ice Franchise Co., No. CV 15‐3509,
2017 WL 1021025, at *8 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 16, 2017) (“TCPA litigation is neither challenging
nor complex.”). And finally, the current lead attorney for the proposed class—who
replaced the attorney who so poorly prepared Winnestaffer for his deposition—has
assured the Court that Winnestaffer will be actively involved and well prepared going
forward. See ECF No. 248 at 27 (“Your Honor, . . . if this case goes to trial and Dr.
Winnestaffer is called to testify, I am going to prep him personally.”).
Although the question is close, the Court finds that Sandusky “will fairly and
adequately protect the interests of the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4). Sandusky is on
notice, however, that if Winnestaffer continues to show a lack of commitment to this
litigation, the Court will not hesitate to revisit this finding.
5. Rule 23(b)(3)—Predominance
As noted, Sandusky has moved for class certification under Rule 23(b)(3). The
first requirement for class certification under Rule 23(b)(3) is that “questions of law or
fact common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only
individual members.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). The Eighth Circuit has already held that
the proposed class action “meets the . . . predominance requirement of Rule 23.” See
Sandusky, 821 F.3d at 998.
6. Rule 23(b)(3)—Superiority
The second requirement for class certification under Rule 23(b)(3) is that a class
action be “superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the
controversy.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). This requirement is easily met in this case—as it
is most TCPA cases—“because the main questions [in a TCPA case], such as whether a
given fax is an advertisement” can usually be resolved in one stroke. Sandusky, 821 F.3d
at 998 (citation omitted). Moreover, a plaintiff in a TCPA case can usually recover little
in the way of damages. See St. Louis Heart Ctr., Inc. v. Vein Ctrs. For Excellence, Inc.,
No. 4:12 CV 174 CDP, 2013 WL 6498245, at *11 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 11, 2013) (noting, among
other things, that “the statutory damages available to each individual class member [in
TCPA cases] are small—at most $1500 per violation,” and the “court will only need to
apply federal law, not multiple state laws”). Litigating the claims of this putative class
in one federal action is far superior to forcing each of 3,256 putative class members to
research the TCPA, figure out how to file a lawsuit in small‐claims court, and then
litigate a TCPA action to a conclusion.
Because Sandusky’s proposed class action meets the four requirements of
Rule 23(a) and the two requirements of Rule 23(b)(3), the Court grants Sandusky’s
renewed motion for class certification.
Based on the foregoing, and on all of the files, records, and proceedings herein,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
Plaintiff’s renewed motion for class certification [ECF No. 229] is
GRANTED, and the Court CERTIFIES a class of “[a]ll persons who
(1) between February 18, 2012, and February 26, 2012, (2) were sent one or
more of the 3,256 transmissions of the telephone facsimile message
attached as Exhibit A to the Complaint, which related to lead testing
services by or on behalf of MedTox.”
Defendant’s motion to dismiss [ECF No. 234] is DENIED.
Dated: April 25, 2017
s/Patrick J. Schiltz
Patrick J. Schiltz
United States District Judge
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?