Fargas v. United States of America et al

Filing 59

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER denying 55 Motion to Reconsider ; granting 57 Application for Permission to Proceed In Forma Pauperis on Appeal (Written Opinion). Signed by Judge John R. Tunheim on January 2, 2014. (DML) cc: Luis Fargas. Modified on 1/2/2014 (lmb).

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
LUIS FARGAS,

Civil No. 12-2165 (JRT/JSM)
Plaintiff,

v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA;
FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS;
WARDEN ANDERSON, FMC Rochester;
LT. MILLER, FMC Rochester; OFFICER
VAVRA, FMC Rochester; and OFFICER
SMITH, FMC Rochester,

MEMORANDUM OPINION
AND ORDER

Defendants.

Luis Fargas, 1275 Cobblers Crossing, Elgin, IL 60120, pro se.
Lonnie F. Bryan, Assistant United States Attorney, UNITED STATES
ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, 600 United States Courthouse, 300 South
Fourth Street, Minneapolis, MN 55415, for defendants.

This order address two post-judgment motions filed by plaintiff Luis Fargas after
the Court issued an order adopting the Report and Recommendation of the Magistrate
Judge and granting defendants’ motion to dismiss or for summary judgment. Fargas filed
a motion for reconsideration or, in the alternative, for rehearing, requesting that the Court
alter or amend its judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59. Fargas also
filed notice of appeal to the Eighth Circuit and sought permission from this Court to
proceed in forma pauperis on appeal.

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The Court will deny Fargas’ motion for

reconsideration and will grant Fargas’ application for permission to appeal in forma
pauperis.

BACKGROUND
Fargas was a prisoner at the Federal Medical Center (“FMC”) in Rochester,
Minnesota, in 2006. He brought this suit in 2012 against the United States, the Federal
Bureau of Prisons, and the warden and several correctional officers at FMC Rochester
(collectively, “defendants”) alleging that in March 2006 officers at FMC Rochester
forced him to share a cell with another prisoner who was HIV positive and a known gang
member with a history of violence. Fargas alleged that defendants physically forced him
into the cell with the other prisoner, who then physically assaulted Fargas until he lost
consciousness, suffering serious injuries.

Fargas alleged that the officers made

inadequate efforts to stop the other prisoner, that he was refused proper medical treatment
for these injuries, and that prison officials obstructed his ability to raise a complaint or
claim regarding the incident.1
Defendants filed a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment.

Construing

Fargas’ claims as First and Eighth Amendment Bivens claims and a common law tort
claim under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”), they argued that the statute of
limitations barred each of Fargas’ claims. Defendants argued that, because the events

1

Fargas brought suit in 2006 alleging the same claims against the same defendants. The
Court granted defendants’ motion to dismiss on the grounds that Fargas failed to exhaust the
relevant administrative remedies and the Eighth Circuit affirmed, modifying only to make the
dismissal be without prejudice. See Fargas v. United States, Civ. No. 06-3267, 2008 WL
698487 (D. Minn. Mar. 13, 2008) aff’d as modified, 334 F. App’x 40 (8th Cir. 2009).
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underlying Fargas’ claim occurred on March 27, 2006, and he brought this action on
August 29, 2012, the six-month window for bringing an FTCA claim and the six-year
statute of limitations for common law torts had passed. The Magistrate Judge similarly
construed Fargas’ claims as an Eighth Amendment claim and a First Amendment access
to courts claim brought under Bivens.

The Magistrate Judge found that his claims

accrued no later than May 8, 2006, and concluded that his claims were time-barred,
recommending that the Court dismiss his claims. (Report and Recommendation, July 22,
2013, Docket No. 48.)

Fargas objected to the Report and Recommendation of the

Magistrate Judge, but the Court overruled his objections, finding that the relevant statute
of limitations barred his claims. (Mem. Op. and Order, Sept. 23, 2013, Docket No. 52.)
Fargas now brings this motion to reconsider.

DISCUSSION
I.

MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
The Court construes Fargas’ motion as one to alter or amend a judgment under

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e), or in the alternative, a motion for reconsideration
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6) because, although the motion references
Rule 59, it is titled as a motion for reconsideration. Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e), 60(b)(6); see
also Miller v. Norris, 247 F.3d 736, 739 (8th Cir. 2001) (construing pro se plaintiff’s
pleadings in favor of plaintiff); Thompson v. Housewright, 741 F.2d 213, 215 (8th Cir.
1984) (“[I]t is our duty to construe pro se pleadings liberally.”). Fargas filed the motion
on October 28, 2013, thirty-five days after the Court entered judgment on September 23,

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2013, which renders any motion under Rule 59(e) untimely. Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) (“A
motion to alter or amend a judgment must be filed no later than 28 days after the entry of
the judgment.”). Thus, the Court will consider Fargas’ motion only as a motion for
reconsideration under Rule 60(b)(6), which must be filed “within a reasonable time.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c).
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6), “the court may relieve a party or
its legal representative from a final judgment [or] order,” for any “reason that justifies
relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6).2 “Motions for reconsideration serve a limited function:
to correct manifest errors of law or fact or to present newly discovered evidence . . . . [A]
motion for reconsideration [may not] serve as the occasion to tender new legal theories
for the first time.” Hagerman v. Yukon Energy Corp., 839 F.2d 407, 414 (8th Cir. 1988)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
Fargas’ motion to reconsider does not fall into this limited category of grounds for
relief under Rule 60(b)(6). He makes two primary arguments against the Court’s statute
of limitations finding.3 First, he appears to argue that part of the reason he missed the
statute of limitations was because of obstruction by the defendants.

(Mot. for

2

Minnesota Local Rule 7.1(j) requires that a party request permission from the Court
before filing a motion to reconsider. D. Minn. LR 7.1(j). Fargas did not do so here, but because
of the liberal construction afforded to pleadings by pro se plaintiffs, the Court declines to rest its
decision on that ground.
3

He makes several other arguments, which the Court deems as non-responsive or
irrelevant to the Court’s order dismissing his claims as time-barred. He argues without
explanation that the statute of limitations “had not elapsed on this action,” and that the Court
“order is only saying that the Defendants can, and will do what they want to people of color.”
(Mot. for Reconsideration at 2, Oct. 28, 2013, Docket No. 55.) Fargas also recites many of the
allegations underlying his complaint. (See, e.g., id. (Lt. Miller “ke[pt] him away from any help”
and didn’t give him any legal mail).)
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Reconsideration at 3, Oct. 28, 2013, Docket No. 55 (“[W]hen an officer of the court is
found to have fraudulently presented facts to [the] court, so that the court is impaired in
the impartial performance of its legal task, the act known as ‘fraud upon the court’ is a
crime . . . that is not subject to any statute of limitation.”).) He also argues that his claim
is not time-barred because his prior, identical lawsuit was dismissed without prejudice
which means that he can re-file.4 (Id. (“If the court adopts the Minnesota state statute of
limitation for general torts claims [of] six years, Plaintiff filed his first claim on
March 27, 2006 . . . . But the dismiss[al] without prejudice means that it can be refilled
[sic].”).)
Neither of these arguments alters the Court’s determination that Fargas’ claims are
barred by the statute of limitations. First, while Fargas’ claim that defendants obstructed
his ability to file within the statute of limitations may arguably have affected his ability to
exhaust administrative remedies in the months following his alleged injuries, any such
obstruction could not reasonably have prevented Fargas from filing this suit within six
years. In fact, Fargas did file a lawsuit based on the injuries alleged here in 2006, in the
same year as his claims accrued. See Fargas v. United States, Civ. No. 06-3267, 2008
WL 698487 (D. Minn. Mar. 13, 2008) aff’d as modified, 334 F. App’x 40 (8th Cir. 2009).
Second, it is well established that a “dismissal without prejudice does not toll a
statute of limitation.” Garfield v. J.C. Nichols Real Estate, 57 F.3d 662, 666 (8th Cir.
1995); see also Ellering v. Sellstate Realty Sys. Network, Inc., 801 F. Supp. 2d 834, 842

4

See Fargas v. United States, 334 F. App’x 40, 40-41 (8th Cir. 2009) (affirming dismissal
but modifying to be without prejudice).
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(D. Minn. 2011) (“[I]t is beyond peradventure that a ‘[d]ismissal without prejudice
operates to leave the parties as if no action had been brought at all.’” (emphasis omitted)
(citing Moore v. St. Louis Music Supply Co., 539 F.2d 1191, 1194 (8th Cir. 1976)). The
Court appreciates the challenge of navigating filing deadlines and court procedures,
particularly for pro se plaintiffs. See Williams v. Carter, 10 F.3d 563, 567 (8th Cir. 1993)
(“Pleadings and other documents filed by pro se litigants should be treated with a degree
of indulgence, in order to avoid a meritorious claim’s being lost through inadvertence or
misunderstanding.”). But the statute of limitations here plainly bars Fargas’ claim and
must be enforced. See United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 101 (1985) (“[S]tatutes of
limitations . . . necessarily operate harshly and arbitrarily with respect to individuals who
fall just on the other side of them, but if the concept of a filing deadline is to have any
content, the deadline must be enforced.”).
Thus, Fargas has not identified any viable factual or legal grounds for setting aside
the judgment in this case pursuant to Rule 60(b).

II.

APPLICATION TO APPEAL IN FORMA PAUPERIS
Fargas seeks permission to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal.

Fargas

previously sought the Court’s permission to proceed in forma pauperis in this action
before the District Court, which the Magistrate Judge granted. (Order on Application to
Proceed in without Prepayment of Fees, Sept. 21, 2012, Docket No. 3.) Fargas presents
comparable financial information on the instant application as the prior application which
was granted by the Magistrate Judge. (Compare Application to Proceed in District Court

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Without Prepaying Fees or Costs, Aug. 29, 2012, Docket No. 2, with Application to
Proceed In Forma Pauperis on Appeal, Oct. 28, 2013, Docket No. 57.) The Court sees no
reason to deny Fargas permission to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal.
The Court notes that under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 24, “A party who
was permitted to proceed in forma pauperis in the district-court action . . . may proceed
on appeal in forma pauperis without further authorization” unless the District Court
certifies that the appeal is not taken in good faith or unless a statute provides otherwise.
Fed. R. App. P. 24(a)(3). Neither exception applies here, so Fargas likely did not need to
seek authorization to proceed on appeal in forma pauperis. Nevertheless, out of an
abundance of caution, the Court will grant the instant application to proceed on appeal
without prepayment of fees under 28 U.S.C. § 1915.
ORDER
Based on the foregoing, and the records, files, and proceedings herein, IT IS
HEREBY ORDERED:
1.

Fargas’ Motion for Reconsideration, or in the Alternative, Motion for

Rehearing [Docket No. 55] is DENIED.
2.

Fargas’ Application for Permission to Appeal In Forma Pauperis [Docket

No. 57.] is GRANTED.
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.
DATED: January 2, 2014
at Minneapolis, Minnesota.

____s/
____
JOHN R. TUNHEIM
United States District Judge
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