Campbell v. Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc.
Filing
27
ORDER granting 14 Motion for Summary Judgment. IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT: 1. The motion for summary judgment of defendant Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc. 14 is GRANTED. 2. The complaint [1-1] is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE AND ON THE MERITS. LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY. (Written Opinion). Signed by Judge Patrick J. Schiltz on March 19, 2014. (CLG)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
BALEKI F. CAMPBELL,
Case No. 12-CV-2657 (PJS/JSM)
Plaintiff,
v.
ORDER
CHIPOTLE MEXICAN GRILL, INC.,
Defendant.
Ryan H. Ahlberg, AHLBERG LAW, PLLC, for plaintiff.
Jacqueline R. Guesno and Tanya E. Milligan, MESSNER & REEVES LLC; Kathleen
Michaela Brennan, MCGRANN SHEA CARNIVAL STRAUGHN & LAMB, CHTD.,
for defendant.
This is an unusual employment-discrimination case. Plaintiff Baleki F. Campbell alleges
that defendant Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc. (“Chipotle”) fired him — not because of what his
ethnicity is, but because of what his ethnicity is not. Specifically, Campbell alleges that Chipotle
hired him under the mistaken impression that he was Hmong — and then, when it learned that he
was not Hmong, it fired him in violation of the Minnesota Human Rights Act (“MHRA”),
Minn. Stat. § 363A.01 et seq. This matter is before the Court on Chipotle’s motion for summary
judgment. For the reasons explained below, Chipotle’s motion is granted, and Campbell’s
complaint is dismissed.
I. BACKGROUND
In late February or early March 2012, Campbell attended a job fair in Minneapolis.
Campbell Dep. 25-26 [ECF No. 18-10]. At that job fair, Campbell met Phil Sieden. Id. at 26.
Sieden works for Chipotle as a “[r]estauranteur.”1 Sieden Dep. 6 [ECF No. 18-1]. Sieden
encouraged Campbell to apply for a position at one of the restaurants that he oversaw. Campbell
Dep. 26.
Campbell did so, and a short time later, he interviewed for a position at the Chipotle
restaurant in Vadnais Heights, Minnesota. Id. at 31-32; Sieden Dep. 41. Several people were
involved in the interview and hiring process, including Sieden, Derek Her (a manager at the
Vadnais Heights restaurant), and Xao Kong (another manager at that restaurant). See Sieden
Dep. 42. This management team decided to hire Campbell, id., and Campbell began working at
the Vadnais Heights restaurant on March 28, 2012, see Compl. ¶ 10 [ECF No. 1-1].
Although Sieden is not Hmong, see Brennan Aff. Ex. B [ECF No. 18-2], the workforce of
the Vadnais Heights Chipotle includes many employees who are Hmong, including both Her and
Kong, see Sieden Dep. 15-36 (identifying 21 of 37 employees and former employees as Hmong
or Hmong-American, and 2 of those 37 employees as being of unknown ethnicity). Campbell is
“African-American and Korean-American.” Compl. ¶ 4. He alleges, however, that due to his
short stature and appearance, “he could be easily confused for a Hmong [or] Hmong-American
. . . .” Id. ¶ 5; see also ECF No. 20 at 1. Campbell claims that his appearance caused Sieden and
the other Chipotle managers to believe that he was Hmong, and he contends that this mistake
contributed to their decision to hire him. Compl. ¶ 19. He acknowledges, however, that Sieden
did not ask him if he was Hmong, see Campbell Dep. 28-29, and Campbell does not allege that
anyone else asked him whether he was Hmong at any time — before or during his employment.
1
Chipotle explains that “[a] restauranteur oversees the management team in one or more
restaurants and assists in recruiting, hiring and developing new managers for the company.”
ECF No. 15 at 7.
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Campbell’s employment with Chipotle did not go smoothly. He admits that he arrived
late to work on at least six occasions between March 28, 2012 (the date he began working) and
September 6, 2012 (the date he was fired).2 See Campbell Dep. 127-32 [ECF No. 18-11].
Campbell also acknowledges that managers spoke to him each month about improving his
attitude at work. Id. at 197. Finally, Campbell admits that his relationship with coworkers was
sometimes strained, including one altercation with a coworker that required Sieden’s
intervention. Id. at 171-72. Sieden testified that this altercation was “pretty significant,” and
that his resulting intervention was unlike anything he had “ever had to do” during his “career at
Chipotle . . . .” Sieden Dep. 77.
On September 6, 2012, Campbell arrived late for work for (at least) the seventh time.
Kong Aff. ¶ 9 [ECF No. 17]. The Chipotle management team — led by Kong, who was
managing the Vadnais Heights restaurant on that date — decided to terminate Campbell’s
employment. Id. ¶ 10. Kong explained to Campbell that Chipotle was firing him due to his
2
The record is unclear about the exact number of times that Campbell arrived late.
Campbell admitted at his deposition that he arrived late on six occasions prior to September 6,
2012. See Campbell Dep. 127-32 [ECF No. 18-11]. In addition, Kong stated that Campbell
arrived late on September 6, 2012, see Kong Aff. ¶ 9 [ECF No. 17], and Campbell has not
disputed this statement. The Court therefore assumes, for purposes of ruling on Chipotle’s
summary-judgment motion, that Campbell was tardy on seven occasions.
In its reply brief, Chipotle claimed (for the first time) that Campbell was tardy on an
additional five occasions, bringing the total number of late arrivals to twelve. See ECF No. 22
at 7. The Court has not considered these additional alleged late arrivals for two reasons. First,
these five occasions were not mentioned by Chipotle until its reply brief, and thus Campbell did
not have an opportunity to respond to Chipotle’s allegation. Second, the only evidence of
Campbell being late on four of those five occasions is a spreadsheet showing the time that he
arrived, but not the time that he was supposed to arrive. See Milligan Aff. Ex. A [ECF No. 231]. Without such evidence, the Court cannot conclude that Campbell was late on any of those
occasions.
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attendance issues and lack of “team integration.” Kong Dep. 9 [ECF No. 18-3]. The next day,
Campbell returned to the restaurant and asked Kong why he had been fired, see Campbell
Dep. 223; unbeknownst to Kong, Campbell was recording their conversation on his phone, id.
Kong reiterated that Campbell was fired due to his attendance issues and his poor interaction
with coworkers. Id. at 225. Campbell’s ethnicity was not referred to during either of these
conversations.
Campbell now alleges that Chipotle discriminated against him on account of his
ethnicity. According to Campbell, the Chipotle management team believed that he was Hmong
when they hired him. When those managers discovered that he was not Hmong, says Campbell,
they used his tardiness, poor attitude, and inability to get along with his coworkers as a pretext
for firing him, thus violating the MHRA. See Compl. ¶¶ 19-20. Chipotle moves for summary
judgment, arguing that a reasonable jury could not conclude, based on the evidence in the record
as a whole, that it terminated Campbell because he was not Hmong.3
3
Chipotle also argues that it is entitled to summary judgment because Campbell has failed
to mitigate any damages suffered as a result of the allegedly discriminatory firing. See Campbell
Dep. 258-59 (admission by Campbell that he has not looked for work since September 2012).
Even if Campbell has failed to mitigate his damages, however, he nevertheless would be entitled
to nominal damages should he prove that his termination was motivated by racial animus. Cf.
Ollis v. HearthStone Homes, Inc., 495 F.3d 570 (8th Cir. 2007) (affirming judgment awarding
nominal damages for federal claim of employment discrimination); Baer v. J.D. Donovan, Inc.,
763 N.W.2d 681 (Minn. Ct. App. 2009) (assuming that, under that MHRA, a prevailing plaintiff
is entitled to nominal damages and attorney’s fees if he is unable to prove actual damages).
Accordingly, Campbell’s failure to mitigate his damages is not a basis for granting summary
judgment to Chipotle.
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II. ANALYSIS
A. Standard of Review
Summary judgment is warranted “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as
to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(a). A dispute over a fact is “material” only if its resolution might affect the outcome
of the lawsuit under the substantive law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248
(1986). A dispute over a fact is “genuine” only if “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury
could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id. “The evidence of the non-movant is to be
believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.” Id. at 255.
B. Discrimination
The MHRA forbids an employer from discharging an employee because of the
employee’s race or national origin. See Minn. Stat. § 363A.08, subd. 2. Campbell does not have
“direct” evidence that he was terminated because of his ethnicity, and therefore his
discrimination claim must be analyzed under the burden-shifting framework described in
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04 (1973). See also Dovenmuehler v. St.
Cloud Hosp., 509 F.3d 435, 439 n.4 (8th Cir. 2007) (explaining that federal precedent may be
used to construe the MHRA). To establish a prima facie case of discrimination under that
framework, a plaintiff must show that he: (1) is a member of a protected class; (2) was qualified
for his job; (3) suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) can provide facts that give rise to
an inference of unlawful discrimination. See Butler v. Crittenden Cnty., Ark., 708 F.3d 1044,
1050 (8th Cir. 2013). If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of discrimination, the burden
shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse
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employment action. See Canady v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 440 F.3d 1031, 1034 (8th Cir. 2006).
If the employer does so, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the employer’s
articulated reason for taking the adverse action is a pretext for unlawful discrimination. Id.
The Court will assume, for purposes of its analysis, that Campbell has established a
prima facie case. The Court also finds that Chipotle has advanced legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reasons for Campbell’s termination — specifically, his tardiness, poor attitude, and inability to
get along with his coworkers. Kong Dep. 9. Accordingly, the Court turns to the final stage of
the McDonnell Douglas analysis: Is there sufficient evidence in the record for a reasonable jury
to find that Chipotle’s proffered reasons for firing Campbell were pretexts for unlawful
discrimination?
“A plaintiff may show pretext, among other ways, by showing that an employer (1) failed
to follow its own policies, (2) treated similarly-situated employees in a disparate manner, or
(3) shifted its explanation of the employment decision.” Gibson v. Am. Greetings Corp., 670
F.3d 844, 854 (8th Cir. 2012) (quotation omitted). Campbell does not allege that Chipotle has
been inconsistent in explaining the reasons for his termination; indeed, he acknowledges that
both times Kong discussed his termination with him — including once while being secretly
recorded — Kong explained that Campbell had been fired due to his chronic tardiness and poor
interaction with coworkers. Campbell Dep. 222-23, 225. Nor does Campbell allege that
Chipotle violated its own policies when it fired him. Instead, Campbell argues that a reasonable
jury could conclude that Chipotle used his ethnicity as a factor in terminating him because it did
not fire Hmong employees who had committed similar infractions.
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In support of his argument, Campbell points out that several Hmong employees at the
Vadnais Heights restaurant were not fired despite arriving late for work as often as (or more
often than) Campbell during the period that he was employed by Chipotle. The Court agrees
with Campbell4 that five Hmong employees — Por Choua Xiong (twelve late arrivals), Meng
Lee (nine late arrivals), Blong Moua (seven late arrivals), Tou Fue Yang (six late arrivals), and
Hsa Nobel (five late arrivals and one failure to arrive for a scheduled shift) — are similarly
situated to Campbell with respect to tardiness. See ECF No. 20 at 4-5.
But tardiness was not the only reason proffered by Chipotle for Campbell’s termination.
Rather, Chipotle has consistently maintained that tardiness and behavioral issues prompted its
decision to fire Campbell. See also Campbell Dep. 197 (testimony from Campbell that Chipotle
managers spoke with him monthly about needing to improve his attitude); id. at 225 (testimony
from Campbell that he was told his interaction with coworkers played a role in his termination).
In order to demonstrate pretext, Campbell must show that he and the alleged comparators are
“similarly situated in all relevant respects.” Muor v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 716 F.3d 1072, 1078
(8th Cir. 2013) (quotation omitted and emphasis added). In other words, Campbell must show
4
Campbell’s evidence about his coworkers’ tardiness suffers from the same problem as
Chipotle’s evidence about Campbell’s tardiness. Campbell has submitted a spreadsheet showing
when his coworkers arrived at work, but there is no evidence in the record showing when those
coworkers were supposed to arrive at work. See Ahlberg Decl. Ex. A [ECF No. 21-1]. Chipotle,
however, has not disputed Campbell’s allegations about the late arrivals of his coworkers,
despite having had an opportunity to do so in its reply brief. The Court therefore assumes that
these coworkers were late on the dates alleged by Campbell.
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not only that the comparators were late at least as often as he was, but also that they displayed a
poor attitude and had difficulty getting along with their coworkers.5
The only evidence cited by Campbell regarding the attitude and conduct of his coworkers
is a set of performance reviews done by Chipotle in October 2012. See ECF No. 20 at 5. But
these performance reviews show exactly the opposite of what Campbell contends, as each of the
alleged comparators was graded as meeting or exceeding expectations with respect to attitude
and interaction with coworkers. See Ahlberg Decl. Ex. C at 7 [ECF No. 21-5] (grading Blong
Moua’s performance with respect to interaction with coworkers as above expectations); id. at 22
(grading Hsa Nobel’s performance with respect to interaction with coworkers as meeting
expectations and describing him as “work[ing] well with the team and . . . always ready to leng
[sic] a helping hand”); id. at 34 (grading Meng Lee’s performance with respect to interaction
with coworkers as meeting expectations and stating that he did “a fantastic job communicating
with crew members and managers”); id. at 49 (grading Tou Fue Yang’s performance with
respect to interaction with coworkers as meeting expectations).6 In other words, the performance
reviews cited by Campbell support Chipotle’s argument that his coworkers were not similarly
situated to Campbell in all relevant respects.
5
Chipotle contends that “Campbell was hired as a ‘fast track’ management candidate” and
thus “was expected to perform in such a way as to justify a higher rate of pay” than the abovelisted employees. ECF No. 22 at 5-6. Because more was expected of Campbell, says Chipotle,
he was not similarly situated to any of those employees. But the record is unclear about the
extent to which these higher expectations were ever communicated to Campbell, or whether
these higher expectations in fact entered into Chipotle’s decisionmaking at the time that it
terminated Campbell. The Court therefore has not considered these putative higher expectations
in determining whether any other Chipotle employee was similarly situated to Campbell.
6
The performance review of the fifth employee who was similarly situated with respect to
lateness (Por Choua Xiong) is not in the record.
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In response, Campbell notes that he received grades comparable to those received by
many of the above-listed coworkers in his April 2012 performance review. See ECF No. 20 at 5.
But Campbell’s performance review [see ECF No. 18-8] was completed less than three weeks
after he started working for Chipotle — that is, before he began displaying a poor attitude and
having problems getting along with his coworkers. See Sieden Dep. 76-77 (describing the
June 30, 2012 altercation requiring Sieden’s intervention); Brennan Aff. Ex. I at 4 [ECF No. 189] (August 26 development journal showing manager’s comment that Campbell needed to work
on “communicating with our team/interaction.”). Comparing Campbell’s April performance
review (which was done shortly after he started) to his coworkers’ October performance reviews
(which were done many months after they started) is therefore a poor way of determining
whether those coworkers were similarly situated at the time that Campbell was fired.
Apart from the performance reviews, Campbell cites nothing in the record suggesting that
any of the alleged comparators had attitude and team-integration problems similar to his.
Moreover, the Court has independently reviewed the entire record and found no such evidence.
Without such evidence, Campbell cannot show that his Hmong coworkers were similarly
situated to him in all relevant respects.
For these reasons, the Court holds that a reasonable jury could not find that Chipotle’s
proffered reasons for firing Campbell were merely a pretext for unlawful discrimination.
Chipotle’s motion for summary judgment is therefore granted.
ORDER
Based on the foregoing, and on all of the files, records, and proceedings herein, IT IS
HEREBY ORDERED THAT:
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1.
The motion for summary judgment of defendant Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc.
[ECF No. 14] is GRANTED.
2.
The complaint [ECF No. 1-1] is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE AND ON THE
MERITS.
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.
Dated: March 19, 2014
s/Patrick J. Schiltz
Patrick J. Schiltz
United States District Judge
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