Bennett v. Geithner
Filing
45
ORDER granting in part and denying in part 18 Motion for Summary Judgment (Written Opinion). Signed by Judge Susan Richard Nelson on 3/10/15. (LDB)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Rosina L. Bennett,
Civil No. 12-CV-2829 (SRN/FLN)
Plaintiff,
v.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
AND ORDER
Jacob J. Lew, Secretary of the Treasury,
Defendant.
Stephen M. Thompson and Tammy P. Friederichs, Friederichs & Thompson, P.A., 1120
East 80th Street, Suite 106, Bloomington, Minnesota 55420, for Plaintiff.
Friedrich A. P. Siekert, United States Attorney’s Office, 300 South Fourth Street, Suite
600, Minneapolis, Minnesota 55415, for Defendant.
SUSAN RICHARD NELSON, United States District Judge
I.
INTRODUCTION
This matter is before the Court on Defendant Jacob J. Lew’s1 Motion for Summary
Judgment [Doc. No. 18]. For the reasons stated below, the Court grants in part and denies
in part Defendant’s Motion.
II.
BACKGROUND
This lawsuit stems from Plaintiff Rosina Bennett’s employment with the Internal
Revenue Service (“IRS”). The IRS hired Bennett, an African-American female, as an
1
Defendant Lew became Secretary of the Treasury on February 27, 2013, and was
substituted for the original defendant, former Secretary of the Treasury Timothy
Geithner. (Mem. in Supp. of Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. [Doc. No. 37] at 1 n.1.) See Fed.
R. Civ. P. 25(d).
entry-level Initial Assistance Representative in the Minneapolis Taxpayer Assistance Center
in August 2006. (Bennett Dep., Vol. 1 [Doc. No. 28] at 51; Stevenson Decl. [Doc. No. 20]
¶ 6.) Initial Assistance Representatives are assigned tasks such as greeting taxpayers,
handing out forms, determining the type of assistance the taxpayer requires, and answering
basic tax questions. (Stevenson Decl. ¶ 4.) Bennett’s supervisor at the Minneapolis center
was Julie Stevenson. (Id. ¶ 6.)
In the Spring of 2008, Bennett applied for a promotion to Individual Taxpayer
Advisory Specialist. (Bennett Dep., Vol. 1 at 53.) Bennett received the promotion in March
2008, with Stevenson’s support, although she was transferred to the Bloomington location
rather than her preferred choice of either St. Paul or Minneapolis. (Id. at 41–42, 54.) There
were only two Specialists, Bennett and Thomas Cartmell, at the Bloomington center, and
there were no Initial Assistance Representatives. (Stevenson Decl. ¶ 14.) Therefore, the
Specialists were required to perform ministerial tasks such as opening boxes, filing, and
maintaining office printers. (E.g., id.; Bennett Dep., Vol. 2 [Doc. No. 29] at 36–39.)
Bennett believes she was required to complete more of these tasks than Cartmell because he
is White and she is Black. (Bennett Dep., Vol. 2 at 36–39, 43–44.) Although Stevenson’s
office was located in Minneapolis, she was the manager of the Bloomington Specialists, and
Bennett complained to her about having to do this work. (Id. at 39; Stevenson Dep. [Doc.
No. 35] at 7, 22–23, 30–31.)
In the Summer of 2008, and again in the Summer of 2009, Stevenson initiated a
special project called the “Correspondence Project.” (Stevenson Decl. ¶ 19 & Ex. 207.)
Stevenson assigned one Specialist at each location to work on the project. (Id. ¶ 19.)
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Bennett states that she wanted to receive training for the project and expressed her interest
to Stevenson. (Bennett Dep., Vol. 2 at 31–32.) However, Stevenson selected Cartmell from
the Bloomington center. (Stevenson Decl. ¶ 19.) The employees who were selected to
receive training for the correspondence project at the various locations were White, and
Bennett believes that she was not selected because she is Black. (Bennett Dep., Vol. 2 at
33–36.) Bennett also believes that she was singled out by the instructor at an unrelated
training in January 2009, as an example of “what not to do,” because of her race. (Id. at 17–
19.) When Bennett complained to Stevenson, she was reassigned to a different instructor.
(Id., Ex. 24 ¶ 21.)
As Bennett’s supervisor, Stevenson completed Bennett’s performance reviews. For
the period of June 2007 to May 2008, Bennett received a performance rating of “exceeds
fully successful” or “outstanding” in the reviewed categories. (Stevenson Decl., Ex. 203 at
1.) In Bennett’s mid-year review dated December 31, 2008, Stevenson rated Bennett’s
performance “outstanding,” “fully successful,” or “met” in each category. (Id., Ex. 204.)
And, for the period of June 2008 to May 2009, Bennett received “fully successful,”
“exceeds fully successful,” or “outstanding” in the reviewed categories. (Stevenson Dep.,
Ex. 111 at 1.) However, Bennett’s overall score did not qualify her for a bonus in 2009.
(Stevenson Decl., Ex. 205.) She asserts that the lower 2009 score was based on her race.
(Bennett Dep., Vol. 4 [Doc. No. 31] at 20).
Bennett also asserts that her co-worker at the Bloomington center, Cartmell, often
made offensive comments to her, including racially-offensive comments. (See Bennett
Dep., Vol. 2 at 22–26.) For example, Bennett alleges that Cartmell referred to her as
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“dumb” and “stupid,” as his “slave,” and as “Aunt Jemima.” (Id. at 23–24; id., Vol. 4 at
71.) Bennett contends that she complained to Stevenson on multiple occasions about the
way Cartmell treated her. (Bennett Dep., Vol. 2 at 21–24; id., Vol. 4 at 16–17.)
Stevenson’s notes on the matter, which are undated but were apparently written in February
2010, (see Stevenson Dep. at 80–81), confirm that she “had a couple conversations . . . with
Rosina Bennett where [Bennett] has indicated that she believes that she is not being treated
equitably,” (id., Ex. 125 at 1). In those notes, Stevenson stated that she “understand[s] that
there are some interpersonal issues between [Bennett] and [Cartmell] . . . which do need to
be resolved.” (Id.) She also noted that Bennett believed she was doing more than her share
of administrative work, assisting more than her share of customers, and receiving
insufficient study time and training. (Id.) Bennett claims that, despite her complaints,
Stevenson did nothing to remedy the situation. (Bennett Dep., Vol. 2 at 21.)
The culmination of Bennett’s interactions with Cartmell occurred on January 5,
2010—the day that Bennett alleges Cartmell threatened her with a knife in her cubicle,
causing her to fall backwards onto her desk and hit her head and neck on her computer
monitor. (See id. at 44–45, 49–53.) According to Bennett, she placed several phone calls to
Stevenson that day to report the incident. (Id. at 67–68.) However, Stevenson did not
answer the phone, so Bennett left a message stating that it was very important that they
speak. (Id. at 68.) Bennett then contacted a union representative, but she stopped
communicating with him after she discovered that he had what she believed to be a conflict
of interest. (Bennett Dep., Vol. 3 [Doc. No. 30] at 8–9.)
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On January 21, 2010, Bennett met with Steve Soria, who she knew was Stevenson’s
supervisor at one point, and submitted a document describing her complaints of
discrimination and harassment. (Id. at 12, 14–15.) Soria informed Bennett that he was no
longer the acting supervisor, but that he would contact the new area manager. (Id. at 14–
16.) On January 22, Gloria Dodd, the new acting manager, called Bennett and left a
voicemail. (Id. at 17.) Also on January 22, Bennett contacted the EEO counseling office
and complained of verbal discrimination by her co-workers, the knife incident, the
requirement that she perform additional duties, her lack of training opportunities, and the
belittling that occurred at the January 2009 training session. (Bennett Dep., Vol. 1, Ex. 1.)
When Bennett returned Dodd’s phone call the following week, Dodd asked Bennett
to email her a summary of her complaint and permitted Bennett to use agency time to
prepare this statement. (Dodd Decl. [Doc. No. 26] ¶ 6.) Bennett did not work on Tuesday,
January 26, but emailed Dodd that afternoon. (Id. ¶ 7.) Her email stated that Cartmell had
approached her from behind with a sharp object that looked like a knife, and had made
stabbing motions with the object. (Bennett Dep. Vol. 3, Ex. 8.) She alleged that Cartmell
stated that he wanted to kill someone and that she felt threatened for her life. (Id.) The
email also alleged that Cartmell called Bennett “dumb” and “stupid” in front of a taxpayer,
that the IRS made assignment and promotion decisions based on Bennett’s race, and that the
IRS was retaliating against her because she had complained about the discriminatory
practices. (Id.) She requested “an immediate supervisor and/or position change.” (Id.)
Dodd set up an appointment to meet with Bennett at the St. Paul location on January 27.
(Bennett Dep., Vol. 3 at 17–18; Dodd Decl. ¶ 9.)
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Bennett claims that, during their meeting, she and Dodd discussed Bennett’s issues
with her performance review, as well as the alleged knife incident, and Dodd told Bennett
that she should not go back to that environment. (Bennett Dep., Vol. 3 at 18–22.) Although
Bennett had returned to the Bloomington location during the period of time between the
knife incident and her meeting with Dodd, Cartmell had been on vacation since January 6.
(Id. at 25–27. Accordingly, they never worked together after the knife incident. (Id. at 26–
27.)
Also during the meeting, Dodd contacted the Treasury Inspector General for Tax
Administration to investigate Bennett’s allegations, and Dodd temporarily reassigned
Bennett to a different center. (Dodd Decl. ¶¶ 10–11.) Because Bennett felt that Stevenson,
who supervised both the Minneapolis and Bloomington centers, was discriminating against
her, Dodd reassigned Bennett to St. Paul. (See id. ¶ 11.) However, Bennett was reluctant to
work out of that office because Cartmell’s wife worked there. (Id. ¶ 12.) Bennett contends
that Dodd should have moved Cartmell to a different office and that her failure to do so was
more evidence of racial discrimination. (Bennett Dep., Vol. 4 at 25–26.)
After this meeting, Bennett took leave time and did not report to the St. Paul
center until February 16, 2010. (See Dodd Decl. ¶¶ 15–17.) Bennett worked in St. Paul
for two days. (Bennett Dep., Vol. 3 at 33–34.) She asserts that, during that time, she
encountered hostility from Cartmell’s wife and from Sharon Torkelson, the supervisor.
(Bennett Dep., Vol. 4 at 65–67.)
Around February 19, Bennett was hospitalized with chest pain. (Bennett Dep.,
Vol. 3 at 34.) She was eventually diagnosed with congestive heart failure and has never
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returned to work. (Id. at 34–35.) Bennett was granted FMLA leave through the summer
of 2010 and, then, disability retirement from the IRS. (See id. at 63–64, 68.)
Plaintiff filed this lawsuit in November 2012, asserting a claim for racial
discrimination and harassment, and a claim for retaliation, all in violation of Title VII of the
1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17. Defendant moved for summary
judgment on December 19, 2014. Defendant submitted a supporting memorandum [Doc.
No. 37], eight declarations [Doc. Nos. 20–27], and the complete deposition transcripts for
Plaintiff and five other individuals [Doc. Nos. 28–36]. Plaintiff submitted an opposition
memorandum [Doc. No. 40] and an affidavit [Doc. No. 41]. Defendant also filed a reply
brief [Doc. No. 43]. The matter was heard on January 30, 2015.
III.
DISCUSSION
“Summary judgment procedure is properly regarded not as a disfavored procedural
shortcut, but rather as an integral part of the Federal Rules as a whole, which are designed
‘to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action.’” Celotex
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327 (1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 1). Summary
judgment is proper if, drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party,
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322–23;
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249–50 (1986). The party moving for
summary judgment bears the burden of showing that the material facts in the case are
undisputed. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323. However, “a party opposing a properly
supported motion for summary judgment may not rest upon mere allegation or denials of
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his pleading, but must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for
trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256. “Only disputes over facts that might affect the
outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary
judgment.” Id. at 248. Moreover, summary judgment is properly entered “against a party
who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential
to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.”
Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322. Defendant seeks summary judgment on each of
Plaintiff’s claims.
A.
Race Discrimination and Harassment (Count I)
In Count I of her Complaint, Bennett asserts a claim for race discrimination and
harassment under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). The Court will analyze these
allegations separately.
1.
Discrimination
Discrimination claims are analyzed using the familiar burden-shifting framework
set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Carraher v. Target
Corp., 503 F.3d 714, 716 (8th Cir. 2007). Under that analysis, a plaintiff asserting a
discrimination claim bears the burden of establishing a prima facie case of
discrimination. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. Specifically, in this case, Bennett
must establish that (1) she is a member of a protected group, (2) she was meeting her
employer’s legitimate expectations, (3) she suffered an adverse employment action, and
(4) the employer did not take similar actions against employees who were not members
of the protected class. See Clark v. Runyon, 218 F.3d 915, 918 (8th Cir. 2000). If
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Bennett establishes a prima facie case of discrimination, the burden of production shifts to
the employer to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its action. See Muor
v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 716 F.3d 1072, 1076 (8th Cir. 2013). If such reason is offered,
then Bennett must show that her employer’s articulated reason was pretext for unlawful
discrimination. See id.
a.
Jurisdiction
Defendant first argues that Bennett’s discrimination claim arising out of (1) her
assignment to Bloomington rather than St. Paul when she was promoted to Specialist;
(2) Stevenson’s failure to assign her to the Correspondence Project; and (3) her 2009
performance review are unexhausted and, therefore, the Court does not have jurisdiction to
consider them. (Mem. in Supp. of Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. [Doc. No. 37] (“Def.’s Supp.
Mem.”) at 24.) Bennett disputes Defendant’s argument only with respect to her claims
regarding Stevenson’s failure to give Bennett access to special projects or special training.
(See Pl.’s Mem. of Law in Opp. to Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. [Doc. No. 40] (“Pl.’s Opp.
Mem.”) at 24–25.) She thus appears to concede that any claim arising out of her initial
assignment to Bloomington and the 2009 performance review are unexhausted and,
therefore, barred.
Title VII requires a federal employee bringing a discrimination claim to first exhaust
his or her administrative remedies. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c). In particular, Bennett was
required to “consult a[n EEO] Counselor prior to filing a complaint in order to try to
informally resolve the matter.” 29 C.F.R. § 1614.105(a). The regulations require Bennett to
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consult with an EEO Counselor “within 45 days of the matter alleged to be discriminatory.”
Id. § 1614.105(a)(1). Bennett first contacted the EEO Counselor on January 22, 2010.
Bennett argues that her claims regarding special projects and training are timely
because “[r]ight up to her last working day with the IRS, February 17, 2010, it could have
provided her with these training opportunities.” (Pl.’s Opp. Mem. at 24.) But she offers no
authority for her theory that Defendant’s alleged failure to assign her to projects or to give
her training constitutes a continuing violation that would toll the running of the 45-day
period, and the Court has found none. Bennett’s request for EEO counseling was far
outside the 45-day period for her claims regarding training and projects, her assignment to
Bloomington, and her 2009 performance review, and Bennett failed to exhaust her
administrative remedies for these claims. Accordingly, Defendant’s motion on this point is
granted.
b.
Prima facie case
One element of Bennett’s prima facie case of discrimination is that she must have
suffered an actionable adverse employment action. “An adverse employment action is a
tangible change in working conditions that produces a material employment disadvantage.”
Rester v. Stephens Media, LLC, 739 F.3d 1127, 1131 (8th Cir. 2014) (quotation omitted).
Bennett’s only contention regarding the adverse employment action element of her prima
facie case of discrimination is that she was denied “the specialized training and special
project opportunities that would allow her to obtain promotions and gain overtime benefits.”
(Pl.’s Opp. Mem. at 21.) She contends that these actions “negatively impacted [her] future
career prospects and prevented her from earning overtime pay.” (Id.)
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As discussed above, Bennett’s claims regarding special projects and specialized
training are unexhausted and the Court is without jurisdiction to consider them. Even if
these claims were exhausted, however, any changes to Bennett’s working conditions did not
produce a “materially significant disadvantage.” Clegg v. Ark. Dep’t of Correction, 496
F.3d 922, 926 (8th Cir. 2007). Bennett relies heavily on Clegg v. Arkansas Dep’t of
Correction for her argument on this point, but Clegg is unavailing. In Clegg, a prison
counselor contended that she was discriminated against on the basis of race and sex in
several ways: her duties were altered or reassigned, she received a poor performance
evaluation, her employer failed to provide her with the equipment necessary for her to be
productive, and she was denied training. Id. at 927. The Eighth Circuit agreed with the
district court that these claims did not establish any adverse employment action. Id. In
particular, the appeals court noted that the “denial of a training request, without something
more, is not itself an adverse employment action.” Id. at 928 (citing Higgins v. Gonzales,
481 F.3d 578, 585 (8th Cir. 2007)). Similarly, the alleged denials of training and
assignment to special projects in Bennett’s case are insufficient to constitute an adverse
employment action. Accordingly, Bennett’s discrimination claim fails, and Defendant’s
motion is granted as to the allegations of race discrimination in Count I.
2.
Harassment or hostile work environment
Title VII’s prohibition on racial discrimination in employment includes a prohibition
on “requiring people to work in a discriminatorily hostile or abusive environment.” Harris
v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993). A workplace is hostile under Title VII when it
is “permeated with ‘discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult.’” Id. (quoting Meritor
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Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986)). In other words, a Title VII plaintiff
must establish that the harassment she alleges was “sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter
the conditions of [her] employment and create an abusive working environment.” Meritor
Sav. Bank, 477 U.S. at 67. “Whether an environment is ‘hostile’ or ‘abusive’ can be
determined only by looking at all the circumstances.” Harris, 510 U.S. at 23. Such
circumstances include “the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it
is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it
unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work performance.” Id.
Defendant argues that Bennett has failed to establish a hostile work environment
because she has no proof that the January 5, 2010, incident occurred. (See Def.’s Supp.
Mem. at 35.) However, even if that were true, Bennett’s claim of harassment does not
depend solely on the knife incident, but also includes what she alleges to be Cartmell’s
repeated verbal harassment and her supervisor’s alleged indifference to her complaints
about that harassment. And, taking the evidence in the light most favorable to Bennett, as
the Court is required to do when considering a motion for summary judgment, she has
raised a genuine issue of fact as to whether she suffered harassment and whether that
harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive to be actionable under Title VII. Most
notably, even Stevenson’s notes from February 2010 demonstrate that Bennett complained
about Cartmell and “interpersonal issues” on several occasions. While Defendant seeks to
cast doubt on the veracity of Bennett’s story, credibility determinations are not appropriate
on a paper record. Defendant’s motion regarding the harassment component of Count I
must, therefore, be denied.
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B.
Retaliation (Count II)
In Count II of her Complaint, Bennett asserts a claim for retaliation under Title VII,
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer to retaliate against
an employee for exercising her rights under those statutes. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (“It
shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against any of
his employees . . . because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment
practice by [Title VII] . . . .”). To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, Bennett must
demonstrate that (1) she engaged in a statutorily protected activity, (2) she suffered an
adverse employment action, and (3) there was a causal connection between the adverse
employment action and the protected activity. Montandon v. Farmland Indus., Inc., 116
F.3d 355, 359 (8th Cir. 1997). The McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework
discussed above with respect to Bennett’s discrimination claim applies with equal force
to her retaliation claim. See Stewart v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 196, 481 F.3d 1034, 1042–
43 (8th Cir. 2007).
Bennett contends that she engaged in protected activity by complaining to
Stevenson about Cartmell’s racial harassment and Stevenson’s failure to give Bennett
training and projects. (See Pl.’s Opp. Mem. at 25–26.) She also complained to Soria and
Dodd about racial harassment, and then filed for EEO counseling and ultimately filed an
EEOC charge. (See id. at 26.) Defendant argues that Bennett cannot rely on any alleged
protected activity that occurred before she filed for EEO counseling because she testified
in her deposition that her retaliation claim was limited to her filing of the EEOC
complaint. (See Def.’s Supp. Mem. at 38–39; Bennett Dep., Vol. 3 at 63.) But Bennett’s
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EEOC complaint, filed in late-February 2010, does not limit her retaliation allegations to
her filing for EEO counseling in January 2010. Rather, that complaint states that Bennett
believed that her supervisor had retaliated against her “because [she had] complained
about discrimination and unfairness by using the kind of employment practices that have
a negative effect on [her] race, color, and age.” (Bennett Dep., Vol. 1, Ex. 5 at 3.)
Nevertheless, Bennett’s retaliation claim fails because she has not established that
she suffered an actionable adverse employment action. According to Bennett, the
adverse employment actions she suffered in retaliation for her protected activity were:
(1) Dodd’s refusal to move Cartmell rather than Bennett after the alleged knife incident;
(2) Dodd’s limiting Bennett’s transfer options “because the supervisor who discriminated
against her . . . was in the Minneapolis location and the wife of the perpetrator was in the
St. Paul location”; (3) dragging out the investigation to force Bennett to go months
without pay; and (4) eventually forcing Bennett to take disability retirement. (Pl.’s Opp.
Mem. at 27.) Bennett argues that all of these actions culminated in her constructive
discharge. (Id.)
As an initial matter, Bennett’s opposition memorandum is her first mention of the
IRS’s allegedly “dragging out” the investigation as an adverse employment action in this
case. Bennett may not amend her pleadings in her opposition to summary judgment, and
the Court will not consider this allegation further.
In addition, Bennett’s reliance on Dodd’s actions to support her retaliation claim is
misplaced. There could be no retaliation given that Bennett’s allegedly discriminatory
supervisor worked in one location and Cartmell’s wife worked in the other location;
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Dodd had no control over this situation and, therefore, it cannot support Bennett’s claim.
More importantly, however, Bennett’s allegation that it was retaliatory for Dodd to move
Bennett rather than Cartmell is belied by Bennett’s own statements. Bennett alleged in
her EEOC complaint that Dodd “immediately removed [her] from the Bloomington
[center] for [her] physical safety.” (Bennett Dep., Vol. 1, Ex. 5 at 3.) There is no
allegation, or even insinuation, that Dodd’s immediate removal of Bennett in response to
Bennett’s allegations regarding Cartmell was done in retaliation; rather, the only
reasonable inference to be drawn from Dodd’s actions was that Dodd wanted to protect
Bennett.
Finally, Bennett has failed to establish that she was constructively discharged, or
“forced” to take disability retirement. To establish constructive discharge, Bennett “must
show that (1) a reasonable person in her situation would find the working conditions
intolerable, and (2) the employer intended to force her to quit.” Rester, 739 F.3d at 1132
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “In addition, an employee must give her
employer a reasonable opportunity to resolve a problem before quitting.” Sanders v. Lee
Cnty. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 669 F.3d 888, 893 (8th Cir. 2012).
The undisputed evidence shows that Bennett worked for a total of three days after
reporting the alleged discrimination to Dodd. She has proffered no evidence that the
working conditions during those days were intolerable. Nor has she established that
anything other than her serious health condition led to her inability to return to work.
Therefore, Bennett has not raised a genuine issue of material fact regarding constructive
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discharge, and her retaliation claim fails. Accordingly, Defendant’s motion for summary
judgment is granted as to Count II.
IV.
CONCLUSION
Bennett has failed to make out a prima facie case of discrimination or retaliation, but
she has raised a genuine issue of fact as to her claim of a racially hostile work environment.
THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT Defendant’s Motion for
Summary Judgment [Doc. No. 18] is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART,
consistent with this Order.
Dated: March 10, 2015
s/Susan Richard Nelson
SUSAN RICHARD NELSON
United States District Judge
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