Kennedy v. Heritage of Edina, Inc.
Filing
42
ORDER granting in part consistent with this order 28 Motion for Summary Judgment (Written Opinion). Signed by Senior Judge David S. Doty on 8/4/2014. (PJM)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Civil No. 13-71(DSD/JJG)
Hawa Kennedy,
Plaintiff,
ORDER
v.
Heritage of Edina, Inc.,
Defendant.
Gerald T. Laurie, Esq. and Laurie
& Laurie, P.A.,
Leopold B. Epee, Esq. and Epee Law Firm, LLC, 1660 South
Highway 100, Minneapolis, MN 55416, counsel for
plaintiff.
Kerri J. Nelson, Esq. and Bassford Remele, PA, 30 South
Sixth Street, Suite 3800, Minneapolis, MN 55402, counsel
for defendant.
This matter is before the court upon the motion for summary
judgment by defendant Heritage of Edina, Inc. (Heritage). Based on
a review of the file, record and proceedings herein, and for the
following reasons, the court grants the motion in part.
BACKGROUND
This employment dispute arises out of the December 2010
termination of plaintiff Hawa Kennedy by Heritage.
Heritage is an
assisted living facility owned solely by its Chief Executive
Officer, Maria Field.
Field Dep. 65:23.
Kennedy, a Liberian
immigrant, worked for Heritage as a housekeeper. Kennedy Dep. 7:124; Kennedy Aff. ¶¶ 1, 7.
Kennedy
alleges
that,
during
her
time
at
Heritage,
her
supervisor, Shayron Rundquist, made several discriminatory comments
to her, calling Kennedy a “black bitch” and “nigger” at least two
times per month1 during the course of her employment.
67:6–13; Kennedy Aff. ¶ 7.
Kennedy also alleges that Rundquist
told her that “Africans don’t know how to clean.”
¶ 8.
Kennedy Dep.
Kennedy Aff.
Further, Kennedy alleges that Rundquist required her to lie
on the ground and clean underneath tables and refused her eye
protection while cleaning ceilings and high walls with chemicals,
tasks that were not assigned to other housekeepers.
51:7-52:21, 53:19-54:24.
Kennedy Dep.
Rundquist also gave Kennedy more work
than she could complete during her two-hour shifts and often made
her repeat tasks.
Id. at 51:19-52:7, 53:8-23.
Kennedy typically did not report such behavior to Heritage.
Id.
at
60:5–21,
68:7-69:21.
Kennedy
did,
however,
complain
informally to Director of Human Resources Bonnie Miller on numerous
occasions. Specifically, Kennedy (1) complained that Rundquist did
not let her drink water while working and (2) twice complained that
Rundquist made her reclean bathrooms.
1
Id. at 60:22–64:11.
In her affidavit submitted in opposition to this motion,
Kennedy states that Rundquist called her “nigger” “no less than two
times a month.” Kennedy Aff. ¶ 7. In her deposition, however,
Kennedy stated she was unsure how often Rundquist made such
comments.
Kennedy Dep. 68:20-69:4.
At this stage in the
proceedings and viewing all evidence and inferences in favor of
Kennedy, the court credits the evidence contained in the affidavit
regarding the frequency of such comments.
2
In 2009, Kennedy made several requests to reduce her hours to
care for her son, who has sickle-cell anemia.
Kennedy Aff. ¶ 14.
Heritage granted Kennedy an extended leave of absence following her
son’s surgery.
Kennedy Dep. 45:4-46:24.
Thereafter, Kennedy
requested reductions in hours on three occasions. Heritage granted
each request.
the
last
of
Id. at 46:2-50:22; Miller Dep. 90:8-91:25.
these
requests,
in
September
2010,
After
Kennedy
was
scheduled from 9:00 a.m. to 11:15 a.m. for four days each week.
Miller Dep. 91:10–17; Laurie Aff. Ex. 5.
Kennedy alleges that in December 2010, Field called her a
“black bitch” and a “bad nigger” and stated that Africans did not
know how to clean.
Kennedy Dep. 65:7–66:8.
Kennedy reported such
comments to Miller shortly after they occurred.
Id. at 65:7–22.
Later that day, Field left a telephone message informing Kennedy
that she was terminated.
Id. at 72:11-73:14.
Thereafter, Kennedy
received two termination letters, which stated that Heritage was
unable to accommodate her latest scheduling request.2
75:18.
Id. at 74:5-
The decision to terminate Kennedy was made jointly by
Rundquist, Field, Miller and Melissa Heller. Miller Dep. 30:16-17.
On December 21, 2012, Kennedy filed this action in Minnesota
court.
Heritage timely removed.
2
On November 14, 2013, Kennedy
Both letters were dated December 2, 2010. Laurie Aff. Ex.
3, 4. One letter provided that Kennedy could “reapply in May/June
2011.”
Laurie Aff. Ex. 4.
The other letter excludes this
language, but is otherwise identical. Id. Ex. 3.
3
filed an amended complaint, alleging (1) race and national origin
discrimination,
(2)
retaliation
and
reprisal,
(3)
disability
discrimination, (4) breach of contract and (5) promissory estoppel.
Heritage moves for summary judgment.
DISCUSSION
I.
Standard of Review
“The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows
that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed. R. Civ.
P. 56(a); see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).
A fact is material only when its resolution affects the outcome of
the case.
(1986).
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 272, 248
A dispute is genuine if the evidence is such that it could
cause a reasonable jury to return a verdict for either party.
See
id. at 252.
On a motion for summary judgment, the court views all evidence
and inferences in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party.
See id. at 255.
The nonmoving party, however, may not rest upon
mere denials or allegations in the pleadings but must set forth
specific facts sufficient to raise a genuine issue for trial.
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324.
See
A party asserting that a genuine dispute
exists–or cannot exist–about a material fact must cite “particular
parts of materials in the record.”
4
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A).
If a plaintiff cannot support each essential element of a claim,
the court must grant summary judgment because a complete failure of
proof regarding an essential element necessarily renders all other
facts immaterial.
II.
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-33.
Race and National Origin Discrimination
Kennedy alleges race and national origin discrimination under
Title VII and the Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA).3
Though the
complaint and memoranda are not a model of clarity, Kennedy seems
to argue that she can establish discrimination under both disparate
treatment and hostile work environment theories.
A.
Disparate Treatment
Kennedy first argues that she was terminated because of her
race and national origin.
A plaintiff in race or national origin
action may survive a motion for summary judgment through either
direct evidence of discrimination or through the burden-shifting
analysis of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802–04
(1973).
Kennedy argues that she has presented direct evidence of
discrimination.
Specifically, Kennedy argues that on the day of
her termination, Field called her a “black bitch” and “bad nigger”
and stated that Africans did not know how to clean.4
3
Claims under Title VII and the MHRA are analyzed using the
same standard. See Torgerson v. City of Rochester, 643 F.3d 1031,
1043 (8th Cir. 2011); Clearwater v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 166, 231
F.3d 1122, 1124 n.2 (8th Cir. 2000).
4
Kennedy argues that the history of comments by Rundquist
also constitutes direct evidence of discrimination. Because the
court determines that Field’s comments are sufficient to establish
(continued...)
5
“Direct evidence is evidence showing a specific link between
the alleged discriminatory animus and the challenged decision,
sufficient to support a finding by a reasonable fact finder that an
illegitimate criterion actually motivated the adverse employment
action.”
Gallagher v. Magner, 619 F.3d 823, 831 (8th Cir. 2010)
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Direct evidence
does not include “statements by decisionmakers unrelated to the
decisional process itself.”
Id.
(citation omitted).
“Direct
refers to the causal strength of the proof, not whether it is
circumstantial evidence.”
Young–Losee v. Graphic Packaging Int’l,
Inc., 631 F.3d 909, 912 (8th Cir. 2011) (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted).
Here,
crediting
Kennedy’s
version
of
the
events,
the
statements made by Field are direct evidence of discrimination.
Field was the CEO of Heritage, and had the authority to fire
Kennedy.
See Field Dep. 65:23.
Indeed, Field was involved in the
decisionmaking process and informed Kennedy of the termination.
Kennedy Dep. 72:11-73:14.
Moreover, there is a strong temporal
connection between the comments and termination, as both allegedly
occurred on the same day.
Servs., 528
F.3d
evidence
a
in
See Roberts v. Park Nicollet Health
1123, 1128
pregnancy
(8th Cir.
discrimination
4
2008)
(finding
dispute
where
direct
a
“key
(...continued)
direct evidence of discrimination for purposes of the instant
motion, however, it need not reach such argument.
6
decisionmaker” expressed concerns regarding plaintiff’s pregnancy
on the day she was terminated).
Africans
do
not
know
how
to
Further, the statement that
clean
is
directly
connected
to
Kennedy’s job duties and provides insight into a potential motive
for termination.
See Gallagher, 619 F.3d at 831.
the court
direct
finds
evidence
of
race
and
As a result,
national
origin
discrimination, and summary judgment is not warranted.
B.
Hostile Work Environment
Kennedy next alleges that Heritage maintained a hostile work
environment.
Specifically, Kennedy argues that (1) Rundquist
called her “nigger” or “black bitch” at least twice a month, (2)
Rundquist made her perform dangerous and demeaning work and (3)
Field made discriminatory comments on the day that Kennedy was
terminated.5
An employee experiences a hostile work environment when “the
workplace is permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule,
5
In her affidavit submitted in opposition to this motion,
Kennedy states that Field made racial comments to her “almost every
time I was sent to clean her office.” Kennedy Aff. ¶ 9. In her
deposition, however, Kennedy stated that the only time Field made
such comments was on the day of her termination.
Kennedy Dep.
94:23-95:10. A plaintiff cannot create a genuine issue of material
fact by submitting a self-serving affidavit to contradict earlier
deposition testimony.
City of St. Joseph, Mo. v. Sw. Bell
Telephone, 439 F.3d 468, 476 (8th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted).
Moreover, Kennedy does not state that the purpose of her affidavit
was to clarify or correct her deposition.
See id. (providing
courts should not strike a contradicting affidavit if it states
that it is offered to clarify or correct prior testimony). As a
result, the court disregards this portion of the affidavit.
7
and insult that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the
conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive working
environment.”
(1993)
Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21
(citations
and
internal
quotation
marks
omitted);
see
Palesch v. Mo. Comm’n on Human Rights, 233 F.3d 560, 566 (8th Cir.
2000). To succeed on a hostile work environment claim, a plaintiff
must show that (1) she belongs to a protected group, (2) she was
subject to unwelcome harassment, (3) a causal nexus exists between
the harassment and the protected group status, (4) the harassment
affected a term, condition, or privilege of her employment and
(5) the defendant knew or should have known of the harassment and
failed to take proper action.
Tademe v. St. Cloud State Univ., 328
F.3d 982, 991 (8th Cir. 2003).
If one or more of the people
creating the hostile environment are supervisors, a plaintiff need
not prove the fifth element.
524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998).
avoid
liability
if
it
can
See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton,
In such a scenario, a defendant can
establish
that
it
implemented
an
effective program for reporting and resolving harassment, the
program was available to the plaintiff and the plaintiff failed to
take advantage of it.
See id. at 806-07.
Heritage argues that the alleged racial harassment was not
sufficiently severe or pervasive to affect a term, condition or
privilege of Kennedy’s employment. In deciding whether a plaintiff
has demonstrated that the harassment affected a term, condition or
8
privilege of employment, the court looks at all the circumstances,
including
“the
frequency
of
the
discriminatory
conduct;
its
severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or
a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes
with an employee’s work performance.”
Woodland v. Joseph T.
Ryerson & Son, Inc., 302 F.3d 839, 843 (8th Cir. 2002) (citations
omitted).
To avoid imposing “a code of workplace civility,” the
threshold for actionable harm is high. Id. The harassment must be
so intimidating, offensive, or hostile that it “poisoned the work
environment.”
Scusa v. Nestle U.S.A. Co., 181 F.3d 958, 967 (8th
Cir. 1999) (citations omitted).
or
racial
employee”
violation.
epithet
does
not
which
alone
The “mere utterance of an ethnic
engenders
rise
to
offensive
the
level
feelings
of
a
in
Title
an
VII
Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67
(1986) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, however, Kennedy states that she was called “nigger” and
“black bitch” twice a month for approximately twenty-seven months.
See Kennedy Aff. ¶ 7.
Further, Kennedy alleges that Rundquist -
the same individual that used such slurs - forced her to perform
physically-demeaning work, such as laying on the ground to clean
tables.
See Kennedy Dep. 51:7-52:21, 53:19-54:24.
Such frequency
and severity of remarks, as well as physically-humiliating tasks,
could - if found to be true - lead a reasonable jury to find that
the
harassment
affected
a
term,
9
condition
or
privilege
of
employment.
See Green v. Franklin Nat’l Bank of Minneapolis, 459
F.3d 903, 911 (8th Cir. 2006) (“In all, there are eight alleged
instances of co-worker using racially insensitive terms toward
plaintiff in a three-month time frame.
We have found just a few
incidents in a longer time span to be sufficient for a hostile work
environment claim.” (citation omitted)).
As a result, Heritage’s
argument that the alleged harassment was not severe or pervasive
enough to constitute a hostile work environment is without merit.
Heritage also argues that the Faragher affirmative defense
applies
because
Kennedy
never
reported
harassment to anyone at Heritage.
the
alleged
racial
That defense, however, is
unavailable where, as here, the alleged harassment culminated in a
tangible employment action, such as termination.
Brenneman v.
Famous Dave’s of Am., 507 F.3d 1139, 1144 (8th Cir. 2007).
Here,
as already explained, a reasonable jury could find that Kennedy was
terminated based on her race and national origin.
As a result,
material fact issues remain as to whether the Faragher defense is
applicable, and summary judgment is not warranted on the hostile
work environment claim.
C.
Retaliation
Kennedy next argues a claim for retaliation under Title VII
and reprisal under the MHRA. Specifically, Kennedy argues that she
was terminated for reporting Field’s racial comments. To establish
a prima facie case of retaliation under either statute, Kennedy
10
must show that (1) she engaged in a statutorily-protected activity,
(2) an adverse employment action was taken and (3) there was a
causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse
employment action.
Wright v. St. Vincent Health Sys., 730 F.3d
732, 737 (8th Cir. 2013).
Moreover, an employee must show that
“the desire to retaliate was the but for cause of her termination
– that is, that the unlawful retaliation would not have occurred in
the absence of the alleged wrongful action or actions of the
[defendant].” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Kennedy argues that she engaged in protected conduct by
reporting Field’s alleged racial slurs.
Indeed, statutorily-
protected conduct includes opposing any employment practice that is
unlawful under Title VII or the MHRA.
Minn. Stat. § 363A.15.
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a);
Further, Kennedy has sufficiently tied her
termination to the report of discrimination, as only a few hours
elapsed between Kennedy’s complaint and subsequent termination.
Such temporal proximity is sufficient at the prima facie stage to
establish a connection between the protected conduct and the
adverse employment action.
See Tyler v. Univ. of Ark. Bd. of Trs.,
628 F.3d 980, 986 (8th Cir. 2011) (stating that “in cases where the
temporary proximity is very close” the plaintiff can “rest on it
exclusively”).
discrimination
terminated
Moreover,
complaint
Kennedy.
As
Field
and
a
was
one
result,
11
both
of
the
the
of
the
decisionmakers
who
Kennedy can
subject
demonstrate a
connection between the protected activity and her termination, and
has made out a prima facie case of retaliation and reprisal.
Heritage responds that it had a legitimate, non-discriminatory
reason to terminate Kennedy’s employment.
Specifically, Heritage
argues that it was not possible to find work for Kennedy because of
her limited schedule.
Such a reason may be legitimate and non-
discriminatory. See Bennis v. Minn. Hockey Ventures Grp., LLP, No.
12-341, 2013 WL 3305213, at *13 (D. Minn. June 28, 2013) (finding
employer met its burden where, in part, employee “over-utilized”
the company’s flexible scheduling policies).
As a result, the
burden shifts to Kennedy to establish pretext.
“To demonstrate pretext, a plaintiff must present sufficient
evidence to demonstrate both that the employer’s articulated reason
for the employment action was false and that discrimination was the
real reason.”
Wilking v. Cnty. of Ramsey, 153 F.3d 869, 874 (8th
Cir. 1998) (emphasis in original) (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted).
Here, Kennedy argues that she can demonstrate
pretext based on (1) the timing of the termination and (2) the
racial remarks made by decisionmakers.
The court agrees.
Despite Heritage’s claims of lack of work, Heritage agreed less than two months before the termination - that Kennedy’s
reduced schedule was acceptable. See Laurie Aff. Ex. 5. Moreover,
Kennedy notes that nobody from Heritage ever met with her to (1)
discuss the schedule, (2) tell her that two hours per day was
12
insufficient or (3) suggest an alternative schedule that would have
been more amenable to Heritage.
77:15.
See Kennedy Dep. 75:20-25, 76:20-
Such circumstances, coupled with the extremely close
temporal proximity between the complaint of discrimination and the
termination, suggest a finding of pretext.
See Sprenger v. Fed.
Home Loan Bank of Des Moines, 253 F.3d 1106, 1113 (8th Cir. 2001)
(looking
“for
[temporal]
proximity
evidence” to establish pretext).
in
conjunction
with
other
Finally, Kennedy argues that the
history of racial remarks made by Rundquist and Field - two
decisionmakers in the termination - are indicative of pretext. The
court agrees.
See, e.g., Walton v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 167
F.3d 423, 426-28 (8th Cir. 1999) (distinguishing pretextual remarks
from statements that are remote in time, made by non-decisionmakers
or unconnected to the employment decisional process). As a result,
an issue of material fact remains as to whether the proffered
reason for the termination was pretextual, and summary judgment is
not warranted.
III.
Disability Discrimination
Kennedy next argues that Heritage unlawfully terminated her in
violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the
disability provisions of the MHRA.6
6
Specifically, Kennedy argues
Other than one exception - which is not relevant here - the
ADA and MHRA are analyzed under the same standard. See Kammueller
v. Loomis, Fargo & Co., 383 F.3d 779, 789 (8th Cir. 2004).
Further, the court may look to federal precedent when construing
the MHRA. Dovenmuehler v. St. Cloud Hosp., 509 F.3d 435, 439 n.4
(continued...)
13
that she was discriminated against based on her son’s diagnosis of
sickle-cell anemia.
or
otherwise
The ADA prohibits an employer from “excluding
denying
equal
jobs
or
benefits
to
a
qualified
individual because of the known disability of an individual with
whom the qualified individual is known to have a relationship or
association.”7
42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(4).
To establish a prima
facie case of associational discrimination, a plaintiff must show
that (1) she was qualified for the job at the time of the adverse
employment action, (2) she was subjected to an adverse employment
action, (3) the employer knew that she had a relative or associate
with a disability and (4) the adverse employment action occurred
under
circumstances
raising
a
reasonable
inference
that
the
disability of the relative or associate was a determining factor in
the employer’s decision.
See Land v. Wash. Cnty., No. 99-1255,
2001 WL 228441, at *3 (D. Minn. Mar. 5, 2001).
Here, Kennedy points to no evidence - such as comments about
her son or his diagnosis - indicating that her son’s disability was
a determining factor behind her termination.
argues
that
Heritage
failed
to
reasonably
Rather, Kennedy
accommodate
scheduling requests necessitated by her son’s medical needs.
6
her
Such
(...continued)
(8th Cir. 2007).
7
The MHRA contains no such provision, and Minnesota courts
have never recognized claims for associational discrimination in
the disability context. Here, even if the MHRA recognizes such a
claim, it fails on the merits, and summary judgment would be
warranted.
14
a claim is not cognizable, however, as the ADA does not require an
employer to provide reasonable accommodations to an employee who is
caring for a disabled relative or associate. See, e.g., Den Hartog
v. Wasatch Acad., 129 F.3d 1076, 1085 (10th Cir. 1997) (“[O]nly job
applicants or employees, but not their relatives or associates,
need be reasonably accommodated.” (emphasis added)); Tyndall v.
Nat’l Educ. Ctrs., Inc. of Cal., 31 F.3d 209, 214 (4th Cir. 1994)
(same).
As a result, Kennedy cannot establish a prima facie case
of disability discrimination, and summary judgment is warranted.
IV.
Breach of Contract
Kennedy next alleges a claim for breach of contract based on
her termination.
Under Minnesota law, “[a] claim of breach of
contract requires proof of three elements: (1) formation of a
contact, (2) the performance of conditions precedent by plaintiff,
and (3) breach of the contract by the defendant.”
Thomas B. Olson
& Assocs., P.A. v. Leffert, Jay & Polglaze, P.A., 756 N.W.2d 907,
918 (Minn. Ct. App. 2008) (citations omitted).
“The formation of
a contract requires communication of a specific and definite offer,
acceptance, and consideration.”
Id.
(citation and internal
quotation marks omitted).
“The usual employer-employee relationship is terminable at the
will of either” the employer or employee.
Bhd.,
117
presumption
N.W.2d
of
213,
at-will
221
(Minn.
employment,
15
Cederstrand v. Lutheran
1992).
an
To
employee
overcome
“must
the
present
evidence [the employer] made oral or written statements with
specific and definite provisions.”
Lindgren v. Harmon Glass Co.,
489
App.
N.W.2d
804,
810
(Minn.
Ct.
1992).
An
employee’s
subjective beliefs about her employment status are irrelevant. Id.
Here, Kennedy acknowledges that her employment was at-will, but
argues that Heritage altered this status by granting her last
scheduling request.
Such an argument fails, however, as Kennedy
does not point to any conduct or statement by Heritage that
indicates an intent to alter her at-will status.
Indeed, the
document that Kennedy argues creates such a contract - a September
13,
2010
“Payroll/Status
Change
Form”
approving
the
schedule
request - only sets forth the hours Kennedy would work and does not
evince any intent to alter the employment relationship. See Laurie
Aff. Ex. 5.
As a result, Kennedy has not established a clear and
definite promise to alter the at-will employment relationship, and
summary judgment is warranted on the breach of contract claim.
V.
Promissory Estoppel
Kennedy
next
alleges
a
claim
for
promissory
estoppel.
Promissory estoppel “is an equitable doctrine that implies a
contract in law where none exists in fact.”
Martens v. Minn.
Mining & Mfg., 616 N.W.2d 732, 746 (Minn. 2002) (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted).
To prove promissory estoppel,
“the plaintiff must show that (1) there was a clear and definite
promise, (2) the promisor intended to induce reliance and such
16
reliance occurred, and (3) the promise must be enforced to prevent
injustice.”
Park Nicollet Clinic v. Hamann, 808 N.W.2d 828, 834
(Minn. 2011) (citation omitted).
As already explained, however,
Kennedy points to no promise or conduct sufficiently clear and
definite to establish a promissory estoppel claim.
Cont’l
Ltd.
P’ship,
78
F.3d
409,
414
(8th
See Fox v. T-H
Cir.
1996)
(“An
employer’s use of the terms permanent employment, life employment,
or employment as long as the employee chooses creates only an
indefinite general hiring terminable at the will of either party.”
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted)).
As a result,
summary judgment is warranted on the promissory estoppel claim.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, based on the above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that
Heritage’s motion for summary judgment [ECF No. 28] is granted in
part, consistent with this order.
Dated:
August 4, 2014
s/David S. Doty
David S. Doty, Judge
United States District Court
17
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?