Riley v. Smith

Filing 25

ORDER ADOPTING 19 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION: 1. The Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus [Doc. No. 1] is DENIED; 2. The Motion for New Trial [Doc. No. 2] is DENIED AS MOOT; and 3. No Certificate of Appealability is issued (Written Opinion). Signed by Judge Susan Richard Nelson on 3/6/14. (LPH) CC: Riley. (kt)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA

Adrian Dominic Riley, also known as
Amiri Rasheed-El,

Case No. 13-cv-674 (SRN/JJG)

Petitioner,

MEMORANDUM OPINION
AND ORDER

v.
Michelle Smith,
Respondent.

Adrian Dominic Riley, Bayport, Minnesota 55003, pro se Petitioner.
Matthew Frank and Michael T. Everson, Minnesota Attorney General’s Office, Suite
1800, 445 Minnesota Street, Saint Paul, Minnesota 55101, for Respondent.

SUSAN RICHARD NELSON, United States District Judge
I.

INTRODUCTION
This matter is before the undersigned United States District Court Judge for

consideration of Petitioner Adrian Riley’s Objections [Doc. No. 20] to United States
Magistrate Judge Jeanne J. Graham’s December 17, 2013, Report and Recommendation
(“R&R”) [Doc. No. 19]. The Magistrate Judge recommended that: (1) the Petition for Writ
of Habeas Corpus [Doc. No. 1] be denied; (2) the Motion for New Trial [Doc. No. 2] be
denied as moot; (3) no certificate of appealability be issued; and (4) judgment be entered
accordingly. For the reasons set forth below, the Court overrules Petitioner’s objections and
adopts the R&R in its entirety.
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II.

BACKGROUND
The Magistrate Judge’s R&R thoroughly describes the factual and procedural

background of Petitioner’s case, and the Court incorporates it here by reference. On April
25, 1996, Petitioner was convicted by a jury of three counts of first-degree murder and three
counts of second-degree murder. The state trial court sentenced Petitioner to three
consecutive life sentences for the first-degree murder convictions, which the Minnesota
Supreme Court affirmed. State v. Riley, 568 N.W.2d 518 (Minn. 1997).
Petitioner then filed three post-conviction petitions in state court. The first, filed on
July 30, 2007 and requesting additional fingerprint and forensic testing, was abandoned by
Petitioner on or before August 24, 2007, before the trial court issued an order. The second,
filed on November 9, 2009, was summarily denied without an evidentiary hearing by the
trial court, and the Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed. Riley v. State, 792 N.W.2d 831
(Minn. 2011). The third, filed on June 20, 2011, claimed that Petitioner was entitled to an
evidentiary hearing or a new trial based on newly discovered evidence, and it requested
additional fingerprint and forensic DNA testing. The trial court concluded that the third
petition was time-barred and not supported by adequate proof, and the appellate courts
affirmed. Riley v. State, 819 N.W.2d 162 (Minn. 2012).
On March 25, 2013, Petitioner filed the instant Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus
under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on the following grounds: (1) ineffective assistance of counsel, (2)
prosecutorial misconduct, and (3) wrongful admission of fingerprint and ballistics evidence.
(Pet. [Doc. No. 1].) Petitioner also challenges the state courts’ reliance on Minn. Stat. §
590.01, subd. 4, in denying his third post-conviction petition. (Id. at 7.)
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III.

DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
A party “may file and serve specific written objections to a magistrate judge’s

proposed findings and recommendations.” D.Minn. LR 72.2(b)(1). The district court
will review de novo those portions of the Report and Recommendation to which an
objection is made, and it “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings
or recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); FED. R.
CIV. P. 72(b)(3); D.Minn. LR 72.2(b)(3). Ordinarily, the district judge relies on the
record of proceedings before the magistrate judge. D.Minn. LR 72.2(b)(3).
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, federal court habeas review of state court criminal
convictions resulting in incarceration is limited:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody
pursuant to the judgment of a State Court shall not be granted with respect
to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings
unless the adjudication of the claim—
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable
application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the
Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination
of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). In addition, a one-year limitations period applies to Section
2254 petitions. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). 1
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28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) provides:

(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas corpurs
by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The limitation period
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B. Timeliness
The R&R recommended denial of this Section 2254 petition because Petitioner
brought it outside the applicable one-year limitations period. (Dec. 17, 2013, Order at 5-6
[Doc. No. 19].) Petitioner objects that there is a basis for equitable tolling on two grounds:
(1) Petitioner’s purported eleven-year perseverance in bringing forth the affidavit of Mr.
White, and (2) the affidavit of Mr. White, which avers that: “I am coming forward now
because I was scared at the time and I ran away during the trial because I had a lot of issues
going on . . . .” (Objections ¶ 11 [Doc. No. 22].)
The Court respectfully disagrees. Equitable tolling is available “only when
extraordinary circumstances beyond a prisoner’s control make it impossible to file a petition
on time,” or “when conduct of the defendant has lulled the plaintiff into inaction.” Jihad v.
Hvass, 267 F.3d 803, 805 (8th Cir. 2001). “[A]ny invocation of equity to relieve the strict
shall run from the latest of—
(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or
the expiration of the time for seeking such review;
(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by State action
in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the
applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;
(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by the
Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and
made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or
(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could
have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.
(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other
collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be
counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection.
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application of a statute of limitations must be guarded and infrequent, lest circumstances of
individualized hardship supplant the rules of clearly drafted statutes.” Id. at 806. Here,
Petitioner has not shown that Mr. White’s affidavit prevented Petitioner from timely filing
his petition, or that Respondent lulled him into inaction. Likewise, Petitioner’s purported
perseverance in bringing forth Mr. White’s affidavit does not amount to diligent pursuit of
his Section 2254 motion. Equitable tolling is therefore inappropriate here.
Because Petitioner’s Section 2254 motion is time-barred and equitable tolling does
not apply, the Court does not reach the merits of Petitioner’s claims for ineffective
assistance of counsel, prosecutorial misconduct, and admission of fingerprint evidence and
ballistics testing. Thus, the Court denies Petitioner’s Section 2254 motion with prejudice.
C. Certificate of Appealability
In order to appeal a final ruling on a federal habeas corpus petition, a state prisoner
must be granted a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A); FED. R. APP. P.
22(b)(1). The Court cannot grant such a certificate unless “the applicant has made a
substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). The
applicant must show that the issues to be raised on appeal are “debatable among reasonable
jurists,” that different courts “could resolve the issues differently,” or that the issues
otherwise “deserve further proceedings.” Flieger v. Delo, 16 F.3d 878, 882-83 (8th Cir.
1994). The Court finds that Petitioner has not made such a showing. Accordingly, it
declines to issue a certificate of appealability.
IV.

ORDER
The Court OVERRULES Defendants’ Objections [Doc. No. 20] and ADOPTS
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the Magistrate Judge’s December 17, 2013, Report and Recommendation [Doc. No. 19].
Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
1. The Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus [Doc. No. 1] is DENIED;
2. The Motion for New Trial [Doc. No. 2] is DENIED AS MOOT; and
3. No Certificate of Appealability is issued.
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.

Dated: March 6, 2014

s/ Susan Richard Nelson
SUSAN RICHARD NELSON
United States District Court Judge

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