H.W. v. Velasquez et al
Filing
35
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER. 1. Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 25 ) is GRANTED; and 2. Defendants are entitled to judgment on all of Watkins' claims. (Written Opinion). Signed by Judge Donovan W. Frank on 5/21/2014. (BJS)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Hakim Watkins,
Civil No. 13-868 (DWF/JSM)
Plaintiff,
v.
MEMORANDUM
OPINION AND ORDER
David Velasquez, Jamie
Angerhofer, and City of
Brooklyn Park,
Defendants.
Joshua R. Williams, Esq., and Timothy M. Phillips, Esq., Law Office of Joshua R.
Williams, PLLC, counsel for Plaintiff.
Jon K. Iverson, Esq., and Stephanie A. Angolkar, Esq., Iverson Reuvers Condon, counsel
for Defendants.
INTRODUCTION
This matter is before the Court on a Motion for Summary Judgment brought by
Defendants David Velasquez (“Officer Velasquez”), Jamie Angerhofer (“Officer
Angerhofer”) (together, the “Officers”), and the City of Brooklyn Park (the “City”)
(collectively, “Defendants”). (Doc. No. 25.) For the reasons set forth below, the Court
grants the motion.
BACKGROUND
On February 21, 2010, Brooklyn Park police responded to a reported assault of a
Metro Transit bus driver involving a group of males. (Doc. No. 28 (“Angolkar Aff.”) ¶ 3,
Ex. 2 (“Velasquez Dep.”) at 9-16.) The responding officers were advised that one of the
male suspects had threatened to kill the bus driver. (Id. at 11-12.) Officers located a
group of five males who matched the description of the suspects. (Id. at 13; Angolkar
Aff. ¶ 6, Ex. 5 (“Edwards Dep.”) at 17; Angolkar Aff. ¶ 2, Ex. 1 (“Watkins Dep.”) at
33-34.) Plaintiff Hakim Watkins (“Watkins”) submits that after he got off the bus, he
walked with four other boys, saw a police squad car, and stopped. (Watkins Dep. at 34.)
Officer Velasquez approached the group and told them to take their hands out of
their pockets. (Watkins Dep. at 34-35; Velasquez Dep. at 18.) Officer Velasquez then
told Watkins to put his hands on top of his head to make sure Watkins did not have a
weapon. (Velasquez Dep. at 15; Watkins Dep. at 35; Angolkar Aff. ¶ 5, Ex. 4 (“Squad
Video”).) 1 Watkins placed his hands on his head. (Velasquez Dep. at 18.) Officer
Velasquez testified that he randomly picked Watkins to pat down first because Watkins
was the first one in his line of sight. (Id. at 15.)
Officer Velasquez testified that after Watkins initially complied, he became
uncooperative. (Id. at 18.) For example, Officer Velasquez claims that after asking
Watkins what took place, Watkins became upset, claimed that he did not do anything
wrong, tensed his body, and refused to stay still. (Watkins Dep. at 35-37; Velasquez
Dep. at 16, 18-19; Squad Video.) Officer Velasquez told Watkins to relax and attempted
1
Squad video footage of the encounter with Watkins exists and is part of the record.
Watkins and Defendants both contend that the footage supports their respective versions
of the facts.
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to pat-search him. (Velasquez Dep. at 16, 20.) Officer Velasquez decided to remove
Watkins from the group and Watkins continued to resist being moved. (Velasquez Dep.
at 16-17; Squad Video.)
Officer Velasquez walked Watkins toward his squad car and attempted to lean
Watkins over the car. (Velasquez Dep. at 17, 21.) Watkins claims that he was pulled
toward the squad car, that his head was slammed onto the hood, and that he was choked
and violently taken to the ground. (Watkins Dep. at 35, 41-43, 48, 74.) Defendants
contend that Watkins continued to tense up and resist commands, and that Officer
Velasquez had to forcefully “wrestle” with Watkins and hold him over the car.
(Velasquez Dep. at 17, 21-22.) Officer Velasquez testified that Watkins was struggling
and that he lost control of one of Watkins’ arms. (Id. at 17.) Officer Velasquez claims
that he attempted to grab one of Watkins’ arms and “bear hug” him in an attempt to
control the other arm. (Velasquez Dep. at 21-22; Squad Video.) Watkins asserts that he
was put in a choke hold, but acknowledges that Office Velasquez’s arms were around
Watkins’ neck and shoulders and that Watkins was able to speak and may have said “let
me go.” (Watkins Dep. at 44-45, 48; Squad Video.) Watkins was moving around and his
legs were kicking or “flailing around.” (Velasquez Dep. at 17, 39-40; Angolkar Aff. ¶ 4,
Ex. 3 (“Angerhofer Dep.”) at 13; Edwards Dep. at 23-24; Squad Video.)
Officer Velasquez was able to secure Watkins’ left arm behind his back, but
continued to attempt to secure his right arm. (Velasquez Dep. at 22; Squad Video.)
Officer Velasquez was assisted by a Community Service Officer and, eventually, Officer
Angerhofer. (Velasquez Dep. at 17-18; Angerhofer Dep. at 11-12.) Officer Angerhofer
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testified that when he arrived on the scene, he witnessed Officer Velasquez struggling
with Watkins and that Officer Velasquez was trying to get Watkins’ hands behind his
back. (Angerhofer Dep. at 11-12.) With help, Officer Velasquez attempted to place
Watkins in handcuffs. (Velasquez Dep. at 22; Angerhofer Dep. at 12.) Defendants
contend that Watkins, however, pulled his arm away. (Angerhofer Dep. at 12; Squad
Video.) At some point, Officer Angerhofer suggested that Officer Velasquez take
Watkins to the ground as the Officers attempted to handcuff Watkins. (Velasquez Dep. at
22.) Officers Velasquez and Angerhofer then took Watkins to the ground and placed him
in handcuffs. (Watkins Dep. at 50; Velasquez Dep. at 25; Angerhofer Dep. at 12-13;
Squad Video.) Watkins complained that the handcuffs were too tight. (Watkins Dep. at
52-53.) Officer Velasquez checked the handcuffs and confirmed they were placed
appropriately. (Velasquez Dep. at 26, 41-42.) Watkins was placed in the back of the
squad car. (Squad Video.)
Despite the above record evidence, Watkins asserts that he did not resist at any
time during his encounter with the police. (Doc. No. 32 (“Watkins Decl.”) ¶¶ 2-3.)
Watkins claims that his face hit the hood of the car during the struggle. (Watkins Dep. at
41.) Watkins claims that his lip was lacerated and a prior back injury was aggravated.
(Id. at 53-54.) In addition, he asserts that he had marks on his wrists from the handcuffs.
(Id. at 53-54.) Watkins did not seek medical treatment. (Id.)
In his First Amended Complaint, Watkins asserts a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
for violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments for excessive force (Count I);
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battery (Count II); and infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”) (Count III). (Doc. No.
10, First Am. Compl. ¶¶ 29-43.) Defendants move for summary judgment on all claims.
DISCUSSION
I.
Standard of Review
Summary judgment is proper if there are no disputed issues of material fact and
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The
Court must view the evidence and the inferences that may be reasonably drawn from the
evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Enter. Bank v. Magna Bank
of Mo., 92 F.3d at 747. However, as the Supreme Court has stated, “[s]ummary judgment
procedure is properly regarded not as a disfavored procedural shortcut, but rather as an
integral part of the Federal Rules as a whole, which are designed ‘to secure the just,
speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action.’” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477
U.S. 317, 327 (1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 1).
The moving party bears the burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of
material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Enter. Bank,
92 F.3d at 747. The nonmoving party must demonstrate the existence of specific facts in
the record that create a genuine issue for trial. Krenik v. County of Le Sueur,
47 F.3d 953, 957 (8th Cir. 1995). A party opposing a properly supported motion for
summary judgment “may not rest upon mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but
must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256 (1986).
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II.
Excessive Force Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
Watkins asserts a claim of excessive force against Officers Velasquez and
Angerhofer. In particular, Watkins argues that, viewing the facts in the light most
favorable to him, a reasonable officer on the scene would not have used the force
employed by Officers Angerhofer and Velasquez. In support, Watkins maintains that he
was slammed onto the hood of the car, choked, and violently taken to the ground.
Defendants argue that Officers Angerhofer and Velasquez are entitled to qualified
immunity from Watkins’ excessive force claim.
The doctrine of qualified immunity protects state actors from civil liability when
their “conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of
which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818
(1982). The defense provides “ample room for mistaken judgments” as it protects “all
but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” Malley v. Briggs,
475 U.S. 335, 341, 343 (1986). To overcome the defense of qualified immunity, a
plaintiff must show that: (1) the facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff,
demonstrate the deprivation of a constitutional or statutory right; and (2) the right was
clearly established at the time of the deprivation. Parrish v. Ball, 594 F.3d 993, 1001
(8th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). The Court has discretion to decide which qualified
immunity prong to consider first. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009).
The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable seizures. Graham v. Connor, 490
U.S. 386, 394-95 (1989). The Court evaluates excessive force claims under an
objective-reasonableness test. Id. at 397. In determining whether the use of force is
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“reasonable” under the Fourth Amendment, a court must balance “the nature and quality
of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests” against the
government’s interests at stake. Id. at 396 (citation omitted). The reasonableness of the
use of force must be judged from the “perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene,
rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” See id. The proper application of the
Fourth Amendment “requires careful attention to the facts and circumstances of each
particular case, including the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an
immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively
resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.” Id. The Court’s decision here
turns on the question of whether, taking the facts in the light most favorable to Watkins,
Watkins was subjected to excessive force so as to violate a constitutional right and, if so,
whether that right was clearly established at the time.
Watkins contends that the use of any force was unreasonable because: Officers
Velasquez and Angerhofer did not know which of the suspects, if any, had interacted
with the bus driver; the bus driver did not report that any weapons were involved;
Watkins did not resist or attempt to flee; and Watkins was fourteen years old at the time
of the incident. Defendants contend, however, that the force used was objectively
reasonable because: the Officers were responding to a report of a serious crime—assault
of a bus driver where someone threatened to kill the driver; Watkins resisted and impeded
the Officers from determining if he had a weapon; and Watkins continued to resist until
he was handcuffed. Moreover, Defendants contend that Watkins did not suffer any
permanent injury from the use of force.
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The use of some force is reasonable when an arrestee resists arrest or disobeys
orders. See, e.g., Cook v. City of Bella Villa, 582 F.3d 840, 851 (8th Cir. 2009); Foster v.
Metro Airports Comm’n, 914 F.2d 1076, 1082 (8th Cir. 1990). The same is true when an
officer is performing an investigatory stop. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396 (“Our Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence has long recognized that the right to make an arrest or
investigatory stop necessarily carries with it the right to use some degree of physical
coercion or threat thereof to effect it.”). “Not every push or shove, even if it may later
seem unnecessary in the peace of a judge’s chambers . . . violates the Fourth
Amendment.” Id. at 396-97 (citation omitted).
Here, Officers Velasquez and Angerhofer responded to a reported assault of a bus
driver, where one of the suspects allegedly threatened to kill the driver. When Officer
Velasquez approached the five suspects, he and a Community Service Officer were
outnumbered, and Officer Velasquez decided to check for weapons. Officer Velasquez
told Watkins to put his hands on his head and Watkins initially complied. While Watkins
disputes that he resisted Officer Velasquez’s commands, the Court has the benefit of the
Squad Video, which shows that Watkins was not cooperative during the investigatory
stop. Specifically, consistent with the testimony of Officer Velasquez, the video shows
that after Watkins initially complied with the command to place his hands on his head,
Watkins quickly became uncooperative by moving around and refusing to remain still. In
addition, when Officer Velasquez moved Watkins to the squad car to handcuff him,
Watkins continued to move around. At one point, Officer Velasquez appears unable to
handcuff Watkins and orders Watkins to “loosen up” and Watkins attempts to lift his
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head and shoulders to turn around. Officer Velasquez then used additional force to gain
control, such as forcing Watkins onto the hood of the car and putting an arm around
Watkins’ neck and shoulders. In addition, there is no dispute that Watkins’ legs were
moving during this struggle. Watkins asserts that he moved his legs to regain balance.
(Watkins Dep. at 55.) However, there is other testimony, and video evidence, that
Watkins was kicking or, at least, flailing. (Velasquez Dep. at 17, 39-40; Angerhofer Dep.
at 13; Edwards Dep. at 23-24; Squad Video.) Watkins’ subjective intentions do not
matter, as it is the objective reasonableness of an officer’s belief as to the appropriate
level of force that is relevant. See, e.g., Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 206 (2001) (“If an
officer reasonably, but mistakenly, believed that a suspect was likely to fight back, for
instance, the officer would be justified in using more force than in fact was needed.”),
overruled in part on other grounds, Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236.
The Court concludes that, under the circumstances presented, the Officers’ use of
force to restrain and handcuff Watkins was objectively reasonable and does not amount
to a violation of the Fourth Amendment. The Officers’ attempts to search him for
weapons and later to handcuff him were met with resistance. Resistance may justify
force. See Crumley v. City of St. Paul, 324 F.3d 1003, 1008 (8th Cir. 2003) (holding that
pushing and shoving by police officer did not constitute excessive force when the
plaintiff defensively moved away from the police officer during an arrest); see also Kain
v. City of Eden Prairie, Civ. No. 1740, 2011 WL 797455, at *7 (D. Minn. Feb. 28, 2011)
(concluding that turning away from an officer, despite it being a natural reaction to a dog
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bite, was reasonably viewed as resistance and justified the officer’s actions in grabbing
the suspect’s arm and pulling her to the ground).
Even if the use of force was not objectively reasonable and Watkins could
establish a constitutional violation, such a violation must be clearly established. “For a
constitutional right to be clearly established, its contours ‘must be sufficiently clear that a
reasonable officer would understand that what he is doing violates that right.’” Hope v.
Pelzer, 536 U.S.730, 739 (2002). Here, there was sufficient legal precedent that could
support the Officers’ use of force under the circumstances presented. See, e.g., Crumley,
324 F.3d at 1003; Kain, Civ. No. 1740, 2011 WL 797455, at *7. 2
In sum, viewing these facts in the light most favorable to Watkins, no reasonable
juror could conclude that the force used during the February 21, 2010 incident was not
objectively reasonable. Nor could a reasonable juror conclude that the Officers violated a
clearly established constitutional right. Thus, the Officers are entitled to qualified
immunity and summary judgment is warranted on Watkins’ excessive force claim.
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Defendant also asserts that Watkins’ alleged injuries—laceration to his lip and
aggravated back injury—are de minimis and therefore could not support a finding of a
constitutional violation. Prior to Chambers v. Pennycook, 641 F. 3d 898, 901, 906
(8th Cir. 2011), whether an excessive force claim required a minimum level of injury
remained an open question. 641 F.3d at 904, 908. For purposes of the qualified
immunity analysis here, the Court concludes that Watkins’ alleged injuries are not
de minimis. See, e.g., Copeland v. Locke, 613 F.3d 875, 881-82 (8th Cir. 2010) (finding
lacerations from handcuffs and an injury to the knee are not de minimis). Even so,
because the Court has concluded that Officers Velasquez and Angerhofer are entitled to
qualified immunity on Watkins’ excessive force claim, the issue of de minimis injury is
moot.
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III.
Battery
Watkins also asserts a claim for battery against Defendants. Battery is “an
intentional, unpermitted offensive contact with another.” Johnson v. Morris, 453
N.W.2d 31, 40 (Minn. 1990). Defendants argue that Watkins’ battery claim is barred by
the doctrine of official immunity. Under Minnesota law, public officials are
automatically entitled to official immunity from state law claims when their duties
require the exercise of discretion, so long as the officer is not guilty of a willful or
malicious wrong. See id. at 41-42. Police officers are generally classified as
discretionary officers. Id. at 42. Here, there is no question that Officers Velasquez and
Angerhofer’s actions required the exercise of discretion. See, e.g., Pletan v. Gaines,
494 N.W.2d 38, 41 (Minn. 1992). Accordingly, to defeat official immunity, Watkins
must establish malice or willfulness. See, e.g., Mumm v. Mornson, 708 N.W.2d 475, 490
(Minn. 2006) (“Official immunity prevents a public official charged by law with duties
which call for the exercise of his judgment or discretion from being held personally liable
for damages, unless the official has committed a willful or malicious act.”) (internal
quotations omitted). Malice in the context of official immunity requires proof of an
officer’s intentional doing of a wrongful act without legal justification or excuse or,
stated another way, a willful violation of a known right. Rico v. State,
472 N.W.2d 100, 107 (Minn. 1991).
As explained above with respect to Watkins’ excessive force claim, viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to Watkins, no reasonable juror could find that the
force used constituted a violation of the law. Thus, no reasonable juror could conclude
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that Officers Velasquez and Angerhofer intentionally engaged in a wrongful act without
legal justification. Accordingly, summary judgment is properly granted as to Watkins’
battery claim.
In addition, the City asserts that it is entitled to vicarious official immunity on
Watkins’ battery claim. An employer may be vicariously immune from liability if the
conduct of a government employee is protected by official immunity. Wiederholt v. City
of Minneapolis, 581 N.W.2d 312, 316-17 (Minn. 1998); Pletan, 494 N.W.2d at 42
(“Generally, if the employee is found to have immunity, the claim against the municipal
employer has been dismissed without any explanation.”). Because the Court finds that
there is no basis for imposing liability on the Officers, the Court concludes that there is
no basis for imposing vicarious liability on the City. Accordingly, the City is entitled to
summary judgment on Watkins’ battery claim.
IV.
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
Under Minnesota law, there are four elements to an IIED claim: (1) the conduct
must be extreme and outrageous; (2) the conduct must be intentional or reckless; (3) the
conduct must cause emotional distress; and (4) the distress must be severe. Hubbard v.
United Press Int’l, Inc., 330 N.W.2d 428, 438-39 (Minn. 1983) (citing Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 46(1) (1965)). Watkins’ claim for IIED fails for two primary
reasons. First, no reasonable juror could conclude that the Officers’ behavior was
“extreme and outrageous.” “Extreme and outrageous” conduct is that which is “so
atrocious that it passes the boundaries of decency and is utterly intolerable to the civilized
community.” Hubbard, 330 N.W.2d at 439 (citations omitted). Based on the facts and
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circumstances discussed above, no reasonable juror could conclude that the Officers’
actions were unreasonable, let alone extreme and outrageous. Second, Watkins has failed
to raise a genuine issue of fact that could lead a juror to conclude that Watkins has
suffered severe emotional distress. “Severe emotional distress” is “distress so severe that
a reasonable person could not be expected to endure it. Id. at 440. Watkins submits that
he suffers from anxiety when around Brooklyn Park police. (Watkins Dep. at 57.) This
evidence, as a matter of law, does not support the type of distress required to sustain an
IIED claim. Accordingly, the Court grants summary judgment as to Watkins’ IIED
claim.
CONCLUSION
Based on the files, record, and proceedings herein, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED
that:
1.
Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. [25]) is
GRANTED; and
2.
Defendants are entitled to judgment on all of Watkins’ claims.
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.
Dated: May 21, 2014
s/Donovan W. Frank
DONOVAN W. FRANK
United States District Judge
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