Lockhart-Beilke v. Peterson et al
Filing
50
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER granting defendants' 24 Motion for Summary Judgment(Written Opinion) Signed by Chief Judge John R. Tunheim on September 29, 2015. (DML)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
BERNARD LOCKHART-BEILKE,
Civil No. 13-1208 (JRT/BRT)
Plaintiff,
v.
JEFFREY PETERSON, RICK PUNG,
ZACH GAHM, ROGER BABURAM,
and ALL HEARINGS AND RELEASE
OFFICERS FOR THE HEARING AND
RELEASE UNIT,
MEMORANDUM OPINION
AND ORDER GRANTING
DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Defendants.
A.L. Brown, CAPITOL CITY LAW GROUP, LLC, 413 Wacouta Street,
Suite 140, Saint Paul, MN 55101, for plaintiff.
Scott A. Grosskreutz, Assistant Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE
MINNESOTA ATTORNEY GENERAL, 445 Minnesota Street, Suite
900, Saint Paul, MN 55101, for defendants.
Plaintiff Bernard Lockhart-Beilke (“Lockhart-Beilke”) was sentenced for criminal
sexual conduct and received an executed sentence of thirty-eight months, to be served
partially in prison and partially on supervised release. He was also given a mandatory
ten-year conditional release term.
The executed sentence was scheduled to end in
September 2010. In October 2010, after his executed sentence had ended, LockhartBeilke’s release was revoked for misconduct he likely committed mostly or entirely
during his supervised release term. Nevertheless, he was given years of additional prison
time during what was his conditional release term.
30
Although Minnesota case law formerly allowed this sort of practice, two recent
Minnesota Court of Appeals decisions have stated that an offender cannot be forced to
serve time during his conditional release term for misconduct committed during a
supervised release term. Lockhart-Beilke was held in prison for almost three years after
his release was revoked and now brings this action against the Minnesota Department of
Corrections’ (“DOC”) Hearings and Release Unit (“HRU”) officers (“defendants”),
alleging that he was unlawfully incarcerated in violation of his constitutional rights, and
that he was falsely imprisoned in violation of state law. The defendants now move for
summary judgment. Because qualified immunity protects the defendants from suit, the
Court will grant the defendants’ motion as to the federal law claims. In the absence of
any remaining federal law claims, the Court will decline to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over the state law claims.
BACKGROUND
On August 5, 2008, Lockhart-Beilke was adjudicated guilty of fourth-degree
criminal sexual conduct, a felony, in Dakota County, Minnesota.
(Aff. of Patrick
Courtney (“Courtney Aff.”) ¶ 30, Oct. 1, 2014, Docket No. 30; id., Ex. 6 at Peterson
0719)1; see also Minn. Stat. § 609.345. The court imposed an executed sentence of
thirty-eight months, along with a ten-year period of conditional release. (Courtney Aff.
¶ 30.) Lockhart-Beilke received a credit of 396 days, however, for time already served.
1
All page numbers refer to the CM/ECF pagination unless otherwise noted. Citations to
the Courtney Affidavit exhibits will use the Bates numbering pagination “Peterson ___.”
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(Id.) Before delving into Lockhart-Beilke’s allegations, it is necessary to discuss how the
DOC administers sentences and to summarize recent relevant state case law.2
I.
EXECUTED
RELEASE
SENTENCES
IN
MINNESOTA
AND
SUPERVISED
An executed sentence in Minnesota consists of two parts: “(1) a specified
minimum term of imprisonment that is equal to two-thirds of the executed sentence; and
(2) a specified maximum supervised release term that is equal to one-third of the
executed sentence.” Minn. Stat. § 244.101, subd. 1. “[T]he amount of time the defendant
actually serves in prison may be extended by the commissioner if the defendant commits
any disciplinary offenses in prison.” Id. at subd. 2. Indeed, a defendant could serve his
entire executed sentence term in prison. Id.
The DOC labels “the date of an offender’s initial release from prison” a supervised
release date (“SRD”). (Courtney Aff. ¶ 4.) Following his SRD, as noted above, a
defendant serves the remainder of his executed sentence on supervised release, also
known as parole. (Decl. of Jeffrey Peterson (“Peterson Decl.”) ¶¶ 8-9, Oct. 1, 2014,
Docket No. 27.) If an offender violates the terms of his release, the relevant corrections
agent contacts the HRU and generally recommends either (1) a restructured release,
2
The most relevant DOC office in this case is the DOC’s HRU. The HRU was led by
defendant Jeffrey Peterson from 1997 until August 1, 2014. (Decl. of Jeffrey Peterson
(“Peterson Decl.”) ¶ 1, Oct. 1, 2014, Docket No. 27.) The HRU generally has nine hearing
officer positions, along with additional administrative support staff, and those hearing officers
perform a variety of duties relevant to this case. (Id. ¶ 2.) All three other named defendants,
Richard (“Rick”) Pung, Zachary Gahm, and Roger Baburam, were hearing officers with the
HRU, under the supervision of Peterson, during the relevant time period. (See Aff. of Richard S.
Pung (“Pung Aff.”), Oct. 1, 2014, Docket No. 28; Aff. of Zachary Gahm (“Gahm Aff.”), Oct. 1,
2014, Docket No. 29; Aff. of Roger J. Baburam (“Baburam Aff.”), Oct. 1, 2014, Docket No. 31.)
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whereby the offender remains in the community under revised conditions; or (2) a
revocation of release and return to prison. (Id. ¶ 9.) The offender is arrested and an HRU
hearing officer conducts a revocation hearing at the jail.
(Id.; see also id., Ex. 1
(Evidentiary Hearings Policy).) Hearing officers make factual findings at the hearing
and, at the disposition phase of the hearing, decide whether the release should be revoked
and whether the offender should return to prison. (Id. ¶¶ 9-11.) If an offender disagrees
with the hearing officer’s decision, he may appeal to the head of the HRU. (Id. ¶ 11.)
Hearing officers make complex decisions throughout the parole revocation process but,
according to Peterson, they rely on attorneys in the DOC’s Policy and Legal Services
division for information regarding new laws or judicial decisions. (Id. ¶ 12.)
If an offender is sent back to prison (called “accountability time”), he does not
receive a new SRD. (Id. ¶ 13.) Instead, the offender receives a projected release date
(“PRD”). (Id.) Unlike the SRD, which is a guaranteed date of release, the “PRD is
subject to change based on the offender’s behavior . . . and his compliance with any
directives imposed by the hearing officer.” (Id.) The offender has regular meetings,
called review hearings, at which a hearing officer considers whether his PRD should be
extended further. (Id. ¶ 14.)
Throughout this process, hearing officers do not carry an offender-specific
caseload and instead hear cases as they arise. (Id. ¶ 3.) Moreover, the hearings officers
do not actually calculate the offenders’ sentences, or their exact SRDs or PRDs. (Id.
¶¶ 6, 13.)
Instead, staff at the DOC’s Records and Sentence Administration unit
(“records unit”) completes those calculations. (Id. ¶ 13; Courtney Aff. ¶ 3.)
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II.
CONDITIONAL RELEASE
At the time Lockhart-Beilke committed his crime and was sentenced, Minnesota
law required the DOC to place an offender, who was guilty of criminal sexual conduct,
“on conditional release for ten years, minus the time the offender served on supervised
release.” Minn. Stat. § 609.3455, subd. 6 (2005).3 Conditional release and supervised
release are functionally the same: “an offender resides in the community, subject to
compliance with a list of release conditions and to reincarceration for violating release
conditions.” (Peterson Decl. ¶ 15.)
Based on the prior version of the relevant statute and past caselaw, the DOC’s
long-time understanding was that “supervised release terms and conditional-release terms
ran concurrently.” (Id.; see also Courtney Aff. ¶ 11); see also State v. Koperski, 611
N.W.2d 569, 572 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000) (interpreting a similar, earlier version of Section
609.3455 (then labeled Minn. Stat. § 609.109, subd. 7), which contained similar language
subtracting from the conditional release term any time spent on supervised release, and
stating that “[t]here is no doubt that the intent of the legislature was for conditional
release and supervised release to run concurrently once the defendant is released from
prison”); State v. Enger, 539 N.W.2d 259, 263-64 & n.1 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995). The
effect of this understanding, in Peterson’s words, was that “when a hearing officer
revoked an offender’s release, the revocation could extend through expiration of the
offender’s conditional-release term.”
(Peterson Decl. ¶ 15.)
3
In other words, if an
The current statute directs the DOC to place an offender, who committed criminal
sexual conduct, “on conditional release for ten years.” Minn. Stat. § 609.3455, subd. 6 (2014).
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offender’s release was revoked during his period of supervised release, prior to his SRD,
his accountability time in prison could run beyond his SRD (and the corresponding end to
his executed sentence) and instead run through the end of his concurrently running
conditional release term. (Id.) Once an offender, serving accountability time, went
beyond his SRD, the SRD date disappeared from his file in the Correctional Operational
Management System (“COMS”) and the end of his sentence was the same as the end of
his conditional release term. (Courtney Aff. ¶ 12.)
A.
Peterson v. Fabian
In a 2010 decision, the Minnesota Court of Appeals appeared to reverse course, at
least in certain statutory contexts. Peterson v. Fabian, 784 N.W.2d 843 (Minn. Ct. App.
2010). In that case, an offender was sentenced to one year and one day for failing to
register as a predatory offender, along with a ten-year conditional release term under
Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 5a. Id. at 844-45. The statute directs the DOC to place a
person who fails to register “on conditional release for ten years.” Minn. Stat. § 243.166,
subd. 5a. The statute does not contain a provision that subtracts from the conditional
release term any time spent on supervised release. Id. While on supervised release, the
defendant in Peterson violated the terms of his release and was sentenced to 250 days of
incarceration, which went beyond the end of his executed sentence term and into the tenyear conditional release term. Peterson, 784 N.W.2d at 844. The defendant’s release
date was extended even further, by another 180 days.
Id. at 845.
The defendant
challenged his incarceration via a habeas petition and the Minnesota Court of Appeals
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held in his favor. Id. at 845-48. The court concluded that a conditional release term
under Section 243.166 for failure to register “is consecutive to a supervised-release
term.” Id. at 846. Consequently, when the defendant was reincarcerated following the
revocation of his supervised release, that reincarceration could only last as long as his
executed sentence (i.e., to the end of his supervised release term), not through the end of
his conditional release term. Id. at 845 (“[The defendant] argues that conditional release
is consecutive to supervised release and that the extension of his incarceration beyond the
completion of his sentence, based on a supervised-release violation, is unlawful.”).
The court derived this ruling from the plain language of Section 243.166, subd. 5a,
which states “that ‘the court shall provide that after the person has completed the
sentence imposed, the commissioner shall place the person on conditional release for ten
years.’” Id. at 846 (emphasis added) (quoting Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 5a (2005)).4
In reaching its conclusion, the court squarely rejected the defendant’s argument, relying
on a comparison of Section 243.166, subd. 5a and Section 609.3455, subd. 6, that the two
release terms in Section 243.166, subd. 5a run consecutively because that provision does
not contain the language, “minus the time the offender served on supervised release.” Id.
at 846 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also State v. Schnagl, No. A13-1332, 2013
WL 6152348, at *3-*4 (Minn. Ct. App. Nov. 25, 2013) (discussing the Peterson
decision), aff’d as modified by 859 N.W.2d 297 (Minn. 2015) (affirming the Court of
4
Section 609.3455 contained similar language: “[T]he court shall provide that, after the
offender has completed the sentence imposed, the commissioner shall place the offender on
conditional release for ten years, minus the time the offender served on supervised release.”
Minn. Stat. § 609.3455, subd. 6 (2005) (emphasis added).
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Appeals decision on the grounds that the defendant had not used the proper procedure to
obtain judicial review of the DOC’s administration of the sentence imposed; not reaching
the merits of the defendant’s motion). The court concluded that the subtraction language
in Section 609.3455, subd. 6 “merely directs a court to credit against a conditional-release
term a person’s time spent on supervised release.” Peterson, 784 N.W.2d at 846.
The court criticized its earlier decision in Koperski, calling into question that
case’s claim that a conditional release period and supervised release period must run
concurrently. Id. at 847. The court noted that the statute at issue in Koperski, like its
modern version, Section 609.3455, subd. 6, did not use the term “concurrently” at all. Id.
The court also noted, however, that the issue in Koperski was different than the issue in
the Peterson case. Id. (“But unlike in Enger and Koperski, the issue here is not whether
Peterson is entitled to credit against his conditional-release term for time served on
supervised release; the issue is the time at which the conditional-release term begins.”).
The day the Peterson decision was released, an attorney at the DOC’s Policy and
Legal Services division, Krista Fink, alerted the HRU, via Peterson, to the new decision.
(Peterson Decl. ¶ 16.) She indicated that the decision applied to a small number of
offenders; namely, offenders “convicted for failing to register as level-III predatory
offenders” under Minn. Stat. § 243.166. (Id.; id., Ex. 3 (Fink e-mail) at Peterson 2151.)5
Fink followed up with a memo to the HRU on August 5, 2010. (Id., Ex. 3 (Fink Mem.) at
Peterson 3240-41 (“This change does not implicate new parameters when revoking
5
References to Peterson Declaration exhibits will use the Bates numbering pagination
“Peterson ___”.
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release for offenders on conditional release pursuant to other statutes.”).) Peterson states
that he likely heard the same interpretation from the DOC’s general counsel at the time,
Brent Warner. (Peterson Decl. ¶ 16.) Peterson gave the same narrow interpretation of
the Peterson decision to his hearing officers. (Id. ¶ 17.) Staff in the records unit received
the same interpretation from Fink and conducted an audit to determine which failure-toregister offenders would be affected and to begin the process of releasing those offenders
– fifty in totally – who were eligible for release under Peterson. (Courtney Aff. ¶¶ 1317.)
B.
Cote v. Roy
In 2011, in an unpublished order opinion, the Minnesota Court of Appeals applied
its reasoning in Peterson to Minn. Stat. § 609.109, subd. 7 (2002), and its successor
statute – the statute at issue in this case: Minn. Stat. § 609.3455, subd. 6 (2005). Cote v.
Roy, No. A11-727, at 1 n.1 (Minn. Ct. App. Nov. 15, 2011).6 In that case, the defendant
had been convicted of third-degree criminal sexual conduct, was sentenced to a term of
prison and supervised release, and was also given a ten-year conditional release term
under now-Section 609.3455, subd. 6. Id. at 1-2. Cote breached the conditions of his
supervised release, his release was revoked, and he was given enough accountability time
to keep him incarcerated beyond the expiration of his supervised release term and into his
conditional release term. Id.
6
The Cote decision is available in the record. (See Aff. of Scott A. Grosskreutz
(“Grosskreutz Aff.”), Ex. 2, Oct. 1, 2014, Docket No. 32.) Citations to the case will refer to the
page numbers of the case itself.
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Cote sought habeas relief, which the state trial court granted. Id. The appellate
court affirmed, citing Peterson. Id. at 4-6. The court noted that Peterson involved a
different statute, the failure-to-register statute, but it reasoned that the relevant language
of both statutes is “nearly identical.” Id. at 4-5; compare Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 5a
(2002) (“[A]fter the person has completed the sentence imposed, the commissioner shall
place the person on conditional release.” (emphasis added)), with Minn. Stat. § 609.109,
subd. 7 (2002) (“[A]fter the person has completed the sentence imposed, the
commissioner of corrections shall place the person on conditional release.” (emphasis
added)). The court noted that while there is a difference between the statute in Peterson
and the statute in Cote – namely the language that the conditional release term should be
reduced by the length of the supervised release term – the Peterson court had expressly
rejected that distinction as a reason for its decision. Id. at 5-6. As a result, the Cote court
extended Peterson to Minn. Stat. § 609.109, subd. 7 and its successor statute, Minn. Stat.
§ 609.3455, subd. 6.7 Id. The state petitioned the Minnesota Supreme Court for review
of the Cote decision, but the court denied the petition. (Aff. of Scott A. Grosskreutz
(“Grosskreutz Aff.”), Ex. 4 (Minnesota Supreme Court Order) at 17, Oct. 1, 2014, Docket
No. 32.)
7
Note that the current versions of the statutes cited in both Peterson and Cote were
amended in 2013 to change the language on which the Minnesota Court of Appeals focused in its
decisions. 2013 Minn. Sess. Law. Serv. Ch. 96, §§ 1, 3 (2013) (amending Minn. Stat.
§§ 243.166, 609.3455). The current statutes clearly state that the mandatory conditional release
term begins after the offender is “released from prison.” Minn. Stat. §§ 243.166, subd. 5a,
609.3455, subd. 6.
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Following the Cote decision, despite the fact that it was not precedential and
applied only to the offender in that case, the DOC general counsel8 decided – as a matter
of policy – to apply the case to “all offenders with a conditional-release term imposed for
criminal sexual conduct.” (Peterson Decl. ¶ 19; id., Ex. 5 at Peterson 3404.) The records
unit was involved in the planning and administration of the DOC’s plan to implement
Cote. (Courtney Aff. ¶ 21.) While the agency wanted to move quickly, it took a
significant amount of time to plan out its response, both because there were a large
amount of affected offenders – potentially thousands – and because the DOC’s tracking
and calculation system, COMS, was in the midst of a transition and was not initially wellsuited for the task of easily tracking down affected offenders. (Id. ¶¶ 21-24.) Initially,
the records unit responded most quickly to requests from attorneys and offenders
themselves, usually through an HRU hearing officer, to make adjustments due to
Peterson and Cote. (Id. ¶ 22.) Eventually, by mid-2012, the records unit began a DOCwide audit of offenders, focused primarily on identifying offenders who were serving
accountability time, beyond the end of their supervised release term but during their
conditional release term, due to misconduct committed during their supervised release
term.
(Id. ¶ 24.)
Once such an offender was identified by records unit staff, the
offender’s case manager took over and began planning for release immediately. (Id.)
Records staff also needed to adjust the length of conditional release terms, to reflect the
DOC’s new interpretation of the statute’s requirement that conditional release terms be
8
The records unit contends that it was actually then-Deputy Commissioner of
Community Services for the DOC Rich Crawford’s decision to apply Cote as though it was
binding law. (Courtney Aff. ¶ 19.)
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decreased by the amount of time an offender spends on supervised release. (Id.) The
records unit contends that this complicated process was made even more difficult by the
fact that some state courts did not agree with the DOC’s decision, refused to apply Cote,
and instead issued conflicting sentencing orders. (Id. ¶ 28.) The DOC continues to
administer sentences in line with Peterson and Cote for crimes that were committed
before August 1, 2013, when the Minnesota legislature revised the conditional release
statutes. (Id. ¶¶ 28-29.)
III.
LOCKHART-BEILKE’S SENTENCE
According to the records unit staff, Lockhart-Beilke entered DOC custody on
August 26, 2008, following sentencing, to serve his thirty-eight month executed sentence.
(Id. ¶ 31.) At the time of entry, his SRD was determined to be August 14, 2009, with his
thirty-eight month executed sentenced scheduled to expire on September 3, 20109 and his
ten-year conditional release term scheduled to end on August 14, 2019. (Id.) LockhartBeilke was released on intensive supervised release on August 17, 2009. (Id.) He was
found to have violated the terms of his release in December 2009, by consuming alcohol,
and his release conditions were restructured. (Peterson Decl. ¶ 23.)
On October 25, 2010, hearing officer Pung held a revocation hearing for LockhartBeilke, due to Lockhart-Beilke’s admission to his supervising agent, on October 14,
2010, that he had breached the conditions of his parole by having sexual intercourse with
9
Lockhart-Beilke is less specific in his calculations, simply speculating that his executed
sentence should have ended sometime in early September. (Pl.’s Resp. Mem. at 3, Nov. 7, 2014,
Docket No. 37.)
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a fifteen-year old female at his home. (Id.; Aff. of Richard S. Pung (“Pung Aff.”) ¶ 8,
Oct. 1, 2014, Docket No. 28.) The girl then became pregnant. (Id.) Pung revoked
Lockhart-Beilke’s release and extended his PRD by 365 days (i.e., giving him one year of
accountability time in prison). (Id.) He directed Lockhart-Beilke to receive sex offender
treatment while incarcerated. (Id.) Hearing officer Roger Baburam held another review
hearing for Lockhart-Beilke on August 8, 2011. (Aff. of Roger J. Baburam (“Baburam
Aff.”) ¶ 8, Oct. 1, 2014, Docket No. 31.) His understanding was that Lockhart-Beilke
had failed to request admission to sex offender treatment and, consequently, he extended
PRD another 365 days. (Id.) Lockhart-Beilke appealed the decision to HRU-head
Peterson, but Peterson denied the appeal. (Peterson Decl. ¶ 26.) It appears that LockhartBeilke did not make any arguments regarding the Peterson decision at these hearings or
during his administrative appeal to Peterson. (Pung. Aff. ¶¶ 8-9; Baburam Aff. ¶¶ 8-9;
Peterson Decl. ¶ 26.)
In June 2012, Lockhart-Beilke, through his attorney, requested an audit of his
records in light of Peterson and Cote. (Peterson Decl. ¶ 27.) Fink, in the DOC’s
counsel’s office, investigated and determined that Peterson and Cote did not apply,
because Lockhart-Beilke’s misconduct with the fifteen-year old girl had occurred in
October 2010, during his conditional release period. (Id.; id., Ex. 10 at Peterson 2788,
2820-21.) Peterson sent Lockhart-Beilke this information. (Id. ¶ 27.)
Lockhart-Beilke filed a habeas petition in state court on October 1, 2012, seeking
relief under Peterson and Cote. (Courtney Aff., Ex. 8 at Peterson 1217-30.) The DOC’s
counsel again contended, in response, that Lockhart-Beilke’s misconduct had occurred up
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to and during his conditional release period, so that he was not eligible for release
pursuant to Peterson and Cote. (Courtney Aff. ¶ 32.)
While the habeas case was ongoing, hearing officer Zachary Gahm conducted
another review hearing for Lockhart-Beilke on October 8, 2012. (Aff. of Zachary Gahm
(“Gahm Aff.”) ¶ 8, Oct. 1, 2014, Docket No. 29.) Gahm extended the PRD another 365
days to allow Lockhart-Beilke to complete sex offender treatment. (Id.) Gahm concedes
that Lockhart-Beilke’s attorney requested the offender’s immediate release, due to
Peterson and Cote, but he contends that the attorney also acknowledged that LockhartBeilke had filed a habeas petition and that he had no qualms with letting the court work
out Lockhart-Beilke’s case. (Id. ¶¶ 8-9.)
The Minnesota Appellate Public Defender appealed Gahm’s decision within the
HRU and Peterson denied the appeal, citing the earlier audit, performed by Fink, into
Lockhart-Beilke’s allegations. (Peterson Decl. ¶ 28.) The state court, in Anoka County,
granted the habeas petition on March 28, 2013 and ordered Lockhart-Beilke released.
(Courtney Aff., Ex. 8 at Peterson 3917-24.) The court concluded that there was little
evidence that Lockhart-Beilke violated the terms of his release in the fall of 2010, into his
conditional release period. (Id. at Peterson 3923.) As a result, the hearing officer had no
factual basis to find that Lockhart-Beilke had violated his conditional release. (Id.)
Lockhart-Beilke could, consequently, receive the benefit of the Peterson and Cote
decisions. (Id.) Lockhart-Beilke was released on April 10, 2013. (Courtney Aff. ¶ 32.)
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IV.
THIS CASE
Lockhart-Beilke filed a complaint in this case on May 20, 2013.
(Compl.,
May 20, 2013). In it, he sues Peterson, Pung, Baburam, and Gahm, along with all
hearing officers in the HRU generally, in their personal capacities, seeking damages.
(Id.; see also id. ¶¶ 64-68.) In Count I, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, he alleges a violation of
his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment by holding
him beyond the end of his lawful term of imprisonment. (Id. ¶¶ 47-52.) In Count II, also
under Section 1983, he alleges a violation of his due process rights under the Fifth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. (Id. ¶¶ 53-58.) In Count III, he alleges false
imprisonment under state common law. (Id. ¶¶ 59-63.) The defendants moved for
summary judgment on October 1, 2014. (Mot. for Summ. J., Oct. 1, 2014, Docket
No. 24.)
DISCUSSION
I.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment is appropriate where there are no genuine issues of material
fact and the moving party can demonstrate that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is material if it might affect the outcome of the suit,
and a dispute is genuine if the evidence is such that it could lead a reasonable jury to
return a verdict for either party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248
(1986). A court considering a motion for summary judgment must view the facts in the
light most favorable to the non-moving party and give that party the benefit of all
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reasonable inferences that can be drawn from those facts. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v.
Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U .S. 574, 587 (1986).
II.
FEDERAL CLAIMS
In Counts I and II of his complaint, Lockhart-Beilke asserts constitutional claims
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of his Eighth Amendment right not to be
unlawfully imprisoned and his Fifth Amendment due process rights.10 (Compl. ¶¶ 4758.) Courts analyze Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment claims in the false imprisonment
context the same way. See Scott v. Baldwin, 720 F.3d 1034, 1036 (8th Cir. 2013); cf.
Kahle v. Leonard, 477 F.3d 544, 550 (8th Cir. 2007). Under both amendments, LockhartBeilke “had a clearly established right to be free from wrongful, prolonged
incarceration.” Scott, 720 F.3d at 1036 (internal quotation marks omitted). The scope of
that right in this case, however – namely the legality of Lockhart-Beilke’s incarceration
during his conditional release period, for a wrong that may have occurred only during his
supervised release period – is a question of state law. Cf. Swarthout v. Cooke, 131 S. Ct.
859, 862 (2011) (“Whatever liberty interest exists [in parole] is, of course, a state interest
created by [state] law.
There is no right under the Federal Constitution to be
10
The defendants contend that the Court should dismiss Lockhart-Beilke’s Fifth
Amendment claims in Count II because the Fifth Amendment applies only to federal actors.
Barnes v. City of Omaha, 574 F.3d 1003, 1005 n.2 (8th Cir. 2009) (“The Fifth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause applies only to the federal government or federal actions . . . .”). The defendants
are correct that the Fifth Amendment applies only against the federal government, but the Court
will not rely on this ground to dismiss Count II. The complaint explicitly references the
Fourteenth Amendment, noting that the Fifth Amendment is made applicable to the states via the
Fourteenth Amendment. (Compl. ¶ 54.); see Knutson v. City of Fargo, 600 F.3d 992, 999 n.5
(8th Cir. 2010). That reference is sufficient to make clear that the complaint is asserting its due
process claims via the Fourteenth Amendment.
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conditionally released before the expiration of a valid sentence, and the States are under
no duty to offer parole to their prisoners.”); Carrillo v. Fabian, 701 N.W.2d 763, 773
(Minn. 2005) (“[W]e hold that under the Due Process Clause of the United States
Constitution, [the petitioner] has a protected liberty interest in his supervised release date
that triggers a right to procedural due process before that date can be extended.”).
The defendants argue that qualified immunity protects them from this action.
Qualified immunity “shields public officials from § 1983 damage actions if their conduct
does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a
reasonable person would have known.” Scott, 720 F.3d at 1036 (internal quotation marks
omitted). The first step in the two-step qualified immunity analysis is to determine
whether the facts show that the “officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right.” Davis
v. Hall, 375 F.3d 703, 712 (8th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The second step is to decide “whether the constitutional right alleged to have been
violated was clearly established.”
Id. at 719.
“In order for a right to be clearly
established, ‘the contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official
would understand that what he [or she] is doing violates that right.’” Id. (quoting
Johnson-El v. Schoemehl, 878 F.2d 1043, 1048 (8th Cir. 1989)). “In other words, a
constitutional right is clearly established when it would be clear to a reasonable officer
that his [or her] conduct was unlawful in the situation he [or she] confronted.” Id.
(internal quotation marks omitted). Due to the doctrine of qualified immunity, officials
are not liable under Section 1983 for “bad guesses in gray areas; they are liable for
transgressing bright lines.” Scott, 720 F.3d at 1036 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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The Supreme Court has clarified that a district court need not engage in both steps of the
qualified-immunity analysis, and need not engage in the steps in a specific order, if the
case can be resolved on one step or the other alone. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223,
236-37 (2009) (“There are cases in which it is plain that a constitutional right is not
clearly established but far from obvious whether in fact there is such a right.”).
Assuming, without deciding, that Lockhart-Beilke’s rights were violated, the
Court will nevertheless grant the defendants’ motion for summary judgment because
Lockhart-Beilke’s rights were not clearly established. In other words, the defendants
were operating in a “gray area[]” and did not cross a “bright line.” Scott, 720 F.3d at
1036. First, Lockhart-Beilke’s rights were obviously not clearly established when Pung
and Baburam interacted with his case. They held hearings in this case in October 2010
and August 2011, respectively. These hearings both preceded the Minnesota Court of
Appeals’ decision in Cote v. Roy, which was the first case to conclude that a person like
Lockhart-Beilke, guilty of criminal sexual conduct – as opposed to failing to register as a
sex offender, which the court considered in Peterson, 784 N.W.2d at 846 – could not be
incarcerated beyond the end of the supervised release term imposed. Cote, No. A11-727,
at 4-6. Indeed, the DOC did not make the decision to apply its new post-Peterson
sentencing policy to criminal sexual conduct offenders until after Cote was decided.
(Peterson Decl. ¶ 19.)
It is true that language in the Peterson decision, and similarities between the
failure to register statute and the criminal sexual conduct statute led to the court’s
decision in Cote. But the decision in Peterson still represented a shift from past decisions
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in Enger and Koperski. Peterson, 784 N.W.2d at 846-47. To attempt – as LockhartBeilke does – to extend the change in the law enunciated in Peterson to other criminal
statutes, before the court addressed those statutes and while the law in that area is in flux,
is to push too far the boundaries of what law is “clearly established.” Whatever clues
might be found in the Peterson decision’s reasoning, it was not enough to mark a change
in the law surrounding sentencing for criminal sexual conduct, such that LockhartBeilke’s rights in his hearings with Pung and Baburam were clearly established.
The issue is a somewhat closer one as to Peterson and Gahm, both of whom
rejected Lockhart-Beilke’s attempts to obtain release pursuant to Peterson and Cote, after
Cote was decided.
Unlike a case in which corrections officers reject or delay a
petitioner’s attempt to gain release, despite an explicit court order, see Scott, 720 F.3d at
1036-37 (contrasting the Scott case from the Davis case, in which “some state DOC
defendants were denied qualified immunity because they knew a court order directed
immediate release, but detained the inmate another 57 days”), here Peterson and Gahm
had no such court order. Peterson and Gahm relied on the analysis of DOC attorney
Fink, who determined that Lockhart-Beilke’s misconduct had occurred during both his
supervised release and conditional release periods and, consequently, that he did not
benefit from Peterson and Cote. (Peterson Decl., Ex. 10 at Peterson 2788, 2820-21.) As
a result, it would not have been clear to a reasonable officer in Peterson’s or Gahm’s
position “‘that his [or her] conduct was unlawful in the situation he [or she]
confronted.’”
Harris v. Hammon, 914 F. Supp. 2d 1026, 1038 (D. Minn. 2012)
(emphasis added) (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202 (2001)); see also
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Watertown Equip. Co. v. Nw. Bank Watertown, 830 F.2d 1487, 1495 (8th Cir. 1987)
(“This Court has also recognized that although reliance on the advice of counsel alone
will not satisfy an official’s burden of acting reasonably, it may be a factor which bears
on the question of qualified immunity.”)
Moreover, the state of the law at the time of Peterson’s and Gahm’s interactions
with Lockhart-Beilke was anything but clear. Instead, the law surrounding the complex
relationship between supervised release periods and conditional release periods was in
flux – a gray area void of the “bright lines” that might eliminate Peterson’s and Gahm’s
protection under the qualified immunity doctrine. Scott, 720 F.3d at 1036. Peterson
represented a shift from Enger and Koperski, changing to some extent the legal landscape
surrounding supervised and conditional release and the DOC’s understanding of how to
calculate sentences.
Peterson, 784 N.W.2d at 846-48; (Peterson Decl. ¶¶ 16-19;
Courtney Aff. ¶¶ 13-15, 18-20.). Cote, the decision that is explicitly on point and that
helps clarify the effect of Peterson on criminal sexual conduct defendants, is an
unpublished, non-precedential order. Cote, No. A11-727, at 8. It is true that the DOC
decided to change its policies following Cote, but it did so as a policy decision, not
because Cote – which was non-binding – clearly established a new right. (Peterson
Decl., Ex. 5 at Peterson 3404.) Indeed, at least one subsequent state trial court decision
stated that, following the Peterson decision, this area of the law consists of “evolving
(and at times perplexing) Court of Appeals decisions.” (Grosskreutz Aff., Ex. 8 at
Peterson 5006-15 (Belt v. Roy, No. 82-CV-13-3110 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Aug. 2, 2013)).)
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Even more proof of the fluctuating nature of this area of the law is the evolving
series of decisions considering the related issue of how to calculate, under Koperski, how
supervised release time should be deducted from a conditional release term (i.e., should
time spent in the community on supervised release be the only time that is deducted, or
should time spent back in prison due to the revocation of supervised release also count).
Compare Schnagl, 2013 WL 6152348, at *4-*5 (“Thus, we conclude that appellant is not
entitled to credit against his conditional-release period for the time he spent incarcerated
on violations of his supervised-release term.”), aff’d as modified by 859 N.W.2d 297
(Minn. 2015), and State v. Ward, 847 N.W.2d 29, 34 (Minn. Ct. App. 2014) (concluding
that an “inmate’s conditional release should not be reduced by the time spent in custody
after [supervised release] revocation”), review granted (Minn. June 17, 2014), with
(Grosskreutz Aff., Ex. 6 at Peterson 3877 (State v. Jones, No. 27-CR-03-71227 (Minn.
Dist. Ct. Dec. 18, 2012)) (“The Court agrees with Defendant that . . . his entire supervised
release time (whether he was in or out of prison during that period) must be deducted
from his conditional release period.”).).
Indeed, the Eighth Circuit has stated that
“[w]here courts are uncertain of the parameters of a right, no reasonable public official
can be expected to know that a clearly established constitutional right is being violated.”
Vieira v. Presley, 988 F.2d 850, 853 n.4 (8th Cir. 1993).
The state legislature has kept the law in this area in flux as well. Following the
decisions in Peterson and Cote, the state legislature changed the relevant failure-toregister and criminal sexual conduct laws to state that a mandatory conditional release
term starts after an offender is “released from prison,” not following the end of a
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supervised release term.
Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 5a; Minn. Stat. § 609.3455,
subd. 6; (Courtney Aff. ¶ 29.). The legislature also deleted the phrase “minus the time
the offender served on supervised release.” 2013 Minn. Sess. Law. Serv. Ch. 96, § 3
(2013).
In sum, the Court concludes that because this area of the law in Minnesota is still
in flux, it was not clearly established that the defendants were violating LockhartBeilke’s Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. While it is true that this circuit takes
a relatively broad view of what constitutes clearly established law, Hayes v. Long, 72
F.3d 70, 73-74 (8th Cir. 1995) (“In order to determine whether a right is clearly
established . . . a court should look to all available decisional law including decisions of
state courts, other circuits and district courts” (quoting Norfleet v. Ark. Dep’t of Human
Servs., 989 F.2d 289, 291 (8th Cir. 1993)), courts generally have looked to multiple clear
statements of the law, either in statute or in case law, to conclude that a law is clearly
established. Stoner v. Watlingten, 735 F.3d 799, 804 (8th Cir. 2013) (concluding a right
was clearly established where the state supreme court had stated as much on “at least
three occasions”); see also Kahle v. Leonard, 477 F.3d 544, 554 (8th Cir. 2007) (holding
that a right was clearly established and summarizing various court decisions that had
stated as much, explicitly). Here, there is only one state appellate court decision that is
directly on point, that decision is non-precedential, and the entire area of the law is in
flux, with the Supreme Court possibly weighing in on a related issue and the legislature
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making statutory changes. The law is not clearly established.11 Consequently, the Court
will grant the defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to all defendants on
Lockhart-Beilke’s federal claims and will dismiss with prejudice Counts I and II of his
complaint.
III.
STATE LAW CLAIMS
Lockhart-Beilke alleges in Count III a violation of his state common law right to
be free of false imprisonment. (Compl. ¶¶ 59-63.) False imprisonment in Minnesota
requires “(1) words or acts intended to confine, (2) actual confinement, and (3) awareness
by the plaintiff that he is confined.” Blaz v. Molin Concrete Prods. Co., 244 N.W.2d 277,
279 (Minn. 1976).
The defendants argue, however, that the Court should decline to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over Lockhart-Beilke’s state law claims.
See Cooke v.
Peterson, No. 12-1587, 2012 WL 6061724, at *2 (D. Minn. Dec. 6, 2012) (in a case
involving similar allegations against many of the same defendants, declining to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after dismissing federal law claims).
Because the Court will grant summary judgment to the defendants on Lockhart-Beilke’s
federal law claims, and dismiss those claims, the Court will also exercise its discretion
under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) to “dismiss supplemental state law claims when all federal
11
Lockhart-Beilke filed an affidavit and additional record materials on January 19, 2015.
(Second Aff. of A.L. Brown, Jan. 19, 2015, Docket No. 47.) The defendants have asked the
Court not to consider those materials. (Letter to District Judge, Jan. 28, 2015, Docket No. 48.)
Even considering those additional materials, the Court still concludes that the law in this case
was not clearly established and that the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.
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claims have been dismissed.” Gibson v. Weber, 433 F.3d 642, 647 (8th Cir. 2006); see
also Stokes v. Lokken, 644 F.2d 779, 785 (8th Cir. 1981) (“[W]hen federal claims are
dismissed before trial, the normal practice is to dismiss pendent [state law] claims.”),
overruled on other grounds by Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622 (1988); Magee v. Hamline
Univ., 1 F. Supp. 3d 967, 977-78 (D. Minn. 2014) (“Courts should ‘exercise judicial
restraint and avoid state law issues wherever possible.’” (quoting Thomas v. Dickel, 213
F.3d 1023, 1026 (8th Cir. 2000))).
ORDER
Based on the foregoing, and all the files, records, and proceedings herein, IT IS
HEREBY ORDERED that:
1.
The defendants’ motion for summary judgment [Docket No. 24] is
GRANTED.
2.
Lockhart-Beilke’s federal law claims – Counts I and II of his complaint –
are dismissed with prejudice.
3.
Lockhart-Beilke’s state law claims – Count III of his complaint – are
dismissed without prejudice.
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.
DATED: September 29, 2015
at Minneapolis, Minnesota.
____s/
____
JOHN R. TUNHEIM
United States District Judge
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