Scheer v. St. Louis County Social Services
Filing
23
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER granting 15 Defendant's Motion to Dismiss; all claims alleged in the Amended Complaint 10 are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE (Written Opinion). Signed by Judge Ann D. Montgomery on 11/25/2013. (TLU)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Sharon Scheer,
Plaintiff,
MEMORANDUM OPINION
AND ORDER
Civil No. 13-1238 ADM/LIB
v.
St. Louis County,
Defendant.
______________________________________________________________________________
Stephanie M. Balmer, Esq., Falsani, Balmer, Peterson, Quinn & Beyer, Duluth, MN, on behalf of
Plaintiff.
Nick D. Campanario, Esq., St. Louis County Attorney’s Office, Duluth, MN, on behalf of
Defendant.
______________________________________________________________________________
I. INTRODUCTION
On November 22, 2013, the undersigned United States District Judge heard oral
argument on Defendant St. Louis County’s (the “County”) Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s
Amended Complaint [Docket No. 15].1 Plaintiff Sharon Scheer opposes the motion. For the
reasons set forth below, Defendant’s motion to dismiss is granted, and the Amended Complaint
[Docket No. 10] is dismissed without prejudice.
II. BACKGROUND
On May 24, 2013, Scheer filed the original Complaint [Docket No. 1] in this action
against St. Louis County Social Services. Thereafter, Scheer learned that no entity named “St.
Louis County Social Services” existed, and thus amended her Complaint to add St. Louis County
1
The parties stipulated to the dismissal of Count 3 of the Complaint, as well as the
dismissal of St. Louis County Social Services as a defendant in this action.
as a defendant. See Pl.’s Mem. Supp. Am. Compl. [Docket No. 6].
The Amended Complaint, like the original Complaint, offers very little substance as to
what misconduct Scheer alleges. Scheer began working as a receptionist for the County in 1998,
and thereafter became a Financial Worker for the County’s Social Services office. Am. Compl.
¶ 12. In very vague terms, Scheer alleges St. Louis County “agents and employees subjected
[Scheer] to sexual harassment, discrimination, a hostile work environment, retaliation, and
reprisal because of her gender.” Id. ¶ 15. Scheer also alleges she “repeatedly complained of and
opposed” the alleged misconduct, but the County continued to “retaliate and commit reprisal”
against her. Id. ¶ 16. Thus, Scheer alleges, she was constructively discharged by the County in
March 2010 when she resigned her position. Id. ¶¶ 18-19. Based on these allegations, Scheer
states claims for: (1) sex discrimination in violation of Title VII and the Minnesota Human
Rights Act (MHRA); and (2) retaliation and reprisal in violation of Title VII and the MHRA.
III. DISCUSSION
Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states that a party may move to dismiss a
complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
The court construes the pleadings in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and the
facts alleged in the complaint must be taken as true. Hamm v. Groose, 15 F.3d 110, 112 (8th
Cir. 1994) (citation omitted). However, Rule 12, working in combination with Rule 8, requires
the plaintiff’s factual allegations to “raise a right to relief above the speculative level,” and push
claims “across the line from conceivable to plausible.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 555, 570 (2007). In other words, the complaint must establish more than a “sheer
possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
2
The ruling court “must not presume the truth of legal conclusions couched as factual
allegations,” and should “dismiss complaints based on ‘labels and conclusions, and a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action.’” Hager v. Ark. Dept. of Health, --- F.3d ----,
2013 WL 6038991, at *2 (8th Cir. 2013) (quoting, in part, Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
Scheer’s Amended Complaint is a textbook example of claims based on labels and
conclusions. Nowhere in the Amended Complaint does Scheer state a single factual allegation
regarding discriminatory conduct, harassment, a hostile work environment, retaliation, or
reprisal. Instead, the Amended Complaint simply repeats these legal terms several times in a
conclusory manner. To satisfy Rule 8 pleading standards, discrimination and retaliation claims
need not identify offending individuals by their full names. Nor do such claims require exact
dates of conduct. But Scheer’s allegations are so lacking in factual detail they do not give the
County any meaningful notice as to its alleged misconduct. The Court has no choice but to find
the Amended Complaint’s allegations insufficient as a matter of law.
In addition, the Amended Complaint lacks even formulaic recitations of claim elements.
For example, with regard to her discrimination claim, Scheer does not allege she was meeting
her employer’s legitimate expectations at the time of her alleged constructive discharge. See
Johnson v. AT&T Corp., 422 F.3d 756, 761 (8th Cir. 2005) (listing prima facie elements of Title
VII discrimination claim). Similarly, Scheer does not allege even a basic time frame for her
retaliation claim. Without reference to when she committed any protected activity, it is
impossible to determine whether engaging in protected activity may have led to her discharge.
See Cross v. Cleaver, 142 F.3d 1059, 1071 (8th Cir. 1998) (listing elements for retaliation claim
under Title VII). As a general matter, Scheer has failed to offer any factual support for her
3
claims, so it is impossible to draw reasonable inferences in her favor which might compensate
for lacking elements.
At oral argument, Scheer’s counsel requested leave to file a second amended complaint.
Based on counsel’s very limited proffer, this request will be denied. Although the Court has
significant doubts Scheer will be able to support her claims with factual allegations sufficient to
satisfy Rule 8 pleading standards, the matter will be dismissed without prejudice.
IV. CONCLUSION
Based upon all the files, records, and proceedings herein, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1.
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss [Docket No. 15] is GRANTED;
2.
All claims alleged in the Amended Complaint [Docket No. 10] are DISMISSED
WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
BY THE COURT:
s/Ann D. Montgomery
ANN D. MONTGOMERY
U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated: November 25, 2013.
4
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?