Wood v. Kapustin et al

Filing 45

ORDER denying 39 Motion to Alter/Amend/Correct Judgment (Written Opinion). Signed by Senior Judge David S. Doty on 7/28/2014. (PJM)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Civil No. 13-1495(DSD/TNL)
Nadezhda V. Wood,
Plaintiff,
ORDER

v.
Sergey Kapustin, Irina Kapustina,
Mikhail Goloverya, Global Auto,
Inc., G Auto Sales, Inc., Effect
Auto Sales, Inc.,
Defendants.

Nadezhda V. Wood, Esq., 500 Laurel Avenue, St. Paul, MN
55102.
Nicholas M. Wenner, Esq., Boris Parker, Esq. and Parker
& Wenner, 100 South Fifth Street, 2100 Fifth Street
Towers, Minneapolis, MN 55402, counsel for defendants.

This matter is before the court upon the pro se motion to
alter judgment by plaintiff Nadezhda V. Wood.

Based on a review of

the file, record and proceedings herein, and for the following
reasons, the court denies the motion.

BACKGROUND
The background of this matter is fully set forth in previous
orders, and the court recites only those facts necessary to resolve
the instant motion.
against

defendants

On June 19, 2013, Wood filed this action
Sergey

Kapustin,

Irina

Kapustina,

Mikhail

Goloverya, Global Auto, Inc., G Auto Sales, Inc. and Effect Auto

Sales,
(1)

Inc.

(collectively,

copyright,

trade

defendants),

dress

and

service

alleging
mark

claims

for

infringement;

(2) violations of the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act
(ACPA);

(3)

cyberpiracy

violations

under

15

U.S.C.

§

1129;

(4) defamation; and (5) tortious interference with prospective
economic advantage.

On that same day, Wood moved for a temporary

restraining order and preliminary injunction, seeking a court order
directing defendants to take down allegedly-infringing websites
pending trial.
After defendants did not appear at the hearing on the request
for injunctive relief, the court granted the motion for preliminary
injunction.

Thereafter, defendants moved to dismiss for lack of

personal jurisdiction.

On January 17, 2014, the court granted the

motion to dismiss and vacated its prior order.

Wood now moves to

alter the judgment and for relief from judgment.

DISCUSSION
Wood moves to alter judgment under Rule 59(e) and for relief
from judgment under Rule 60(b).

The court considers such motion

only under Rule 59(e) “because any motion that draws into question
the correctness of the judgment is functionally a motion under
[Rule 59(e)], whatever its label.”

Norman v. Ark. Dep’t of Educ.,

79 F.3d 748, 750 (8th Cir. 1996) (citations and internal quotation
marks

omitted).

“A

district

court

2

has

broad

discretion

in

determining whether to grant or deny a motion to alter or amend
judgment pursuant to Rule 59(e) ....”

United States v. Metro. St.

Louis Sewer Dist., 440 F.3d 930, 933 (8th Cir. 2006) (citation
omitted).

“Rule 59(e) motions serve the limited function of

correcting manifest errors of law or fact or to present newly
discovered evidence.”
omitted).
introduce

Id. (citation and internal quotation marks

“In other words, [s]uch motions cannot be used to
new

evidence,

tender

new

legal

theories,

or

raise

arguments which could have been offered or raised prior to entry of
judgment.”

Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

Wood argues that newly discovered evidence demonstrates that
defendants have substantial contacts with Minnesota, such that the
court

now

has

personal

jurisdiction

over

the

defendants.

Specifically, Wood argues that, by hiring Minnesota-based attorney
Boris Parker in this matter and other matters in New York and New
Jersey, defendants have established a sufficient connection with
Minnesota for purposes of personal jurisdiction.

Such an argument

is unavailing.
Contacts

with

the

forum

state

can

establish

personal

jurisdiction under either general or specific jurisdiction.

A

forum state has specific jurisdiction when the cause of action
“arise[s] out of” or “relate[s] to” a defendant’s activities within
that state.

Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472

(1985) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

3

General

jurisdiction is present when, regardless of the cause of action, a
defendant has “continuous and systematic contacts with the forum
state.”

Coen v. Coen, 509 F.3d 900, 905 (8th Cir. 2007) (citation

and internal quotation marks omitted). Under either principle, the
Eighth

Circuit

considers

five

factors

in

determining

whether

personal jurisdiction is present: “(1) the nature and quality of
defendant’s

contacts

with

the

forum

state;

(2)

quantity

of

contacts; (3) source and connection of the cause of action with
those contacts; and to a lesser degree, (4) the interest of the
forum state; and (5) the convenience of the parties.”

Wessels,

Arnold & Henderson v. Nat’l Med. Waste, Inc., 65 F.3d 1427, 1432
(8th Cir. 1995) (citations omitted).
Wood argues that, after the court dismissed this matter for
lack of personal jurisdiction, Parker has represented defendants by
(1)

appearing

pro

hac

vice

in

New

Jersey

court,

(2)

filing

pleadings and other court documents and (3) contacting opposing
parties on defendants’ behalf.1

As explained in the court’s

January 17, 2014, order, however, defendants have neither traveled
to nor conducted business in Minnesota. Moreover, the retention of
a Minnesota attorney does not amount to a continuous and systematic

1

Wood also argues that several actions taken by Parker before
the court’s January 17, 2014, order confer personal jurisdiction.
Such arguments, however, do not present newly-discovered evidence
and could have been raised before the court entered judgment. See
Metro St. Louis Sewer, 440 F.3d at 933. As a result, any argument
based on actions occurring before January 17, 2014, is without
merit.
4

contact

sufficient

defendants.
Liab.

confer

general

jurisdiction

over

the

See, e.g., In re Chinese Manufactured Drywall Prods.

Litig.,

(collecting

to

767

cases

F.
and

Supp.

2d

649,

“declin[ing]

to

675-76
base

(E.D.
general

La.

2011)

personal

jurisdiction over [defendants] on the basis of its hiring of forum
... lawyers”).

As a result, Wood’s argument regarding general

jurisdiction is unavailing.
Wood also argues that specific jurisdiction is present because
defendants have moved to disqualify her from representing adverse
parties on the basis of Wood’s allegations in the instant matter.
Wood’s causes of action against the defendants, however, in no way
arise out of or relate to defendants’ retention of Parker as
counsel in this and other matters.

See Coen, F.3d at 905.

As a

result, the argument that newly-discovered evidence impacts the
court’s jurisdictional analysis is without merit, and denial of the
Rule 59(e) motion is warranted.

CONCLUSION
Accordingly, based on the above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the
motion to alter or amend the judgment [ECF No. 39] is denied.
Dated:

July 28, 2014
s/David S. Doty
David S. Doty, Judge
United States District Court

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