Solomon v. Knight et al
Filing
45
ORDER granting 29 and 31 Motions for Summary Judgment. (Written Opinion). Signed by Senior Judge David S. Doty on 11/26/2014. (PJM) CC: Solomon. (kt)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Civil No. 13-1679(DSD/TNL)
Arkinzie Solomon,
Plaintiff,
ORDER
v.
City of Chaska Police and
officers; Chief Scott Knight,
Captain John Kherberg, Brady
Juell, Tony Kjorstad, Rachel
Nelson, Tracy Perlich, Josh
Lawrenz, Kathy Hogan, Jamie
Personius and Sheriff Jim Olson,
Deputy Sheriff Blair Anderson,
in their individual and official
capacity,
Defendants.
Arkinzie Solomon, 3230 James Avenue North, Minneapolis,
MN 55412, pro se.
Nathan C. Midolo, Esq. and Iverson Reuvers, LLC, 9321
Ensign Avenue South, Bloomington, MN 55438; Scott T.
Anderson, Esq. and Rupp, Anderson, Squires & Waldspurger,
527 Marquette Avenue South, Suite 1200, Minneapolis, MN
55402, counsel for defendants.
This matter is before the court upon the motions for summary
judgment by defendants.1
Based on a review of the file, record,
and proceedings herein, and for the following reasons, the court
grants the motions.
1
Defendants include the City of Chaska Police and officers,
Chief Scott Knight, Captain Jon Kherberg, Brady Juell, Tony
Kjorstad, Rachel Nelson, Tracy Perlich, Josh Lawrenz, Kathy Hogan,
Jamie Personius, Sheriff Jim Olson, and Deputy Sheriff Blair
Anderson. All defendants are sued in their individual and official
capacities.
BACKGROUND
This
civil-rights
dispute
plaintiff Arkinzie Solomon.
arises
out
of
the
arrest
of
On March 24, 2011, Officers Tony
Kjorstad and Brady Juell were dispatched to 616 Willow Street in
Chaska, Minnesota.
Juell Aff. Ex. 1, at 1.
The officers were
responding to the sounds of a woman struggling on an open 911 line.
Id.
When Kjorstad and Juell arrived at the home, they heard a
woman
screaming.
Id.
They
knocked
on
the
front
door
and
identified themselves as police officers, but no one answered the
door.
Id.
Kjorstad looked through a window and observed a male
and female move from the living room to a bedroom.
Id.
Kjorstad and Juell eventually forced entry into the home. Id.
After they entered, they heard a woman yell “I’m fine” several
times.
Id.
When they searched the bedroom, they found a woman
sitting on the floor, hugging her knees and crying.
2.
Id. Ex. 1, at
When Juell asked where the man was, she pointed to Solomon, who
was attempting to hide in the bedroom closet.
Salmon in handcuffs.
Id. Kjorstad placed
Id.
Juell then questioned the woman, who complained of pain in her
mouth and on her head and neck.
Id.
She was not wearing clothing
from the waist down, and she had a bleeding lip, black and blue
marks on her eyes, and a swollen left eyelid.
Id.
She explained
that Solomon assaulted her and threatened to kill her.
at 3.
Id. Ex. 1,
Based on this information, and from the other observations
2
made at the scene, Solomon was taken into custody.
Ex.
A.
Solomon
was
transferred
to
Carver
Id.; Olson Aff.
County
Jail
for
processing on nine criminal counts, including criminal sexual
conduct
in
the
third
and
imprisonment, and assault.
fifth
degrees,
Juell Aff. ¶ 6.
kidnapping,
false
Solomon remained
incarcerated during the course of his criminal proceedings, from
March 2011 to on or about June 29, 2012.
Olson Aff. ¶ 9.
On June 19, 2012, the woman contacted Officer Rachel Nelson
and stated that most of what she reported to the police regarding
the alleged assault was a lie.
Nelson Aff. Ex. 13.
On June 29,
2012, the state dismissed the charges against Solomon, noting that
a material witness was no longer available.
Midolo Aff. Ex. 1.
The charges were dismissed with prejudice on August 31, 2012.
Id.
Ex. 2.
Solomon filed an amended pro se complaint on October 8, 2013,
alleging claims for various constitutional violations under § 1983.
Defendants now move for summary judgment.2
2
A responding party must file a memorandum of law in
opposition to a dispositive motion within twenty-one days after the
motion is filed. D. Minn. LR 7.1(c)(2). Defendants filed their
motions on August 8, 2014, and September 2, 2014. ECF Nos. 29, 31.
Although Solomon attended the October 17, 2014, hearing on the
motions, he did not file responses in opposition. Summary judgment
is warranted on this basis alone. See D. Minn. LR 7.1(g)(6) (“If
a party fails to timely file and serve a memorandum of law, the
court may ... take any ... action that the court considers
appropriate.”); cf. Satcher v. Univ. of Ark. at Pine Bluff Bd. of
Trs., 558 F.3d 731, 735 (8th Cir. 2009) (“[F]ailure to oppose a
basis for summary judgment constitutes waiver of that argument.”).
3
ANALYSIS
I.
Standard of Review
“The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows
that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed. R. Civ.
P. 56(a); see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).
A fact is material only when its resolution affects the outcome of
the case.
(1986).
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248
A dispute is genuine if the evidence is such that it could
cause a reasonable jury to return a verdict for either party.
Id.
at 252.
On a motion for summary judgment, the court views all evidence
and inferences in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party.
Id. at 255.
The nonmoving party, however, may not rest upon mere
denials or allegations in the pleadings but must set forth specific
facts sufficient to raise a genuine issue for trial.
U.S. at 324.
Celotex, 477
A party asserting that a genuine dispute exists - or
cannot exist - about a material fact must cite “particular parts of
materials in the record.”
Fed R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A).
If a
plaintiff cannot support each essential element of a claim, the
court must grant summary judgment because a complete failure of
proof regarding an essential element necessarily renders all other
facts immaterial.
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23.
4
II.
Section 1983 Claims
Solomon argues that defendants violated his constitutional
rights when they arrested and detained him.3
The court construes
such claims as brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Claims under § 1983
require that defendants acted under color of state law and that
their conduct resulted in a denial of rights secured by the United
States Constitution or by federal law.
Scheeler v. City of St.
Cloud, 402 F.3d 826, 830 (8th Cir. 2005).
independent
source
of
rights,
and
a
Section 1983 is not an
successful
claim
must
demonstrate a deprivation of a specific right, privilege, or
immunity.
Morton v. Becker, 793 F.2d 185, 187 (8th Cir. 1986).
Accordingly,
a
court
considering
a
§
1983
claim
must
first
“identify the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed.”
Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (citing Graham v.
Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394 (1989)).
Here, the court construes the
complaint as alleging unlawful arrest and detention in violation of
Solomon’s Fourth Amendment rights.4
3
At oral argument, Solomon made new factual allegations
regarding his arrest and confinement. The court does not consider
these allegations, however, as they were not presented in Solomon’s
amended complaint or at any time before the hearing.
4
In his amended complaint, Solomon alleges that defendants
broadly violated his rights under the “1st, 4th, 5th, 6th, 8th, &
14th Amendments” and his “rights under due process.” Am. Compl.
¶¶ 4, 7. The court, however, finds that the facts underlying this
action only implicate a Fourth Amendment claim.
5
“A warrantless arrest is consistent with the Fourth Amendment
if it is supported by probable cause.”
823, 832 (8th Cir. 2008).
Amrine v. Brooks, 522 F.3d
Probable cause exists when “the facts
and circumstances are sufficient to lead a reasonable person to
believe that the defendant has committed or is committing an
offense.”
United States v. Jones, 535 F.3d 886, 890 (8th Cir.
2008) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Moreover,
officers are entitled to qualified immunity if “arguable probable
cause” exists for the arrest.
1074
(8th
Cir.
2012)
Galarnyk v. Fraser, 687 F.3d 1070,
(citation
and
internal
quotation
marks
omitted).
Solomon fails to present any evidence showing that probable
cause, let alone arguable probable cause, was lacking for his
arrest.
The record shows that it was objectively reasonable for
Juell and Kjorstad to believe Solomon had engaged in criminal
activity.
As noted in Juell’s police report, the officers were
responding to the sounds of a female struggling on an open 911
line.
The officers heard a female screaming when they first
approached the home, and they witnessed a male and female retreat
to a bedroom.
After entering the home, the woman, who had clearly
been injured, identified Solomon as the man who assaulted her. She
later provided a detailed description of the assault. As a result,
the court finds that there can be no genuine dispute as to whether
probable cause existed for the arrest. Moreover, because Juell and
6
Kjorstad acted with probable cause, Solomon’s false imprisonment
claim necessarily fails as well.
See Anderson v. Franklin Cnty.,
192 F.3d 1125, 1132 (8th Cir. 1999) (denying false imprisonment
claim where officers had probable cause to arrest the plaintiff).
As
a
result,
summary
judgment
is
warranted
on
Solomon’s
constitutional claims.
III.
Municipal Liability
The court interprets Solomon’s claims against defendants in
their official capacities as claims against Carver County and the
City of Chaska.
See Johnson v. Outboard Marine Corp., 172 F.3d
531, 535 (8th Cir. 1999) (“A suit against a public employee in his
or her official capacity is merely a suit against the public
employer.”).
“[A]
municipality
may
be
held
liable
for
the
unconstitutional acts of its officials or employees when those acts
implement or execute an unconstitutional ... policy or custom.”
Mettler v. Whitledge, 165 F.3d 1197, 1204 (8th Cir. 1999) (citing
Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978)).
The
municipality, however, may not be held liable for its officers'
actions unless the officers are “found liable on the underlying
substantive claim.”
Abbott v. City of Crocker, 30 F.3d 994, 998
(8th Cir. 1994), abrogated on other grounds by Engleman v. Deputy
Murray, 546 F.3d 944 (8th Cir. 2008).
7
As explained, summary
judgment is warranted on Solomon’s constitutional claims against
defendants.
As a result, summary judgment in favor of Carver
County and the City of Chaska is warranted as well.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, based on the above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the
motions for summary judgment [ECF Nos. 29, 31] are granted.
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.
Dated:
November 26, 2014
s/David S. Doty
David S. Doty, Judge
United States District Court
8
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