Luke v. Dougan et al

Filing 31

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER denying 6 Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction; granting 14 Defendant's Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction (Written Opinion). Signed by Judge Ann D. Montgomery on 07/24/2013. (TLU)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Florence Hilda Luke,
Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM OPINION
AND ORDER
Civil No. 13-1748 ADM/JJK

v.
Samuel G. Dougan, Fannie Dougan,
State of Minnesota/Hennepin County
District Court, City of Philadelphia/
Department of Human Services,
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania/In the
Family Court of Philadelphia County,

Defendants.
______________________________________________________________________________
Marcus Anton Jarvis, Esq., Marcus-Jarvis Law Limited, Burnsville, MN, on behalf of Plaintiff.
Melanie P. Persellin, Esq., Jensen Anderson Sonderall, PA, Brooklyn Park, MN, on behalf of
Defendant Samuel G. Dougan.
John S. Garry, Esq., Assistant Attorney General for the State of Minnesota, Saint Paul, MN, on
behalf of Defendant State of Minnesota.
______________________________________________________________________________
I. INTRODUCTION
On July 23, 2013, the undersigned United States District Judge heard oral argument on
Plaintiff Florence Hilda Luke’s (“Luke”) Motion for Preliminary Injunction [Docket No. 6] and
Defendant Samuel G. Dougan’s (“Dougan”) Motion to Dismiss for lack of jurisdiction [Docket
No. 14]. For the reasons stated below, Defendant’s motion to dismiss is granted and Plaintiff’s
motion for preliminary injunction is denied.
II. BACKGROUND
Luke is a resident of Minnesota, a United States citizen, and the mother of two children,
approximately age 15 and 17. Compl. [Docket No. 1] ¶¶ 1, 8. Dougan is a resident and citizen

of Liberia, and the father of the two minor children. Id. ¶ 2. Fannie Dougan is Dougan’s sister,
the children’s aunt, and a resident of Pennsylvania. Id. ¶ 3.
Luke and Dougan have been litigating custody arrangements for several years. On June
5, 2013, Hennepin County District Court Judge Kevin S. Burke ordered Luke to send the
children to Pennsylvania to meet Dougan for his court appointed parenting time. Exhibits re
Mem. Supp. Mot. Prelim. Inj. [Docket No. 10] Ex. 3. Judge Burke held that if Dougan could
obtain U.S. passports for his daughters before or during the summer, he could conduct his
parenting time in Liberia. Id.
On June 12, 2013, Judge Burke issued an Emergency Order Modifying Physical and
Legal Custody. Id. Ex. 4. The Emergency Order was issued after Luke failed to ensure her
children boarded their flight to Pennsylvania.1 In response to Luke’s “failure to comply with the
[Hennepin County] Court’s numerous orders,” Judge Burke determined “that a modification of
custody is in the children’s best interests.” Id. ¶ 6. Judge Burke granted “sole physical custody
and sole legal custody of the minor children” to Dougan.2
III. DISCUSSION
Luke alleges Judge Burke abused his discretion. She asks this Court to overrule or
modify Judge Burke’s orders, prevent the Pennsylvania State Court from honoring Judge

1

According to the Emergency Order, when the children did finally arrive in
Pennsylvania, the children ran away from Fannie Dougan at the airport. Exhibits re Mem. Supp.
Mot. Prelim. Inj., Ex. 4 ¶ 7. The Philadelphia police called Luke, but she refused to confirm that
Fannie Dougan was authorized to pick the children up from the airport. Id. ¶ 8. Therefore the
children were temporarily placed in the care of the Philadelphia Department of Human Services
for a short time. Id.
2

At the hearing, Dougan’s counsel represented to the Court that Dougan will not be
leaving the country with his daughters until further order by the state court.
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Burke’s orders, and finally, prohibit Dougan from taking their daughters to Liberia. Compl. ¶¶
72-76. Luke requests a federal preliminary injunction to accomplish her objective. Mem. Supp.
Inj. [Docket No. 8]. Defendants oppose Luke’s motion for preliminary injunction and move to
dismiss, arguing the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction.3
A. Preliminary Injunction Standard
Courts weigh four factors in determining whether to grant injunctive relief: (1) the threat
of irreparable harm to the moving party if an injunction is not granted; (2) the harm suffered by
the moving party if injunctive relief is denied as compared to the effect on the non-moving party
if the relief is granted; (3) the probability that the moving party will succeed on the merits; and
(4) the public interest. Dataphase Sys., Inc. v. CL Sys., Inc., 640 F.2d 109, 113 (8th Cir. 1981).
The movant “bears the burden of establishing the necessity of this equitable remedy.” Gen.
Motors Corp. v. Harry Brown’s, LLC, 563 F.3d 312, 316 (8th Cir. 2009); see also Oglala Sioux
Tribe v. C & W Enters., Inc., 542 F.3d 224, 233 (8th Cir. 2008) (ceasing a Dataphase analysis
after finding no likelihood of success on the merits).
In this case, Luke has not shown evidence that any of the Dataphase factors weigh in her
favor. As discussed below, the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction; therefore, Luke has no
likelihood of success on the merits in this forum. Next, Luke’s Complaint and memorandum in
support of preliminary injunction relate many of the factual disputes which are the subject of the

3

Defendants Fannie Dougan, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania/In the Family Court of
Philadelphia County and the City of Philadelphia’s Department of Human Services have not yet
responded to Luke’s motion. These remaining Defendants may not have been properly served;
however, since lack of subject-matter jurisdiction bars the Court from hearing Luke’s claims, the
Court’s ruling applies equally to them as it does to the responding Defendants.
3

state court action, but these filings have not shown any irreparable harm she will suffer if the
injunction is denied.
B. Lack of Subject-Matter Jurisdiction
If subject-matter jurisdiction is lacking over a claim, the claim must be dismissed. Fed.
R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), (h)(3).
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine stands for the concept that federal courts lack subjectmatter jurisdiction over certain challenges to state court judgments. Rooker v. Fidelity Trust
Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); D.C. Ct. of App. v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983); see also Exxon
Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005) (holding that RookerFeldman bars “cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court
judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court
review and rejection of those judgments”). Luke’s Complaint accuses Judge Burke of abuse of
discretion and requests that this Court enjoin his orders and modify his decisions on custody.
This is clearly an effort to overturn a state court judgment, and as a result, the suit is barred by
the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, depriving this Court of subject-matter jurisdiction.
To the extent Luke’s Complaint is a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action, this Court still lacks
subject-matter jurisdiction.4 The Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution
prohibits suits against a state in federal court, unless the state consents or Congress has

4

Luke also offers 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as a ground for jurisdiction, Compl. ¶ 54. However,
she makes no allegations of official misconduct, such that even if there were jurisdiction, Luke
has failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Even if
Luke meant to sue Judge Burke, as the allegations suggest, judicial immunity would almost
certainly protect his judgment, Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 355-57 (1978). Also, 42
U.S.C. § 1983 specifically prevents injunctive relief from his decision.
4

unequivocally abrogated the state’s sovereign immunity. Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon,
473 U.S. 234, 243 (1985). There is no suggestion the State of Minnesota has consented to this
suit. And, Congress did not abrogate the states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity when enacting
42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 345 (1979). Thus, the State of Minnesota
and the Hennepin County District Court are not proper parties to this action and must be
dismissed as defendants.5
IV. CONCLUSION
Based upon all the files, records, and proceedings herein, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1.

Plaintiff Florence Hilda Luke’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction [Docket No. 6]
is DENIED;

2.

Defendant Samuel G. Dougan’s Motion to Dismiss for lack of jurisdiction
[Docket No. 14] is GRANTED;

3.

Remaining Defendants are also DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction.

LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.
BY THE COURT:

s/Ann D. Montgomery
ANN D. MONTGOMERY
U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated: July 24, 2013.

5

At the hearing, Defendant State of Minnesota also raised the Younger-abstention
doctrine, which recommends staying a federal proceeding when state proceedings are pending.
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). Given the other grounds for dismissal, a stay is not
appropriate here.
5