Larson v. Wells Fargo Bank N.A. et al
Filing
28
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER granting Plaintiff's 18 Motion to Remand to State Court; Defendants' Motion to Dismiss 7 is not reached in federal court(Written Opinion). Signed by Judge Ann D. Montgomery on 01/27/2014. (TLU)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Brandon Larson,
Plaintiff,
v.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
AND ORDER
Civil No. 13-2117 ADM/JJK
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.;
and Paul Timp,
Defendants.
______________________________________________________________________________
Frances E. Baillon, Esq., and Christopher D. Jozwiak, Esq., Baillon Thome Jozwiak & Wanta
LLP, Minneapolis, MN, on behalf of Plaintiff.
Joseph G. Schmitt, Esq., David A. James, Esq., and Sejal Desai Winkelman, Esq., Nilan Johnson
Lewis PA, Minneapolis, MN, on behalf of Defendants.
______________________________________________________________________________
I. INTRODUCTION
This matter is before the undersigned United States District Judge for consideration of
Plaintiff Brandon Larson’s (“Larson”) Motion for Remand [Docket No. 18] and Defendants
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (“Wells Fargo”) and Paul Timp’s (“Timp”) Motion to Dismiss [Docket
No. 7]. For the reasons stated herein, Larson’s motion is granted and Defendants’ motion is not
reached.
II. BACKGROUND
Larson was a Vice President in the Home Mortgage Division at Wells Fargo. See Notice
of Removal [Docket No. 1] Ex. A (“Complaint”) ¶ 9. A group of employees (“direct reports”)
reported directly to Larson; Larson, in turn, reported to Timp, his immediate supervisor. Id. ¶¶
10, 12. In June 2012, some of Larson’s direct reports complained of sexual harassment by one
of their co-workers, Brett Jacobs. Id. ¶¶ 12-15. During his investigation, Larson alleges other
direct reports made similar complaints about Jacobs. Id. ¶¶ 19-22. Larson followed company
procedures and reported the situation to Timp and Wells Fargo’s employee relations department
(“Human Resources”). Id. ¶¶ 15, 17. A few weeks later, Larson alleges he received another
complaint from one of his direct reports that Jacobs had engaged in sexually offensive behavior.
Id. ¶ 19. Upon hearing of the allegations, Jacobs requested a meeting with his co-workers to
discuss the claims; Timp approved the meeting. Id. ¶ 23.
On September 25, 2012, Larson alleges he received still further complaints that Jacobs
was creating a sexually hostile work environment and retaliating against co-workers. Id. ¶¶ 2425. As with the previous incidents, Larson states he reported these new complaints to Timp and
Human Resources. Id. ¶¶ 30-31. Larson alleges Timp responded to the report by telling Larson
“he was sick of hearing about these issues and they had to end.” Id. ¶ 32. Larson met face-toface with Timp the following day to talk about Jacobs’ access to email accounts. Id. ¶ 33.
During the meeting, Timp allegedly told Larson that Human Resources was tired of Larson
reporting sexual harassment. Id. Days later, Wells Fargo, through Timp, fired Larson. Id. ¶ 36.
Larson claims Defendants fired him because of his good faith reports of sexual
harassment in the workplace. Id. ¶ 41. Therefore, Larson claims his termination was in violation
of the Minnesota Human Rights Act (“MHRA”), Minn. Stat. § 363A.15.
III. DISCUSSION
The Complaint in this action was filed in the Fourth Judicial District of Minnesota,
Hennepin County, on July 9, 2013. See Notice of Removal. Plaintiff Larson is a resident of
Hennepin County, Minnesota. Wells Fargo Bank is a resident of South Dakota and Timp is a
resident of Otsego, Minnesota. On August 5, 2013, Defendants removed the action to this Court,
2
invoking the United States District Court’s diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1).
Defendants acknowledge: a) Larson decided to file his case in state court, b) Larson has only
brought a state law action under Minn. Stat. § 363A.15, and no federal law is at issue, and c)
Larson and Timp are both Minnesota residents. Defendants admit these facts facially defeat
diversity jurisdiction. However, Defendants argue that Timp, as an employee of Wells Fargo, is
not a liable party under Minnesota law, and is thus fraudulently joined. Since Timp is not liable,
Defendants argue, he was necessarily added to the case for the sole purpose of defeating
diversity jurisdiction. Larson argues Timp is liable for his role in retaliating against Larson;
therefore, Defendants improperly removed this action and the case should be remanded to state
court.
A. Standard of Review for Removal Versus Remand
When a plaintiff has joined a non-diverse party as a defendant in a state case, the
defendants may avoid remand by demonstrating that the non-diverse party was fraudulently
joined. Filla v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 336 F.3d 806, 809 (8th Cir. 2003). “Joinder is fraudulent
and removal is proper when there exists no reasonable basis in fact and law supporting a claim
against the resident defendants.” Wiles v. Capitol Indemnity Corp., 280 F.3d 868, 871 (8th Cir.
2002). This means “the district court’s task is limited to determining whether there is arguably a
reasonable basis for predicting that the state law might impose liability based on the facts
involved.” Id. at 811.
B. Reasonable Basis for Remand
The state law at issue in this case is Minn. Stat. § 363A.15, which states in relevant part:
It is an unfair discriminatory practice for any individual who participated in the
alleged discrimination as a perpetrator, employer, labor organization, employment
3
agency, public accommodation, public service, educational institution, or owner,
lessor, lessee, sublessee, assignee or managing agent of any real property, or any real
estate broker, real estate salesperson, or employee or agent thereof to intentionally
engage in any reprisal against any person . . . [who complained about the
discrimination.]
The parties disagree about the meaning of the plain language of the statute. Defendants
argue that Timp, as a supervisor and employee at Wells Fargo, cannot be held individually liable
for his role in terminating Larson’s employment. Defendants read the language of the statute to
mean that “or employee” only refers to employees in the real estate business, not employees in
general. Defendants therefore conclude that since Timp is not a real estate employee or agent, he
cannot be liable for firing Larson, even if Wells Fargo is ultimately held liable for retaliation.
Larson reads the language differently, arguing that “employee” refers to any individual
employee who participates in reprisal against a person who reports discrimination. Larson
argues that the statute holds liable both Wells Fargo and Timp, the supervisor. Neither party has
identified state law precedent that directly addresses which interpretation is correct.
Nevertheless, Defendants argue that the Minnesota Supreme Court’s recent interpretation of
Minn. Stat. § 363A.14 makes clear that a supervisor and his employer cannot both be held liable
under the MHRA for the same conduct. Defs.’ Opp’n to Remand [Docket No. 24] at 4-5 (citing
Rasmussen v. Two Harbors Fish Co., 832 N.W.2d 790 (Minn. 2013)).
In Rasmussen, the Minnesota Supreme Court analyzed Minn. Stat. § 363A.14 and
determined that “[i]f the Legislature had intended to create liability for any individual employee
who engaged in an unfair employment practice in the employment setting, it could have done so
without resorting to a theory of aiding and abetting liability.” 832 N.W.2d at 801. Whether the
Minnesota Supreme Court would interpret § 363A.15 the same way is unclear. See Rasmussen,
4
832 N.W.2d at 801 (the Court commented that individual liability is found, for example, in
Minn. Stat. § 363A.09, subd. 2). As United States District Judge Richard H. Kyle noted when he
remanded a factually similar case, “the reprisal portion of the MHRA is phrased differently than
its discrimination portion.” Arens v. O’Reilly Auto., Inc., 874 F. Supp. 2d 805, 808 (D. Minn.
2012) (listing two cases, Zmora v. Minnesota, No. 01-1905, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6341, at
*8-9 (D. Minn. Apr. 10, 2002) (Kyle, J.) and Nelson v. Cnty. of St. Louis, No. A10-676, 2011
WL 382630, at *3-7 (Minn. Ct. App. Feb. 8, 2011), which suggest supervisor liability may exist
for reprisal). Without directly ruling on the issue, Judge Kyle wrote that in contrast to Minn.
Stat. § 363A.14, § 363A.15 “suggests that supervisors may be held individually liable for
engaging in acts of reprisal against employees complaining about discrimination.” Id. Although
Defendants’ argument may ultimately prove correct, the analysis of Minn. Stat. § 363A.14 in
Rasmussen does not clearly require this Court to ignore the analysis in Arens. Nor does
Rasmussen necessarily require the Court to find that the analysis of § 363A.15’s different
language provides no arguably reasonable basis for predicting that the state law might impose
individual liability on Timp.
Timp is accused of telling Larson that Timp was “sick of hearing” from Larson about
sexual harassment. Timp is further accused of firing Larson for reporting the sexual harassment.
Where, as here, Timp’s potential liability under state law is unclear, a court deciding whether the
defendant was fraudulently joined “has no responsibility to definitively settle the ambiguous
question of state law.” Filla, 336 F.3d at 811. Rather, “the better practice is for the federal court
not to decide the doubtful question in connection with a motion to remand but simply to remand
the case and leave the question for the state courts to decide.” Id. Therefore, Larson’s motion to
5
remand is granted.
C. Motion to Dismiss
Because the Court has remanded this case to state court, the Defendants’ Motion to
Dismiss need not be considered in federal court.
IV. CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, and all the files, records, and proceedings herein, IT IS
HEREBY ORDERED:
1.
Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand [Docket No. 18] is GRANTED;
2.
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss [Docket No. 7] is not reached in federal court;
and
3.
This case is REMANDED to Hennepin County District Court.
BY THE COURT:
s/Ann D. Montgomery
ANN D. MONTGOMERY
U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated: January 27, 2014.
6
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?