Greenman v. Jessen et al
Filing
24
ORDER granting in part consistent with this order 7 Motion to Dismiss; granting in part consistent with this order 12 Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (Written Opinion). Signed by Senior Judge David S. Doty on 3/25/2014. (PJM)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Civil No. 13-2139(DSD/TNL)
Mark Alan Greenman,
Plaintiff,
ORDER
v.
Officer Jeremiah Jessen,
Sgt. Jason Nelson, Chief
Ed Belland, City of Medina
and Steven M. Tallen,
Defendants.
Jordan S. Kushner, Esq., Law Office of Jordan S. Kushner,
431 South Seventh Street, Suite 2446, Minneapolis, MN
55415, counsel for plaintiff.
Daniel P. Kurtz, Esq. and Everett and VanderWiel, PLLP,
100 Center Drive, Buffalo, MN 55313 and George C. Hoff,
Esq. and Haff, Barry & Kozar, P.A., 775 Prairie Center
Drive, Suite 160, Eden Prairie, MN 55344, counsel for
defendants.
This matter is before the court upon the motion to dismiss by
defendant Steven M. Tallen and the motion for judgment on the
pleadings by defendants Officer Jeremiah Jessen, Sgt. Jason Nelson,
Chief Ed Belland and City of Medina (collectively, defendants).
Based on a review of the file, record and proceedings herein, and
for the following reasons, the court grants the motions in part.
BACKGROUND
This
civil-rights
dispute
arises
out
of
the
arrests
of
plaintiff Mark Alan Greenman by Medina, Minnesota police officers.
On three occasions, Greenman was arrested by Medina police officers
while operating his Segway personal transporter device under the
influence of alcohol.
On the evening of August 17, 2010, Greenman was riding his
Segway on a road near his home in Medina.
pulled
over
Department.
by
Id.
Jessen,
an
officer
Id. ¶ 11.
with
the
Greenman was
Medina
Police
Jessen stated in his police report that he
stopped Greenman because the “Segway ... did not have a headlight
or other lights for safety purposes for traveling on a roadway.”
Id. ¶ 12. Upon stopping Greenman, Jessen asked Greenman to perform
field sobriety tests and take a preliminary breath alcohol test.
Id. ¶ 13.
Greenman refused the tests.
Id.
Jessen arrested
Greenman, handcuffed him and placed him in the back of the squad
car.
Id. ¶¶ 13-14.
Jessen transported Greenman to the Medina
police station and then to Maple Grove Hospital for a blood alcohol
test.
Id. ¶ 14.
On October 15, 2010, Nelson, a sergeant with the Medina Police
Department, filed a formal criminal complaint against Greenman in
Hennepin
County
District
Court,
charging
him
with
(1)
gross
misdemeanor DWI, (2) misdemeanor DWI, (3) misdemeanor careless
driving and (4) possession of marijuana in a motor vehicle.1
1
Id.
The misdemeanor careless driving charge was later amended to
a misdemeanor charge of failing to operate an electric personal
assistive device with due care, and the charge for possession of
marijuana in a motor vehicle was amended to possession of a small
(continued...)
2
¶ 15.
Tallen represented the City of Medina during the subsequent
proceedings.
Id. ¶ 16.
Greenman filed a motion to dismiss the
charges for lack of probable cause.
Id.
On June 17, 2011,
Hennepin County District Court Judge Ronald L. Abrams dismissed the
two DWI charges and the possession of marijuana charge.2
Id.
Following a bench trial, Greenman was acquitted of failing to
operate an electric personal assistive device with due care.
¶ 17.
Id.
The City of Medina did not appeal the dismissal or the
acquittal.
Id. ¶ 18.
On February 4, 2012, Jessen again stopped Greenman while
Greenman was riding his Segway on Elm Creek Drive in Medina.
¶ 21.
Id.
Greenman again refused to perform field sobriety and breath
tests, and Jessen arrested Greenman.
Id.
Jessen charged Greenman
with driving while impaired, issued a notice of revocation of
Greenman’s driver’s license and impounded the Segway.
Id.
On March 16, 2012, Nelson observed Greenman lying down next to
his Segway on the sidewalk of Hunter Drive in Medina.
Id. ¶ 25.
Nelson administered field sobriety tests and a preliminary breath
1
(...continued)
amount of marijuana.
Compl. ¶ 15.
2
Judge Abrams found that the Segway fell under Minnesota’s
definition of “electric personal assistive mobility device,” and
that those operating such a device have the rights and
responsibilities of a pedestrian.
Kurtz Aff. Ex. B, at 3; see
Minn. Stat. § 169.212 subdiv. 1. Further, Judge Abrams dismissed
the marijuana charge because the marijuana was discovered during a
search incident to the unlawful custodial arrest. Kurtz Aff. Ex.
B, at 3-4.
3
test, which Greenman failed.
Greenman,
transported
him
Id.
to
the
administered a breath alcohol test.
Thereafter, Nelson arrested
Medina
police
Id. ¶ 26.
station
and
Nelson impounded
the Segway and issued a notice of forfeiture for the Segway.
Id.
Nelson also issued a notice of revocation of Greenman’s driver’s
license.
Id.
Greenman was then transported to Hennepin County
Jail in Minneapolis, where he was booked for probable cause felony
DWI and held for three days.
Id. ¶ 27.
On March 22, 2012, Belland, the Medina Police Chief, filed a
formal criminal complaint against Greenman relating to the February
4, 2012, arrest.
misdemeanor DWI.
The complaint alleged two counts of gross
Id. ¶ 22.
On July 13, 2012, Nelson filed a
formal criminal complaint relating to the March 16, 2012, arrest,
charging Greenman with felony DWI.
Id. ¶ 28.
On August 29, 2012,
Hennepin County District Court Judge Denise Reilly dismissed the
charges relating to the February 4, 2012, arrest.3
Id. ¶ 23.
The
City of Medina appealed, and on January 22, 2013, the Minnesota
Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal, holding that “a Segway is
not a motor vehicle within the meaning of the impaired-driving
code.”
Id. ¶ 24; see State v. Greenman, 825 N.W.2d 387, 393 (Minn.
3
Specifically, Judge Reilly held that, while operating his
Segway, Greenman “was acting as a pedestrian as a matter of law”
and could not be charged with DWI. Kurtz Aff. Ex. G, at 7.
4
Ct. App. 2013).
On March 1, 2013, the Hennepin County Attorney’s
Office voluntarily dismissed the charges relating to the March 16,
2012, arrest.
Compl. ¶ 29.
On July 8, 2013, Greenman filed this action in Minnesota
court, alleging (1) claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, (2) false
imprisonment, (3) trespass to chattel, (4) malicious prosecution
and (5) negligence.
Defendants timely removed.
Tallen moves to
dismiss and the remaining defendants move for judgment on the
pleadings.
DISCUSSION
I.
Standard of Review
The same standard governs a motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) and a motion for judgment on the
pleadings under Rule 12(c).
See Clemons v. Crawford, 585 F.3d
1119, 1124 (8th Cir. 2009). To survive either motion, “a complaint
must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state
a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
Braden v. Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc., 588 F.3d 585, 594 (8th Cir. 2009) (citations and
internal
quotation
marks
omitted)).
“A
claim
has
facial
plausibility when the plaintiff [has pleaded] factual content that
allows
the
court
to
draw
the
reasonable
inference
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
that
the
Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
5
550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007)).
Although a complaint need not contain
detailed factual allegations, it must raise a right to relief above
the speculative level.
See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
“[L]abels
and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a
cause of action” are not sufficient to state a claim.
Iqbal, 129
S. Ct. at 1949 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
The court does not consider matters outside the pleadings
under Rule 12(b)(6) and Rule 12(c).
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d).
The court, however, may consider matters of public record and
materials
that
do
not
contradict
the
complaint,
as
well
materials that are “necessarily embraced by the pleadings.”
as
See
Porous Media Corp. v. Pall Corp., 186 F.3d 1077, 1079 (8th Cir.
1999) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, the
state court decisions are matters of public record and are properly
considered.
II.
Section 1983 Claims
Section
1983
of
substantive rights.”
Title
42
“is
not
itself
must
“identify
allegedly infringed.”
source
of
Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266 (1994)
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
plaintiff
a
the
specific
As a result, a
constitutional
Id. (citations omitted).
right
Here, Greenman
claims that defendants violated (1) his Fourth Amendment right to
be free from unreasonable search and seizure, (2) his Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendment due process rights and (3) his First Amendment
6
rights of free speech and to petition the government for redress of
grievances. Greenman also alleges that the defendants conspired to
deprive him of such rights.
Defendants argue that each of the § 1983 claims is barred by
their qualified immunity.4
“The doctrine of qualified immunity
protects [law enforcement] officers from personal liability under
§
1983
insofar
as
their
conduct
does
not
violate
clearly
established ... constitutional rights of which a reasonable person
would have known.”
Baribeau v. City of Minneapolis, 596 F.3d 465,
473 (8th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (second alteration in original)
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
“The protection
of qualified immunity applies regardless of whether the government
official’s error is a mistake of law, a mistake of fact, or a
mistake based on mixed questions of law and fact.”
Pearson v.
Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808, 815 (2009) (citations and internal
quotation marks omitted).
qualified
immunity so
The court applies the doctrine of
as to
afford “ample
room
for
mistaken
judgments by protecting all but the plainly incompetent or those
who knowingly violate the law.”
Walker v. City of Pine Bluff, 414
F.3d 989, 992 (8th Cir. 2005) (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted).
4
Tallen also argues that the claims against him are barred by
absolute prosecutorial immunity.
Because the court finds that
qualified immunity bars all of the § 1983 claims, it need not reach
this argument.
7
To determine whether defendants are entitled to qualified
immunity, the court views the facts in the light most favorable to
plaintiffs and considers (1) whether the alleged facts demonstrate
that the conduct of defendants violated a constitutional right and
(2) whether the right claimed was clearly established at the time
of the alleged injury.
See Howard v. Kan. City Police Dep’t, 570
F.3d 984, 988 (8th Cir. 2009).
“If the answer to either question
is no, then [defendants are] entitled to qualified immunity.”
v. Flaherty, 623 F.3d 577, 583 (8th Cir. 2010).
Doe
The court may
consider either prong first, “in light of the circumstances in the
particular case at hand.”
Baribeau, 596 F.3d at 474 (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted).
A.
Fourth Amendment
Greenman
first
alleges
that
violation of the Fourth Amendment.
each
of his
arrests
was
in
Specifically, Greenman alleges
that defendants did not have probable cause to arrest or prosecute
him for DWI because Minnesota’s impaired-driving code does not
apply to Segways.
Defendants argue that they are entitled to
qualified immunity because, at the time of the arrests, it was not
clearly established that Segways were exempt from the impaireddriving statutes.
The “clearly established” inquiry asks “whether
it would be clear to a reasonable [official] that [his] conduct was
unlawful in the situation [he] confronted.”
Lindsey v. City of
Orrick, Mo., 491 F.3d 892, 897 (8th Cir. 2007) (first alteration in
8
original)
(citations
and
internal
quotation
marks
omitted).
Officers are entitled to qualified immunity “if they arrest a
suspect under the mistaken belief that they have probable cause to
do so, provided that the mistake is objectively reasonable.”
Baribeau, 596 F.3d at 478 (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted). “The fundamental question under this analysis is whether
the state of the law, as it existed at the time of the arrest, gave
the defendants fair warning that the arrest was unconstitutional.”
Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
1.
Arrest on August 17, 2010
Defendants first argue that at the time of the August 17,
2010, arrest, it was not clearly established that Segways were
exempt
from
the
impaired-driving
code.
The
court
agrees.
Minnesota traffic law is governed by Minnesota Statutes Chapters
169, which sets forth general traffic regulations, and 169A, which
governs impaired-driving offenses.
Under Minnesota law, “[i]t is
a crime for any person to drive, operate, or be in physical control
of any motor vehicle ... when ... the person is under the influence
of alcohol.”
Minn. Stat. § 169A.20, subdiv. 1(1).
A “motor
vehicle” is defined by the impaired-driving code as “every vehicle
that is self-propelled and every vehicle that is propelled by
electric power obtained from overhead trolley wires.
The term ...
does not include a vehicle moved solely by human power.”
§ 169A.03, subdiv. 15.
9
Id.
Greenman agues that the broad definition of “motor vehicle” in
Chapter 169A is limited by that Chapter’s incorporation of the
definition of “vehicle” from Chapter 169.
Both Chapters 169 and
169A define “vehicle” as “every device in, upon, or by which any
person or property is or may be transported or drawn upon a
highway.”
Minn. Stat. § 169.011, subdiv. 92; see Minn. Stat.
§ 169A.03, subdiv. 25 (incorporating Chapter 169’s definition of
“vehicle”). Indeed, subsequent to the August 17, 2010, arrest, the
Minnesota Court of Appeals adopted such an interpretation, holding
that a motorized “mobility scooter” was not a “motor vehicle” for
purposes of Chapter 169A because it did not generally travel on the
highway and,
“vehicle.”
2011).
thus,
did
not
meet
Chapter
169’s
definition of
See State v. Brown, 801 N.W.2d 186, 189 (Minn. Ct. App.
Greenman argues that by examining the plain language and
interrelatedness of the two chapters, a reasonable officer would
have known that there was no probable cause to arrest him for DWI.
At the time of the August 17, 2010, arrest, however, there was
no judicial interpretation of the definition of “motor vehicle” as
narrower than the plain language of Chapter 169A.
§ 169A.03, subdiv. 15.
See Minn. Stat.
“[I]n close qualified immunity cases, the
absence of judicial guidance can be significant because [p]olice
officers are not expected to parse code language as though they
were participating in a law school seminar.” Baribeau, 596 F.3d at
480
(second
alteration
in
original)
10
(citations
and
internal
quotation marks omitted).
Indeed, given the plain language of the
statute and the state of the law at the time of the August 17,
2010, arrest, any mistake as to whether there was probable cause to
arrest
an
individual
reasonable.
for
See id. at 478.
DWI
while
operating
a
Segway
was
As a result, qualified immunity bars
any claim relating to the August 17, 2010, arrest.
2.
Arrests on February 4, 2012, and March 22, 2012
Defendants also argue that they are entitled to qualified
immunity on the claims arising out of the arrests on February 4,
2012, and March 22, 2012, because, at the time of those arrests,
the law was still not clearly established. Greenman responds that,
in between his first and subsequent arrests, two judicial opinions
clearly established the inapplicability of the impaired-driving
code to Segways: (1) the Minnesota Court of Appeals’ June 13, 2011,
decision in Brown and (2) the Hennepin County District Court’s
dismissal of the charges stemming from hi first arrest.
See Kurtz
Aff. Ex. B.
a.
Brown
Greenman argues that Brown clearly established that Segways
were exempt from the impaired-driving code.
As already explained,
the Brown court held that the “operation of [a] scooter as a
substitute for walking does not make [the operator] the driver of
a motor vehicle within the meaning of [the impaired-driving code]
and does not
subject
[the
operator]
11
to
criminal
charges
for
operating the scooter while impaired.”
801 N.W.2d at 189.
In so
doing, the court relied upon the fact that a mobility scooter is
“generally not a device in, upon, or by which any person or
property is or may be transported ... upon a highway” and thus, is
not a “vehicle” for purposes of the impaired-driving code.
Id.
(alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Defendants respond that Brown - which analyzed the application
of the impaired-driving code to a motorized scooter - did not
clearly
establish
Segways.
that
the
The court agrees.
impaired-driving
code
applies
to
Although the Minnesota Court of
Appeals later extended the reasoning of Brown to Segways, “[p]ublic
officials are not obligated to be creative or imaginative in
drawing analogies from previously decided cases.”
Hudson v. Hall,
231 F.3d 1289, 1297 (11th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted); see
Greenman, 825 N.W.2d at 390.
liable
for
bad
guesses
in
In other words, “[o]fficials are not
gray
areas;
they
are
liable
for
transgressing bright lines.” Davis v. Hall, 375 F.3d 703, 712 (8th
Cir. 2004) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Here,
the application of the statute was an unsettled question at the
time of the arrests, and a reasonable officer could have thought
that the impaired-driving code applied to Segways.
Indeed, the
decision ultimately extending the reasoning of Brown to Segways was
a split one, indicating that at least one reasonable judicial
officer thought that Segways were not exempt from the impaired-
12
driving code.
dissenting).
See Greenman, 825 N.W.2d at 393-94 (Klaphake, J.,
As a result, the Brown decision regarding motorized
scooters did not clearly establish that Segways were exempt from
the impaired-driving code.
b.
Dismissal of Previous Case
Greenman next argues that defendants are not entitled to
qualified immunity because the Hennepin County District Court
dismissed the charges against him stemming from the February 4,
2012, arrest.
In support, Greenman argues that there is no
qualified immunity when a state official “disobey[s] a final and
nonappealable court order.”
Slone v. Herman, 983 F.2d 107, 111
(8th Cir. 1993); see also Walters v. Grossheim, 990 F.2d 381, 385
(8th Cir. 1993).
Here, however, unlike in Slone and Walters, the
District Court opinion, though final, only dismissed the pending
criminal charges and was not a court order directing defendants to
take or refrain from any action.
Moreover, qualified immunity is only “lost when plaintiffs
point
either
to
cases
of
controlling
authority
in
their
jurisdiction at the time of the incident or to a consensus of cases
of persuasive authority such that a reasonable officer could not
have believed that his actions were lawful.”
Ashcroft v. al-Kidd,
131 S. Ct. 2074, 2086 (2011) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (emphasis
added) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
A single
district court opinion is not controlling authority, nor does it
13
reflect a consensus of persuasive authority.
As a result, a
reasonable officer at the time of the arrests could have believed
that operating a Segway while impaired violated the impaireddriving code. Therefore, qualified immunity bars the § 1983 Fourth
Amendment claim, and dismissal is warranted.
B.
Due Process
Greenman next alleges a § 1983 due process claim under the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.
Specifically, Greenman alleges
that (1) after the charges from his first arrest were dismissed, he
had a constitutional expectation that Medina police officers would
not arrest him again for similar conduct and (2) defendants engaged
in malicious prosecution.
It is unclear whether Greenman is
alleging violations of his substantive or procedural due process
rights.
Defendants argue that Greenman’s claim fails under either
substantive or procedural due process.
The court agrees.
To the
extent that Greenman alleges a substantive due process claim, it is
duplicative of his Fourth Amendment claim.
particular
Amendment
provides
an
explicit
Indeed, “where a
textual
source
of
constitutional protection against a particular sort of government
behavior, that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of
substantive due process, must be the guide for analyzing th[o]se
claims.”
Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 273 (1994) (citation
and internal quotation marks omitted).
14
Because the allegations of
arrest and prosecution without probable cause fall within the ambit
of the Fourth Amendment claim, any substantive due process claim
necessarily fails.
See Smithson v. Aldrich, 235 F.3d 1058, 1064
(8th Cir. 2000).
Moreover, to the extent that Greenman alleges a procedural due
process claim, such a claim also fails. “To set forth a procedural
due process violation, a plaintiff, first, must establish that his
protected liberty or property interest is at stake ....
Second,
the plaintiff must prove that the defendant deprived him of such an
interest without due process of law.”
Gordon v. Hansen, 168 F.3d
1109, 1114 (8th Cir. 1999) (per curiam) (citations omitted).
Greenman has not alleged a constitutionally-recognized liberty
interest5 or any available process that he was denied.
As a
result, any procedural due process claim fails, and dismissal is
warranted.
C.
First Amendment Claim
Greenman next alleges a claim for violation of his First
Amendment rights.
Specifically, Greenman argues that his arrests
5
Greenman argues that the Eighth Circuit has recognized that
liberty interests are implicated when state officials disregard
court orders affecting the confinement of prison inmates.
See
Walters v. Grossheim, 990 F.2d 381, 385 (8th Cir. 1993); Slone v.
Herman, 983 F.2d 107, 110 (8th Cir. 1993). As already explained,
however, the order dismissing the charges stemming from Greenman’s
first arrest is distinguishable from the court orders in Walters
and Slone. Therefore, Walters and Slone are inapposite.
15
were in retaliation for representing a client in a case6 against
the City of Medina.
As already explained, however, the defendants
had arguable probable cause to arrest Greenman for DWI on each of
the incidents in question.
As a result, those arrests cannot
support a § 1983 First Amendment claim.
See Redd v. City of
Enterprise, 140 F.3d 1378, 1383 (11th Cir. 1998) (“Because we hold
that the officers had arguable probable cause to arrest [the
plaintiff] for disorderly conduct, we must hold that the officers
are
also
entitled
to
qualified
immunity
from
the
...
First
Amendment claims.”). As a result, dismissal of the First Amendment
claim is warranted.
D.
Civil Rights Conspiracy
Greenman next alleges that defendants conspired to violate his
constitutional
immunity
on
rights.
all
of
Defendants
the
are
underlying
entitled
to
constitutional
qualified
claims.
“[B]ecause there was no underlying constitutional violation, [the]
conspiracy claim necessarily fails as well.”
Immekus v. Page, 44
F. App’x 35, 36 (8th Cir. 2002) (per curiam) (citation omitted).
As a result, dismissal of the civil rights conspiracy claim is
warranted.
6
Greenman is an attorney licensed to practice in the State of
Minnesota. Compl. ¶ 9.
16
III.
Municipal Liability
Greenman also alleges that the City of Medina is liable for
the acts of its officers because it maintained an unconstitutional
policy or custom.
“[A] municipality may be held liable for the
unconstitutional acts of its officials or employees when those acts
implement
or
execute
an
unconstitutional
municipal
policy
or
custom.” Mettler v. Whitledge, 165 F.3d 1197, 1204 (8th Cir. 1999)
(citing Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978)).
A
municipality, however, may not be held liable for its officers'
actions unless the officers are “found liable on the underlying
substantive claim.”
Abbott v. City of Crocker, 30 F.3d 994, 998
(8th Cir. 1994) (citations omitted), abrogated on other grounds by
Engleman v. Deputy Murray, 546 F.3d 944 (8th Cir. 2008).
As
already explained, dismissal is warranted on all constitutional
claims against the individual defendants.
As a result, dismissal
of the municipal liability claim against the City of Medina is
warranted.
IV.
Remaining State Law Claims
Dismissal of the § 1983 claims - the only claims for which
original jurisdiction existed - is warranted. Thus, the court must
now consider whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the
remaining state-law claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); Johnson v.
City of Shorewood, Minn., 360 F.3d 810, 819 (8th Cir 2004).
“[I]n
the usual case in which all federal-law claims are eliminated
17
before trial, the balance of factors to be considered under the
pendent jurisdiction doctrine — judicial economy, convenience,
fairness, and comity — will point toward declining to exercise
jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims.” Dodson v. Univ.
of Ark. for Med. Scis., 601 F.3d 750, 756 (8th Cir. 2010) (per
curiam) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Based on
consideration of the pendent jurisdiction factors, the court does
not exercise its discretion to take supplemental jurisdiction over
the state-law claims.
Therefore, the court dismisses Greenman’s
remaining state law claims without prejudice.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, based on the above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
1.
The motion to dismiss [ECF No. 7] is granted in part,
consistent with this order;
2.
The motion for judgment on the pleadings [ECF No. 12] is
granted in part, consistent with this order;
3.
Greenman’s federal constitutional claims are dismissed
with prejudice;
4.
Greenman’s state-law claims are remanded to Minnesota
state court.
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.
Dated:
March 25, 2014
s/David S. Doty
David S. Doty, Judge
United States District Court
18
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