Songa v. Sunrise Senior Living Investments Inc.
Filing
33
ORDER granting 12 Motion to Dismiss/General (Written Opinion). Signed by Senior Judge David S. Doty on 5/16/2014. (CLB)cc: Mattu Songa on 5/16/2014 (MMP).
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Civil No. 13-2254(DSD/JJG)
Mattu Songa,
Plaintiff,
ORDER
v.
Sunrise Senior Living
Investments Inc., doing
business as Rosewood Estates,
Defendant.
Mattu Songa, 321 Old Highway 8 Southwest, Apartment
Number 204, New Brighton, MN 55112, pro se.
Jeffrey B. Hardie, Esq., Thomas P. Murphy, Esq. and
Hunton & Williams, LLP, 1751 Pinnacle Drive, Suite
1700, McLean, VA 22102; Joel D. O’Malley, Esq. and
Dorsey & Whitney LLP, 50 South Sixth Street, Suite
1500, Minneapolis, MN 55402, counsel for defendant.
This matter is before the court upon the motion to dismiss or,
in the alternative, for summary judgment by defendant Sunrise
Senior
Living
Investments,
Rosewood Estates.
Inc.
(Sunrise),
doing
business
as
Based on a review of the file, record and
proceedings herein, and for the following reasons, the court grants
the motion for summary judgment.
BACKGROUND
This employment dispute arises out of the February 2, 2010,
termination of pro se plaintiff Mattu Songa by Sunrise. From March
2004
until
facilities.
her
termination,
Songa
worked
at
several
Sunrise
At the time of her termination, Songa was an assisted
living supervisor at the Rosewood Estates facility in Roseville,
Minnesota.
Compl. ¶ 3.
Songa was hired as an at-will employee.
See Cherwin Decl. Ex. A.
would
continue
regulations.”
“in
Sunrise told Songa that her employment
accordance
Compl. ¶ 19.
with
applicable
laws
and
Songa received positive performance
evaluations and was the only supervisor employed by Sunrise who was
an African immigrant.
See Songa Aff. ¶ 3; id. Ex. 6.
On January 10, 2010, Songa encountered a calendar entry
referring to a “Negro appointment” with a physician at Rosewood
Estates with whom she was scheduled to meet.
Songa Aff. ¶ 7.
Songa reported the entry to Executive Director Grace Hall.
¶ 8.
No action was taken in response to the entry.
Id.
Id. ¶ 9.
Songa alleges that, on several occasions, Hall stated that Songa
“focused on ... culture too much.”
7.
See Compl. ¶ 24; Songa Aff. Ex.
On February 2, 2010, Songa was terminated.
Compl. ¶ 4.
Hall
later informed Songa that “[t]he reason for [her] termination was
failure to work in a cooperative manner.”
On
August
19,
2013,
Songa
filed
Songa Aff. Ex. 5.
a
complaint,
alleging
defamation, breach of contract, intentional infliction of emotional
distress
(IIED)
and
discrimination
Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA).1
under
VII
and
the
Sunrise moved to dismiss or,
in the alternative, for summary judgment.
1
Title
On December 10, 2013,
To the extent that Songa now argues a claim for retaliation,
such a claim was not pleaded and is not properly before the court.
2
the court notified the parties that it would consider the instant
motion as one for summary judgment and allowed the submission of
additional materials.
DISCUSSION
I.
Rule 56(d)
Songa first argues that summary judgment is not warranted
because discovery is not complete. “A party opposing summary
judgment who believes that she has not had an adequate opportunity
to conduct discovery must seek relief pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 56[d], which requires the filing of an affidavit
with the trial court showing what specific facts further discovery
might unveil.” Stanback v. Best Diversified Prods., Inc., 180 F.3d
903, 911 (8th Cir. 1999) (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted).
Songa
filed an
affidavit,
but
has
not
identified
specific facts that discovery would reveal in support of her
claims. Further, the parties were notified that the court intended
to treat the instant motion as one for summary judgment. Upon such
notice, Songa submitted a supplemental memorandum opposing summary
judgment, but adduced no further evidence, exhibits or affidavits
in support of her position.
“Where a party fails to carry her
burden under Rule 56[d], postponement of a ruling on a motion for
summary judgment is unjustified.”
quotation
marks omitted).
As
a
3
Id. (citation and internal
result,
Songa’s
argument
is
unavailing, and the court may properly consider summary judgment at
this stage of the proceedings.
II.
Standard of Review
“The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows
that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed. R. Civ.
P. 56(a); see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).
A fact is material only when its resolution affects the outcome of
the case.
(1986).
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248
A dispute is genuine if the evidence is such that it could
cause a reasonable jury to return a verdict for either party.
See
id. at 252.
On a motion for summary judgment, the court views all evidence
and inferences in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party.
See id. at 255.
The nonmoving party, however, may not rest upon
mere denials or allegations in the pleadings but must set forth
specific facts sufficient to raise a genuine issue for trial.
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324.
See
A party asserting that a genuine dispute
exists — or cannot exist — about a material
fact must cite
“particular parts of materials in the record.”
Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(c)(1)(A).
If a plaintiff cannot support each essential element
of a claim, the court must grant summary judgment, because “a
complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the
nonmoving
party’s
case
necessarily
4
renders
all
other
facts
immaterial.”
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.
III. Statute of Limitations
As an initial matter, Sunrise argues that the claims for
defamation
and
limitations.
IIED
are
barred
by
the applicable
statute
of
The court agrees.
In Minnesota, claims for defamation and IIED are subject to a
two-year statute of limitations.
See Minn. Stat. § 541.07; see
also Wild v. Rarig, 234 N.W.2d 775, 791 (Minn. 1975) (per curiam);
Wenigar v. Johnson, 712 N.W.2d 190, 208-09 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006).
Songa was terminated in February 2010 and filed the instant action
in August 2013.
As a result, the defamation and IIED2 claims are
time-barred and summary judgment is warranted.3
IV.
Race and National Origin Discrimination
Songa next argues that Sunrise discriminated against her on
2
Even if the court construed the “emotional distress” claim
as one for negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED), which
has a six-year statute of limitations, such a claim fails on the
merits. See Minn. Stat. § 541.05, subdiv. 1(5). To prevail on an
NIED claim, Songa must demonstrate that, among other things, she
“suffered severe emotional distress with attendant physical
manifestations.” See Engler v. Ill. Farmers Ins. Co., 706 N.W.2d
764, 767 (Minn. 2005) (citation omitted). Songa has adduced no
medical records or other evidence to demonstrate that she has met
this requirement. As a result, summary judgment is warranted on
any NIED claim.
3
Sunrise also argues that the MHRA claim is time-barred.
Because the court finds that the MHRA claim fails on the merits, it
need not reach this argument.
5
the basis of her race and national origin.
Title VII and the MHRA4
prohibit employers from “discharg[ing] any individual, or otherwise
... discriminat[ing] against any individual with respect to [her]
compensation,
terms,
conditions,
or
privileges
of
employment,
because of such individual’s race ... or national origin.”
42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
In the absence of direct evidence, race and national origin
discrimination
claims
are
analyzed
under
the
burden-shifting
framework of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
A
plaintiff
must
first
establish
a
prima
facie
case
of
discrimination. See Humphries v. Pulaski Cnty. Special Sch. Dist.,
580 F.3d 688, 692 (8th Cir. 2009).
Upon such a showing, a
defendant must articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason
for its actions.
See id. at 692-93.
“If the employer makes such
a showing, the plaintiff must then demonstrate by a preponderance
of the evidence that the stated non-discriminatory rationale was a
mere pretext for discrimination.” Twymon v. Wells Fargo & Co., 462
F.3d 925, 935 (8th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted).
Here, even if Songa could establish a prima facie case of race
or
national
legitimate,
original
discrimination,
nondiscriminatory
research
4
Sunrise
for
her
has
provided
discharge:
a
her
The court applies the same analysis to claims under the MHRA
and Title VII when, as here, the claims depend on identical facts
and theories. See Kasper v. Federated Mut. Ins. Co., 425 F.3d 496,
502 (8th Cir. 2005).
6
failure to work cooperatively.
An employer’s burden of showing a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for termination is not onerous.
Bone v. G4S Youth Servs., LLC, 686 F.3d 948, 954 (8th Cir. 2012)
(citation omitted), cert. denied, 133 S.Ct. 1252 (2013).
Indeed,
the record reveals tension and frustration between Hall and Sunrise
employees, including Songa.
may
constitute
See Songa Aff. Ex. 4.
legitimate,
nondiscriminatory
Such concerns
reasons
for
termination. See Larry v. Potter, 424 F.3d 849, 851 (8th Cir. 2005)
(finding
“negative
work
attitude”
to
be
legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason (citation omitted)).
Thus, the burden shifts to Songa to demonstrate that Sunrise’s
proffered explanation is pretextual, and that discrimination is the
true reason for the adverse action.
See Elnashar v. Speedway
SuperAmerica, LLC, 484 F.3d 1046, 1055 (8th Cir. 2007).
“There are
at least two ways [Songa] may demonstrate a material question of
fact regarding pretext.”
Guimaraes v. SuperValu, Inc., 674 F.3d
962, 975 (8th Cir. 2012) (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted).
“She may show that [Sunrise’s] explanation is unworthy
of credence because it has no basis in fact, or she may show pretext
by persuading the court that discriminatory animus more likely
motivated [Sunrise].”
Id. (citation omitted).
“Either route
amounts to showing that a prohibited reason, rather than [Sunrise’s]
stated reason, actually motivated” her termination.
and internal quotation marks omitted).
7
Id. (citation
Here, Songa argues that various job-related accolades and
positive performance reviews demonstrate that the reason provided
by Sunrise for her termination has no basis in fact.
history was generally positive.
Songa’s work
See Songa Aff. Exs. 3, 6.
The
“certificate of achievement” earned in mid-2005 and the evaluation
of Songa in early 2009, however, are not determinative of her
performance as viewed by Sunrise at the time of her termination in
2010. As a general matter, “evidence of a strong employment history
will not alone create a genuine issue of fact regarding pretext and
discrimination ... [but it] can be relevant when considering whether
the record as a whole establishes a genuine issue of material fact.”
Strate v. Midwest Bankcentre, Inc., 398 F.3d 1011, 1020 (8th Cir.
2005) (citation omitted).
As a result, Songa’s employment history
alone is not indicative of pretext.
Songa also argues that the “Negro appointment” calendar entry
and the statement that Songa “focused on ... culture too much”5
establish pretext.
the calendar entry.
Songa, however, does not identify the source of
See Hitt v. Harsco Corp., 356 F.3d 920, 925
(8th Cir. 2004) (finding stray comments “are not persuasive evidence
of motive when the remarks are made by persons other than a
decisionmaker” (citation omitted)).
5
Moreover, both the entry and
The record is unclear as to whether the statement referred
to Songa’s focus on her own or others’ cultures. Because the issue
is not outcome-determinative, however, any such dispute will not
preclude summary judgment. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
8
the comment about culture are wholly unrelated to the termination
process. Indeed, Songa does not argue that any reference to culture
was made close in time to her termination.
See Simmons v. Oce-USA,
Inc., 174 F.3d 913, 916 (8th Cir. 1999) (“Stray remarks that are
remote in time do not support a finding of pretext for intentional
[race] discrimination.” (alteration in original) (citations and
internal quotation marks omitted)).
Further, the comment about
culture is not indicative of discriminatory animus.
See Agarwal v.
Regents of Univ. Of Minn., 788 F.2d 504, 509 (8th Cir. 1986) (per
curiam).
In sum, the comments at issue are stray remarks and are
not indicative of pretext.
As a result, Songa has not raised a
material fact issue as to whether Sunrise discriminated against her
because of her national origin or race, and summary judgment is
warranted.
V.
Breach of Implied Employment Contract
Songa next alleges that Sunrise breached an implied promise
that her employment would continue “in accordance with applicable
laws and regulations.”6
Compl. ¶ 19.
6
Songa does not dispute that
Songa also argues that Sunrise “disclos[ed] ... [her]
personnel files, and [had] secret discussions of her performance
with co-workers, constitut[ing] fraud and deceit which constitute
a breach of the implied covenant of fair dealing.” Compl. ¶ 20.
To the extent that Songa alleges a claim for a breach of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, “the Minnesota
Supreme Court has squarely held that there is no implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing in Minnesota employment contracts,”
and summary judgment is warranted. Poff v. W. Nat’l Mut. Ins. Co.,
13 F.3d 1189, 1191 (8th Cir. 1994) (citations omitted).
9
she was hired as an at-will employee, but argues that the statement
by Sunrise altered the at-will nature of her employment.
Under Minnesota law, “employment is generally considered to be
at will.”
Martens v. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co., 616 N.W.2d 732, 741
(Minn. 2000) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
As
a result, the relationship “can be terminated for any reason or for
no reason at all.”
Nelson v. Productive Alternatives, Inc., 715
N.W.2d 452, 454 (Minn. 2006) (citation omitted).
Generally, an at-
will employee has “no claim for wrongful termination or breach of
an employment contract once discharged.”
Bolander v. Bolander, 703
N.W.2d 529, 545 (Minn. Ct. App. 2005) (citation omitted).
“To
overcome the presumption of at-will employment, [Songa] must present
evidence [Sunrise] made oral or written statements with specific and
definite
provisions,
and
not
general
statements
of
policy.”
Lindgren v. Harmon Glass Co., 489 N.W.2d 804, 810 (Minn. Ct. App.
1992) (citation omitted).
“General statements about job security
... are insufficient to overcome a grant of summary judgment to an
employer.”
that
it
Id. (citation omitted).
would
continue
to
Here, the statement by Sunrise
employ
Songa
“in
accordance
with
applicable laws and regulations” is a general statement of policy
lacking in any meaningful degree of specificity.
Such a statement
is insufficiently definite to alter the terms of the otherwise atwill employment relationship.
As a result, summary judgment is
10
warranted.7
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, based on the above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the
motion for summary judgment [ECF No. 12] is granted.
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.
Dated:
May 16, 2014
s/David S. Doty
David S. Doty, Judge
United States District Court
7
Songa also argues that, by terminating her employment for
discriminatory reasons, Sunrise breached an implied promise not to
dismiss her for proscribed reasons.
“[T]ermination ... in
contravention of discrimination law ... [i]s an exception to the
at-will doctrine[.]” Knudsen v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 450
N.W.2d 131, 133 (Minn. 1990). Such a claim is properly pleaded
under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. See, e.g., Skinner v. Maritz, Inc., 253
F.3d 337, 342 (8th Cir. 2001) (finding termination of at-will
employee for a racially discriminatory reason violative of § 1981).
Even if Songa had pleaded such a claim, however, it would
fail. “[A] plaintiff must demonstrate purposeful discrimination to
support a § 1981 claim.” Bogren v. Minnesota, 236 F.3d 399, 409
(8th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted).
As already explained, the
discrimination claims fail on the merits and, for the same reasons,
summary judgment on any § 1981 claim would also be warranted.
11
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?