Peterson v. United States Postal Service

Filing 13

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER granting 5 Defendant's Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction; all claims alleged in the Complaint [1-1] are DISMISSED(Written Opinion). Signed by Judge Ann D. Montgomery on 02/07/2014. (TLU) (cc: Douglas A. Peterson) Modified on 2/7/2014 (jz).

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA

Douglas A. Peterson,
Plaintiff,
MEMORANDUM OPINION
AND ORDER
Civil No. 13-2363 ADM/JJG

v.
United States Postal Service,

Defendant.
______________________________________________________________________________
Douglas A. Peterson, pro se.
Bahram Samie, Esq., United States Attorney’s Office, Minneapolis, MN, on behalf of Defendant.
______________________________________________________________________________
I. INTRODUCTION
On December 4, 2013, the undersigned United States District Judge heard oral argument
on Defendant the United States Postal Service’s (“USPS”) Motion to Dismiss [Docket No. 5].
Plaintiff Douglas A. Peterson did not appear in opposition to the motion. For the reasons set
forth below, Defendant’s motion to dismiss is granted.
II. BACKGROUND
On or about August 5, 2013, Plaintiff Peterson initiated this action in Ramsey County
Conciliation Court. Not. of Removal [Docket No. 1] Ex. A (Complaint); Ex. B (Summons).
Peterson was terminated as an employee of Defendant USPS on March 15, 2013. Pl.’s Mem. in
Opp’n Mot. to Dismiss [Docket No. 9]. That same day, Peterson made a written demand for his
final wages, but alleges he did not receive them until March 29, 2013. He thus seeks penalties
for the late payment under Minn. Stat. § 181.13. On August 29, 2013, the USPS removed this
action to federal court, and October 1, 2013, the USPS moved to dismiss the action.

III. DISCUSSION
A. Motion to Dismiss Standard
Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (the “Rules”) states that a party may
move to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed.
R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The court construes the pleadings in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party, and the facts alleged in the complaint must be taken as true. Hamm v. Groose,
15 F.3d 110, 112 (8th Cir. 1994) (citation omitted).
Subject matter jurisdiction “is a threshold requirement which must be assured in every
federal case.” Turner v. Armontrout, 922 F.2d 492, 493 (8th Cir. 1991). If, whether prompted
by the parties or otherwise, a court determines that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the court
must dismiss the action. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). A defendant seeking dismissal for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) must prevail on either a facial or factual
challenge to the complaint. Titus v. Sullivan, 4 F.3d 590, 593 (8th Cir. 1993). In a facial
challenge, “all of the factual allegations concerning jurisdiction are presumed to be true and the
motion is successful if the plaintiff fails to allege an element necessary for subject matter
jurisdiction.” Id.
B. Application of Minn. Stat. § 181.13 to USPS
Because Peterson proceeds in this litigation pro se, his pleadings are interpreted liberally.
Minn. Stat. § 181.13, a subsection of the “Payment of Wages Act,” (“PWA” or the “Act”) states
that when an employee is discharged, “the wages or commissions actually earned and unpaid at
the time of the discharge are immediately due and payable upon demand of the employee.” If
the employer does not pay the owed wages within 24 hours of discharge, “the discharged

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employee may . . . collect a penalty equal to the amount of the employee’s average daily
earnings at the employee’s regular rate of pay . . . for each day up to 15 days.” Id. Peterson
made his written demand for wages under the statute on March 15, 2013, and did not receive
final payment until March 29. Thus, Peterson seeks approximately 14 days of additional wages.
In response, and in addition to arguing the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction in this case, the
USPS argues the PWA does not apply to federal agencies as employers.
Peterson has not demonstrated how the PWA’s definition of employer encompasses the
USPS, a federal agency. See Peltonen v. Branch No. 9, No. 05-605, 2006 WL 2827239, at *23
(D. Minn. Sept. 29, 2006) (noting USPS is federal agency) (citing Fed. Express Corp. v. U.S.
Postal Serv., 151 F.3d 536, 539-40 (6th Cir. 1998); Wright v. Runyon, 2 F.3d 214, 216 (7th Cir.
1993)). The PWA defines “employer” as “any person having one or more employees in
Minnesota and includes the state and any political subdivision of the state.” Minn. Stat. §
181.171. The USPS persuasively argues that a basic axiom of statutory interpretation applies
here: namely, “the expression of one thing excludes others not expressed.” Watt v. GMAC
Mortg. Corp., 457 F.3d 781, 783 (8th Cir. 2006). Although the PWA specifically includes the
state of Minnesota and its political subdivisions as employers under the Act, it does not include
the federal government or its agencies. The PWA thus implicitly excludes federal agencies from
being subject to the Act.
This interpretation is in keeping with the “sensitive considerations of federalism which
necessarily pervade a State’s interest in regulating the employment relations of the wholly
sovereign Federal weal.” Callanan v. Runyun, 903 F. Supp. 1285, 1294 (D. Minn. 1994)
(reaching analogous holding with respect to application of Minnesota Human Rights Act to

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USPS). Presumably, had the Minnesota Legislature intended to apply a state wage law to the
federal government in its capacity as an employer, the legislature would have done so expressly.
See id. Peterson has not demonstrated why another interpretation of § 181.171 is appropriate.
C. Collective Bargaining Agreement
In their memoranda, the parties also address the USPS’s purported sovereign immunity,
an issue the Court does not reach here. Nevertheless, in the course of these arguments, Peterson
raises the Collective Bargaining Agreement (“CBA”) that, in part, defined his terms of
employment with the USPS.1 To the extent Peterson is now also alleging a breach of the CBA,
that argument must fail because Peterson has not exhausted the arbitration process required by
the CBA. See DelCostello v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 164-65 (1983).
IV. CONCLUSION
Based upon all the files, records, and proceedings herein, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1.

Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss [Docket No. 5] is GRANTED;

2.

All claims alleged in the Complaint [Docket No. 1-1] are DISMISSED.

LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.
BY THE COURT:

s/Ann D. Montgomery
ANN D. MONTGOMERY
U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated: February 7, 2014.

1

Collective Bargaining Agremeent, Between APWU, AFL-CIO and USPS, Nov. 21,
2010 to May 20, 2015, available at
http://www.apwu.org/dept/ind-rel/sc/APWU%20Contract%202010-2015.pdf
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