Anderson v. City of Coon Rapids
Filing
31
ORDER granting 19 Motion for Summary Judgment (Written Opinion). Signed by Senior Judge David S. Doty on 1/27/2015. (PJM)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Civil No. 13-3015(DSD/HB)
Wayne Anderson,
Plaintiff,
ORDER
v.
City of Coon Rapids,
Defendant.
Bryce M. Miller, Esq., Caitlin M. Grom, Esq. and Schaefer
Law Firm, LLC, 412 South Fourth Street, Suite 1050,
Minneapolis, MN 55415, counsel for plaintiff.
Jana M. O’Leary Sullivan, Esq., League of Minnesota
Cities, 145 University Avenue West, St. Paul, MN 55103,
counsel for defendant.
This matter is before the court upon the motion for summary
judgment by defendant City of Coon Rapids (the City).
Based on a
review of the file, record, and proceedings herein, and for the
following reasons, the court grants the motion.
BACKGROUND
This employment dispute arises out of the March 29, 2012,
termination of plaintiff Wayne Anderson.
City as a career firefighter.
Ex. 33.
Anderson worked for the
When Anderson turned 55, he
became eligible for a monthly benefit paid by the Public Employees
Retirement Association (PERA). Fulton Dep. at 91:7-10. As a union
member, he was subject to a collective bargaining agreement that
allowed for a 23.33% payout of accumulated sick leave upon his
severance.
Sullivan Aff. Ex. 7, at 12.
In 2005, Anderson began experiencing symptoms of endocarditis,
a heart infection. Anderson Dep. at 88:16-89:12. He was diagnosed
in May 2006, and he continues to be monitored for the condition.
Id. at 90:1-92:12; 101:14-20.
In 2011, Anderson saw neurologist
Moeen Masood for complaints regarding fatigue, gait instability,
and muscle weakness.
Id. at 93:2-12; Grom Decl. Ex. A.
Masood
ordered a muscle biopsy to rule out alternative causes for his
symptoms.
Anderson Dep. at 101:2-9; Grom Decl. Ex. A.
On October
25, 2011, the City received a letter from Masood stating that
Anderson
could
not
return
to
work
until
November
25,
2011.
Sullivan Aff. Ex. 12.
On November 15, 2011, Anderson left a voicemail with Jill
Pocklington, the City’s human resources coordinator, stating the
following:
I have to prepare myself for early retirement. All of
the medical tests are in.
I’m pretty sure Dr.
[Halverston’s] not going to let me come back. But, you
know, one thing at a time.
Sullivan Aff. Ex. 13; Anderson Dep. 131:23-132:6.
On December 1,
2011, Masood met with Anderson and explained that the biopsy
results showed he had muscular dystrophy.
5, 131:12-13; Grom Ex. A.
second opinion.
Anderson Dep. at 124:1-
Masood recommended that Anderson seek a
Anderson Dep. 93:9-24; 138:10-17.
2
On
December
2,
2011,
Anderson’s FMLA paperwork.
Masood
completed
an
attachment
Sullivan Aff. Ex. 11, at 3-6.
to
Masood
stated that Anderson had a permanent and potentially progressive
muscle disease and that he could no longer work as a firefighter.
Id. at 4-5.
Hoversten
for
On December 8, 2011, Anderson met with Phillip
a
fitness-for-duty
examination.
Id.
Ex.
16.
Although Hoversten did not conduct new tests on Anderson, he
reviewed Masood’s findings and concluded that “Mr. Anderson is not
fit for firefighting.”
Id.; Anderson Dep. 126:10-12.
Anderson then sought out John Piper, the head of the City’s
Fire Department, to inform him about the diagnosis.
at 134:16-135:17.
Anderson Dep.
Anderson told Piper that he was going to seek
care at the University of Minnesota.
Id. at 138:6-22.
Anderson
alleges that Piper approached him less than one hour after the
meeting and told him that Matt Fulton, the City Manager, was
demanding his resignation.
On
January
2,
2012,
Id. at 124:20-25.
Anderson
sent
a
letter
to
Piper
reiterating his diagnosis and discussing the prospect of future
employment with the City.
Sullivan Aff. Ex. 19.
In particular,
Anderson stated that the work limitations placed on him by Masood
and Hoversten “forbid me from performing many of the essential job
functions of the firefighters job description for the City of Coon
Rapids.”
Id. at 1.
The letter further stated that “there are no
long-term light duty positions with the fire department” and “no
3
realistic ADA accommodations that could be made internally that
would allow me to remain employed and in PERA P/F.”
Id.
Anderson
ended the letter by stating that he intended to use “the remaining
accrued
time
contract.”
off
as
allowed
by
past
practice
and
the
union
Id. at 3.
Anderson met with Fulton on January 5, 2012, to discuss his
diagnosis and employment.
informed Fulton
that
he
Anderson Dep. at 140:9-18.
had
been diagnosed
disability and likely could not return to work.
with
a
Anderson
permanent
Id. at 156:2-7;
165:7-12. Fulton responded “then I’m separating you and I’m taking
your sick time.”
Id. at 156:2-7.
Anderson told Fulton “I’m in the
union and I have rights,” and Fulton replied “you’re one of those,
huh?”
Id.
Fulton then told Anderson that he was not being
terminated, but asked if Anderson intended to retire on March 29,
when he would turn 55.
Id. at 156:17-21.
Fulton told Anderson
that he would not be eligible for full PERA benefits unless he
waited until then to retire.
had no intention of retiring.
Id. at 196:2-25.
Anderson said he
Id. at 156:22.
Fulton brought Anderson to Piper’s office and instructed Piper
to look into options for light duty work.
10.
Id. at 155:20-22; 140:6-
Following the meeting, Piper called Anderson four times to
determine if he would retire when he turned 55.
Id. at 147:15-25.
Anderson alleges that these calls were made at the direction of
Fulton.
Id.
Piper and Pocklington also called Anderson on one
4
occasion to discuss PERA and the potential penalties of early
retirement.
Pocklington Dep. at 23:1-8.
On March 14, 2012, Fulton sent Anderson a letter summarizing
his meetings with city officials.
letter
provided
that
Anderson
Sullivan Aff. Ex. 20.
had
“expressed
an
interest
The
in
delaying [his] resignation and using accrued sick leave until June
2012.”
Id.
Fulton
explained
that
extending
leave
beyond
Anderson’s birthday would “set a bad organizational precedent” and
that Fulton would consider his “resignation from the City to be
effective March 29, 2012.”
Id.
Fulton further stated that “[i]f
you believe I have misunderstood your intention to resign, please
contact me immediately.”
Id.
Anderson sent the City a letter dated March 15, 2012, which
stated:
Pursuant to our previous discussions, past practice and
the Collective Bargaining Agreement, I am writing to
inform you that I will utilize all accrued and accruing
sick, vacation, holiday and other benefits to extend my
employment with the City of Coon Rapids through December,
2012.
Upon exhaustion of all accrued and accruing
benefits, I understand my employment with the City will
end.
Sullivan Aff. Ex. 21.
The City responded to Anderson in a letter,
stating that the request was contrary to past practices and the
collective bargaining agreement and went “well beyond what is
reasonable for the City to accommodate.”
terminated on March 29, 2012.
Id. Ex. 22.
Id. Ex. 25.
Anderson was
He was paid 349.95
hours of sick leave, which amounted to 23.33% of what he had
5
accrued since 2011.
Id.
He was replaced by a 28 year-old male.
Grom Decl. Ex. B, at 8; Pocklington Dep. at 25:8-15.
Sometime in April 2012, Anderson visited Dr. Peter Karachunski
at the University of Minnesota.
determined
that
Anderson
was
Id. at 190:9-18.
misdiagnosed.
Karachunski
Id.
at
192:3.
Karachunski wrote a letter dated July 23, 2012, stating that
Anderson had “no evidence of progressive muscle disease” and there
was “no contraindication to his returning to work.”
Ex. 27.
Sullivan Aff.
Anderson placed the letter on the desks of Piper and the
Assistant City Manager. Anderson Dep. at 193:16-21; Stemwedel Dep.
at 53:9-14.
Until he delivered the letter, Anderson had not told
city officials that he was seeking a second opinion. Anderson Dep.
at 138:2-22.
On
(1)
November
disability
4,
2013,
Anderson
discrimination,
(2)
filed
age
suit,
alleging
discrimination,
and
(3) retaliation and reprisal. The City moves for summary judgment.
DISCUSSION
I.
Standard of Review
“The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows
that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed. R. Civ.
P. 56(a); see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).
A fact is material only when its resolution affects the outcome of
6
the case.
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248
(1986). A dispute is genuine if the evidence is such that it could
cause a reasonable jury to return a verdict for either party.
Id.
at 252.
On a motion for summary judgment, the court views all evidence
and inferences in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party.
Id. at 255.
The nonmoving party, however, may not rest upon mere
denials or allegations in the pleadings but must set forth specific
facts sufficient to raise a genuine issue for trial.
U.S. at 324.
Celotex, 477
A party asserting that a genuine dispute exists - or
cannot exist - about a material fact must cite “particular parts of
materials in the record.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A).
If a
plaintiff cannot support each essential element of a claim, the
court must grant summary judgment because a complete failure of
proof regarding an essential element necessarily renders all other
facts immaterial.
II.
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23.
Disability Discrimination
Anderson first alleges that the City discriminated against him
on the basis of his disability in violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA).1
Anderson may prevail on his claim under either by presenting direct
evidence or by proceeding under the burden-shifting framework of
1
Except for one instance that is not relevant here, the ADA
and MHRA are analyzed under the same standard. See Kammueller v.
Loomis, Fargo & Co., 383 F.3d 779, 784 (8th Cir. 2004).
7
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
Because
Anderson does not allege direct evidence of discrimination, the
court will proceed under McDonnell Douglas.2
Anderson argues that the City failed to provide him with a
reasonable accommodation by not allowing him to use his accrued
sick leave to seek a second opinion. Failure-to-accommodate claims
are subject to a modified burden-shifting framework.
Fenney v.
Dakota, Minn. & E. R.R. Co., 327 F.3d 707, 712 (8th Cir. 2003).
Under this approach, the employee “must first make a facial showing
that he has an ADA disability and that he has suffered adverse
employment action.”
Id.
“Then he must make a facial showing that
he is a ‘qualified individual.’” Id. “[A] qualified individual is
an individual who, ‘with or without reasonable accommodation, can
2
To the extent Anderson argues that Fulton’s comments during
their meeting or that the phone calls made from Piper and
Pocklington constitute direct evidence under any of his claims, the
argument fails. “Direct evidence is that which shows a specific
link between the alleged discriminatory animus and the challenged
decision, sufficient to support a finding by a reasonable fact
finder that an illegitimate criterion actually motivated the
adverse employment action.” St. Martin v. City of St. Paul, 680
F.3d 1027, 1033 (8th Cir. 2012) (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted). Direct evidence “most often comprises remarks made
by decisionmakers that reflect, without inference, a discriminatory
bias.” McCullough v. Univ. of Ark. for Med. Scis., 559 F.3d 855,
861 (8th Cir. 2012).
Although the communications pertained to
Anderson’s retirement status and age, the court does not find that
they reflect, without inference, a discriminatory or retaliatory
bias.
8
perform the essential functions of the employment position that
such individual holds.’”
Browning v. Libery Mut. Ins. Co., 178
F.3d 1043, 1047 (8th Cir. 1999) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8)).
There is no dispute that, after Anderson’s initial diagnosis
and before his termination, everyone agreed he could no longer work
as a firefighter.
Anderson argues, however, that because his
diagnosis was reversed, he would have been able to perform his
duties had the City given him time to seek a second opinion.
A
“leave of absence might, in some circumstances, be a reasonable
accommodation.”
Cir. 2008).
Brannon v. Luco Mop Co., 521 F.3d 843, 849 (8th
Leave is not reasonable under the ADA, however, where
“at the time of termination [the employee] had no idea when, if
ever, [he] would be able to return ....”
Peyton v. Fred’s Stores
of Ark., 561 F.3d 900, 903 (8th Cir. 2009); see also Graves v.
Finch Pruyn & Co., Inc., 457 F.3d 181, 186 n.6 (2d Cir. 2006)
(noting
most
courts
hold
that
leave
“may
be
a
reasonable
accommodation where it is finite and will be reasonably likely to
enable the employee to return to work”).
Neither Anderson nor the City had reason to doubt the medical
opinions of Masood and Hoversten, and the reversal of the diagnosis
could not have been reasonably predicted.
See Browning, 178 F.3d
at 1049 (stating that employers are not expected to “predict the
degree of success of an employee’s recovery from an illness or
injury”).
Moreover, Anderson did not tell city officials that he
9
was seeking a second opinion.3
Rather, he informed Piper that he
was receiving care at the University of Minnesota, and he expected
officials to infer that he was seeking more than just treatment.
Anderson Dep. at 138:18-22; 150:19-152:6.
See Broadwater v. Minn.
Dep’t of Human Servs., 22 F. Supp. 3d 989, 998 (D. Minn. 2014)
(“The ADA places the initial burden on the employee to request
accommodation.”).4
Anderson further argues, however, that letting him use his
accrued sick leave would have been reasonable because the City had
recently granted a similar request to a younger employee who was
recovering from a stroke.
See Mallon v. U.S. Physical Therapy,
Ltd., 395 F. Supp. 2d 810, 820 (D. Minn. 2005) (stating that a
requested leave was reasonable where the employer had granted
3
Even if Anderson informed others that he was getting a
second opinion, it is still not apparent that he wanted to use his
accrued sick leave for this purpose. Rather, the record shows that
Anderson simply thought he was entitled to all of his accrued sick
leave, pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement and past
practices. See Sullivan Aff. Ex. 21.
4
Anderson also argues that the City did not understand his
request because it failed to engage in an interactive process. The
court disagrees.
“To establish that an employer failed to
participate in an interactive process, a disabled employee must
show ... the employee requested accommodation or assistance for his
or her disability ... and the employee could not have been
reasonably accommodated but for the employer’s lack of good faith.”
Cravens v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Kan. City, 214 F.3d 1011,
1021 (8th Cir. 2000). Anderson, his doctor, and city officials all
agreed that no reasonable accommodation existed for Anderson to
return to work. As a result, no reasonable jury could find that the
City demonstrated bad faith, and any claim premised on a failure to
participate in an interactive process fails.
10
similar requests). The court disagrees. In contrast to Anderson’s
situation, the City understood that the other employee might be
able to return to work.
Sullivan Aff. Ex. 32, at 3, 5-6, 10;
Fulton Dep. at 68:20-24.5
The court finds that Anderson has not
established a prima facie case of disability discrimination, and
summary judgment is warranted.
III.
Age Discrimination
Anderson next alleges that the City discriminated against him
on the basis of his age in violation of the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (ADEA) and the MHRA.6
relies
on
circumstantial
rather
“When, as here, a plaintiff
than
direct
evidence
of
age
discrimination, the case is considered under the burden-shifting
framework
[(1973)].”
2011).
of McDonnell
Douglas
Corp.
v.
Green,
411
U.S. 792
Rahlf v. Mo-Tech Corp., 642 F.3d 633, 637 (8th Cir.
To establish a prima facie case of age discrimination,
Anderson “must show that (1) he is over 40 years old, (2) he met
the applicable job qualifications, (3) he suffered an adverse
employment action, and (4) there is some additional evidence that
age was a factor in the employer’s termination decision.”
Id.
“If
5
The City eventually determined that the employee was not fit
for duty. Fulton Dep. at 69:1-9; Piper Dep. at 17:7-13; Sullivan
Aff. Ex. 32, at 16-18.
6
The ADEA and MHRA are analyzed under the same standard. See
Chambers v. Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 351 F.3d 848, 855 (8th
Cir. 2003). The ADEA protects employees who are 40 years or older,
while the MHRA protects employees who are 18 years or older. See
29 U.S.C. § 631(a); Minn. Stat. § 363A.03, subd. 2.
11
[Anderson] establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to
[the City] to provide a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for
the [adverse employment action].”
F.3d 464, 468 (8th Cir. 2011).
Haigh v. Gelita USA, Inc., 632
“Finally, if [the City] provides
such a reason, the burden returns to [Anderson] to prove [the
City’s] reason was mere pretext for discrimination.”
Id.
The court finds that Anderson has not established a prima
facie case of age discrimination. Anderson notes that the comments
made by Fulton during their January 5, 2012, meeting focused on his
retirement status and pension eligibility.
This simply shows,
however, that Fulton was attempting to determine how to offer
Anderson full PERA benefits.
“[E]mployment decisions motivated by
factors other than age (such as salary, seniority, or retirement
eligibility), even when such factors correlate with age, do not
constitute age discrimination.”
EEOC v. McDonnell Douglas Corp.,
191 F.3d 948, 952 (8th Cir. 1999).
Moreover, the record does not
support a finding that Fulton was using PERA eligibility as a proxy
for age. See Tramp v. Assoc. Underwriters, Inc., 768 F.3d 793, 801
(8th Cir. 2014) (holding that a reasonable jury could find that an
employer’s
desire
“analytically
to
reduce
distinct”
from
health
insurance
considerations
of
costs
was
employee
not
age).
Although age and PERA eligibility are correlated, the record shows
that city officials, in attempting to determine when Anderson would
retire, were “wholly motivated by factors other than age.”
12
Id.
(quoting Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 611 (1993)).
As
a result, Anderson does not show that age “had a determinative
influence”5 on the decision to terminate and deny him sick leave.
Hazen Paper Co., 507 U.S. at 610.
Even if Anderson could establish a prima facie case of age
discrimination, the City provides a legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason for its decisions. At the time of his termination, everyone
- including Anderson - agreed that he could not perform the
essential duties of a firefighter.
See Barket v. NexitiaOne, LLC,
No. 01-278, 2002 WL 1457631, at *5 (D. Minn. July 3, 2002).
Moreover, denying Anderson’s additional sick leave request was in
accordance with the collective bargaining agreement.
As a result,
the burden shifts back to Anderson to prove that the City’s reasons
are pretextual.
“[T]he showing of pretext ... requires more than merely
discrediting an employer’s asserted reasoning for terminating an
employee. A plaintiff must also demonstrate that the circumstances
permit a reasonable inference of discriminatory animus.”
632 F.3d at 470 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Haigh,
Anderson
argues that he was treated less favorably than the previously
5
It is unsettled whether an age discrimination claim under
the MHRA requires “but for” or merely “motivating factor”
causation.
See Gifford v. Target Corp., No. 10-2049, 2011 WL
3876420, at *7 n.5 (D. Minn. Aug. 31, 2011). This distinction is
immaterial for purposes of this motion, because the court finds
that Anderson has put forth no evidence showing that age was a
motivating factor in the City’s decisions.
13
referenced younger employee.
As already stated, however, the City
treated Anderson differently because there was no reason to believe
he would be able to return to work.
See Bone v. G4S Youth Servs.,
LLC, 686 F.3d 948, 956 (8th Cir. 2012) (stating that a comparator
must be “similarly situated in all relevant respects ... without
any mitigating
or
distinguishing
internal quotation marks omitted)).
circumstances”
(citation and
Further, the court does not
find it material that Anderson was replaced by a 28 year-old male.
See Carraher v. Target Corp., 503 F.3d 714, 719 (8th Cir. 2007)
(holding the fact that an employee was replaced by a younger
individual is insufficient on its own to show pretext).
As a
result, Anderson has not presented sufficient evidence from which
a reasonable jury could determine that the City discriminated
against him on the basis of his age, and summary judgment is
warranted.
IV.
Retaliation
Anderson next argues a claim for retaliation under the ADA,
Title VII, and the MHRA.
To establish a prima facie case of
retaliation under any of these statutes, Anderson must show that
(1) he engaged in statutorily protected activity, (2) he suffered
an adverse employment action, and (3) a causal connection exists
between the protected activity and the adverse employment action.
Fercello v. Cnty. of Ramsey, 612 F.3d 1069, 1077-78 (8th Cir.
2010); Thomas v. Corwin, 483 F.3d 516, 530 (8th Cir. 2007).
14
Anderson fails to establish the requisite causal connection.
The City terminated Anderson and denied him his requested sick
leave more than two months after the January 5, 2012, meeting with
Fulton.
See Tyler v. Univ. of Ark. Bd. of Trs., 628 F.3d 980, 986
(8th Cir. 2011) (holding that an inference of retaliation “vanishes
altogether when the time gap between the protected activity and the
adverse employment action is measured in months”).
Moreover,
everyone agreed before the meeting that Anderson could no longer
work as a firefighter.
that he
did
determines
Indeed, Anderson indicated multiple times
not intend
that
no
to return.
reasonable
jury
As
could
a
result,
find
that
the
court
the City
retaliated against Anderson, and summary judgment is warranted.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, based on the above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that
defendant’s motion for summary judgment [ECF No. 19] is granted.
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.
Dated:
January 27, 2015
s/David S. Doty
David S. Doty, Judge
United States District Court
15
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?