Balenger et al v. Meridian Services Inc. et al

Filing 195

ORDER: Plaintiffs' objection to the magistrate judge's order 192 is DENIED. The magistrate judge's order of March 10, 2015 187 is AFFIRMED. (Written Opinion) Signed by Judge Joan N. Ericksen on April 9, 2015. (CBC)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Unity Healthcare, Inc., et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.

Case No. 14-CV-114 (JNE/JJK)
ORDER

County of Hennepin, et al.,

Defendants.

This matter is before the Court on Plaintiffs’ objection to Magistrate Judge Jeffrey J.
Keyes’s March 10, 2015 order denying Plaintiffs’ motion for leave to file a third amended
complaint because the motion was untimely and Plaintiffs failed to show good cause, as required
when modifying a pretrial scheduling order. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4). For the reasons stated
below, the objection is denied and the order is affirmed.
An order granting or denying leave to amend is nondispositive, and objections to
magistrate judges’ nondispositive orders are reviewed under a clearly erroneous or contrary to
law standard. See 28 U .S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a); D. Minn. LR 7.1(b)(4)(A)(i),
72.2(a); see also Daley v. Marriott Int'l, Inc., 415 F. 3d 889, 893 n. 9 (8th Cir. 2005) (referring to
a motion to amend as a “nondispositive pretrial motion”). Plaintiffs argue that the Court should
depart from this general rule and review de novo the magistrate judge’s order because it has a
dispositive effect, namely that it would result in the termination of Plaintiffs’ claims. Plaintiffs
cite no persuasive authority showing that the Court should look behind the nondispositive label
of the motion to consider the dispositive effects, if any, in this instance. See Hofmann v.
Enterprise Leasing Co. of Minnesota, LLC, No. 13-cv-255, 2014 WL 6911113, at *1-2 (D. Minn.

Dec. 8, 2014). Regardless, the magistrate judge’s order withstands scrutiny under any standard of
review.
Leave to amend must be freely given “when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2).
However, because Plaintiffs’ motion was filed on February 11, 2015, after the pretrial scheduling
order’s October 1, 2014 deadline for amended pleadings, the magistrate judge applied Rule
16(b)’s “good cause” standard for modifying a scheduling order. “The primary measure of good
cause is the movant’s diligence in attempting to meet the order’s requirements.” Rahn v.
Hawkins, 464 F.3d 813, 822 (8th Cir. 2006).
Plaintiffs argue that the magistrate judge erred by applying Rule 16(b) instead of 15(a)
because the parties had agreed good cause existed when, on January 23, 2015, they jointly
moved to suspend the scheduling order’s forthcoming deadlines. Based on that motion, the
magistrate judge filed a January 26 order suspending “all forthcoming fact and expert discovery,
motion, and trial deadlines in the Pretrial Scheduling Order.” Plaintiffs argue that they should not
have to show good cause twice, once with respect to the January 26 order and again now.
However, any good cause shown with respect to the January 26 order concerned only
“forthcoming” deadlines, not past deadlines. No party showed good cause for resetting the
expired October 1, 2014 deadline for filing amended pleadings, and the Court never found that
good cause existed.
With respect to whether good cause exists now, Plaintiffs argue that they diligently
pursued a protective order that was not in place until December 4, 2014. It is arguable whether
Plaintiffs were diligent. They filed their complaint on January 10, 2014 but did not file their
motion for a protective order until September 10, 2014. Regardless, Plaintiffs have failed to
show how the absence of a protective order is relevant to their motion. The magistrate judge

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explained in his order that Plaintiffs do not “point to any specific allegations in the proposed
Third Amended Complaint that they could not have included in their pleadings before the entry
of the Protective Order or prior to the expiration of the deadline for amending pleadings in the
Scheduling Order.” For example, Plaintiffs’ second amended complaint identified clients by
specific letters. Their proposed third amended complaint identifies additional clients by initials.
As the magistrate judge found, “[i]t is unclear how the entry of the Protective Order, which
allows a party to designate certain information in this case as ‘confidential’ and governs the use
of information so designated in this proceeding, made it possible for the plaintiffs to use
individuals’ initials in their proposed Third Amended Complaint that they could not have used
earlier in the case.” Plaintiffs provided no explanation to the magistrate judge, and they have
likewise provided no explanation in their objection. Plaintiffs have also not identified any
newfound information or recent law that they could not have included in earlier pleadings.
Finally, Plaintiffs suggest that good cause exists because they seek to clarify the factual
allegations that the Court found deficient in its December 2, 2014 order dismissing and
narrowing Plaintiffs’ claims. However, as the magistrate judge correctly concluded, Plaintiffs’
earlier failure to allege sufficient facts does not support a finding of good cause. See Target
Corp. v. LCH Pavement Consultants, LLC, 960 F. Supp. 2d 999, 1009 (D. Minn. 2013).
Based on the files, records, and proceedings herein, and for the reasons stated above, IT
IS ORDERED THAT:
1. Plaintiffs’ objection to the magistrate judge’s order [Docket No. 192] is DENIED.
2. The magistrate judge’s order of March 10, 2015 [Docket No. 187] is AFFIRMED.

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Dated: April 9, 2015
s/Joan N. Ericksen
JOAN N. ERICKSEN
United States District

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