Rebischke v. Tile Shop, LLC, The
Filing
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MEMORANDUM OF LAW & ORDER. IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 1. Plaintiff's Motion for FLSA Conditional Certification and Judicial Notice 21 is GRANTED and this matter is conditionally certified as a collective action. 2. Plaintiff's propos ed Notice form 24 , Exhibit F, is hereby APPROVED. The Court authorizes Plaintiffs' counsel to mail such Notice to the putative class members identified in the list provided by the Defendant. The Notice shall provide for a 90 day opt-in perio d. 3. The Defendant is ordered to post the Notice in all break and lunch rooms at nationwide locations where the Defendant employs putative class members. 4. The Court authorizes Plaintiff's counsel to re-mail the Notice one time during t he 90 day opt-in period to those putative class members who have not yet opted in as of the date of the re-mailing. 5. The Court orders the Defendant to provide Plaintiff's counsel with a list of all Store Managers employed nationwide for the three year period preceding the date of this Order. This list shall include the last known address, telephone number, dates of employment, location of employment, last four digits of their social security number, and date of birth, and shall be in electronic and importable format. Defendant is ordered to produce this list within ten days of this Order. (Written Opinion). Signed by Chief Judge Michael J. Davis on 1/26/15. (GRR)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
David Rebischke, individually
and on behalf of all other similarly
situated individuals,
Plaintiff,
v.
MEMORANDUM OF LAW & ORDER
Civil No. 14‐624 (MJD/SER)
The Tile Shop, LLC,
Defendant.
___________________________________________________________________
Rowdy B. Meeks, Rowdy Meeks Legal Group LLC, J. Derek Braziel, Lee &
Braziel, LLP and Michele R. Fisher and Paul J. Lukas, Nichols Kaster, Counsel for
Plaintiffs.
Joseph M. Sokolowski, Lindsay Sokolowski and Krista A.P. Hatcher,
Fredrikson & Byron, P.A., Counsel for Defendant.
___________________________________________________________________
I.
Introduction
This matter is before the Court upon Plaintiff’s Motion for Conditional
Class Certification pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C.
§ 201 et seq. Plaintiff seeks to represent a class of Store Managers employed by
Defendant The Tile Shop, LLC, that were not paid overtime premiums pursuant
to FLSA.
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Defendant operates approximately 80‐90 stores nationwide which sell tile
and related materials and accessories. (Doc. No. 1 (Complaint ¶ 1).) Its
headquarters are located in Plymouth, Minnesota. (Doc. No. 16 (Answer at ¶ 1).)
Plaintiff was hired as a Material Handler, Warehouse Manager, and Sales
Associate. From October 2003 through January 2013, he was a Store Manager in
four different stores. (Comp. ¶ 4.) Plaintiff and five other Store Managers have
opted into this case. (Plaintiff Ex. C (Declarations of Opt‐In Store Managers.)
These Stores Managers, between them, worked in 15 different stores in at least
five different states. (Id.) Plaintiff asserts the declarations from the opt‐in Store
Managers provide a colorable basis in support of his claim that Defendant’s pay
plan and salary deduction policy are implemented nationwide and that all Store
Managers are similarly situated.
Plaintiff asserts that Defendant generally employs one Store Manager per
store. (Answer ¶ 14.) The Store Manager’s primary duty is to manage their
assigned store. Each Store Manager is paid a salary, bonus and commissions on
sales. (Answer ¶ 15; Plaintiff Ex. C ¶ 6; Plaintiff Ex. D (Store Manager Salary Plan
Example).) As Store Managers frequently talked with each other, they were
aware that Defendant paid them in the same manner. (See Plaintiff Ex. C ¶¶ 4‐6.)
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Plaintiff asserts that Store Managers routinely work over 40 hours per
week; frequently they work 50 hours per week and on occasion, work 70 hours
per week, yet they receive no overtime pay. (Comp. ¶ 16; See Plaintiff Ex. C ¶ 7.)
Defendant must pay its Store Managers on a salary basis in order for them
to be exempt from FLSA’s overtime requirements. See Berscheid v. Northwest
Respiratory Serv., No. 09‐3392, 2011 WL 1084749 (D. Minn. Mar. 21, 2011); 29 CFR
§ 541.602(a). Plaintiff asserts that the Store Managers are not paid on a salary
basis as evidenced by the fact that Defendant told its Store Managers that their
pay would be reduced based upon their performance and the performance of
their store. (See Plaintiff Ex. C ¶¶ 8‐10).) This policy is evidenced in a writing.
(Plaintiff Ex. E (Tile Shop Senior Mgmt. Email at 2 “If I believe you could have
done more than what you finish with, I “WILL” hit you with everything . . . If
that wipes out your bonus, so be it . . . if it takes form your salary . . . so be it”).)
Plaintiff further asserts that Defendant did make deductions pursuant to
this policy. (See Plaintiff Ex. C ¶ 9.) Defendant also made deductions that it
placed on the “Bonus” line, but which were actually salary deductions as the
Store Manager had not been paid a bonus during such pay period. (Id. ¶ 10.)
Plaintiff argues that Defendant loses any exemption from overtime payments for
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Store Managers because Defendant actually made improper deductions from
Store Manager compensation pursuant to its own articulated policy. See 29 CFR
§ 541.603(a).
Defendant asserts that its Store Managers are paid between $70,000 and
$250,000 per year. (Behrman Aff. ¶ 4.) Their compensation has three
components: 1) base salary; 2) commissions and spiffs; and 3) bonuses. (Id.)
Because of commissions and bonuses, a Store Manager’s paycheck will vary.
(Id.) Bonuses are paid based on various factors, including a negative store
performance. (Id. ¶ 5.) A negative bonus amount may be offset against other
compensation a Store Manager earns, such as commissions and spiffs. (Id.) A
negative bonus is never offset against a fixed salary. (Id.)
Defendant’s Human Resources (“HR”) personnel accumulates all
components of a Store Manager’s salary, imports it into the payroll system and
reviews it for accuracy and compliance with the FLSA. (Id. ¶ 6.) Defendant
asserts that although Regional Sales Managers are responsible for calculating
their Store Managers’ bonuses, and submitting that information to HR, HR, not
the Regional Sales Managers, determines the amount of each Store Manager’s
compensation every pay period. (Id.) HR is responsible for auditing the
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compensation of Store Managers to ensure that no deductions from salary occur.
(Id.)
Defendant asserts that Regional Sales Managers have no control of, or
review the Defendant’s payroll process and do not establish guidelines or
policies for payroll administration. (Id. ¶ 7.) If an improper salary deduction is
made, Defendant immediately corrects the deduction.
In April 2014, an audit was conducted of all Store Managers’ payroll over
the previous three years. (Id. ¶ 11.) It was determined from this audit that
deductions had inadvertently been made from the salaries of 14 Store Managers.
(Id.) The improper deductions totaled less than $5,000. (Id.) Defendant
immediately reimbursed the affected Store Managers for all salary amounts that
had been improperly deducted. (Id.)
II.
Standard for Conditional Class Certification
Plaintiff seeks conditional class certification and Court‐facilitated notice
pursuant to the FLSA, which provides:
An action . . . may be maintained against any employer . . . in any
Federal or State court of competent jurisdiction by any one or more
employees for and in behalf of himself or themselves and other
employees similarly situated. No employee shall be a party plaintiff
to any such action unless he gives his consent in writing to become
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such a party and such consent is filed in the court in which such
action is brought.
29 U.S.C. § 216(b).
The Court performs a two‐step process to determine whether a case should
be certified under the FLSA:
First, the court determines whether the class should be conditionally
certified for notification and discovery purposes. At this stage, the
plaintiffs need only establish a colorable basis for their claim that the
putative class members were the victims of a single decision, policy,
or plan. In the second stage, which occurs after discovery is
completed, the court conducts an inquiry into several factors,
including the extent and consequences of disparate factual and
employment settings of the individual plaintiffs, the various
defenses available to the defendant that appear to be individual to
each plaintiff, and other fairness and procedural considerations.
Dege v. Hutchinson Tech., Inc., Civil No. 06‐3754 (DWF/RLE), 2007 WL 586787, at
*1 (D. Minn. Feb. 22, 2007) (unpublished) (citations omitted).
In the first step,
the Court only must determine whether Plaintiffs have come
forward with evidence establishing a colorable basis that the
putative class members are the victims of a single decision, policy, or
plan. The court does not make any credibility determinations or
findings of fact with respect to contrary evidence presented by the
parties at this initial stage.
Id. at *2 (citations omitted). “A colorable basis means that plaintiff[s] must come
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forward with something more than the mere averments in [their] complaint in
support of [their] claim.” Lyons et al. v. Ameriprise Fin., Inc., Civ. No. 10‐503,
2010 WL 3733565, at *3 (D. Minn. Sept. 20, 2010)(J. Kyle) (internal citation
omitted) (finding that plaintiff had established a colorable basis for their claims
through declarations, deposition excerpts and interrogatory responses).
III.
Analysis
A.
Whether the Putative Class Members Are Similarly Situated
Plaintiff seeks to conditionally certify a class consisting of all former and
current Store Managers for the previous three years from the mailing date of the
notice at its stores throughout the nation.
Plaintiff argues that conditional certification is appropriate in this case
because Plaintiff has established a colorable basis that the class members are
similarly situated through the declarations of six opt‐in plaintiffs. This Court has
previously found that the standard for certification is low at this initial stage.
Burch v. Qwest Communications Intern., Inc., 500 F. Supp.2d 1181, 1190 (D.
Minn. 2007); see also Chin v. The Tile Shop, LLC, No. 13‐2969 (SRN/JSM), __ F.
Supp.2d __, 2014 WL 5461891 (D. Minn. Oct. 27, 2014).
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Defendant asserts that Plaintiff has not established that he and other Store
Managers are similarly situated because they were harmed by the same
nationwide policy. Instead, Plaintiff relies on an email from one Regional Sales
Manager, and such evidence is insufficient to demonstrate that Defendant had a
nationwide policy. Defendant has put forth evidence that its policy is that only a
Store Manager’s non‐salary compensation ‐ bonuses, spiffs and commissions ‐ are
subject to a negative bonus offset. (Behrman Aff ¶ 5.)
Defendant further argues the declarations of the Store Managers do not
establish with specificity that their salaries were offset by the negative bonus,
versus a bonus or commission payment. This is an important distinction as the
FLSA does not prohibit offsetting negative bonus amounts against non‐salary
compensation. 29 CFR § 541.602; see also Coppage v. Bradshaw, 665 F. Supp.2d
1361, 1366 (N.D. Ga. 2009).
B.
Defenses
Plaintiff asserts that at this stage of the proceedings, the Court must not
address arguments that go to the merits of the claims. See Edwards v. Multibrand
Corp., No. 10‐2826 (MJD/JJK), 2011 WL 117232 (D. Minn. Jan. 13, 2011). As such,
any arguments as to any supposed exemption or individual defense should not
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be addressed at this time.
Moreover, where the evidence shows that a defendant had an express
policy to improperly deduct from Store Manager salaries and did deduct sums in
violation of the FLSA, the defendant cannot escape liability by claiming that such
improper deductions were infrequent. See Casellino v. M.I. Friday, Inc., No. 11‐
261, 2012 WL 2513500 *9 (W.D. Pa. June 29, 2012). Plaintiff further asserts that
Defendant cannot utilize the “window of correction” under 29 CFR § 541.603(c)
because Defendant intentionally enacted a policy of improper deductions which
resulted in actual improper deductions.
In response, Defendant argues that collective actions impose a significant
burden on a defendant employer. As such, courts require plaintiffs to present
actual evidence in support of their allegations in order to obtain certification of a
collective action. Severtson v. Phillips Beverage Co., 137 F.R.D. 264, 267 (D.
Minn. 1991); Jones v. Casey’s Gen. Stores, 538 F. Supp. 2d 1094, 1102 (S.D. Iowa).
Besides the July 2013 email, Plaintiff offers evidence in the form of nearly
identical declarations from himself and five other former Store Managers. The
assertions in these boilerplate declarations are even more generalized and
conclusory than the averments in Plaintiff’s Complaint, alleging they were
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threatened with salary deductions from “TTS Management,” that they
experienced salary deductions and hearsay that “other Store Managers” also
experienced salary deductions. Plaintiff provides no details about “who” made
the alleged deductions, “when” they were made, the amount or frequency of
such deductions and what was said by whom in management or why the
deductions were made. Defendant argues the lack of evidence compels the
conclusion that the Store Managers throughout the country are not similarly
situated.
In addition, the declarations do not support the theory of an illegal
company‐wide policy. In most large companies, “mistakes will occasionally be
made, and employees will occasionally not receive compensation to which they
are entitled under the FLSA.” Thompson, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115050 at *3.
While those employees may sue to recover wages they claim they are owed, “to
go further and receive conditional certification of a large, nationwide class, those
employees must come forward with evidence establishing a colorable basis for
their claim that the putative class members were together the victims of single
decision, policy, or plan.” Id.
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The Court has reviewed the submissions of the parties and finds that
Plaintiff has set forth a colorable basis that the putative class members are the
victims of a single decision, policy, or plan by Defendant to illegally withhold
overtime pay. At this initial stage, the Court finds that conditional certification is
appropriate.
C.
Judicial Notice
“[D]istrict courts have discretion, in appropriate cases, to implement 29
U.S.C. § 216(b) . . . by facilitating notice to potential plaintiffs.” Hoffmann‐La
Roche Inc. v. Sperling, 493 U.S. 165, 169 (1989). “Because trial court involvement
in the notice process is inevitable in cases with numerous plaintiffs where written
consent is required by statute, it lies within the discretion of a district court to
begin its involvement early, at the point of the initial notice, rather than at some
later time.” Id. at 171. “By monitoring preparation and distribution of the notice,
a court can ensure that it is timely, accurate, and informative. Both the parties
and the court benefit from settling disputes about the content of the notice before
it is distributed. This procedure may avoid the need to cancel consents obtained
in an improper manner.” Id. at 172. “Court authorization of notice serves the
legitimate goal of avoiding a multiplicity of duplicative suits and setting cutoff
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dates to expedite disposition of the action.” Id.
Plaintiff has submitted a proposed notice. (Plaintiff Ex F.) Plaintiff has
based the notice and consent form on those approved by the district court in Chin
v. Tile Shop, 2014 WL 5461891 (involving a collective action of sales associates
and assistance store managers claiming unpaid minimum wage and overtime).
Defendant has not commented on or otherwise objected to the form of notice or
the consent form submitted by Plaintiff.
Accordingly, based upon the files, records, and proceedings herein, IT IS
HEREBY ORDERED:
1.
Plaintiff’s Motion for FLSA Conditional Certification and Judicial
Notice (Doc. No. 21) is GRANTED and this matter is conditionally certified as a
collective action.
2.
Plaintiff’s proposed Notice form (Doc. No. 24, Exhibit F) is hereby
APPROVED. The Court authorizes Plaintiffs’ counsel to mail such Notice to the
putative class members identified in the list provided by the Defendant. The Notice
shall provide for a 90 day opt‐in period.
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3.
The Defendant is ordered to post the Notice in all break and lunch
rooms at nationwide locations where the Defendant employs putative class
members.
4.
The Court authorizes Plaintiff’s counsel to re‐mail the Notice one time
during the 90 day opt‐in period to those putative class members who have not yet
opted in as of the date of the re‐mailing.
5.
The Court orders the Defendant to provide Plaintiff’s counsel with a list
of all Store Managers employed nationwide for the three year period preceding the
date of this Order. This list shall include the last known address, telephone number,
dates of employment, location of employment, last four digits of their social security
number, and date of birth, and shall be in electronic and importable format.
Defendant is ordered to produce this list within ten days of this Order.
Date: January 26, 2015
s/ Michael J. Davis
MICHAEL J. DAVIS
CHIEF JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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