Taylor v. City of Amboy et al
ORDER granting 188 Motion for Attorney Fees. See Order for details. (Written Opinion) Signed by Judge Patrick J. Schiltz on September 14, 2017. (CLG)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
JARED MICHAEL GRANT TAYLOR,
Case No. 14‐CV‐0722 (PJS/TNL)
CITY OF AMBOY, et al.,
Jonathan A. Strauss, Kenneth C. Edstrom, Lorenz F. Fett., Jr., and Sonia L. Miller‐
Van Oort, SAPIENTIA LAW GROUP, PLLC, for plaintiff.
Jon K. Iverson, Stephanie A. Angolkar, and Susan M. Tindal, IVERSON
REUVERS CONDON, for defendants Cities of Bloomington, Dundas, Faribault,
Lonsdale, Montgomery, Northfield, and Owatonna, and defendants Lee
Phillippe, Eric Kline, Matt Knutson, David Orr, Patrick Nelson, Mark Dukatz,
Jeffrey Gigstad, Billy Houts, Steve Klostermeier, Mischelle Watkins, and Kyle
This matter is before the Court on the motion of plaintiff Jared Taylor for an
award of attorney’s fees and costs under 18 U.S.C. § 2724. Taylor seeks attorney’s fees
in the amount of $117,383.14 and costs in the amount of $10,523.69 from a group of
defendants to whom the Court will refer as the “Remaining Defendants.”1 The
Remaining Defendants concede that Taylor is entitled to an award of attorney’s fees and
The “Remaining Defendants” are the Cities of Bloomington, Dundas, Faribault,
Lonsdale, Montgomery, Northfield, and Owatonna, and individual defendants Lee
Phillippe, Eric Kline, Matt Knutson, David Orr, Patrick Nelson, Mark Dukatz, Jeffrey
Gigstad, Billy Houts, Steve Klostermeier, Mischelle Watkins, and Kyle Parr.
costs, but they argue that Taylor’s request for attorney’s fees is inflated by over
$31,000.00 and his request for costs is inflated by about $6,000.00. After reviewing the
materials submitted by the parties, the Court finds that Taylor is entitled to recover
$105,357.04 in attorney’s fees and $4,707.53 in costs.
Taylor filed this action against 34 municipalities and counties—along with
numerous employees designated as “John Doe” or “Jane Doe”—alleging that the
defendants had unlawfully obtained, disclosed, or used information contained in his
driver’s‐license record on hundreds of occasions in violation of the Driver’s Privacy
Protection Act (“DPPA”), 18 U.S.C. §§ 2721 et seq. See generally ECF No. 1. Following
discovery, Taylor amended his complaint to identify by name the individual employees
who had unlawfully accessed his driver’s‐license record. ECF No. 97.
During the three‐year course of this litigation, the claims against some of the
defendants were dismissed, and the claims against other of the defendants were settled,
leaving only the Remaining Defendants. After the case was scheduled for trial, the
Remaining Defendants extended—and Taylor accepted—an offer of judgment in the
amount of $55,100.00. The parties also agreed that Taylor could seek an award of the
reasonable attorney’s fees and costs that he had incurred in litigating his claims against
the Remaining Defendants. ECF No. 186‐1. As noted, Taylor now seeks attorney’s fees
in the amount of $117,383.14 and costs in the amount of $10,523.69.
II. ATTORNEY’S FEES
The parties agree that Taylor prevailed on his DPPA claims against the
Remaining Defendants and therefore is entitled to recover reasonable attorney’s fees.
See 18 U.S.C. § 2724(b)(3). The starting point for calculating a fee award is the
lodestar—that is, “the number of hours reasonably expended . . . multiplied by a
reasonable hourly rate.“ See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983) (finding the
lodestar method to be the “most useful starting point for determining the amount of a
A. Hourly Rate
Taylor is represented by a team of six lawyers and three legal assistants who
have ably represented numerous plaintiffs in DPPA cases in this District. Taylor argues
that his attorneys should be compensated at the following rates:
Larry Fett (35 years of legal experience) at $450.00 per hour;
Kenneth C. Edstrom (33 years) at $400.00 per hour;2
Although Taylor states in his brief that Edstrom charges an hourly rate of
$450.00, ECF No. 189 at 14, the evidence provided in his counsel’s declaration and
attached exhibits indicates that, at least in connection with this case, Edstrom’s rate was
only $400.00 per hour. See ECF No. 191 (“Miller‐Van Oort Decl.”) ¶ 17; id. Ex. A, ECF
No. 191‐1, at 12.
Jonathan Strauss (19 years) at $400.00 per hour;
Sonia Miller‐Van Oort (19 years) at $400.00 per hour;
Robin Wolpert (15 years) at $400.00 per hour; and
Kenneth Fukuda (4 years) at $225.00 per hour.3
ECF No. 189 at 14‐15; ECF No. 191 (“Miller‐Van Oort Decl.”) ¶ 17. The billing rate of all
three legal assistants—who recorded their time under the initials “D.H.,” “P.A.R.,” and
“K.L.T.”—is $100.00 per hour. Miller‐Van Oort Decl. ¶ 17; id. Ex. A, ECF No. 191‐1.
In support of his fee request, Taylor submitted an affidavit from Marshall Tanick,
a prominent litigator in the Twin Cities. Based on his knowledge of the rates charged in
the Twin Cities for comparable legal work, Tanick opines that the hourly rates charged
by Taylor’s legal team were “very reasonable in light of the background, experience and
quality of the work performed by them in this matter.” ECF No. 190 ¶ 8; see also Emery
v. Hunt, 272 F.3d 1042, 1048 (8th Cir. 2001) (“A reasonable hourly rate is usually the
ordinary rate for similar work in the community where the case has been litigated.”).
Moreover, in other DPPA cases handled by members of the same legal team, similar
hourly rates have been found reasonable by judges of this District. See, e.g., Myers v.
Aitkin Cty., No. 14‐CV‐0473 (JRT/LIB), 2017 WL 1134575, at *1‐2 (D. Minn. Mar. 27, 2017)
Fukuda is not mentioned in Taylor’s memorandum in support of his fee
petition, but the time that Fukuda billed is included in the Miller‐Van Oort Declaration
and accompanying exhibits. See Miller‐Van Oort Decl. ¶ 17; id. Ex. A at 2.
(awarding attorney’s fees for the same attorneys based on the same hourly rates in a
similar DPPA action); Rasmusson v. City of Bloomington, No. 12‐CV‐0632 (SRN/JSM),
2013 WL 3353931, at *2‐3 (D. Minn. July 3, 2013) (awarding attorney’s fees based on
hourly rates between $100.00 and $400.00 in a similar DPPA action).
In light of these authorities, and in light of the Court’s own knowledge of the
prevailing rates in the Twin Cities legal market, the Court finds that the rates charged
by the attorneys and legal assistants who represented Taylor are reasonable. See Hanig
v. Lee, 415 F.3d 822, 825 (8th Cir. 2005) (“When determining reasonable hourly rates,
district courts may rely on their own experience and knowledge of prevailing market
rates.”) (citation omitted).
B. Number of Hours Reasonably Expended
There is no dispute that the Remaining Defendants should pay for any task that
related solely to a claim against one of the Remaining Defendants (assuming that the
amount of time billed was reasonable and is adequately supported). But many of the
tasks performed by Taylor’s attorneys and legal assistants—for example, attending a
Rule 16 conference or researching a particular legal issue—related both to claims
against the Remaining Defendants and to claims against other defendants. To calculate
the share of these fees that should be paid by the Remaining Defendants, Taylor has
used what he calls a “per‐access analysis.” ECF No. 189 at 5.
Taylor has divided the litigation into four stages; for example, the first stage
begins with the filing of the original complaint and ends with the entry of the Court’s
order granting in part the defendants’ motions to dismiss. For each stage, Taylor has
identified the total number of accesses of his driver’s‐license record that were being
litigated, and Taylor has identified the number of those accesses that were attributable
to the Remaining Defendants. For example, during the first stage of the litigation, there
were 353 accesses that were at issue, and 45 (or about 12.7%) of those accesses were
attributable to the Remaining Defendants. Taylor then seeks to hold the Remaining
Defendants responsible for their share of the time that his attorneys devoted to general
tasks. ECF No. 189 at 4‐7.
The Remaining Defendants do not seem to object to this methodology, but they
argue that Taylor got some of his numbers wrong. See generally ECF No. 194; ECF
No. 196 (“Angolkar Aff.”) Ex. 1, ECF No. 196‐1. Specifically, the Remaining Defendants
argue that “‘sequential accesses occurring within a several‐minute time span should be
considered as one obtainment rather than several.’” ECF No. 194 at 2 n.2 (quoting
Tichich v. City of Bloomington, 835 F.3d 856, 867 (8th Cir. 2016)); Angolkar Aff. ¶ 3. Thus,
say the Remaining Defendants, there were 296 (instead of 353) accesses that were being
litigated during the first stage of the case.
The Court will accept Taylor’s allocation. Taylor’s allocation is required to be
reasonable, not perfect, and the Court finds that Taylor’s methodology and its
application are reasonable.
The Remaining Defendants also object to numerous specific entries on the time
sheets of Taylor’s attorneys. The Court will now march through those objections.
1. Agreed‐Upon Reductions
In response to objections from the Remaining Defendants, Taylor has withdrawn
a number of time entries. See ECF No. 197 at 8‐9. Consequently, the Court will not
include the following in calculating the lodestar:
March 18, 2014: “(Cities) Telephone conference w/ Jared re
Morristown accesses; inquire with Daneka re same”—billed by
Strauss for .2 hours ($80.00) (Miller‐Van Oort Decl. Ex. A at 2; ECF
No. 194 at 13; ECF No. 197 at 8‐9);
March 18, 2016: “Scanned Taylor depo exhibits & saved to server;
added depo transcript & exhibits to docs to produce to defendants;
re‐drafted service letter & affidavit of service to reflect
changes”—billed by P.A.R. for .636 hours ($63.60) (Miller‐Van Oort
Decl. Ex. A at 9; ECF No. 194 at 22; ECF No. 198 (“Strauss Decl.”)
April 22, 2016: “Email audit results from DPS to J. Flynn and N.
Maxwell; email same to Jared for review; review same audit from
DPS”—billed by Strauss for .5 hours ($200.00) (Miller‐Van Oort
Decl. Ex. A at 10; ECF No. 194 at 13; ECF No. 197 at 8);
April 22, 2016: “Review email and documents from N. Maxwell
regarding purported reason for Finnesgard’s accesses of Jared;
telephone call with Maxwell re same; draft email to Jared re
same”—billed by Strauss for .3 hours ($120.00) (Miller‐Van Oort
Decl. Ex. A at 10; ECF No. 194 at 13; ECF No. 197 at 8);
December 2, 2016: “Address logistics of meet and confer with Joe
Flynn re settlement”—billed by Wolpert for .1 hours ($40.00)
(Miller‐Van Oort Decl. Ex. A at 11; ECF No. 194 at 13; ECF No. 197
at 8); and
December 3, 2016: “Meeting with Joe Flynn to discuss Plaintiff’s
settlement offer”—billed by Wolpert for .3 hours ($120.00)
(Miller‐Van Oort Decl. Ex. A at 11; ECF No. 194 at 13; ECF No. 197
The Court will also reduce the lodestar $437.50 in connection with Strauss’s
January 26, 2016 entry and $385.00 in connection with Strauss’s January 28, 2016 entry.
Miller‐Van Oort Decl. Ex. A at 8. Taylor concedes that it was attorney Andrew Larson‐
Wille, and not Strauss, who performed those services, and that Larson‐Wille’s hourly
rate was lower. ECF No. 197 at 9; Strauss Decl. ¶¶ 8‐10. Finally, the Court will deduct
$40.00 in connection with Strauss’s February 1, 2017 entry as Strauss merely “reviewed”
the notice of acceptance rather than “filed” it. Miller‐Van Oort Decl. Ex. A at 11; Strauss
Decl. ¶ 15. Thus, a total of $1,486.10 will be removed from the lodestar by agreement of
2. The Complaint and the Amended Complaint
The Remaining Defendants challenge a number of specific entries related to the
drafting of what they call a “cookie‐cutter” complaint that closely resembles the
complaints filed in many other DPPA actions. ECF No. 194 at 15‐16 (objecting to the
January 12, 2014, January 13, 2014, February 27, 2014, March 8, 2014, and March 13, 2014
entries). Taylor responds that this case involved “significant fact development and fact‐
specific arguments” and that the complaint required a significant amount of case‐
specific work. ECF No. 197 at 5‐6; Strauss Decl. ¶ 3. Given the complexity of the
case—including the large number of defendants and huge number of challenged
accesses—the Court finds that the amount of time devoted to drafting the complaint is
The Remaining Defendants also challenge the time devoted to drafting the
amended complaint. ECF No. 194 at 16. Taylor has presented sufficient evidence that
those time entries were reasonable and that the work was necessary to comply with
Magistrate Judge Leung’s orders. Strauss Decl. ¶ 4; ECF No. 197 at 6‐7.
3. January 16, 2015
The Remaining Defendants next object to time entries regarding the attendance
of Taylor’s attorneys at the Rule 16 conference on January 16, 2015.
First, the Remaining Defendants complain that only one, not two, attorneys
should have attended the conference. ECF No. 194 at 16‐17. But this was a complex
case involving dozens of defendants and hundreds of allegedly illegal acts; it was not
unreasonable for two attorneys to show up at the Rule 16 conference.
Second, the Remaining Defendants object that Taylor’s attorneys billed more
than the 30‐minute duration of the Rule 16 conference. Id. at 17. But the entries
identified by the Remaining Defendants also covered time devoted to preparing for the
Rule 16 conference and traveling to the federal courthouse. See Miller‐Van Oort Decl.
Ex. A at 3; Strauss Decl. ¶ 5. Those entries were reasonable. See Ludlow v. BNSF Ry. Co.,
788 F.3d 794, 803‐04 (8th Cir. 2015) (concluding that it was reasonable to bill attorney
travel time “‘at the same hourly rate as the lawyer’s normal working time’”) (citation
4. March 2, 2016
The Remaining Defendants challenge a pair of entries for P.A.R. dated March 2,
2016, as duplicative. ECF No. 194 at 17. Both entries contain the same description:
“Reviewed new docs produced by cities (police personnel files) for privacy‐related
incidents.” Miller‐Van Oort Decl. Ex. A at 9. Strauss states that the work was
conducted before and after a lunch break, which is why the two entries are identically
labeled. Strauss Decl. ¶ 6. The Court accepts Strauss’s explanation.
5. May 2, 2016
The Remaining Defendants also object to Taylor’s request for fees related to an
in‐firm conference between Wolpert and Miller‐Van Oort on May 2, 2016. ECF No. 194
at 18. At the conference, Wolpert and Miller‐Van Oort strategized about responding to
defendants’ summary‐judgment motions. See Miller‐Van Oort Decl. Ex. A at 10. The
Court overrules defendants’ objection, as there is nothing unreasonable about two
attorneys talking to each other about how to approach the briefing of multiple
complicated summary‐judgment motions.
6. Vague Entries
The Remaining Defendants next challenge a number of entries as vague and,
thus, unreasonable. ECF No. 194 at 18‐19. The Court has reviewed the entries and finds
that the entries are not unduly vague, particularly in light of the explanatory material
that Taylor has submitted in connection with his motion for a fee award.
7. Summary‐Judgment Motion
Next, the Remaining Defendants challenge the 35 hours billed for responding to
summary‐judgment motions in May 2016. The main complaint of the Remaining
Defendants is that Taylor’s attorneys should have been more efficient because they had
briefed the same legal issues in other cases. ECF No. 194 at 20. In response, Taylor
points out that the hearing on the summary‐judgment motions lasted approximately
two‐and‐a‐half hours and that new case law was published in the time between briefing
and argument. Strauss Decl. ¶¶ 12‐13. In addition, Taylor’s response brief spanned
84 pages and addressed 7 cities and 21 individual defendants. Id. ¶ 12. The Court
agrees with Taylor that his attorneys did not devote an unreasonable amount of time to
the summary‐judgment motions.
8. Fee Petition
The Remaining Defendants also challenge the hours devoted to the drafting and
filing of Taylor’s fee petition. See ECF No. 194 at 20‐21; see also Miller‐Van Oort Decl.
Ex. A at 11‐12. The Court finds that the parties’ agreement does not authorize the
recovery of those fees. The offer of judgment that was accepted by Taylor provides that
Taylor could petition the Court for “reasonable costs and attorney’s fees solely
attributed to these Defendants, incurred to date, as determined recoverable under 18
U.S.C. § 2724.” ECF No. 186‐1 at 2 (emphasis added). That offer of judgment was dated
January 18, 2017; therefore, fees incurred by Taylor after that date are not recoverable.
Accordingly, the Court will exclude $8,630.00 in calculating the lodestar.
9. October 5, 2015
The Remaining Defendants assert that they should not be required to pay
attorney’s fees that Taylor incurred on October 5, 2015, in connection with an
inadvertent disclosure made by Taylor’s counsel. ECF No. 194 at 21. The Court agrees
that Taylor’s attorneys should bear the cost of their own mistake. See Brown v. Astrue,
No. 07‐CV‐3053, 2009 WL 1634898, at *3 (W.D. Ark. June 10, 2009) (“Counsel is not
entitled to additional hours of compensation for correcting his own mistakes.”). But
given that the October 5 entry is not entirely devoted to the inadvertent disclosure, the
Court will reduce the entry by only half, from $280.00 to $140.00.
10. Clerical Work
The Remaining Defendants next ask the Court to reject a number of entries as
representing clerical work that should have been done by a secretary and not by an
attorney or legal assistant. ECF No. 194 at 21‐22. Ordinarily, clerical tasks “cannot
fairly be accounted for at an attorney’s, or even a paralegal’s, billing rate.” Rosen v.
Wentworth, 13 F. Supp. 3d 944, 953 (D. Minn. 2014). The Court has reviewed the
challenged entries and Taylor’s explanation of those entries and finds that only
two—the two January 13, 2016 entries—are attributable to clerical work that did not
require any specialized legal analysis or knowledge. See Miller‐Van Oort Decl. Ex. A at
7. A total of $250.00 will be deducted from Taylor’s request.
11. Depositions Not Related to the Remaining Defendants
Finally, the Remaining Defendants challenge fees related to the depositions of
witnesses Cordova (January 19, 2016), Harms (January 27, 2016), and Rix
(January 29, 2016) because those individuals appear to have no connection to the
Remaining Defendants. ECF No. 194 at 23; Miller‐Van Oort Decl. Ex. A at 8. The Court
agrees, and thus will exclude 1.3 hours from Strauss’s January 19, 2016 entry ($520.00);
1.1 hours from Strauss’s January 27, 2016 entry ($440.00); and 1.4 hours from Strauss’s
January 29, 2016 entry ($560.00).
For the reasons described above, the Court will deduct a total of $12,026.10 from
Taylor’s attorney’s‐fees request.
C. Adjustments to the Lodestar
Finally, the Remaining Defendants argue that Taylor’s fee award should be
reduced based on Taylor’s limited success in this case. ECF No. 194 at 7‐11; see also
Emery, 272 F.3d at 1047 (“[T]he fee award must be justified by the plaintiff’s level of
success. ‘The most critical factor is the degree of success obtained.’” (quoting Hensley,
461 U.S. at 436)). The Court disagrees.
Had the case proceeded to trial—and had Taylor been able to prove actual
damages—Taylor would likely have recovered $2,500.00 for each violation. See Potocnik
v. Carlson, No. 13‐CV‐2093 (PJS/HB), 2016 WL 3919950, at *10‐12 (D. Minn.
July 15, 2016). According to the Remaining Defendants, there were 22 accesses that
would have been the subject of trial. Angolkar Aff. ¶ 3; see also ECF. No. 189 at 16
(stating that there were 22 instances of alleged accesses for trial). Had Taylor proved
that all 22 accesses were illegal—and had he proved that he suffered actual damages
with respect to each of the 22 illegal accesses—he likely would have recovered
$55,000.00. That is $100.00 less than the offer of judgment that he accepted. See ECF
No. 194 at 5; ECF No. 186‐1. The result achieved by Taylor is far better than the kinds of
results that have caused courts to depart from lodestars. See, e.g., Johnson v. Bismarck
Pub. Sch. Dist., 949 F.2d 1000, 1003 (8th Cir. 1991) (finding limited success where
litigation “ended with a promise by the District to provide services that it had not
previously refused to provide”); DeGidio v. Pung, 920 F.2d 525, 533 (8th Cir. 1990)
(finding limited success where “remedial actions . . . sought at trial were not granted
and injunctive relief was denied”).
The Remaining Defendants point out that the amount Taylor recovered is “a very
small fraction of the $965,000 he originally sought.” ECF No. 194 at 10. That is true, but
the vast majority of Taylor’s claims were dismissed early in the litigation based on the
statute of limitations. Taylor then successfully pursued his claims against the
Remaining Defendants for over two years, culminating in the best result that he could
have realistically expected. The Court declines to depart from the lodestar based on any
purported lack of success.
For these reasons, the Court awards Taylor a total of $105,357.04 in attorney’s
The DPPA also allows recovery of “other litigation costs reasonably incurred.”
18 U.S.C. § 2724(b)(3). Taylor requests costs in the amount of $10,523.69, comprising
deposition‐services costs, mailing‐services costs, and costs for “review of documents
and consultation” by “Quinn and Associates Publishing and Consulting.” Miller‐Van
Oort Decl. ¶ 21; id. Ex. C, ECF No. 191‐3, at 1. The Remaining Defendants object to
Taylor’s request for reimbursement of $2,284.96 paid to Quinn and Associates (ECF No.
194 at 14); $215.50 in deposition‐transcript costs for Sandra Johnson (id. at 22); and
$3,496.30 in other invoices that do not identify the deposition to which the costs were
attributable (id. at 22‐23).
A. Expert Fees
The Remaining Defendants characterize the amount paid to Quinn and
Associates as “expert fees” and object on the grounds that the DPPA “does not
explicitly permit recovery of expert fees.” ECF No. 194 at 14. While Taylor does not
address this objection in his reply brief, Taylor’s memorandum in support of his fee
petition states that he seeks costs that “only relate to a proportionate amount of the . . .
expert fees[.]” ECF No. 189 at 18. Further, the invoice for these fees characterizes them
as fees for “expert witness rev[iew].” See Miller‐Van Oort Decl. Ex. C at 1. As a result,
the Court will treat these fees as expert fees.
This Court agrees with Chief Judge Tunheim’s recent decision that expert fees
are not recoverable in DPPA actions. See Myers, 2017 WL 1134575, at *2‐3. Moreover,
even if expert fees were generally recoverable, the Court would not award expert fees in
this case because Taylor does not explain what Quinn and Associates is, what the firm
did, or why it was necessary for Taylor’s nine‐member legal team to seek outside
assistance. As a result, the Court rejects Taylor’s request for expert fees in the amount
B. Deposition Costs
The remaining costs that Taylor seeks include costs for deposition and mailing
services. These are costs commonly billed to clients and thus they are generally
compensable. See Ludlow, 788 F.3d at 804 (“In general, an award of reasonable
attorney’s fees may include litigation expenses if it is ‘the prevailing practice in a given
community’ for lawyers to bill those expenses separately.” (quoting Missouri v. Jenkins,
491 U.S. 274, 287 (1989)).
Taylor has not sufficiently established Sandra Johnson’s connection to the case,
and therefore the Court agrees that Johnson’s deposition costs cannot be taxed to the
Remaining Defendants. See Angolkar Aff. Ex. 3. Hence, $215.50 will be deducted from
Taylor’s requested costs. See Miller‐Van Oort Decl. Ex. C at 9 (Invoice No. 101298). The
Court also excludes costs that are supported only by generic invoices with little or no
description of the services provided or why such services are attributable to the
Remaining Defendants. See id. at 10‐14. Accordingly, the Court will deduct the
following amounts from Taylor’s requested costs:
Invoice No. 101352: $586.90 (Miller‐Van Oort Decl. Ex. C. at 10);
Invoice No. 101418: $941.70 (id. at 13); and
Invoice No. 101396: $660.80 (the amount requested by Taylor) (id. at
12; ECF No. 189 at 8).
In addition, the Remaining Defendants seek to exclude Invoice No. 101311 for
deposition services rendered on January 20, 2016, on the grounds that the invoice is
vague and does not identify a deponent. ECF No. 194 at 23. The invoice does, however,
attribute $270.60 to Nelson, an employee of one of the Remaining Defendants. See
Miller‐Van Oort Decl. Ex. C. at 11. The Court will therefore exclude only $1,036.30 of
Invoice No. 101311 from Taylor’s recoverable costs.
For these reasons, the Court awards Taylor a total of $4,707.53 in costs from the
There appears to be a clerical error in Taylor’s fee petition with respect to the
cost of Jeffrey G. Kelzer’s deposition services. See ECF No. 189 at 7. The correct amount
is $452.98, not $542.98.
Based on the foregoing, and on all of the files, records, and proceedings herein,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:
Plaintiff’s motion for an award of attorney’s fees and costs under 18 U.S.C.
§ 2724 [ECF No. 188] is GRANTED.
Plaintiff is awarded $105,357.04 in attorney’s fees and $4,707.53 in costs,
for a total of $110,064.57, from the following defendants, jointly and
severally: Cities of Bloomington, Dundas, Faribault, Lonsdale,
Montgomery, Northfield, and Owatonna, and Lee Phillippe, Eric Kline,
Matt Knutson, David Orr, Patrick Nelson, Mark Dukatz, Jeffrey Gigstad,
Billy Houts, Steve Klostermeier, Mischelle Watkins, and Kyle Parr.
Dated: September 14, 2017
s/Patrick J. Schiltz
Patrick J. Schiltz
United States District Judge
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