Hagen v. Messerli & Kramer, P.A.
Filing
54
ORDER granting in part 41 Motion for Attorney Fees (Written Opinion). Signed by Senior Judge David S. Doty on 4/30/2015. (PJM)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Civil No. 14-863(DSD/JSM)
Della Virginia Hagen,
Plaintiff,
ORDER
v.
Messerli & Kramer, P.A.,
Defendant.
Prentiss E. Cox, Esq., Jean M. Sanderson, Esq. and
University of Minnesota Law Center, 229 19th Avenue
South, Suite 190, Minneapolis, MN 55455, counsel for
plaintiff.
Derrick N. Weber, Esq. and Messerli & Kramer, 3033 Campus
Drive, Suite 250, Plymouth, MN 55441, counsel for
defendant.
This matter is before the court upon the motion for attorney’s
fees and nontaxable expenses by plaintiff Della Virginia Hagen.
Based on a review of the file, record, and proceedings herein, and
for the following reasons, the court grants the motion in part.
BACKGROUND
This debt-collection dispute arises out of communications made
by defendant Messerli & Kramer, P.A. (M&K) to Hagen regarding a
consumer debt.
Hagen filed suit on March 28, 2014, alleging
violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA).
In
support of her claim, Hagen argued that M&K mailed her debt
collection letters after receiving a written cease request under 15
U.S.C. § 1692c(c).
The court granted summary judgment to Hagen on
January 13, 2015, and awarded $1,000 in statutory damages under
§ 1692k(a)(2)(A). ECF No. 39. Thereafter, Hagen moved for $27,870
in attorney’s fees and $110 in nontaxable expenses.
ECF No. 41.
On February 20, 2015, the clerk of court taxed $400 in favor of
Hagen.
ECF No. 49.
DISCUSSION
A debt collector who fails to comply with the provisions of
the FDCPA must pay, “in the case of any successful action to
enforce the foregoing liability, the costs of the action, together
with a reasonable attorney’s fee as determined by the court.”
U.S.C.
§
1692k(a)(3).
M&K
does
not
contest
that
Hagen
15
was
successful in this action. As a result, only the reasonableness of
the requested fees and costs is at issue.
I.
Attorney’s Fees
Because of the court’s extensive contact with the parties and
familiarity with the issues, determination of the reasonable amount
of
attorney’s
discretion.”
fees
is
“peculiarly
within
the
...
court’s
Greater Kan. City Laborers Pension Fund v. Thummel,
738 F.2d 926, 931 (8th Cir. 1984).
“The starting point in
determining attorney fees is the lodestar, which is calculated by
multiplying
the
number
reasonable hourly rates.”
of
hours
reasonably
expended
by
the
Hanig v. Lee, 415 F.3d 822, 825 (8th
2
Cir. 2005) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
In
assessing the reasonableness of fees, the court considers:
(1) the time and labor required; (2) the novelty and
difficulty of the questions; (3) the skill requisite to
perform the legal service properly; (4) the preclusion of
employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case;
(5) the customary fee; (6) whether the fee is fixed or
contingent; (7) time limitations imposed by the client or
the circumstances; (8) the amount involved and the
results obtained; (9) the experience, reputation, and
ability of the attorneys; (10) the “undesirability” of
the case; (11) the nature and length of the professional
relationship with the client; and (12) awards in similar
cases.
Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 430 n.3 (1983). In calculating
the reasonable number of hours expended, the court excludes hours
that are “excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary.”
Id. at
434.
Hagen’s counsel requests reimbursement for 207.2 hours of
work, at hourly rates ranging from $350 for Prentiss Cox, Professor
at the University of Minnesota’s Legal Clinic, to $100 for the four
student attorneys assigned to the case.
Aff. Ex. A.
See Cox Aff. Ex. A; Moe
M&K does not take issue with these rates, and the
court finds that they are reasonable.
See Ash v. Malacko, No. 14-
590, 2014 WL 4384475, at *4 (D. Minn. Sept. 4, 2014) (affirming
identical rates for legal clinic pursuing FDCPA action).
M&K does
argue, however, that the fee award should be reduced to $10,500 to
account for time that is redundant, excessive, and unnecessary.
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Although such a reduction overstates the amount of time spent on
unnecessary tasks, the court finds that some of the requested fees
are excessive.
M&K
argues
that
it
was
unreasonable to
spend
146
hours
associated with briefing cross-motions for summary judgment. Hagen
responds that it was forced to spend an unusual amount of time on
its briefing because M&K raised novel legal theories and made
accusations
regarding
irrelevant,
required
a
Legal
response.
Aid
attorney
Although
that,
responding
although
to
these
arguments and accusations required additional effort, the court
finds that a reduction is nonetheless warranted.
In particular,
the court notes that three student attorneys spent time briefing
the motions.
Hagen explains that this is typical, as the law
clinic sequentially staffs student attorneys as a case progresses.
Such
diffusion
inefficiencies.
of
work,
however,
inevitably
results
in
As a result, the court finds that a 46-hour
reduction of student attorney time, or $4,600, is warranted.
M&K also argues that it was unreasonable for three attorneys
to attend the summary judgment hearing.
educational
value
of
student
The court understands the
attorneys
participating
argument and encourages this practice in the future.
in
oral
The court is
required, however, to exclude hours that would not ordinarily be
billed to one’s client.
Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434.
Although a
complex matter may require three attorneys at oral argument, the
4
issues underlying this action did not compel such staffing.
A 1.8
hour, or $180, reduction is warranted to account for an additional
student’s attendance at the hearing.
See Moe Aff. Ex. A, at 1.
After careful consideration of the Hensley factors, the court finds
that the remainder of the fees are reasonable.
As a result, the
court awards $23,090 in attorney’s fees.
II.
Nontaxable Expenses
M&K also argues that Hagen cannot recover $110 associated with
service of process and delivery of motion papers to the court.
Moe Aff. Ex. B.
§ 1920.
See
These costs are not recoverable under 28 U.S.C.
See Smith v. Tenet Healthsystem SL, Inc,, 436 F.3d 879,
889 (8th Cir. 2006).
Although certain fee-shifting provisions
expand
recoverable
the
scope
of
costs
and
other
expenses,
§ 1692k(a)(3) limits recovery to “the costs of the action” and “a
reasonable attorney’s fee.”
See Gopher Oil Co. v. Union Oil Co. of
Cal., 757 F. Supp. 998, 1013 (D. Minn. 1991) (allowing recovery of
costs not included in § 1920 because the statutory provision at
issue was “radically different”).
As a result, the court excludes
these expenses from the award.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, based on the above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
1.
The motion for attorney’s fees and nontaxable expenses
[ECF No. 41] is granted in part; and
5
2.
Dated:
Hagen is awarded $23,090 in attorney’s fees.
April 30, 2015
s/David S. Doty
David S. Doty, Judge
United States District Court
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