Hedrington v. Colvin

Filing 29

ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION. 1. Plaintiff Bret Steven Hedrington's objections (Doc. No. 26 ) to Magistrate Judge Leo I. Brisbois's July 27, 2015 Report and Recommendation are OVERRULED. 2. Magistrate Judge Leo I. Brisbois 9;s July 27, 2015 Report and Recommendation (Doc. No. 24 ) is ADOPTED. 3. Plaintiff Bret Steven Hedrington's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 18 ) is DENIED. 4. Defendant Carolyn W. Colvin's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 20 ) is GRANTED and this action is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. (Written Opinion). Signed by Judge Donovan W. Frank on 9/17/2015. (BJS)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA

Bret Steven Hedrington,

Civil No. 14-1048 (DWF/LIB)

Plaintiff,
v.

ORDER ADOPTING REPORT
AND RECOMMENDATION

Carolyn w. Colvin, Acting
Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant.

This matter is before the Court upon Plaintiff Bret Steven Hedrington’s
(“Plaintiff”) objections (Doc. No. 26) to Magistrate Judge Leo I. Brisbois’s July 27, 2015
Report and Recommendation (Doc. No. 24) insofar as it recommends that: (1) Plaintiff’s
Motion for Summary Judgment be denied; and (2) Defendant’s Motion for Summary
Judgment be granted. Defendant Carolyn W. Colvin filed a response to Plaintiff's
objections on August 24, 2015. (Doc. No. 28.)
The Court has conducted a de novo review of the record, including a review of the
arguments and submissions of counsel, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local
Rule 72.2(b). The factual background for the above-entitled matter is clearly and
precisely set forth in the Report and Recommendation and is incorporated by reference
for purposes of Plaintiff’s objections.

Magistrate Judge Brisbois concluded that the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”)
properly weighed the medical opinions of the six doctors outlined below. First,
Magistrate Judge Brisbois concluded that, upon the Court’s independent review of the
record as a whole, the ALJ properly weighed the medical opinion of Dr. Dorn. (Doc.
No. 24 at 21-24.) The ALJ specifically articulated the reasons for why he discounted
Dr. Dorn’s opinions, which included the fact that they were not based on compelling
medical evidence, were based on Plaintiff’s subjective descriptions, and did not include a
diagnosis of traumatic brain injury. (Id.) Further, Magistrate Judge Brisbois concluded
that Plaintiff’s arguments relating to Dr. Dorn’s “nonexertional opinions” were misplaced
because Dr. Dorn never performed assessments or offered opinions related to Plaintiff’s
nonexertional or mental limitations. (Id.) Second, Magistrate Judge Brisbois concluded
that the “ALJ specifically considered Dr. Hoschouer’s opinions and findings and
articulated reasons for not affording the non-treating opinions great weight” and therefore
the ALJ did not err when weighing his opinions. (Id. at 24-25.) Third, the Court
concluded that the ALJ did not err when he declined to afford Dr. Hinze’s opinions
weight because the ALJ specifically articulated that the record did not corroborate
Dr. Hinze’s findings and because he was a consulting examining source who is not
entitled to controlling weight. (Id. at 25-26.) Fourth, Magistrate Judge Brisbois found
that the ALJ did not err in neglecting to mention Dr. Hipp’s evaluation in his decision
because Dr. Hipp was not a treating physician and did not base his evaluation on his own

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findings but instead reviewed Plaintiff’s records. (Id. at 26-27.) Fifth,
Magistrate Judge Brisbois found that the ALJ did not err with respect to Dr. Johnson’s
opinions, which he considered and credited as an examining physician. Further, the ALJ
did not err when he explicitly declined to give weight to Dr. Johnson’s cognitive
impairment and short term memory opinion because it was not based on objective
findings. (Id. at 27-28.) Sixth, Magistrate Judge Brisbois concluded that the ALJ did
not err when he afforded greater weight to Dr. Horozaniecki’s opinions because he is
allowed to rely upon the opinions of consulting opinions when the ALJ determines he
cannot rely on a treating doctor’s opinions and because the ALJ acted within his
discretion and did so consistent with the objective medical evidence in the record as a
whole. (Id. at 28-30.) Seventh, Magistrate Judge Brisbois concluded that the ALJ’s
residual functional capacity (“RFC”) determination that Plaintiff is capable of performing
sedentary work is supported by substantial evidence in the records as a whole. (Id.
at 31-33.) Eighth, Magistrate Judge Brisbois concluded that “the ALJ did properly
consider and weigh all medical evidence in the record, and that the RFC accurately
reflected said assessment, the ALJ presented the [vocational expert (“VE”)] with a
complete hypothetical.” (Id. at 33-34 (emphasis in original).) Finally, overall, the Court
declined to substitute its own judgment for that of the ALJ’s in accordance with legal
standards.

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Next, Magistrate Judge Brisbois concluded that the ALJ was not required to
“complete” or otherwise update the record in this case and, as a result, properly, fully, and
fairly developed and evaluated the record. (Id. at 34-37.)

Similarly,

Magistrate Judge Brisbois concluded that the ALJ did not err in his consideration and
valuation of Plaintiff’s mother’s third party function report. (Id. at 37-38.) Finally,
Magistrate Judge Brisbois concluded that, in light of the record as a whole, the ALJ did
not err in his valuation and consideration of Plaintiff’s credibility.
Plaintiff objects to the Report and Recommendation on the grounds that the
Magistrate Judge failed to find that the ALJ erred by failing to specifically determine the
weight to be given to the opinions of Plaintiff’s treating/examining physicians.
According to Plaintiff, the Magistrate Judge “consistently excused the ALJ from
determining the evidentiary weight of the opinions,” but failed to offer legal support for
that approach. (Doc. No. 26 at 2.) Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ erred by failing to
give more weight to the opinions of Plaintiff’s treating and examining sources and that
the Magistrate Judge failed to recognize this. As a result, Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ’s
RFC assessment was inappropriate. Plaintiff further asserts that the ALJ erred in failing
to fully develop the record on Plaintiff’s claim as is evidenced by significant evidence and
the fact that the ALJ failed to make a finding on medical equivalency at step three.
Finally, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred when weighing Plaintiff’s credibility by failing
to apply the required analytical factors and the Magistrate Judge failed to indicate why

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such a failure was justified. Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ relied instead on Plaintiff’s
limited daily activities, which is an improper basis for discrediting Plaintiff’s allegations
as to his disability.
Respondent counters that the Report and Recommendation accurately recites the
facts and correctly applies the law and should be adopted without modification.
Specifically, Respondent asserts that the Magistrate Judge thoroughly addressed each of
Plaintiff’s primary concerns regarding the weight given to the opinions at issue and that
substantial evidence in the record as a whole supports the ALJ’s RFC finding and the
hypothetical question offered to the VE. Respondent also counters that Plaintiff’s
argument regarding step three holds no weight because the state agency doctors were
clear that Plaintiff did not qualify for a listed impairment and Plaintiff failed to carry his
burden of proving he met or equaled the requirements. Finally, Respondent argues that
the Magistrate Judge correctly assessed the ALJ’s determinations with respect to
Plaintiff’s credibility and his mother’s credibility.
The Court agrees with Respondent. The Magistrate Judge fully considered and
addressed each of the arguments Plaintiff now makes and Plaintiff offers no compelling
reason for deviation from the Magistrate Judge’s thorough analysis. Even considering
Plaintiff’s arguments as true, the Court finds that the ALJ’s decision to deny benefits was
fully supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole, Tellez v. Barnhart, 400
F.3d 953, 956 (8th Cir. 2005), and that the ALJ’s decision falls within the “available zone

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of choice,” Bradley v. Astrue, 528 F.3d 1113, 1115 (8th Cir. 2008). As a result, finding
otherwise, the Court would be substituting its own judgment or findings for those of the
ALJ, which is not permitted. See Woolf v. Shalala, 3 F.3d 1210, 1213 (8th Cir. 1993).
Based upon the de novo review of the record and all of the arguments and the
submissions of the parties and the Court being otherwise duly advised in the premises, the
Court hereby enters the following:
ORDER
1.

Plaintiff Bret Steven Hedrington’s objections (Doc. No. [26]) to Magistrate

Judge Leo I. Brisbois’s July 27, 2015 Report and Recommendation are OVERRULED.
2.

Magistrate Judge Leo I. Brisbois’s July 27, 2015 Report and

Recommendation (Doc. No. [24]) is ADOPTED.
3.

Plaintiff Bret Steven Hedrington’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc.

No. [18]) is DENIED.
4.

Defendant Carolyn W. Colvin’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc.

No. [20]) is GRANTED and this action is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.
Dated: September 17, 2015

s/Donovan W. Frank
DONOVAN W. FRANK
United States District Judge

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