Wolfchild et al v. Redwood County et al
Filing
361
MEMORANDUM OF LAW & ORDER. IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 1. Plaintiffs' Motion to Stay the Requirement for the Appellate Cost Bond 293 is DENIED; and 2. Pursuant to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Court's inherent au thority, Plaintiffs and their counsel, Erick Kaardal and MKE, jointly and severally, shall pay reasonable attorney's fees and costs as follows: $107,758.17 to the Lower Sioux Indian Community; $8,109.11 to Defendant Kenneth Larsen; 36;28,351.49 to Defendants Robert and Lori Rebstock, Jon Lussenhop, Dale and Nancy Hanna, John and Mary Simmons, Julie Anna Guggisberg, Lee Guggisberg Trust UWT and Scott and Kimberly Olafson; and $137,687.57 to the Municipal Defendants. These payments shall be made within thirty (30) days from the date of this Order. LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY. (Written Opinion). Signed by Judge Michael J. Davis on 9/25/15. (GRR)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Sheldon Peters Wolfchild et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
MEMORANDUM OF LAW & ORDER
Civil No. 14‐1597 (MJD/FLN)
Redwood County, et al.,
Defendants.
___________________________________________________________________
Erick G. Kaardal and James V.F. Dickey, Mohrman, Kaardal & Erickson,
P.A., Counsel for Plaintiffs.
Joseph F. Halloran, Mary B. Magnuson, and Sara K. Van Normand,
Jacobson, Magnuson, Anderson & Halloran, P.C., and Michael L. Murphy,
Jacobson Law Group, Counsel for Defendant Lower Sioux Indian Community in
Minnesota.
Bradley N. Beisel and David J. Krco, Beisel & Dunlevy, P.A., Counsel for
Defendants Dennis A. Auslam and Michelle D. Auslam, Lyle Black Living Trust,
Scott A. Olafson and Kimberly A. Olafson, John H. Reynolds and Jeanne A.
Reynolds, Allen J. Kokesch and Jacalyn S. Kokesch, Prouty Properties, LLC,
Thomas J. Heiling, Paul W. Schroeder and Karen J. Schroeder, John Hogan, Bruce
Robert Black, Lila L. Black, Douglas Scherer and Brenda Scherer, Charles Case,
Enid Guggisberg, et al., Marlene A. Platt Revocable Living Trust, William
Schmidt and Norma Schmidt, Simmons Valley Trust, Willard Scherer and
Eugenie Scherer, Henry G. Oʹ Neil and Judith A. Oʹ Neil, Lee H. Guggisberg
Trust, Harold Guggisberg, Julie Anna Guggisberg, George F. Schottenbauer,
Sandra Clarken, et al., Keefe Family Farm LLC, John C. Simmons and Mary J.
Simmons, Neil and Donna Berger Family [Trust], TJ & CC Properties LLC,
Sherman Acres, LLC, and Charles D. Neitzel; Robert G. Benner, Dunlap & Seeger,
P.A., Co‐Counsel for Defendant Kenneth Larsen.
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Ken D. Schueler, Robert G. Benner and Jennifer M. Peterson, Dunlap &
Seeger, P.A., Counsel for Defendants Julie Anna Guggisberg, Dale R. Hanna,
Nancy Hanna, Robert D. and Lori A. Rebstock, Jon Lussenhop, John C. Simmons,
and Mary J. Simmons, Lee H. Guggisberg Trust UWT, Scott A. Olafson and
Kimberly A. Olafson.
_______________________________________________________________________
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiffs’ motion to stay the sanctions
proceedings [Doc. No. 321] and to review the submissions for attorney’s fees and
costs.
I.
Background
By Order dated March 5, 2015, this Court granted Defendants’ motions to
dismiss this action with prejudice. The Court found that Plaintiffs failed to assert
a claim for relief and in the alternative, that the action must be dismissed
pursuant to the equitable doctrine set forth in City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian
Nation, 544 U.S. 197, 202 (2005). In addition, the Court found that it had no
subject matter jurisdiction to address the claims against the Lower Sioux Indian
Community (the “Community”), as the Community was entitled to sovereign
immunity against the claims asserted. Plaintiffs have filed an appeal to the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals from the Court’s March 5, 2015 Order.
Following the dismissal of this action, certain Defendants moved the Court
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for sanctions on the grounds that Plaintiffs and their counsel knowingly
commenced and prosecuted this action on legal theories that are not supported
by existing fact or law, or did not involve a nonfrivolous argument for extending,
modifying or reversing existing law. By Order dated June 9, 2015, this Court
granted the Defendants’ motions for sanctions and ordered counsel to submit a
detailed accounting of the attorney’s fees incurred. Plaintiffs were provided the
opportunity to object to those submissions, and they have submitted written
objections. Plaintiffs have also filed an appeal to the Eighth Circuit from the June
9, 2015 Order. Plaintiffs now move to stay the sanctions proceeding pending
appeal.
II.
Standard for Motion to Stay
Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 8, Plaintiffs move to stay the sanctions
proceedings pending appeal. The Court should consider the following four
factors in determining whether to issue the requested stay: “(1) whether the stay
applicant has made a strong showing that he is likely to succeed on the merits; (2)
whether the applicant will be irreparably injured absent a stay; (3) whether
issuance of the stay will substantially injure the other parties interested in the
proceeding; and (4) where the public interest lies.” Brady v. Nat’l Football
3
League, 640 F.3d 785, 789 (8th Cir. 2011) (quoting Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S.
770, 776 (1987)). The movant bears the burden of proof on all four factors. James
River Flood Control Ass’n v. Watt, 680 F.2d 543, 544 (8th Cir. 1982).
A.
Analysis
1.
Likelihood of Success on the Merits
Plaintiffs argue they are likely to succeed on the merits on appeal based on
the same arguments that were included in their opposition to the motions to
dismiss. The Court has thoroughly reviewed the factual background of this case
and all of the arguments submitted, and again finds Plaintiffs’ arguments
without merit. The Community is immune from suit, Plaintiffs failed to state a
claim for relief and under the equitable Sherrill doctrine, Plaintiffs are not
entitled to the relief sought: ejecting defendants from land they and their
predecessors have occupied for more than one hundred years because of an
allegedly illegal act committed by the United States government. Accordingly,
Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits on
appeal.
Plaintiffs further argue they are likely to succeed on the merits of their
appeal of this Court’s Order granting Defendants’ motions for sanctions.
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Plaintiffs again argue that the motions for sanctions was granted in error because
Defendants did not follow the procedural requirements set forth in Rule 11 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and because this Court did not issue an order to
show cause as to why sanctions should not be granted pursuant to the Court’s
inherent authority or 28 U.S.C. § 1927.
In its Order granting sanctions, the Court found that, with the exception of
the Municipal Defendants, the Defendants moving for sanctions had properly
followed the procedures set forth in Rule 11. The Court also held that it could
entertain the Municipal Defendant’s motions for sanctions under the Court’s
inherent authority and § 1927. Plaintiffs argue that a court cannot impose
sanctions under its inherent authority or § 1927 unless the Court first issues an
order to show cause.
The Supreme Court holds that pursuant to the court’s inherent authority,
“[l]ike other sanctions, attorneyʹs fees certainly should not be assessed lightly or
without fair notice and an opportunity for a hearing on the record. But in a
proper case, such sanctions are within a courtʹs powers.” Roadway Exp., Inc. v.
Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 767 (1980). Here, the Community argued that pursuant to the
court’s inherent power and Rule 11(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the
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Court could impose sanctions against Plaintiffs for knowingly making legal
assertions that were contrary to settled law. (Doc. No. 208 (Memorandum of Law
in Support of Sanctions, p. 6, 8, 16‐18, 20).) The Municipal Defendants also
moved for sanctions “based on the same law that is more explicitly set forth in
the memoranda of the Tribe and the Landowners relating to their requests for
sanctions.” (Doc. No. 239 (Municipal Defendants’ Motion p. 2).) Plaintiffs and
their counsel were thus given fair notice that they could be sanctioned under the
court’s inherent authority or Rule 11. Plaintiffs were also provided the
opportunity to submit a memorandum and were provided a hearing to present
argument in opposition to the motions for sanctions.
Plaintiffs also argue they are likely to succeed on the merits of the appeal of
the sanctions Order, as Plaintiffs will prevail on the merits issues. In support,
Plaintiffs reassert arguments previously submitted. Those arguments have been
reviewed and rejected by this Court, and Plaintiffs have not demonstrated any
grounds upon which this Court should reconsider its prior rulings. Accordingly,
Plaintiffs have not demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of their
appeal of the sanctions Order.
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2.
Irreparable Injury/Substantial Harm to Nonmoving Party
Plaintiffs argue they have already been injured by the Court’s decision to
impose sanctions, which has injured their ability to prosecute their appeal by
diverting time and resources from that process. Plaintiffs further argue that had
the Court taken judicial notice of the Community’s Corporate Charter, the Court
would not have issued sanctions against Plaintiffs because the Court would have
found the Community did not have sovereign immunity. Further, Plaintiffs’
counsel assert they face irreparable injury to their reputation so long as the
sanctions order is pending.
Defendants assert that staying the sanctions proceedings will extend and
augment the substantial injury they are already experiencing, having to defend
against a frivolous lawsuit. In addition, judicial economy and efficiency support
one motion to stay the entire June 9, 2015 Order, yet Plaintiffs have chosen to
bring two separate motions to stay. Defendants ask the Court to issue sanctions,
thereby transferring jurisdiction to the Eighth Circuit.
The Court finds that Plaintiffs have not demonstrated they will be
irreparably injured absent a stay. First, Plaintiffs’ arguments with respect to the
Community’s Corporate Charter are without merit. As recognized in this Court’s
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June 9, 2015 Order, the Eighth Circuit has already held that a “sue and be sued
clause” in a Tribe’s corporate charter does not operate as a general waiver of the
Tribe’s immunity from suit. Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Val‐U of South Dak., Inc., 50
F.3d 560, 563 (8th Cir. 1995). Second, sanctions are designed to publically
admonish, reprimand or censure individuals who advance frivolous litigation in
bad faith, therefore harm to reputation is not a basis to stay the order. Plaintiffs
can still seek relief through their appeal of the sanctions order.
3.
Public Interest
The Court finds this factor weighs in favor of denying the stay and
allowing the appeal process to proceed without further delay. See In re Uponor,
Inc., No. 11‐MD‐2247, 2012 WL 4328370, at * 3 (D. Minn. Sep. 20, 2012)
(recognizing that public interest favors swift resolution of action).
Based on the above, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have failed to
demonstrate that a stay of the sanctions order is warranted. Accordingly, the
motion to stay will be denied.
IV.
Reasonable Attorney’s Fees and Costs
Rule 11 (c)(4) provides:
A sanction imposed under this rule must be limited to what suffices to
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deter repetition of the conduct or comparable conduct by others similarly
situated. The sanction may include nonmonetary directives; an order to
pay a penalty into court; or, if imposed on motion and warranted for
effective deterrence, an order directing payment to the movant of part or
all of the reasonable attorneyʹs fees and other expenses directly resulting
from the violation.
In determining what amount of monetary sanction will deter repetition of
the conduct or comparable conduct by others, courts have considered the
reasonable attorney’s fees and costs expended by defendants in defending a
frivolous action. See, e.g., Murphy v. Aurora Loan Serv., LLC, 859 F. Supp.2d
1016, 1023 (D. Minn. 2012).
The lodestar method is frequently used to determine a reasonable
attorneys’ fee award. Fish v. St. Cloud State Univ., 295 F.3d 849, 851 (8th Cir.
2012). This method requires the Court to multiply the reasonable amount of
hours spent on the case by a reasonable hourly amount. Id. The resulting figure
may be adjusted at the discretion of the Court after considering factors relevant
to the case, including:
the experience and ability of the attorney, the time and labor required to
perform the legal service properly, the amount involved in the case and the
results obtained, the novelty and difficulty of the issues involved, the fee
customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services, whether the
fee is fixed or contingent, the time limitations imposed upon the client or
by the circumstances, and the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the
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acceptance of the particular employment will preclude other employment
by the lawyer.
All‐Ways Logistics, Inc. v. USA Truck, Inc., 583 F.3d 511, 520‐21 (8th Cir. 2009).
To determine a reasonable hourly rate, the Court should consider the
prevailing rate for similar services in the community where the litigation took
place when performed by lawyers with similar skills, experience and reputation.
McDonald v. Armontrout, 860 F.2d 1456,1458‐59 (8th Cir. 1988). The Court may
also rely on its own experience and knowledge of the prevailing market rates.
Warnock v. Archer, 397 F.3d 1024, 1027 (8th 2005).
A.
The Lower Sioux Indian Community
On behalf of the Community, Joseph Halloran, Shareholder with Jacobson,
Magnuson, Anderson & Halloran, P.C. (“the Firm”) submitted an affidavit with
attached exhibits setting forth the attorney’s fees and costs incurred in defending
this action. Halloran states the Firm has served as general counsel for the
Community for more than 30 years and has represented the Community in this
action. (Halloran Aff., ¶¶ 2, 3.)
Exhibit 2 to the Halloran Affidavit is the accounting of the attorneys’ fees
and costs incurred by the Community in defending this matter. (Id. ¶ 6.) Exhibit
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2 demonstrates that the hourly rates charged by the Firm’s attorneys in this
matter range from $175 per hour to $125 per hour. To demonstrate these rates
are reasonable, the Firm has submitted as Exhibit 1 a copy of the Laffey Matrix
for 2014‐15 which provides hourly rates for attorneys with varying years of
experience. According to this Matrix, the prevailing rate for an attorney with
more than twenty years experience is $520 per hour. Three of the attorneys
working on this case, Halloran, Mary Magnuson and Mark Anderson, have over
twenty years experience, but have billed only $175 per hour.
In addition to the Laffey Matrix, this Court relies on its own knowledge of
the prevailing hourly rates charged by attorneys in the Twin Cities area, and
finds that the hourly rates charged by counsel in this matter are substantially
lower than the prevailing market rate.
The billings statements from the Firm show total attorney’s fees of
$106,902.02, and the costs in the amount of $42,296.39, for a total amount of
$149,063.89. Plaintiffs have submitted objections to certain entries on the basis
that they appear excessive and demonstrate a lack of billing judgment. The
Court has reviewed the entries identified in Plaintiffs’ objections and finds the
entries to be reasonable.
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With respect to the costs that were billed to the Community, Plaintiffs
generally object to the fact that Defendants are seeking costs, allegedly in
contravention to the Court’s sanctions order. However, the Court’s sanctions
order specifically stated that “a monetary sanction in the form of reasonable
attorney’s fees and costs is necessary in order to deter Plaintiffs and their counsel
from engaging in frivolous litigation in the future.” (Doc. No. 291 (June 9, 2015
Order at 25).)
Plaintiffs also object that the Firm included in its accounting costs and non‐
taxable costs, such as $15,719.72 for Westlaw charges and $25,586 for expert
expenses, without providing a supporting invoice, identification of the expert
and the purpose of the expert.
The Court agrees that the Firm did not submit sufficient documentation
concerning the Westlaw charges and the expert fees, therefore such costs will not
be considered in the sanction award. Subtracting these costs results in reasonable
attorney’s fees and costs totaling $107,758.17.
B.
Defendant Kenneth Larsen
On behalf of Defendant Larsen, Robert G. Benner, with Dunlap & Seeger,
P.A., submitted an affidavit with attached exhibits setting forth the attorney’s
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fees and costs incurred in defending this action. Exhibit A is a detailed billing
statement which demonstrates that the hourly rates charged are $145 per hour for
Benner, $140 per hour for associate work and $70 per hour for paralegal work.
Again, based on this Court’s knowledge of the prevailing hourly rates charged by
attorneys in the twin cities area, the Court finds that the hourly rates charged by
counsel in this matter are substantially lower than the prevailing market rate.
Dunlap & Seeger billed for 69.30 hours for a total attorney’s fee of $8,173.50. (Ex.
A p. 8.)
Plaintiffs claim that the entries are vague, excessive and unreasonable,
which demonstrates a lack of billing judgment. Plaintiffs further assert that
including fees related to the appeal are improper per se.
The Court agrees that the Eighth Circuit should determine whether fees
related to the appeal can be recovered by Defendants. Based on the Court’s
review, it appears that the total fees related to appeal are $549.50, and that
amount will not be included in the final sanction. With respect to the remaining
entries, the Court finds them to be reasonable.
Plaintiffs also object to the inclusion of costs totaling $485.11. Based on its
review, the Court finds the costs listed in Exhibit A are reasonable. Accordingly,
13
the reasonable attorney’s fees and costs incurred on behalf of defendant Larsen
by Dunlap & Seeger total $8,109.11.
C.
Larsen Affidavit
Defendant Kenneth Larsen has submitted an affidavit in which he states he
incurred attorney’s fees totaling $1,000 from Beisel & Dunlevy, P.A. As there is
no invoice or affidavit from Beisel & Dunlevy, P. A., the Court will not include
this amount in the final sanction.
D.
Defendants Robert and Lori Rebstock, Jon Lussenhop, Dale and
Nancy Hanna, John and Mary Simmons, Julie Anna Guggisberg,
Lee Guggisberg Trust UWT and Scott and Kimberly Olafson
On behalf of the above named Defendant Landowners, Ken Schueler, with
Dunlap & Seeger, submitted an affidavit concerning the attorney’s fees and costs
incurred in defending this matter, together with the relevant statements of
services. (Doc. No. 310.) Schueler attests that he and an associate agreed to
defend this action at the reduced rate of $160 per hour for attorneys and $100 per
hour for paralegal work. (Schueler Aff. ¶ 3.) As set forth in the attached exhibit,
the total fees are $33,096.00. (Id. ¶ 4, Ex. A.)
Plaintiffs object to entries in the statement of services as vague and
excessive, which shows a lack of billing judgment. Plaintiffs also object to those
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fees related to the appeal.
The Court has reviewed the statement of services and will deduct from the
requested attorney’s fees those fees related to the appeal of this Court’s Order
granting defendants’ motions to dismiss. Upon review, the Court also finds that
certain entries were vague to the extent that the Court could not discern whether
the hours billed related to the appeal, and those entries will be deducted as well.
Accordingly, from the requested fees, the Court will deduct $5,252.
Schueler included in his affidavit a request for fees paid to Beisel &
Dunlevy, P. A., by defendant landowners Julie Guggisberg and John Simmons.
Again, as there is no invoice or affidavit from Beisel & Dunlevy, P. A., the Court
will not include this amount in the final sanction.
Finally, with respect to costs, the Court will not include costs associated
with the appeal. The Court will include costs of $507.49 in the sanction award.
Accordingly, the reasonable attorney’s fees and costs incurred on behalf of
the above named Defendant Landowners is $28,351.49.
E.
Municipal Defendants
On behalf of the Municipal Defendants, Jessica Schwie, with Jardine, Logan
and O’Brien, PLLP, has submitted an affidavit with attached Exhibit A setting
15
forth the attorney’s fees and costs incurred in defending this action. Schwie
states the hourly rates charged range from $210 per hour for partners, $190 per
hour for associates, $100 per hour for law clerks and $100 per hour for paralegals.
As set forth above, based on this Court’s knowledge of the prevailing hourly
rates charged by attorneys in the Twin Cities area, the Court finds that the hourly
rates charged by counsel in this matter are substantially lower than the prevailing
market rate.
Exhibit A to the Schwie Affidavit is the itemized billing records. The total
amount of fees billed by the Jardine, Logan and O’Brien law firm is $161,427, plus
costs of $947.57. The Municipal Defendants further seek to include the expenses
incurred by the Assistant County Attorney Glen Jacobsen. Pursuant to the
Declaration of Glen Jacobsen, he incurred fees totaling $2,550 and costs of $123.
(Jacobsen Decl. ¶ 1, Ex. B.)
Plaintiffs object to Exhibit A to the Schwie Affidavit to the extent that many
of the entries include redactions which prevent the Court from determining
whether the fees incurred were reasonable. Plaintiffs also object to the fees
related to the appeal in this matter. Finally, Plaintiffs object to the Declaration of
Glen Jacobsen, as such declaration does not provide an explanation of the work
16
performed by him.
The Court will deduct those fees related to the appeal, and will also deduct
the fees incurred by Glen Jacobsen, as there is no explanation for the work
performed. As to the remaining billings, the Court finds that despite the
redactions, there is sufficient information in the billing statements to allow the
Court to make a reasonableness determination. Following the entry of judgment
on March 5, 2015, any billing entry that is unclear as to whether it is related to the
appeal will be deducted. Based on its review of the fees, the Court will deduct
$24,810 from the fee request. Accordingly, the reasonable attorney’s fees and
costs incurred on behalf of the Municipal Defendants is $137,687.57.
F.
Inability to Pay Sanction
The grand total of the reasonable attorney’s fees and costs is $281,906.34.
Plaintiffs and their counsel ask the Court to further reduce the sanction award
based on their ability to pay. In support, Plaintiffs have submitted declarations
from lead counsel Erick Kaardal, and the six named Plaintiffs in order to
demonstrate an inability to pay a sanction award near the $350,000 amount
initially requested by defendants. Counsel also asks that the Court not impose
the sanction against his law firm, Mohrman, Kaardal & Erickson, P.A. (“MKE”),
17
because such a sanction would cause significant financial harm to its business
and employees, given that MKE is a small firm with only three partners. In
addition, Kaardal asserts that no one else at MKE worked on this case, therefore
no sanction should be imposed on MKE.
Rule 11(c)(1) provides that “Absent exceptional circumstances, a law firm
must be held jointly responsible for a violation committed by its partner,
associate, or employee.” There is little guidance as to what constitutes
“exceptional circumstances.” Plaintiffs cite to the decision in Rentz v. Dynasty
Apparel Indus., Inc., 556 F.3d 389, 396‐97 (6th Cir. 2009) in support of their claim
that a small law firm should not be held jointly liable for a Rule 11 violation
committed by one of its members. Plaintiffs’ reliance on Rentz is misplaced,
however, as the court found exceptional circumstances existed to exempt the law
firm from paying the ordered sanction because the sanctioned attorney began to
practice with the firm at issue after the case had already been pending for nine
months. Id. By contrast, in this case, Kaardal has practiced with MKE for the
entire time this matter was pending, and for the entire eleven years during which
the case was pending before the Court of Claims.
The Court also takes issue with Kaardal’s representation that he was the
18
only attorney at MKE handling this case. In addition to Kaardal, attorney James
V.F. Dickey, an associate with MKE, is named as lead counsel and attorney to be
noticed in the Court’s docket. Dickey is also included in the signature block of
Plaintiffs’ memorandum in opposition to the motions to dismiss, (Doc. No. 185 p.
46.) and Plaintiffs’ memorandum in opposition to defendants’ motions for
sanctions. (Doc. No. 251 p. 38.)
Further, MKE did not submit any financial information to the Court,
therefore Kaardal and MKE have not met their burden of demonstrating that
MKE is unable to pay all or part of the sanction. The Court thus finds that
Plaintiffs have not demonstrated that exceptional circumstances exist which
exempt MKE from being held jointly liable for the sanction imposed herein.
The Court has reviewed the declarations of Kaardal and the individual
Plaintiffs. It is clear that each stands in a different financial position, and some
have established that alone, he or she could not pay a large monetary sanction.
However, Plaintiffs and counsel are jointly liable for the sanction, and sharing the
burden of the sanction between them will decrease the financial burden on each
and increase the ability to pay.
Accordingly,
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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1.
Plaintiffs’ Motion to Stay the Requirement for the Appellate Cost
Bond [Doc. No. 293] is DENIED; and
2.
Pursuant to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the
Court’s inherent authority, Plaintiffs and their counsel, Erick Kaardal
and MKE, jointly and severally, shall pay reasonable attorney’s fees
and costs as follows: $107,758.17 to the Lower Sioux Indian
Community; $8,109.11 to Defendant Kenneth Larsen; $28,351.49 to
Defendants Robert and Lori Rebstock, Jon Lussenhop, Dale and
Nancy Hanna, John and Mary Simmons, Julie Anna Guggisberg, Lee
Guggisberg Trust UWT and Scott and Kimberly Olafson; and
$137,687.57 to the Municipal Defendants. These payments shall be
made within thirty (30) days from the date of this Order.
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.
Date: September 25, 2015
s/ Michael J. Davis
Michael J. Davis
United States District Court
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