Ordahl v. Toro
Filing
40
ORDER granting 27 Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings(Written Opinion) Signed by Senior Judge David S. Doty on 7/28/2015. (DLO)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Civil No. 14-1687(DSD/HB)
Dennis Ordahl,
Plaintiff,
ORDER
v.
Toro,
Defendant.
Dennis Ordahl, 908 West 80-1/2 Street, Bloomington, MN
55420, pro se.
Douglas R. Christensen, Esq., Emily A. McNee, Esq. and
Littler Mendelson, PC, 80 South 8th Street, Suite 1300,
Minneapolis, MN 55402, counsel for defendant.
This matter is before the court upon the motion for judgment
on the pleadings by defendant The Toro Company.
Based on a review
of the file, record, and proceedings herein, and for the following
reasons, the court grants the motion.
BACKGROUND
This employment dispute arises out of pro se plaintiff Dennis
Ordahl’s eventual termination from Toro on March 12, 2013.
Ordahl
began working as a machinist for Toro on August 4, 2004.
Ordahl
requested an accommodation in the form of a ten-minute walking
break every two hours.
Toro granted the request.
In June 2007,
Ordahl became a tool and die maker for the company.
On April 20,
2010, Toro informed Ordahl that his position as a tool and die
maker was being eliminated for economic reasons.
Toro then moved
Ordahl back to a machinist position for the same pay he received as
a tool and die maker.
position
required
Ordahl seems to allege that the tool and die
only
minimal
accommodation,
but
that
machinist position required more extensive accommodation.1
the
Am.
Compl. ¶ 14.
On
May
27,
2011,
Ordahl
filed
a
charge
with
the
Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), which he cross-filed with
the Minnesota Department of Human Rights (MDHR), alleging that he
was
removed
disability.
from
the
tool
and
die
Christensen Aff. Ex. A.
position
because
of
his
He also alleged that Toro
denied his reasonable accommodation request to return to the tool
and die position, but admits that he did not apply for two posted
positions within that department following his reassignment back to
the machinist position.
Id.; id. Ex. C, at 1.
The EEOC dismissed
the charge as untimely on March 11, 2014, and the MDHR determined
that the charge lacked probable cause on March 29, 2013.2
Id. Exs.
D, F.
On
February
discrimination
26,
with
2013,
the
Ordahl
MDHR,
filed
alleging
a
second
that
Toro
charge
of
failed
to
reasonably accommodate his disability in 2012 and 2013 and that
Toro’s failure to do so was, at least in part, in retaliation for
1
Ordahl makes this allegation despite the fact that he
worked as a machinist with minimal accommodation from August 2004
to June 2007.
2
The MDHR affirmed its denial on May 8, 2013.
2
Id. Ex. E.
his previous charge of discrimination.
Id. Ex. G.
The MDHR
dismissed the charge on May 15, 2014, concluding that there was no
probable cause to support a finding that Toro discriminated or
retaliated against Ordahl.3
Id. Ex. H.
Toro placed Ordahl on short-term disability on March 14, 2012,
and terminated his employment on March 14, 2013.
commenced the instant action on May 28, 2014.
Ordahl then
Ordahl alleged no
facts or legal theories supporting his complaint, but attached the
EEOC
and
MDHR
discrimination.
complaint
documents
On
asserting
dismissing
June
26,
claims
2014,
for
his
first
charge
filed
an
Ordahl
disability
of
amended
discrimination
reprisal under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).
and
The
amended complaint specifically references alleged discrimination
and reprisal occurring in 2012 and 2013.
Toro now moves for
judgment on the pleadings.
DISCUSSION
I.
Standard of Review
The same standard of review applies to motions under Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure 12(c) and 12(b)(6). Ashley Cnty., Ark. v.
Pfizer, Inc., 552 F.3d 659, 665 (8th Cir. 2009).
Thus, to survive
a motion for judgment on the pleadings, “a complaint must contain
3
The MDHR affirmed its second denial on July 22, 2014.
Ex. I.
3
Id.
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.”
Braden v. Wal–Mart Stores,
Inc., 588 F.3d 585, 594 (8th Cir. 2009) (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted).
“A claim has facial plausibility when
the plaintiff [has pleaded] factual content that allows the court
to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for
the misconduct alleged.”
(2009).
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
Although a complaint need not contain detailed factual
allegations, it must raise a right to relief above the speculative
level.
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).
“[L]abels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements
of a cause of action” are not sufficient to state a claim.
Iqbal,
556 U.S. at 678 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
The court does not consider matters outside of the pleadings
under Rule 12(c).
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d).
The court, however, may
consider matters
of
materials
contradict
the
public
complaint,
record
as
and
well
as
“necessarily embraced by the pleadings.”
that
materials
do
that
not
are
Porous Media Corp. v.
Pall Corp., 186 F.3d 1077, 1079 (8th Cir. 1999) (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted). In this case, the EEOC and MDHR
charges
and
determinations
are
necessarily
pleadings and are properly considered.
4
embraced
by
the
II.
Limitations Period
Toro argues, among other things, that the amended complaint
should be dismissed as untimely. At the outset of this discussion,
the court notes that the parties disagree as to whether the first
or second charge of discrimination, or both, supports the amended
complaint. The court need not resolve that issue, however, because
under either case, Ordahl’s claims fail as a matter of law.
First,
assuming
that
the
first
charge
of
discrimination
underlies the amended complaint, Toro specifically argues that
Ordahl failed to timely file his charges of discrimination with the
EEOC and MDHR and that his complaints filed in this court are also
untimely.
agrees.
Even liberally construing the pleadings, the court
See Stuart v. Gen. Motors Corp., 217 F.3d 621, 631 (8th
Cir. 2000)(the court construes administrative charges liberally,
permitting a plaintiff to “seek relief for any discrimination that
grows out of or is like or reasonably related to the substance of
the
allegations
in
the
administrative
charge”
(citation
and
internal quotation marks omitted)).
An ADA plaintiff must first exhaust administrative remedies by
filing a charge with the EEOC within 300 days “after the alleged
unlawful employment practice occurred.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1);
see also Wilson v. Brinker Int’l, Inc., 382 F.3d 765, 769 (8th Cir.
2004).
Similarly, a claim under the Minnesota Human Rights Act
(MHRA) must be filed within 365 days of the alleged discriminatory
5
conduct.
Minn. Stat. § 363A.28, subd. 3.
The limitations period
is triggered by occurrence of the discriminatory act, not “when the
consequences of that act become most painful.”
Turner v. IDS Fin.
Servs., Inc., 471 N.W.2d 105, 108 (Minn. 1991).
Ordahl filed his first charge of discrimination with the EEOC
and MDHR on May 27, 2011, alleging that he was reassigned to a
machinist position due to his disability on April 20, 2010.
Given
that Ordahl filed the charges more than one year after the alleged
discrimination occurred, his charges were untimely under both the
ADA and the MHRA.
For this reason, Ordahl’s claim, to the extent
it is based on the first charge of discrimination, is untimely and
must be dismissed.
III.
Failure to Exhaust
If based on the second charge of discrimination, Ordahl’s
amended complaint also fails as a matter of law.
Ordahl filed a
second charge with the MDHR based on alleged violations of the MHRA
on February 26, 2013.
Christensen Aff. Ex. G, at 2.
Ordahl
notably did not cross-file or file a separate charge with the EEOC.
Id. On July 22, 2014, the MDHR affirmed its denial of the second
charge.
Id. Ex. I.
Ordahl’s amended complaint, filed on June 26,
2014, seems to match the factual allegations raised in the second
charge, but is grounded in the ADA, rather than the MHRA.
Compl. ¶¶ 1, 25, 32, 33, 36.
See Am.
Because Ordahl never filed a second
charge of discrimination with the EEOC and thus never received a
6
right-to-sue
letter,
he
failed
to
exhaust
his
administrative
remedies and is consequently precluded from filing suit under the
ADA.
See Shelton v. Boeing Co., 399 F.3d 909, 912 (8th Cir. 2005)
(“Exhaustion of administrative remedies is a condition precedent to
the filing of an action under the [ADA] in federal court.”).4
Ordahl argues that he intended to file his claims under the
MHRA rather than the ADA, and that he should be permitted to amend
his complaint accordingly.
The court disagrees.
Ordahl expressly
brought his claims under the ADA, despite knowing the difference
between the
filings.
ADA
and
MHRA
as
evidenced
by
his administrative
Although Ordahl’s pleadings must be liberally construed,
the court is not required to “invent[], ex nihilo, a claim which
simply was not made.”
(8th Cir. 1996).
Shannon v. Ford Motor Co., 72 F.3d 678, 685
Nor is the court required to allow Ordahl a third
bite at the same apple.
As a result, dismissal of Ordahl’s claims
is warranted.
Even if the court were inclined to interpret Ordahl’s ADA
claims as brought under the MHRA, such claims would be untimely
because Ordahl did not bring suit within the 45-day period required
by Minnesota law. See Minn. Stat. § 363A.33, subd. 1(2) (requiring
a civil action to be filed “within 45 days after receipt of notice
4
Any attempt to characterize Ordahl’s claim as a continuing
violation would likewise fail because the amended complaint
includes references to conduct starting in February 2012, more than
one year after he filed his first charge of discrimination.
Christensen Aff. Ex. G, at 1.
7
that the commissioner has reaffirmed a determination of no probable
cause”). The MDHR affirmed its denial of Ordahl’s second charge of
discrimination on July 22, 2014, but Ordahl did not serve Toro with
the amended complaint until October 9, 2014.
ECF No. 16; see also
McKenzie v. Lunds, Inc., 63 F. Supp. 2d 986, 1001 (D. Minn. 1999)
(“State rules for the service of process apply to pendent State law
claims” and under Minnesota law, an action is commenced on the
service of process, not the filing of the complaint).
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, based on the above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
1.
The motion for judgment on the pleadings [ECF No. 27] is
granted; and
2.
The case is dismissed with prejudice.
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.
Dated:
July 28, 2015
s/David S. Doty
David S. Doty, Judge
United States District Court
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