Brooks v. Caraway

Filing 28

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER: 1. Brooks's Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus 1 is DENIED; and 2. This case is DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction. LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY. (Written Opinion). Signed by The Hon. Paul A. Magnuson on 07/10/2014. (LLM) CC: Martes Niyum Brooks. (kt)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Martes Niyum Brooks,

Case No.: 14-cv-2263 (PAM/TNL)
Petitioner,

v.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

J. F. Caraway,
Respondent.

This matter is before the Court on Brooks’s Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus. For
the reasons that follow, the Court denies the Petition.
BACKGROUND
In 2005, Brooks pleaded guilty in this District to possessing a firearm as a felon. (Plea
Agreement (Docket No. 10, Ex. B).) Brooks had previously been convicted of at least three
violent felonies, including a walk-away escape from a halfway house. (Indictment (Docket
No. 10, Ex. A) at 1.) Consistent with the plea agreement, the district court determined that
Brooks qualified as an armed career criminal and sentenced him to 180 months
imprisonment. (Judgment (Docket No. 10, Ex. E).) Brooks did not appeal his conviction or
sentence or move to vacate under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, and was incarcerated at the federal
penitentiary in Terra Haute, Indiana.
Then in 2012, Brooks petitioned the Southern District of Indiana for a writ of habeas
corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (Pet. for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Docket No. 1).) Brooks
contended that he was “actually innocent” of being an armed career criminal because his

prior felony escape conviction was no longer a violent crime under Begay v. United States,
553 U.S. 137 (2008), and Chambers v. United States, 129 S.Ct. 687 (2009), and that he
should be resentenced accordingly. (Id. at 5-9.) The district court denied the petition, ruling
that Brooks already had a meaningful opportunity to dispute his sentence by bringing a
§ 2255 motion, and that his failure to do so within the deadline prevented him from filing a
§ 2241 petition. (Entry (Docket No. 16).)
Brooks appealed, and the Seventh Circuit vacated the district court’s decision.
(Mandate (Docket No. 24).) The Seventh Circuit agreed that Brooks needed to bring a timely
§ 2255 motion in this District. (Id. at 2.) Nonetheless, the Seventh Circuit remanded the case
to the district court for transfer to this District to “consider whether to convert the petition
to a § 2255” motion. (Id.; Order (Docket No. 26).)
DISCUSSION
A federal prisoner generally may pursue post-conviction relief from an unlawful
conviction or sentence through one of two procedural vehicles. First, the prisoner may attack
the validity of a conviction or sentence by bringing a motion to vacate in the sentencing
district under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Section 2255 motions are subject to a one-year statute of
limitations and, if second or successive, a certification requirement. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f), (h).
Second, the prisoner may challenge the execution of a sentence by filing a petition for a writ
of habeas corpus in the incarcerating district under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.

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Brooks’s petition tries to evade this procedural framework. Within the framework,
a § 2255 motion is the exclusive remedy for a prisoner attacking the validity of a sentence.
See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e); Hill v. Morrison, 349 F.3d 1089, 1091 (8th Cir. 2003) (“It is well
settled a collateral challenge to a federal conviction or sentence must generally be raised in
a motion to vacate filed in the sentencing court under § 2255 . . . and not in a habeas petition
filed in the court of incarceration . . . under § 2241.”). By claiming that changes in the law
call into question his status as an armed career criminal, Brooks attacks the validity of his
sentence.

So by asserting that claim in a § 2241 petition instead of a § 2255

motion—presumably to dodge the applicable statute of limitations—Brooks violates the
exclusive-remedy rule. His petition is therefore barred by the rule.
The exclusive-remedy rule does have two qualifications, but neither is satisfied here.
In rare circumstances, a § 2241 petition that is barred by the exclusive-remedy rule may be
treated as a § 2255 motion and transferred to the sentencing district. Yet Brooks’s petition
would be precluded by § 2255’s limitations period because more than one year passed
between the Supreme Court’s decisions in either Begay (2008) or Chambers (2009) and
Brooks’s filing of the petition (2012). See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(3). Given that the petition
would be time-barred under § 2255, the Court declines to treat the petition as a § 2255
motion.
In addition, a savings clause allows a prisoner to attack the validity of a conviction or
sentence through a § 2241 petition if a § 2255 motion is “inadequate or ineffective” to test
the legality of the conviction or sentence. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e). But the prisoner bears the
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burden of showing that a § 2255 motion would be inadequate or ineffective. Abdullah v.
Hedrick, 392 F.3d 957, 959 (8th Cir. 2004). And to make that showing, the prisoner must
point to more than a procedural barrier—like an expired statute of limitations—to bringing
a § 2255 motion. United States v. Lurie, 207 F.3d 1075, 1077 (8th Cir. 2000). The fact that
Brooks may not now use § 2255 because the one-year limitations period has run does not
alone render § 2255 inadequate or ineffective. Section 2255’s one-year window provided
Brooks a reasonable opportunity to raise his claim, and his decision not to avail himself of
that remedy does not reveal any inadequacy in the statute. Nor has Brooks presented any
other evidence showing that a § 2255 motion would be inadequate or ineffective.
Unless a prisoner can show that at § 2255 motion is inadequate or ineffective to test
the legality of a conviction or sentence, a federal district court does not have jurisdiction to
hear a § 2241 petition. DeSimone v. Lacy, 805 F.2d 321, 323 (8th Cir. 1986) (per curiam).
Because Brooks has not shown such inadequacy or ineffectiveness, the Court lacks
jurisdiction over his petition.

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CONCLUSION
Brooks’s § 2241 petition is barred by § 2255’s exclusive-remedy rule, should not be
treated as a § 2255 motion as it would be time-barred, and cannot be saved for § 2255
provided an adequate and effective remedy. The Court thus lacks jurisdiction over the
petition. Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
1.

Brooks’s Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus (Docket No. 1) is DENIED; and

2.

This case is DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction.

LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.

Dated: July 10, 2014

s/ Paul A. Magnuson
Paul A. Magnuson
United States District Court Judge

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