Scheffler v. Minnesota Department of Human Services et al

Filing 81

ORDER: Plaintiff's Motion for Relief from Judgment per Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(2, 5) [ECF No. 72 ] is DENIED. (Written Opinion) Signed by Judge Joan N. Ericksen on August 7, 2015. (CBC)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA

Troy K. Scheffler,
Plaintiff,
No. 14-cv-2946 (JNE/SER)
ORDER

v.
Minnesota Department of Human Services
and Anoka County,
Defendants.

The Court dismissed this action in March of 2015. Plaintiff Troy K. Scheffler
subsequently appealed that decision to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals. With that appeal
currently pending, Scheffler has now filed a Motion for Relief from Judgment under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(2) and (5), claiming that he has acquired “new evidence” that
justifies vacating the Court’s dismissal order. The motion will be denied. See Hunter v.
Underwood, 362 F.3d 468, 475 (8th Cir. 2004) (explaining that “[o]ur case law . . . permits the
district court to consider a Rule 60(b) motion on the merits and deny it even if an appeal is
already pending in this court . . .”).
As the Court explained in its dismissal order, this action centers on Scheffler’s
ineligibility for MinnesotaCare, a taxpayer-subsidized health insurance program for low-income
uninsured people. Scheffler had been receiving MinnesotaCare prior to April of 2013. At that
time, he became eligible for Medicare by virtue of his receipt of Social Security Disability
Insurance benefits. Minnesota law excludes from the MinnesotaCare program individuals with
“minimum essential health coverage” from any other source, including Medicare. Consequently,
the Defendants terminated Scheffler’s MinnesotaCare coverage.

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Scheffler challenged his disenrollment from the program through administrative
channels. When that proved unsuccessful, he brought an appeal of the Defendants’ action in the
Anoka County District Court. There, Scheffler sought to reverse the termination of his
MinnesotaCare coverage, claiming that it was an act of discrimination in violation of the
Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), the Rehabilitation Act (“RA”), and the Minnesota
Human Rights Act. While that state action was pending, Scheffler brought those same claims
against the same Defendants here in federal court. By the time the Defendants moved to dismiss
Scheffler’s Amended Complaint here, the Anoka County District Court had ruled in their favor
in the state case. In so doing, the state district court found that Scheffler was not a “qualified
individual with a disability” with respect to the MinnesotaCare program – an essential element of
proving a disability discrimination claim under the ADA and the RA. The Court subsequently
concluded that the issue-preclusive effects of the Anoka County District Court’s decision were
fatal to the federal disability discrimination claims Scheffler presses in this case, and, in their
absence, declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his state claims.
With his motion under Rule 60(b)(2) and (5), Scheffler now seeks to vacate that decision
based on what he contends is “new evidence” that the state of Minnesota can afford to provide
him with medical coverage through the MinnesotaCare program or an equivalent despite his
eligibility for Medicare. 1 This fails for a variety of reasons.

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Scheffler’s motion also catalogues what he contends are this Court’s “reversible errors in
its issue preclusion-driven dismissal” and recites his position on the merits of his claims. Rule
60(b), however, “is not a vehicle for simple reargument on the merits,” Broadway v. Norris, 193
F.3d 987, 990 (8th Cir. 1999), and the Court will not reconsider issues that are currently pending
before the Eighth Circuit. See Griggs v. Provident Consumer Disc. Co., 459 U.S. 56, 58 (1982)
(“The filing of a notice of appeal is an event of jurisdictional significance – it confers jurisdiction
on the court of appeals and divests the district court of its control over those aspects of the case
involved in the appeal.”).
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First, Rule 60(b)(2) only allows a court to “relieve a party or its legal representative from
a final judgment, order, or proceeding” based on “newly discovered evidence that, with
reasonable diligence, could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule
59(b).” As such, this provision of the rule “permits consideration only of facts which were in
existence at the time of trial” but which were not available to the movant despite his exercise of
due diligence. Swope v. Siegel-Roberts, Inc., 243 F.3d 486, 498 (8th Cir. 2001). Here, though,
Scheffler offers only a letter he received from the Defendant Minnesota Department of Human
Services, dated July 6, 2015, indicating that the premium he pays for the Medical Assistance for
Employed Persons with Disabilities program “will decrease” in September due to “recent
changes in law.” This case was dismissed in March of 2015; this letter was not in existence at
that time.
Furthermore, even if this letter could somehow constitute “newly discovered evidence”
within the meaning of Rule 60(b)(2), Scheffler is not entitled to relief unless he can also show
that it is “material” to the decision he seeks to vacate and “would probably produce a different
result.” Schwieger v. Farm Bureau Ins. Co. of NE, 207 F.3d 480, 487 (8th Cir. 2000).
This Scheffler has not done. As indicated, the Court dismissed his federal claims because
of the issue-preclusive effects of the Anoka County District Court’s determination that he is not a
“qualified individual with a disability” under the ADA and the RA. The letter is not relevant to
and does not undermine the preclusive effect this Court was bound to give the state court’s
decision on that matter in any way. See Nelson v. Am. Family Ins. Grp., 651 N.W.2d 499, 511
(Minn. 2002) (explaining that issue preclusion applies when “(1) the issue was identical to one in
a prior adjudication; (2) there was a final judgment on the merits; (3) the estopped party was a
party or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication; and (4) the estopped party was given a

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full and fair opportunity to be heard on the adjudicated issue”) (internal quotation omitted). The
letter likewise bears no relation to and has no impact on the Court’s decision not to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over Scheffler’s state claims.
Second, with respect to Rule 60(b)(5), that provision allows a district court to “relieve a
party or its legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding” where “the
judgment . . . is based on an earlier judgment that has been reversed or vacated.” This does not
apply here. In fact, on July 27, 2015 – notably, several weeks after Scheffler came into
possession of his “new evidence” – the Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed the Anoka County
District Court’s rejection of his discrimination claims. Scheffler v. Minnesota Department of
Human Services, A14-1939, 2015 WL 4508109. That court “conclude[d] that the district court
did not err by granting summary judgment [to the Defendants] on the ground that Scheffler did
not establish a prima facie case of disability discrimination by showing that he has otherwise
qualified for MinnesotaCare coverage and that he was excluded from MinnesotaCare due to
discrimination based upon disability.” Id. at *4.
Scheffler’s motion under Rule 60(b) is therefore denied.

Based on the files, records, and proceedings herein, and for the reasons discussed above,
IT IS ORDERED THAT:
1. Plaintiff’s Motion for Relief from Judgment per Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(2, 5) [ECF No.
72] is DENIED.

Dated: August 7, 2015

s/Joan N. Ericksen________________
JOAN N. ERICKSEN
United States District Judge

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