Jackson v. State of Minnesota
Filing
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ORDER denying 5 Application on Proceed in District Court without Prepaying Fees or Costs; Adopting 7 Report and Recommendation. The petitioner's petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus is dismissed with prejudice. A certificate of appealability is not granted. (Written Opinion) Signed by Judge Susan Richard Nelson on 08/12/15. (SMD)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Jeremy Jackson,
Case No. 15-cv-1854 (SRN/JSM)
Petitioner,
v.
ORDER
State of Minnesota,
Respondent.
Jeremy Jackson, 225266, MCF, 5329 Osgood Ave N., Stillwater, MN 55082, Petitioner.
Lee W. Barry, III, Hennpin County Attorney’s Office, 300 S. 6th Street, Suite A-2000,
Minneapolis, MN 55487; Matthew Frank and James B. Early, Minnesota Attorney
General’s Office, 445 Minnesota Street, Suite 1800, St. Paul, MN 55101-2134, for
Respondent.
SUSAN RICHARD NELSON, United States District Judge
I.
INTRODUCTION
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff’s Objections [Doc. No. 8] to United
States Magistrate Judge Janie Mayeron’s April 27, 2015, Report and Recommendation
[Doc. No. 7]. Judge Mayeron recommended that the Court deny Plaintiff’s petition for a
writ of habeas corpus and that the Court dismiss this action. (See Report and
Recommendation dated Apr. 27, 2015 (“R&R”) at 1 [Doc. No. 7].) For the reasons set forth
below, the Court adopts the Report and Recommendation.
II.
BACKGROUND
The factual and procedural background of Petitioner’s case is well documented in the
Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) and is incorporated herein by
reference.1 Petitioner Jeremy Jackson (“Petitioner” or “Jackson”) was convicted in
December 2007 of (1) “first-degree murder committed for the benefit of a gang;” and (2)
“attempted first-degree murder committed for the benefit of a gang.” See Jackson v. State,
817 N.W.2d 717, 719 (Minn. 2012). As a result of these convictions, Petitioner was
sentenced to a term of life imprisonment. See State v. Jackson, 770 N.W.2d 470, 477
(Minn. 2009). Jackson’s conviction was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Minnesota on
direct appeal. See id. at 486. Jackson later filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in
this Court, which the Court denied. Jackson v. Symmes, No. 09-cv-2946 (SRN/JSM),
2011 WL 1256617, at *1 (D. Minn. Apr. 4, 2011). Petitioner also filed a motion for postconviction relief in state court, which was also denied. See Jackson, 817 N.W.2d at 719.
On March 27, 2015, Jackson filed another habeas petition, challenging his
underlying convictions for first-degree murder and attempted first-degree murder. (See
Pet. at 1 [Doc. No. 1].) The Court notes that although Jackson does not identity his
pending request for relief as a habeas petition, the Court construes Petitioner’s request as
such. Magistrate Judge Mayeron correctly noted that “[b]ecause Jackson is being held
pursuant to a state-court judgment, and because Jackson seeks to challenge that statecourt judgment in this action, . . . Jackson’s petition [is properly construed] as seeking
habeas relief under [28 U.S.C.] § 2254.” (R&R at 2 n.1 [Doc. No. 7].) In his petition,
Jackson contends that his trial counsel failed to provide effective assistance by
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The Court recites background facts only to the extent necessary to rule on
Petitioner’s objections.
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recommending that Jackson not accept a plea agreement, which included a term of
imprisonment ranging from 150 to 180 months. (See Pet. at 1 [Doc. No. 1].)
In the R&R, Magistrate Judge Mayeron recommended dismissing Jackson’s
petition because “his petition was clearly filed too late,” pursuant to the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). (See R&R at 2 [Doc. No.
7].) The magistrate judge explained that Jackson’s claim was barred both by §
2244(d)(1)(A) and § 2244(d)(1)(C). (See id. at 3.) Additionally, Magistrate Judge
Mayeron noted that the Petitioner was not entitled a certificate of appealability because
he did not make “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” (Id. at 4
(citing 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2)).) On May 13, 2015, Jackson filed Objections to the R&R
[Doc. No. 8]. The Court discusses the merits of his Objections below.
III.
DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
The district court reviews de novo those portions of the R&R to which a specific
objection is made and “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or
recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); accord D.
Minn. LR 72.2(b).
B. Petitioner’s Objections
Petitioner raises a number of objections to the R&R. First, he contends that the
Knaffla rule does not apply to “issues related to violations of a person[’]s federal
constitutional rights.” (See Obj. at 1 [Doc. No. 8].) Second, Jackson argues that his
ineffective assistance of counsel claim is valid because the United States Supreme
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Court’s holding in Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012), is retroactive. (See Obj. at
1–2 [Doc. No. 8].) And finally, liberally construing Petitioner’s brief, he also appears to
argue that he is entitled a certificate of appealability because he is constitutionally
entitled to effective assistance of counsel. (See id. at 2.)
1. Knaffla Rule
Petitioner objects to the magistrate judge’s recommended dismissal of his case
because he contends that the Knaffla rule does not apply. (See id. at 1.) The Knaffla rule
states that if a criminal defendant has previously taken a direct appeal, “all matters raised
therein, and all claims known but not raised, will not be considered upon a subsequent
petition [in state court] for post[-]conviction relief.” State v. Knaffla, 243 N.W.2d 737,
741 (Minn. 1976). Therefore, the Knaffla rule is a procedural bar for petitions seeking
relief in state court on unexhausted federal claims raised in habeas petitions. See French
v. Smith, No. 15-cv-2337 (MJD/JSM), 2015 WL 4077726, at *3 n.4 (D. Minn. July 1,
20150.
As an initial matter, the Court notes that Magistrate Judge Mayeron did not invoke
the Knaffla rule in the R&R. (See generally R&R [Doc. No. 7].) Regardless, if
Petitioner is suggesting that the Minnesota Supreme Court misunderstood or misapplied
the Knaffla rule in earlier proceedings, his argument is unavailing, because “[a] federal
court may not re-examine a state court’s interpretation and application of state law.”
Schleeper v. Groose, 36 F.3d 735, 737 (8th Cir. 1994). In Murray v. Hvass, 269 F.3d
896, 899 (8th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 935 (2002), the Eighth Circuit reiterated
the long-standing principle that “it is not the province of a federal court to decide whether
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a matter ought to be considered procedurally defaulted under state law.” See Carney v.
Fabian, 441 F. Supp. 2d 1014, 1026 (D. Minn. 2006) aff’d, 487 F.3d 1094 (8th Cir.
2007). Accordingly, Petitioner’s objection based on the Knaffla rule is overruled.
2. Statute of Limitations
Petitioner also objects to the magistrate judge’s recommended dismissal of his
ineffective assistance of counsel claim as time-barred under the applicable statute of
limitations. (See Obj. at 2 [Doc. No. 8].)
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) has a one-year
statute of limitations for applications for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in state
custody. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). The one-year limitations period begins to run from the
latest of:
(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of
direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;
(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by
State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is
removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;
(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially
recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized
by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on
collateral review; or
(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented
could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.
28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). However, “[t]he time during which a properly filed application
for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment
or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation.” Id.
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Additionally, “[u]nder the doctrine of equitable tolling, the AEDPA’s statutory limitations
period may be tolled if a petitioner can show that (1) he has been diligently pursuing his
rights and (2) an extraordinary circumstance stood in his way.” White v. Dingle, 616 F.3d
844, 847 (8th Cir. 2010) (citing Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 649 (2010)). Because
Jackson does not allege that (1) there was an impediment to seeking habeas relief (§
2244(d)(1)(B)); or that (2) his claims are predicated on new factual discovery ((§
2244(d)(1)(D)), Jackson’s habeas petition is governed either by § 2244(d)(1)(A) or §
2244(d)(1)(C).
As Magistrate Judge Mayeron explained, the Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed
Jackson’s conviction on August 6, 2009, Jackson, 770 N.W.2d 470; and therefore, his
conviction became final 90 days thereafter, on November 4, 2009. See Boston v. Weber,
525 F.3d 622, 624 (8th Cir. 2008) (finding that “[w]hen the state court of last resort
enters a judgment in a direct criminal appeal and the petitioner does not seek a writ of
certiorari, the judgment is final at the conclusion of the ninety days allowed by the
Supreme Court for the filing of such a writ.”). Accordingly, under § 2244(d)(1)(A), the
one-year limitations period for Jackson to file a habeas petition expired on November 4,
2010. 2
Petitioner does not argue that the magistrate judge’s calculation of elapsed time was
2
The Court notes that Magistrate Judge Mayeron correctly explained that
“[a]lthough the filing of a motion for post-conviction relief in state court tolls the oneyear limitations period, see 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2), the filing of a federal habeas petition
does not, see Lee v. Norris, 354 F.3d 846, 849 (8th Cir. 2003).” (See R&R at 3 n.2 [Doc.
No. 7].) Therefore, the statute of limitations was not suspended or tolled when Jackson
filed his first federal habeas petition on October 22, 2009.
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incorrect under § 2244(d)(1)(A). Rather, Jackson asserts that, pursuant to §
2244(d)(1)(C), the one-year limitations period should run from the date on which the
constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel for plea negotiations was recognized
by the Supreme Court, and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review.
(See generally Obj. [Doc. No. 8].) Insofar as Petitioner argues that Lafler v. Cooper, 132
S. Ct. 1376 (2012), and Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399 (2012), apply retroactively, the
Court finds that Jackson’s petition still fails. In Lafler and Frye, the Supreme Court held
that a defense counsel’s ineffective assistance at the plea stage was an adequate basis for
federal habeas relief. See Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1384–89; Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1404.
Even assuming that the Supreme Court intended to announce a new, retroactive
rule of constitutional law, Jackson’s petition is nevertheless untimely. (See R&R at 3–4
[Doc. No. 7].) The Supreme Court decided both Lafler and Frye on March 21, 2012. At
that time, Jackson’s appeal of the denial of his state-court motion for post-conviction
relief was pending, thus tolling the statute of limitations. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2).
The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the denial of that motion on August 1, 2012, and
thus, the limitations period, under § 2244(d)(1)(C), began to run on that date. Therefore,
the limitations period expired one year later on August 1, 2013. Accordingly, Jackson’s
current pending petition, which was filed on March 27, 2015, was untimely even if Lafler
and Frye extended the limitations period, pursuant to § 2244(d)(1)(C).
The Court notes that it is not completely evident from Petitioner’s Objections
whether he believes Lafler and Frye announced a new, retroactive rule or simply applied
an existing rule, from Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), to a new set of
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facts. (See Obj. at 2 [Doc. No. 8].) Insofar as Petitioner argues that Lafler and Frye did
not announce a new, retroactive rule, the Court finds that Petitioner’s claim is nonetheless
time barred. The Supreme Court decided Strickland on May 14, 1984. Therefore, the
latest date from which Jackson’s one-year limitations period began to run was “the date
on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration
of the time for seeking such review.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). As the Court explained
above, Petitioner’s conviction became final on November 4, 2009; and thus, the one-year
statute of limitations period expired on November 4, 2010.
Petitioner also argues that, pursuant to Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496
(1986), any type of procedural bar must be excused when a constitutional violation has
resulted in a conviction. (See Obj. at 1 [Doc. No. 8].) The Court disagrees. Murray does
not stand for this proposition. Rather, the Murray Court held that “in an extraordinary
case, where a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who
is actually innocent, a federal habeas court may grant the writ even in the absence of a
showing of cause for the procedural default.” Murray, 477 U.S. at 496. Here, Petitioner
does not allege that he is actually innocent. Therefore, the Murray exception does not
apply.
3. Certificate of Appealability
Finally, Petitioner appears to object to the magistrate judge’s denial of a certificate
of appealability (“COA”). A state prisoner may not appeal the denial of a 28 U.S.C. §
2254 habeas petition unless he is granted a COA. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1); Fed. R. App.
P. 22(b)(1). To obtain a COA, a petitioner must make “a substantial showing of the denial
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of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). A COA will not necessarily be granted
simply because an appeal is pursued in good faith and raises a non-frivolous issue. Flieger
v. Delo, 16 F.3d 878, 882 (8th Cir. 1994). Instead, the prisoner must satisfy a higher
standard; he must show that the issues to be raised on appeal are “debatable among
reasonable jurists,” that different courts “could resolve the issues differently,” or that the
issues otherwise “deserve further proceedings.” Id. at 882–83 (citing Lozada v. Deeds, 498
U.S. 430, 432 (1991)).
Magistrate Judge Mayeron correctly determined that Jackson failed to make a
substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. Moreover, he has not raised a
novel question of federal law. It is unlikely that another court, including the Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals, would rule on Petitioner’s claims any differently than the Court has done
so here. Therefore, appellate review is not warranted, and Petitioner is not entitled to a
COA.
IV.
ORDER
Based on the foregoing, and all the files, records and proceedings herein, IT IS
HEREBY ORDERED THAT:
1.
Petitioner’s Objections to Report and Recommendation [Doc. No. 8]
are OVERRULED;
2.
The Court ADOPTS the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation
[Doc. No. 7];
3.
Petitioner’s Petition Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for a Writ of Habeas Corpus
[Doc. No. 1] is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE; and
4.
Petitioner’s Application to Proceed in Forma Pauperis [Doc. No. 5] is
DENIED; and
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5.
A certificate of appealability is NOT GRANTED.
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.
Dated: August 12, 2015
s/Susan Richard Nelson
SUSAN RICHARD NELSON
United States District Judge
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