Strege v. Department of Motor Vehicals et al
Filing
3
ORDER granting 2 Application on Proceed in District Court without Prepaying Fees or Costs (Written Opinion). Signed by Senior Judge David S. Doty on 4/29/2015. (PJM) (cc: Adam Paul Strege)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Civil No. 15-1907(DSD/HB)
Adam Paul Strege,
Plaintiff,
ORDER
v.
Department of Motor Vehicles,
Humboldt County Court and
Humboldt University,
Defendants.
Adam Paul Strege, P.O. Box 263, Eureka, CA 95002, pro se.
This matter is before the court upon the pro se complaint and
application to proceed in forma pauperis by plaintiff Adam Paul
Strege.
Although the complaint is often difficult to understand,
Strege alleges that defendants engaged in conduct1 in violation of
the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), the California Unruh
Civil Rights Act (UCRA), and other civil rights laws.
Compl. ¶ 7.
Defendants include the California Department of Motor Vehicles,
Humboldt County Court, and Humboldt University, all of which are
located in California.
Id. ¶ 2.
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.
Basham, 931 F.2d 521, 522 (8th Cir. 1991).
raise
1
issues
of
jurisdiction
sua
Thomas v.
As such, the court must
sponte
“when
there
is
an
Strege alleges, among other things, that defendants
wrongfully suspended his driver’s license, refused him an
“Assistive device,” ran him out of various towns, and denied him a
hearing under the ADA. See Compl. ¶ 7; ECF No. 1-1.
indication that jurisdiction is lacking.”
Id. at 523.
The court
liberally construes pro se complaints and will dismiss an action
only if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff “can allege no
set of facts which would support an exercise of jurisdiction.”
Sanders v. United States, 760 F.2d 869, 871 (8th Cir. 1985).
The court has studied the complaint and cannot identify any
basis
to
support
defendants.
an
exercise
of
personal
jurisdiction
over
A federal court may assume jurisdiction over a non-
resident defendant “only to the extent permitted by the long-arm
statute of the forum state and by the Due Process Clause.”
Romak
USA, Inc. v. Rich, 384 F.3d 979, 984 (8th Cir. 2004) (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted).
The Minnesota long-arm statute
“confers jurisdiction to the fullest extent permitted by the Due
Process Clause,” and the court therefore need only consider due
process requirements.
Cir. 2007).
See Coen v. Coen, 509 F.3d 900, 905 (8th
“Due process allows a court to exercise personal
jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant only if doing so is
consistent with traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice, and if the defendant has sufficient ‘minimum contacts’
with the forum state.”
Northrup King v. Compania Productora
Semillas, 51 F.3d 1383, 1387 (8th Cir. 1995) (citations omitted).
Construing
the
complaint
liberally,
the
court
finds
no
jurisdictionally significant contacts between the defendants in
this action and Minnesota, the forum state. Defendants are located
2
in
California
and
have
no
apparent
connection
to
Minnesota.
Although the complaint does include numerous allegations pertaining
to events occurring in Minnesota, those events bear no relationship
to defendants and appear to largely concern previous actions that
Strege
has
filed
in
this
district.
As
a
result,
personal
jurisdiction over defendants is lacking.
Because
the
court
does
not
have
jurisdiction,
it
must
determine “if it is in the interest of justice” to transfer the
action to “any other such court in which the action ... could have
been brought at the time it was filed.”
28 U.S.C. § 1631.
The
court finds that transfer is not warranted under the circumstances
here.
In particular, the court notes that the complaint consists
mainly of unintelligible factual allegations that do not provide a
basis for relief.
See Jefferson v. Zych, No. 12-682, 2012 WL
2395498, at *2 (D. Minn. June 25, 2012) (“Transfer is not in the
interest of justice if the Complaint is frivolous and additional
adjudication
a
waste
of
judicial
resources.”)
(citation
and
internal quotation marks omitted)).
The remainder of the complaint alleges that Strege’s driver’s
license
was
suspended,
and
that
he
has
been
prevented
from
challenging that suspension, in violation of the ADA and the UCRA.2
2
Strege also argues that the suspension violates the
International Religious Freedom Act of 1998. See ECF No. 1-1, at
3.
That statute, however, does not provide a private cause of
action for civil litigants. See, e.g., Bey v. Ohio, No. 1:11 CV
(continued...)
3
Although the general nature of this claim is easily understood, the
complaint does not include sufficient coherent factual matter to
provide a basis for relief. For instance, Strege does not identify
his disability, which is necessary to state a claim under either
the ADA or UCRA.
See Signorelli v. Hughes, 363 F. App’x 455, 456
(9th Cir. Jan. 25, 2010); Dep’t of Fair Emp’t & Hous. v. Law Sch.
Admission Council Inc., 896 F. Supp. 2d 849, 865 (N.D. Cal. 2012)
(noting that the UCRA “incorporates the substantive standards of
the ADA”).3
As a result, the court finds that transfer is not
warranted.
Accordingly, based on the above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
1.
The application to proceed in forma pauperis [ECF No. 2]
is denied as moot; and
2
(...continued)
1213, 2011 WL 5024188, at *2 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 19, 2011).
3
Moreover, the ADA and UCRA claims appear to rely on events
in September 2012 and March 2015.
See ECF No. 1-1, at 1-5.
Federal courts in California apply a three-year statute of
limitations to claims under Title II of the ADA and a two-year
limitations period to claims under the UCRA.
See Sharkey v.
O’Neal, 778 F.3d 767, 772 (9th Cir. 2015); Gilly v. JPMorgan Chase
Bank, N.A., No. 12cv1774, 2012 WL 10424926, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Oct.
12, 2012).
Thus, there is little chance that dismissal will
subject Strege to a limitations period that would not have
otherwise barred his claims in this court. See Gunn v. U.S. Dep’t
of Agriculture, 118 F.3d 1233, 1240 (8th Cir. 1997) (noting that
transfer is appropriate when “the statute of limitations would have
run before [the plaintiff] could refile properly”).
4
2.
This action is dismissed without prejudice.
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.
Dated:
April 29, 2015
s/David S. Doty
David S. Doty, Judge
United States District Court
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