Jackson v. Santini et al
Filing
58
ORDER denying 49 Motion for Preliminary Injunction and Motion for Temporary Restraining Order. (Written Opinion) Signed by Judge Patrick J. Schiltz on January 17, 2017. (CLG)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
JAMES JACKSON,
Case No. 15‐CV‐3151 (PJS/TNL)
Plaintiff,
v.
ORDER
LT. AMIE SANTINI, Federal Bureau of
Prisons, FCI Sandstone, Sandstone, MN, in
her individual capacity; LT. DANIEL
GRAVDAHL, S.I.S., Federal Bureau of
Prisons, FCI Sandstone, Sandstone, MN, in
his individual capacity; JAKE BUSH,
Paralegal, Federal Bureau of Prisons, FCI
Sandstone, Sandstone, MN, in his
individual capacity; and DENESE
WILSON, Warden, Federal Bureau of
Prisons, FCI Sandstone, Sandstone, MN, in
her individual capacity; jointly and
severally,
Defendants.
James Jackson, pro se.
D. Gerald Wilhelm, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, for defendants.
This is a Bivens action1 brought by inmate James Jackson against several employees
of the Federal Correctional Institution (“FCI”) in Sandstone, Minnesota. Jackson alleges that
1
That is, an action to recover damages from federal officials who allegedly violated
the constitutional rights of the plaintiff while acting under color of federal authority. Bivens
v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
$175 worth of personal property was wrongfully taken from his cubicle during a
“shakedown” in August 2014. Jackson further alleges that, after he instituted administrative
proceedings to recover his property, prison officials told him that they would return his
property, but only if he would waive his right to pursue any administrative or tort claims
against them. According to Jackson, prison officials warned him that, if he did not sign a
waiver, he would be sanctioned in connection with pornography that was found in his
cubicle. Jackson contends that defendants’ actions deprived him of due process and
interfered with his right of access to the courts.
This matter is before the Court on Jackson’s motion for a temporary restraining order
or preliminary injunction. ECF No. 49. Jackson seeks to enjoin the Bureau of Prisons
(“BOP”) from transferring him to another prison during the pendency of his Bivens action.
Jackson claims that transferring him to another prison will irreparably harm him by
“remov[ing] his BIVENS action from this Court’s territorial jurisdiction,” “imped[ing] the
speed with which [his case] can proceed,” risking the loss of his legal documents during the
transfer, and forcing him to find another inmate to help him litigate this case after the
transfer. Id. at 4‐5.
A court must consider four factors in deciding whether to grant a temporary
restraining order or preliminary injunction: (1) the movant’s likelihood of success on the
merits; (2) the threat of irreparable harm to the movant if the injunction is not granted;
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(3) the balance between that harm and the injury that granting the injunction will inflict on
the other parties; and (4) the public interest. See Dataphase Sys., Inc. v. CL Sys., Inc., 640
F.2d 109, 114 (8th Cir. 1981) (en banc). Temporary restraining orders and preliminary
injunctions are extraordinary remedies, and the party seeking such relief bears the burden of
establishing his entitlement to the relief under the Dataphase factors. See Watkins Inc. v.
Lewis, 346 F.3d 841, 844 (8th Cir. 2003). Jackson has failed to meet his burden in this case.
First, the Court cannot find that Jackson is likely to succeed in recovering on his
Bivens claim. On November 10, 2016, Magistrate Judge Tony N. Leung filed a Report and
Recommendation (“R&R”) in which he recommended that this lawsuit be dismissed. ECF
No. 48. Jackson’s objection to the R&R was filed on January 9, 2017. ECF No. 54. The
Court has not been able to carefully analyze Jackson’s 24 pages of objections to the 20‐page
R&R, but the fact that Judge Leung has recommended that this action be dismissed does not
bode well for Jackson.
Second and most importantly, Jackson has failed to identify any irreparable harm
that he will suffer if he is transferred. Jackson’s transfer to another prison will not have any
material impact on this Bivens action. The transfer will not, as Jackson claims, remove the
case from this Court’s jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (giving federal courts subject matter
jurisdiction over civil actions “arising under” the laws or Constitution of the United States);
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Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 462 (1940) (recognizing that courts may exercise personal
jurisdiction over defendants that are domiciled in the state). Nor will Jackson’s transfer
render the District of Minnesota an improper venue for the case. See Barber v. Simpson, 94
F.3d 648 (8th Cir. 1996) (unpublished table decision) (stating that a Bivens action may be
brought in any judicial district where “a substantial part of the events or omissions giving
rise to the claim occurred” (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2)). Finally, Jackson’s assertions
that, if he is transferred, the BOP might lose his papers and he might have to find a new
jailhouse lawyer to assist him fall far short of establishing the type of irreparable harm that
would justify injunctive relief. See Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 90 (1974).
Third, granting the injunction will cause harm to defendants by interfering with their
ability to administer their facility. As Jackson acknowledges, the Eighth Circuit has warned
that “in the prison context, a request for injunctive relief must always be viewed with great
caution because ‘judicial restraint is especially called for in dealing with the complex and
intractable problems of prison administration.’” Goff v. Harper, 60 F.3d 518, 520 (8th Cir.
1995) (quoting Rogers v. Scurr, 676 F.2d 1211, 1214 (8th Cir. 1982)). This case exemplifies
why “judicial restraint” is needed in this context. According to the “Request for Transfer”
submitted by Jackson’s warden, FCI‐Sandstone is seeking to have Jackson transferred to a
facility that has a Sex Offender Management Program (“SOMP”) because Jackson was
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convicted of distributing child pornography, because “Jackson continues to engage in
behavior that demonstrates continued interest in sexually deviant material,” and because
Jackson “appears unable or unwilling to participate in age appropriate fantasy.” ECF
No. 56 at 2. For these reasons, “[p]sychological services” at FCI‐Sandstone “concluded
Jackson continues to engage in risk relevant behavior and recommends a transfer to a[n]
SOMP.” Id. Granting the injunctive relief sought by Jackson would thus interfere with the
informed judgment of prison officials “as to what would . . . best serve institutional security
or the safety and welfare of the inmate.” Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 225 (1976).
Finally, the Court cannot identify any way in which the public interest would be
served by enjoining defendants from transferring Jackson.
For these reasons, Jackson’s motion for a temporary restraining order or preliminary
injunction is denied.
ORDER
Based on the foregoing, and all the files, records, and proceedings herein, IT IS
HEREBY ORDERED THAT plaintiff James Jackson’s motion for preliminary injunction and
temporary restraining order [ECF No. 49] is DENIED.
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LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.
Dated: January 17, 2017
s/Patrick J. Schiltz
Patrick J. Schiltz
United States District Judge
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