Willis Electric Co., Ltd. v. Polygroup Limited et al

Filing 628

CLAIM CONSTRUCTION ORDER. (Written Opinion) Signed by Judge Wilhelmina M. Wright on 12/6/2021. (RJE)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Willis Electric Co., Ltd.,

Case No. 15-cv-3443 (WMW/KMM)
Plaintiff,
CLAIM CONSTRUCTION ORDER

v.
Polygroup Macau Limited (BVI), Polytree
(H.K) Co. Ltd., and Polygroup Trading
Limited,
Defendants.

In this patent-infringement action, Plaintiff alleges that certain products sold by
Defendants infringe multiple claims in five United States patents owned by Plaintiff.
This matter is now before the Court to construe ten disputed claim terms in Plaintiff’s
asserted patents. (Dkt. 594.) For the reasons addressed below, the Court resolves the
claim-construction disputes as described herein.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Willis Electric Co., Ltd. (Willis Electric) and Defendants Polygroup
Macau Limited (BVI), Polytree (H.K) Co. Ltd., and Polygroup Trading Limited
(collectively, Polygroup) are competitors in the field of artificial holiday trees.
Manufacturers in this field compete based on price, product quality, and product
innovation. Willis Electric began manufacturing holiday lights in 1993 and expanded its
business to include pre-lit artificial holiday trees in 2008. Until 2010, Willis Electric’s
pre-lit holiday trees were “typical of the industry,” as they were “big, bulky, complex,

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and difficult to assemble.” But in 2010, Willis Electric began selling a “One Plug Tree.”
Willis Electric filed patent applications pertaining to the One Plug Tree and other related
pre-lit artificial holiday tree designs. Subsequently, Polygroup began selling an alleged
“knockoff design” and applied for its own patents.
Willis Electric commenced this patent-infringement lawsuit against Polygroup in
August 2015. After the conclusion of inter partes review (IPR) proceedings before the
Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB), Willis Electric filed the now-operative second
amended complaint in May 2019. The second amended complaint alleges that Polygroup
has infringed and continues to infringe five of Willis Electric’s United States patents
pertaining to pre-lit artificial holiday trees.1 Four of the asserted patents pertain to Willis
Electric’s One Plug Tree design: United States Patent No. 8,454,186 (the ’186 Patent);
United States Patent No. 8,454,187 (the ’187 Patent); United States Patent No. 8,936,379
(the ’379 Patent); and United States Patent No. 8,974,072 (the ’072 Patent) (collectively,
the One Plug Tree Patents). A fifth asserted patent, United States Patent No. 9,066,617
(the ’617 Patent), pertains to Willis Electric’s multi-positional locking artificial tree trunk
design. Willis Electric has narrowed the asserted claims in this case to: claims 7, 10, 11,
15–22, 25 and 28 of the ’186 Patent; claims 1–15 of the ’187 Patent; claims 12 and 15 of
the ’379 Patent; claim 5 of the ’072 Patent; and claims 4 and 11 of the ’617 Patent. The
parties dispute ten claim terms in the asserted patent claims: five claim terms that appear
in the One Tree Plug Patents and five claim terms that appear in the ’617 Patent.
1

The second amended complaint also alleges infringement of a sixth patent, United
States Patent No. 9,044,056, which Willis Electric no longer asserts in this lawsuit.
2

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ANALYSIS
I.

Legal Standards

Whoever “without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented
invention, within the United States . . . during the term of the patent,” infringes that
patent. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a). A district court employs a two-step analysis when making a
patent-infringement determination. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d
967, 976 (Fed. Cir. 1995). First, the district court construes the asserted claims of the
patent to ascertain their meaning and scope. Id. Second, the fact finder compares the
construed claims to the accused product. Id. Only claim construction, the first step of
this analysis, currently is at issue.
At the claim-construction stage, it is the district court’s duty to resolve any dispute
about the scope of the patent claims raised by the parties. Eon Corp. IP Holdings LLC v.
Silver Spring Networks, Inc., 815 F.3d 1314, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2016). This duty resides
with the district court because “the ultimate question of construction [is] a legal
question.” Id. at 1318 (quoting Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 574 U.S. 318, 333
(2015)). A district court construes the disputed claims “independent of the accused
product, in light of the specification, the prosecution history, and the prior art.” Embrex,
Inc. v. Serv. Eng’g Corp., 216 F.3d 1343, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks
omitted). Although a district court may consider the accused device when determining
which aspects of the patent claim should be construed, the claim “is construed in . . . light
of the claim language . . . not in light of the accused device.” Exigent Tech., Inc. v.

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Atrana Sols., Inc., 442 F.3d 1301, 1309 n.10 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks
omitted). Claim construction merely elaborates the typically terse claim language “to
understand and explain, but not to change, the scope of the claims.” Embrex, 216 F.3d at
1347 (internal quotation marks omitted).
To ascertain the meaning of disputed patent claim terms, a district court begins its
analysis by focusing on the words of the claims. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303,
1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005). “It is a bedrock principle of patent law that the claims of a patent
define the invention to which the patentee is entitled the right to exclude.” Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted). Courts generally give words in a patent claim their ordinary
and customary meaning. Id. The ordinary and customary meaning of a claim term is the
meaning that would be understood by a person of ordinary skill in the field of technology
in question at the time of the invention:
Such person is deemed to read the words used in the patent
documents with an understanding of their meaning in the
field, and to have knowledge of any special meaning and
usage in the field. The inventor’s words that are used to
describe the invention—the inventor’s lexicography—must
be understood and interpreted by the court as they would be
understood and interpreted by a person in that field of
technology.
Id. at 1313 (quoting Multiform Desiccants, Inc. v. Medzam, Ltd., 133 F.3d 1473, 1477
(Fed. Cir. 1998)).
The ordinary meaning of claim language, at times, “may be readily apparent even
to lay judges, and claim construction in such cases involves little more than the
application of the widely accepted meaning of commonly understood words.”

4

Id.

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at 1314. For this reason, a district court need not construe terms that have ordinary
meanings, “lest trial courts be inundated with requests to parse the meaning of every
word in the asserted claims.” O2 Micro Int’l Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation Tech. Co., 521
F.3d 1351, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2008). Also, to be legally sound, a “claim construction need
not . . . purge every shred of ambiguity.” Acumed LLC v. Stryker Corp., 483 F.3d 800,
806 (Fed. Cir. 2007). “The resolution of some line-drawing problems—especially easy
ones” is a determination that “is properly left to the trier of fact.” Id.
A district court begins the process of claim construction by reviewing the patent
specification and the prosecution history. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1313. The specification,
which includes the written description of the invention, “is the single best guide to the
meaning of a disputed term.” Id. at 1315 (internal quotation marks omitted). When the
specification includes “a special definition given to a claim term by the patentee that
differs from the meaning it would otherwise possess,” the lexicography of the inventor
governs. Id. at 1316. But a district court may not import limitations from the written
description into the claims. Laitram Corp. v. NEC Corp., 163 F.3d 1342, 1347 (Fed. Cir.
1998).

The disclosure of a particular embodiment of the claimed invention in the

specification does not narrow the patent claims. Id. at 1347–49. Moreover, “[a] claim
interpretation that excludes a preferred embodiment from the scope of the claim is rarely,
if ever, correct.” MBO Labs., Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 474 F.3d 1323, 1333
(Fed. Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). Although the patent’s prosecution
history may be used to understand the claim terms, it cannot enlarge, diminish, or vary

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To ascertain the meaning of disputed patent claim terms, a district court begins its
analysis by focusing on the words of the claims. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312. The ’186
Patent includes the following representative examples of the disputed coupling terms:
[Claim 1]
. . . wherein an end of the second trunk portion is configured
to couple with an end of the first trunk portion . . . .
[Claim 10]
. . . wherein the second tree portion is mechanically and
electrically connectable to the first tree portion by coupling a
lower end of the second trunk body to an upper end of the
first trunk body along a common vertical axis . . . .
[Claim 16]
. . . the first plug surface being adjacent to and in contact with
the second plug surface when the first tree body is coupled to
the second tree body.
(Emphasis added.)
Courts generally give words in a patent claim their ordinary and customary
meaning. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312. Some claim terms are simple enough that a lay
person can understand their meaning. Id. at 1314. As such, a district court need not
construe terms that have ordinary meanings. O2 Micro, 521 F.3d at 1360. It is true that a
court’s “determination that a claim term ‘needs no construction’ or has the ‘plain and
ordinary meaning’ may be inadequate when a term has more than one ‘ordinary’ meaning
or when reliance on the term’s ‘ordinary’ meaning does not resolve the parties’ dispute.”
Id. at 1361. But “claim construction need not always purge every shred of ambiguity,”
and “resolution of some line-drawing problems . . . is properly left to the trier of fact.”
Acumed LLC, 483 F.3d at 806.

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When the patent’s specification includes “a special definition given to a claim
term by the patentee that differs from the meaning it would otherwise possess,” the
lexicography of the inventor governs. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1316. Here, nothing in the
claim language or specifications of the One Tree Plug Patents reflects that the disputed
coupling terms have a specialized or technical meaning in the relevant art that deviates
from the commonly understood meaning of these terms. To the contrary, the One Tree
Plug Patents provide sufficient context from which the coupling terms can be understood
by a lay juror.
Polygroup’s proposed constructions involve two primary components, neither of
which warrants deviating from the plain and ordinary meaning of the disputed coupling
terms.
First, Polygroup seeks to define the disputed coupling terms to include reference
to the objects that are being coupled—namely, “two trunk portions/bodies.” But adding a
reference to two trunk portions or bodies is superfluous because the claims, as written,
clearly use the coupling terms in reference to two trunk portions or bodies. As such,
Polygroup’s inclusion of “two trunk portions/bodies” in its proposed constructions is
redundant and would not assist a lay juror to understand and apply the claim terms.
Moreover, to the extent that any minimal ambiguity exists as to what objects are being
coupled, Polygroup has not demonstrated that a jury would be incapable of resolving that
ambiguity by considering the coupling terms in context. See Acumed LLC, 483 F.3d at
806. In short, this aspect of Polygroup’s proposed constructions is simply unnecessary.

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Second, Polygroup seeks to define the disputed coupling terms to mean that the
trunk portions or bodies must “securely fit together.” Significantly, however, the patent
claims contain no references that require trunk portions or bodies to “securely fit
together.” Instead, Polygroup relies on references to a secure fit that appear in the patent
specifications.

But a district court may not import limitations from the written

description into the claims, and the disclosure of a particular embodiment of the claimed
invention in the specification does not narrow the patent claims. Laitram Corp., 163 F.3d
at 1347.
Moreover, Polygroup’s proposal to use “securely fit together” to define the
coupling terms could introduce, rather than resolve, ambiguity in the claims. Indeed,
Polygroup does not identify an objective baseline to define the requisite secure fit that
Polygroup’s construction would impose. Cf. Sonix Tech. Co. v. Publ’ns Int’l, Ltd., 844
F.3d 1370, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (recognizing that terms of degree in a patent claim are
“purely subjective,” such that they could be invalid as indefinite, if there is not “an
objective baseline through which to interpret the claims”). And courts generally avoid a
claim construction that might render a claim invalid. See Whittaker Corp. v. UNR Indus.,
Inc., 911 F.2d 709, 712 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (recognizing that “claims are generally construed
so as to sustain their validity, if possible”).

For these reasons, Polygroup has not

demonstrated that the disputed coupling terms should be construed to mean that the trunk
portions or bodies must “securely fit together.”

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wherein the second tree portion is mechanically and
electrically connectable to the first tree portion by coupling a
lower end of the second trunk body to an upper end of the
first trunk body along a common vertical axis at a rotational
orientation of the first trunk portion relative the second trunk
portion about the common vertical axis, thereby causing the
trunk connector of the first trunk portion to make an electrical
connection with the trunk connector of the second trunk
portion within an interior of the lighted artificial tree, the
electrical connection being made independent of the
rotational orientation of the first trunk portion relative
the second trunk portion about the common vertical axis.
(Emphasis added.) The parties’ disagreement as to this disputed phrase pertains to what
it means for an electrical connection to be “made independent of” the rotational
orientation or alignment of tree trunk portions. Willis Electric contends that an electrical
connection is “independent of” the rotational orientation or alignment if making an
electrical connection does not depend on which of the multiple available alignments is
used when mechanically connecting the tree trunk portions. Polygroup contends that an
electrical connection can be “independent of” the rotational orientation or alignment only
if the tree trunk portions can be rotated (while mechanically connected) without
interrupting the electrical connection.
It is undisputed that none of the claims expressly addresses whether tree trunk
portions may or must be capable of being rotated after an electrical connection has been
made. Nor do the claims expressly or implicitly require an electrical connection to
remain uninterrupted if any such rotation occurs. Indeed, the claims say nothing about
maintaining the electrical connection or preventing interruptions in the electrical

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connection if rotation occurs. 2 Instead, the relevant claim language pertains to the
making of the electrical connection: “the electrical connection being made independent of
the rotational orientation.” This is consistent with Willis Electric’s construction, under
which multiple possible rotational orientations are available, but an electrical connection
can be made no matter which of the available rotational orientations is chosen. In
contrast, the plain language of the claims does not support Polygroup’s construction.  
Polygroup instead relies on the structure of the claims, which, according to
Polygroup, implicitly supports Polygroup’s proposed construction. When a claim term is
first introduced with the article “a,” antecedent basis principles suggest that any later
reference to the same claim term using the article “the” is presumptively a reference to
the same thing. See Process Control Corp. v. HydReclaim Corp., 190 F.3d 1350, 1356–
57 (Fed. Cir. 1999). Polygroup correctly observes that the claim language first requires
the tree trunk portions to be coupled “at a rotational orientation” and to “make an
electrical connection,” and the claim language later references “the electrical connection
being made independent of the rotational orientation.” Polygroup contends that the
antecedent basis reflected by this phrasing means that the electrical connection in the
later portion of the claim depends on the rotational orientation used in the earlier portion
of the claim, notwithstanding the claim language requiring the electrical connection be

2

Polygroup cites a passage from the specification, which provides that “in one
embodiment, . . . . [I]f some rotation occurs inadvertently, the coupling and connection
still occurs, regardless of the rotation.” But the disclosure of a particular embodiment of
the claimed invention in the specification does not narrow the patent claims. Laitram
Corp., 163 F.3d at 1347–48.
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independent of the rotational orientation. According to Polygroup, the only logical way
to resolve this inconsistency is “for the electrical connection to not be interrupted when
the trunks are moved,” in which case the electrical connection does not depend on the
initial rotational orientation.
Polygroup’s strained construction imposes an unwarranted limitation on the
claims, however. As addressed above, the disputed claim language addresses the making
of an electrical connection, not the maintaining of such a connection. And an electrical
connection can be made “independent of” the rotational orientation of the trunk portions
if, regardless of which of multiple rotational orientations is used to mechanically connect
the tree trunk portions, an electrical connection is made. This plausible and logical
construction of the claim language does not require rewriting the claims to add implicit
limitations pertaining to whether an electrical connection is “interrupted” if rotation
occurs. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1316 (observing that the “construction that stays true to
the claim language and most naturally aligns with the patent’s description of the
invention will be, in the end, the correct construction” (internal quotation marks
omitted)). Willis Electric’s proposed construction most naturally aligns with the claim
language and specification.
Polygroup contends that PTAB construed this disputed claim language during the
IPR proceedings and that Polygroup’s construction is consistent with PTAB’s
construction. But PTAB’s final written decisions reflect that PTAB did not construe this
claim language. Although PTAB assessed whether the prior art disclosed this limitation,

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and in doing so characterized the functionality of the prior art, PTAB did not expressly
construe the now-disputed phrase in the One Tree Plug Patents: an “electrical connection
being made independent of the rotational orientation” of the tree trunk portions. PTAB’s
characterization of prior art has no bearing on the scope of the claims in the One Tree
Plug Patents.
Polygroup nonetheless contends that PTAB’s final written decisions are
necessarily inconsistent with Willis Electric’s proposed construction, which provides that
an electrical connection can be made at “any available arrangement” of the tree trunk
portions. By limiting the claim language to require an electrical connection only at the
available rotational orientations of the tree trunk portions, Polygroup argues, Willis
Electric’s construction necessarily implies that some rotational orientations are
unavailable. According to Polygroup, the claims require all rotational orientations to be
available. But the claim language belies Polygroup’s argument. The language in some of
the disputed claims reflects that, in certain embodiments of the invention, some rotational
orientations might not be available. For instance, claim 1 of the ’186 Patent and claim 1
of the ’187 Patent refer to trunk portions that are configured to couple “in at least four
different rotational” alignments or orientations, implying that some embodiments of the
invention might permit a limited number of rotational alignments or orientations. PTAB
recognized that prior art that broadly permits “any number” of rotational orientations
includes “at least four different” rotational orientations. But this recognition is consistent
with a construction of the ’186 Patent and the ’187 Patent in which an embodiment of the

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The parties dispute the meaning of the terms “coaxial trunk connectors” and
“coaxial electrical contact set” (collectively, the “coaxial terms”), which appear in the
’186 Patent (asserted claim 15) and the ’187 Patent (asserted claims 4, 10 and 13).
1.

“coaxial trunk connectors”

The dispute as to the term “coaxial trunk connectors” pertains to whether the trunk
connectors must be capable of making an electrical connection at “any rotational
orientation,” as Polygroup contends, or whether the trunk connectors merely need to be
“about a common vertical axis,” as Willis Electric contends. Claim 15 of the ’186 Patent
provides the following representative example of the disputed term in context:
The lighted artificial tree of claim 10, wherein the trunk
connectors of the first and second tree portions form coaxial
trunk connectors.
(Emphasis added.) Claim 10, from which claim 15 depends, describes the first and
second tree portions as being coupled “along a common vertical axis,” which is
consistent with both parties’ proposed constructions. The material difference between the
parties’ proposed constructions is Polygroup’s addition of the requirement that an
electrical connection can be made at “any rotational orientation,” which is language that
undisputedly does not appear in the claim language.
In support of its proposed construction, Polygroup relies in part on the
specification, which describes “one embodiment” in which “the coaxial nature of
connectors . . . permit the electrical connection of the connectors at any rotational
orientation about a vertical axis.” But, as addressed above, it is improper to import

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limitations from the written description into the claims, and the disclosure of one
particular embodiment of the claimed invention in the specification does not narrow the
patent claims. Laitram Corp., 163 F.3d at 1347–48. Absent any support in the claim
language for Polygroup’s proposed “any rotational orientation” limitation, Polygroup’s
reliance on the specification is unavailing.
Moreover, the record reflects that Polygroup’s construction is inconsistent with the
position Polygroup took during the IPR proceedings before PTAB. Indeed, Polygroup’s
expert opined to PTAB that “another example of a conventional coaxial electrical
connector” includes a mechanical block fitted during assembly to “ensur[e] that the final
connection is made in a discrete position,” as opposed to any rotational orientation. As
such, Polygroup’s proposed construction of “coaxial trunk connectors” lacks adequate
support.
2.

“coaxial contact sets”

The dispute as to the term “coaxial contact sets” pertains to whether the claimed
set of electrical contacts must “share a common vertical axis,” as Polygroup contends, or
whether the claimed set of electrical contacts merely “permit the electrical connection to
be made about a common vertical axis,” as Willis Electric contends. Claim 4 of the ’187
Patent provides the following representative example of the disputed term in context:
The lighted artificial tree of claim 1, wherein the first trunk
electrical connector of the first portion includes a first
coaxial electrical contact set and the trunk connector of the
second trunk portion includes a second coaxial electrical
contact set such that the electrical connection between the
first wiring assembly and the second wiring assembly

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comprises an electrical connection between the first coaxial
electrical contact set and the second coaxial electrical
contact set.
(Emphasis added.)
Courts generally give words in a patent claim their ordinary and customary
meaning. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312. When the patent’s specification includes “a special
definition given to a claim term by the patentee that differs from the meaning it would
otherwise possess,” the lexicography of the inventor governs. Id. at 1316. But here,
nothing in the claim language or specifications of the One Tree Plug Patents reflects that
“coaxial” has a specialized or technical meaning in the relevant art that deviates from its
commonly understood meaning, which is—quite literally—sharing a common axis. See
Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 237 (11th ed. 2014) (defining “coaxial” as
“having coincident axes”). As such, the ordinary and customary meaning of “coaxial”
supports Polygroup’s proposed construction.
Although Willis Electric concedes that “the electrical connection formed by the
coaxial electrical connector must be made about a common vertical axis,” Willis Electric
contends that the electrical contacts “need not physically share a common vertical axis.”
But Willis Electric fails to plausibly explain how an electrical connection can be made
“about a common vertical axis” without the electrical contacts physically sharing that
vertical axis. Nor does Willis Electric plausibly explain how an electrical contact set can
even be “coaxial” if it does not, as the term “coaxial” plainly suggests, share an axis.
Indeed, the specification describes and depicts electrical contacts that share a common

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(asserted claims 1–11, 13 and 14), the ’072 Patent (asserted claim 5), and the ’379 Patent
(asserted claims 12 and 15).
A threshold aspect of the parties’ dispute as to the connector terms is whether
“trunk connector assembly” should be construed to have a different meaning than “trunk
electrical connector” and “trunk connector.”4 Willis Electric contends that these phrases
are used interchangeably in the One Plug Tree Patents, whereas Polygroup contends that
“trunk connector assembly” is distinct. Independent claim 7 of the ’187 Patent is the only
asserted claim that uses the “trunk connector assembly” phrase:
a first tree portion including a first trunk portion, a first
plurality of branches joined to the first trunk portion, and a
first light string affixed to a portion of the first plurality of
branches, the first trunk portion having a first trunk body and
a trunk connector assembly, at least a portion of the trunk
connector assembly housed within the first trunk body and
electrically connected to the first light string . . . .
(Emphasis added.) Later in that same claim, the phrase “trunk connector” also is used:
wherein the second tree portion is mechanically and
electrically connectable to the first tree portion by coupling a
lower end of the second trunk body to an upper end of the
first trunk body along a common vertical axis at a rotational
orientation of the first trunk portion relative the second trunk
portion about the common vertical axis, thereby causing the
trunk connector of the first trunk portion to make an
electrical connection with the trunk connector of the second
trunk portion within a trunk interior
(Emphasis added.) All of the other asserted claims that use the connector terms use either
“trunk electrical connector” or “trunk connector.”
4

The parties agree that “trunk electrical connector” and “trunk connector” should
share the same meaning.
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The doctrine of claim differentiation creates a presumption that the use of different
terms in different patent claims indicates that those claims should be ascribed different
scope or meaning. See Chi. Bd. Options Exch., Inc. v. Int’l Sec. Exch., LLC, 677 F.3d
1361, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Andersen Corp. v. Fiber Composites, LLC, 474 F.3d 1361,
1369 (Fed. Cir. 2007). This presumption has less force, however, when there are other
differences between the claims. See, e.g., SRAM Corp. v. AD-II Eng’g, Inc., 465 F.3d
1351, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2006). And when two independent claims are at issue, the doctrine
of claim differentiation generally is not applicable because patentees are free to use
linguistic variations in multiple independent claims. See, e.g., Andersen Corp., 474 F.3d
at 1370 (declining to apply doctrine of claim differentiation to separate independent claim
terms “pellets,” “linear extrudates,” and “composite compositions” when there were other
differences between the claims); Curtiss-Wright Flow Control Corp. v. Velan, Inc., 438
F.3d 1374, 1380–81 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (recognizing that “[c]laim drafters can also use
different terms to define the exact same subject matter”); Hormone Research Found. v.
Genentech, Inc., 904 F.2d 1558, 1567 n.15 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (“It is not unusual that
separate claims may define the invention using different terminology, especially where
(as here) independent claims are involved.”). Moreover, evidence from the specification
may “overcome any presumption arising from the doctrine of claim differentiation.”
Andersen Corp., 474 F.3d at 1370 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, claim 7 of the ’187 Patent is an independent claim, as are several of the
other asserted claims that use one or more of the disputed connector terms. The scope of

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the claims also differs in other respects unrelated to the connectors. As such, the doctrine
of claim differentiation is entitled to significantly less weight here. Moreover, claim 7 of
the ’187 Patent uses the terms “trunk connector assembly” and “trunk connector”
interchangeably within the same claim. And the specification similarly uses these terms
interchangeably. For example, the specification describes a “trunk connector assembly”
as “a female trunk connector configured to receive a male counterpart.” For these
reasons, the doctrine of claim differentiation is not applicable here and the three disputed
connector terms are construed to share the same meaning.
The substance of the parties’ proposed constructions for the connector terms
involves two primary material differences.
First, Willis Electric’s proposed construction defines the trunk connectors as being
“positioned in part or whole in the trunk body.” But several of the asserted claims
already expressly require the trunk connector to be “located within” or “housed within”
the trunk body. Thus, Willis Electric’s proposed construction is needlessly redundant as
to these asserted claims. In addition, some of the asserted claims do not expressly require
the trunk connector to be located or housed within the trunk body. Thus, Willis Electric’s
proposed construction would improperly add a limitation as to these asserted claims, and
Willis Electric provides no basis for doing so. For these reasons, the Court rejects this
aspect of Willis Electric’s proposed construction.
Second, Polygroup’s proposed construction defines the physical structure of trunk
connectors as “a non-conductive body enclosing a pair of electrical contacts,” whereas

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Willis Electric’s proposed construction refers to the physical structure of the trunk
connectors simply as “an assembly.” According to Willis Electric, Polygroup’s proposed
construction is “nonsensical” because to “make an electrical connection . . . a connector
must include some conductive material.” But Polygroup’s proposed construction is not
devoid of conductive material. Rather, under Polygroup’s proposed construction, the
conductive material (namely, “a pair of electrical contacts”) is merely enclosed by “a
non-conductive body.”

Polygroup’s proposed construction, therefore, is not

“nonsensical.”
Polygroup’s proposed construction is not consistent with the claim language,
however. Nothing in the asserted claims requires a trunk connector to have “a nonconductive body” enclosing a pair of electrical contacts.

Polygroup relies on the

specification, which describes the use of “plastic or similar non-conducting material.”
But, as addressed above, it is improper to import limitations from the written description
into the claims, and the disclosure of a particular embodiment of the claimed invention in
the specification does not narrow the patent claims. Laitram Corp., 163 F.3d at 1347.
Moreover, Polygroup cites the specification out of context. In full, this aspect of the
specification provides: “Although not intending to be limiting, insert . . . may comprise a
plastic or similar non-conducting material.” (Emphasis added.) Polygroup provides no
other support for this aspect of its proposed construction, which is inconsistent with the
claim language.

The Court, therefore, rejects this aspect of Polygroup’s proposed

construction.

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lower end of the second trunk body and having a second
plug surface, the first plug surface being adjacent to and in
contact with the second plug surface when the first tree body
is coupled to the second tree body.
17. The lighted artificial tree of claim 16, wherein the first
plug includes flexible portions that deform when inserted into
the trunk body, thereby forming an interference fit between
the first plug and the first trunk body.
(Emphasis added.) Claim 14 of the ’187 Patent is nearly identical to claim 16 of the ’186
Patent. And it is undisputed that the terms “plug” and “plug insertable into the . . . trunk
body” have the same meaning.
Notably, although claim 17 of the ’186 Patent references “an interference fit” as to
the first of two plugs, claim 17 does not impose this requirement on the second plug.
And the other two relevant claims do not reference “an interference fit” at all. Instead,
claim 16 of the ’186 Patent (and claim 14 of the ’187 Patent) describe two plugs that are
“adjacent to and in contact with” each other without describing any type of “fit.” By
incorporating the “interference fit” limitation into its definition of the plug terms,
Polygroup’s construction improperly imposes a limitation onto all plugs referenced in all
three relevant claims even though the limitation appears in only one relevant claim and
applies only to one of the two plugs referenced in that claim. Moreover, none of the
relevant claims references a “compression” fit.
Polygroup contends that, because the relevant claims describe inserting the plug as
well as physical contact with the plug, the claim language necessary describes a

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compression or interference fit. 5

But this inference does not explain why the

“interference fit” limitation is expressly referenced in one claim but omitted from the
other two relevant claims. Indeed, because claim 17 of the ’186 Patent depends from
claim 16 of the ’186 Patent, and claim 17 uses a phrase that claim 16 does not, the
doctrine of claim differentiation creates a presumption that the difference in phrasing is
meaningful. See, e.g., Andersen Corp., 474 F.3d at 1369. Significantly, the reference to
an interference fit appears to be the primary difference between claim 16 and claim 17,
which strengthens this presumption.

Acumed, 483 F.3d at 806 (observing that the

“presumption is especially strong when the limitation in dispute is the only meaningful
difference between an independent and dependent claim, and one party is urging that the
limitation in the dependent claim should be read into the independent claim” (internal
quotation marks omitted)).

Polygroup’s arguments are insufficient to overcome the

presumption that the “interference fit” limitation in claim 17 should not be imposed on
claim 16. As such, the Court rejects Polygroup’s proposed construction of the plug
terms.
Polygroup argues that the phrase “fixedly positioning” in Willis Electric’s
proposed construction is vague and unsupported by the claims or specification. Indeed,
Willis Electric does not explain what “fixedly positioning” means, and this phrase does
not appear in the claims or specifications of the One Plug Tree Patents. Instead, the

5

Polygroup also relies on references to interference and compression fits that
appear in the specification. But the specification cannot limit the claims in a manner that
is inconsistent with the claim language. See Laitram Corp., 163 F.3d at 1347.
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The parties dispute the meaning of the preamble to claim 1 of the ’617 Patent,
from which asserted claims 4 and 11 depend. Specifically, the parties disagree about
whether this preamble is limiting and, if it is limiting, the parties dispute the scope and
proper construction of the preamble.
1.

Whether the Preamble is Limiting

As a threshold issue, the parties disagree as to whether the preamble to claim 1 of
the ’617 Patent is limiting. Polygroup argues that it is limiting, whereas Willis Electric
argues that it is not limiting.
“[U]se descriptions” in the preamble of a patent claim are “rarely treated as claim
limitations.” Marrin v. Griffin, 599 F.3d 1290, 1294 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (explaining that
“[p]reamble language that merely states the purpose or intended use of an invention is
generally not treated as limiting the scope of the claim” (internal quotation marks
omitted)). For apparatus claims, such as those at issue here, “patentability depends on the
claimed structure, not on the use or purpose of that structure.” Id. (quoting Catalina
Mktg. Int’l v. Coolsavings.com, Inc., 289 F.3d 801, 809 (Fed. Cir. 2002)).
There is no “litmus test” for a court to determine whether a preamble limits the
scope of patent claims. Catalina Mktg., 289 F.3d at 808. The Federal Circuit has
articulated several factors or “guideposts” that a court may consider. Id. For example, a
preamble may be limiting if (1) “dependence on a particular disputed preamble phrase for
antecedent basis . . . indicates a reliance on both the preamble and claim body to define
the claimed invention,” (2) “the preamble is essential to understand limitations or terms

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in the claim body,” (3) the preamble recites “additional structure or steps underscored as
important by the specification,” or (4) the patentee demonstrated “clear reliance on the
preamble during prosecution to distinguish the claimed invention from the prior art.” Id.
Here, the parties fail to address most of these factors in their briefing.
The record reflects that several of the Catalina Marketing factors are present.
First, the bodies of the asserted claims depend on the preamble for an antecedent basis
and to understand the terms in the claim body. For example, the bodies of the asserted
claims do not reference a tree, artificial or otherwise. Without the preamble’s reference
to an “artificial tree,” it would not necessarily be clear that the claimed apparatus is an
artificial tree.

Moreover, the preamble provides context for understanding certain

otherwise ambiguous claim terms, such as “trunk,” which can have multiple meanings.
Second, the preamble defines the structure of the invention—a “multi-positional
interlocking artificial tree assembly”—as opposed to merely stating its purpose or
intended use. See, e.g., Rowe v. Dror, 112 F.3d 473, 478 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Corning Glass
Works v. Sumitomo Elec. U.S.A., Inc., 868 F.2d 1251, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 1989). Third, the
record from the IPR proceedings supports the conclusion that the preamble to claim 1 of
the ’617 Patent is limiting. Not only did Willis Electric extensively argue that the
preamble is limiting during IPR proceedings (contrary to the arguments Willis Electric
makes now to this Court), PTAB also agreed that the preamble is limiting.6 Although

6

Willis Electric misleadingly fails to acknowledge in its briefing to this Court that
the position Willis Electric took in the IPR proceedings and the conclusion reached by
PTAB both are contrary to the position Willis Electric takes in this case.
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PTAB’s final written decisions are not binding on this Court, see Cuozzo Speed Techs.,
LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2146 (2016), it is notable and relevant that Willis Electric
demonstrated clear reliance on the preamble to distinguish the claimed invention from the
prior art, see Catalina Mktg., 289 F.3d at 808.
For these reasons, the preamble to claim 1 of the ’617 Patent is limiting.
2.

Scope of the Preamble

The parties also dispute the scope and proper construction of the preamble. The
disputed preamble provides: “A multi-positional interlocking artificial tree assembly,
comprising . . . ,” followed by a series of claim limitations.
The parties first dispute whether the preamble should be construed to require “two
or more trunk portions,” as Willis Electric contends, or to require “two trunk portions,” as
Polygroup contends. As Willis Electric correctly argues, nothing in the claim language
or specification of the ’617 Patent limits the patented artificial tree to having only two
trunk portions. To the contrary, the specification provides that a user may “optionally”
include a third trunk portion or “more than three trunk portions.” For this reason, the
Court rejects this aspect of Polygroup’s proposed construction, and instead adopts Willis
Electric’s proposed “two or more trunk portions” construction.
The parties next dispute whether the preamble requires an already-assembled
artificial tree, or merely one that is capable of being assembled. Under Willis Electric’s
proposed construction, the trunk portions are “configured to mechanically couple
together in multiple orientations,” whereas under Polygroup’s proposed construction, the

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trunk portions have already been “coupled together in one of multiple orientations.”
According to Polygroup, the preamble’s use of the word “assembly” refers to an
assembled tree. But as Willis Electric correctly observes, the patent claims use active
verbs to describe the assembly process—for example, “the male body portion inserts into
the trunk cavity.” (Emphasis added.) As Willis Electric persuasively argues, it would be
illogical for the preamble to require an already-assembled artificial tree when the
limitations that follow the preamble describe the assembly process. Accordingly, the
Court rejects this aspect of Polygroup’s proposed construction, and instead adopts Willis
Electric’s proposed “configured to mechanically couple together” construction.
The parties also dispute whether the preamble’s reference to an “interlocking”
assembly means that the invention allows “limited rotational movement,” as Willis
Electric contends, or “prevent[s] rotation of the coupled trunk portions,” as Polygroup
contends.

Significantly, nothing in the claim language addresses rotation, let alone

requires the trunk portions to be strictly prevented from rotating. Nor does the ordinary
and customary meaning of “interlocking” compel such a construction.7 Polygroup relies
solely on references in the specification that describe trunk portions that cannot rotate.
But, as addressed above, the specification cannot limit the claims in a manner that is not
reflected in the claim language. See Laitram Corp., 163 F.3d at 1347–48. Thus, the

7

See Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 653 (11th ed. 2014) (defining
“interlock” as “to lock together” or “to connect so that the motion or operation of any part
is constrained by another”).
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wherein the lip defines a portion of an inner cavity of the
coupling mechanism, the inner cavity defined by an inner
wall continuous with the lip, the inner wall further comprising
a plurality of ribs.
The claims provide little description of a coupling mechanism. But the specification
describes a coupling mechanism as follows:
[A] coupling mechanism like a securing sleeve or securing
plug is provided to assist in joining two sections of artificial
tree trunk.
...
The securing sleeve includes at least one flange of the same
shape as the notch of the first trunk portion such that the
sleeve is insertable and securable to the first trunk portion.
The length of the sleeve is shaped to contour the shape of the
second trunk portion such that the first trunk portion and
second trunk portion make a snug fit and cannot rotate
relative to each other.
And the specification describes several embodiments of the coupling mechanism, as
follows:
Coupling mechanism 106 as depicted in FIGS. 1-3 comprises
a substantially sleeve-shaped hollow structure including body
portion 144 having a lower end 146, an upper end 148, an
outside wall 150, an inner surface 158 formed by the opposite
side of outside wall 150, and radially-extending ribs 156 that
run along at least a portion of the length of the inner surface
158. In an embodiment, outside wall 150 may also form
multiple longitudinal rib-like projections 159 along a length
of body portion 144.
...
Coupling mechanism 110 comprises a substantially plugshaped hollow structure including plug body 168 having a
lower end 170, an upper end 172, an outside wall 174, and a

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top wall 180 formed orthogonally from the plug body 168
across the opening at upper end 172.
...
Coupling mechanism 206 as depicted in FIGS. 7-9 comprises
a substantially sleeve-shaped hollow structure including
sleeve body 218 having a lower end 220, an upper end 222,
an outside wall 224, an inner surface 232 formed by the
opposite side of outside wall 224, and radially-extending ribs
230 that run along at least a portion of the length of the inner
surface 232.
When resolving a disputed claim construction, the “construction that stays true to
the claim language and most naturally aligns with the patent’s description of the
invention will be, in the end, the correct construction.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1316
(internal quotation marks omitted). The disclosure of a particular embodiment of the
claimed invention in the specification does not narrow the patent claims. Laitram Corp.,
163 F.3d at 1347–49. But a “claim interpretation that excludes a preferred embodiment
from the scope of the claim is rarely, if ever, correct.” MBO Labs., Inc. v. Becton,
Dickinson & Co., 474 F.3d 1323, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks
omitted). As such, the Court must reject any aspect of the parties’ proposed constructions
that either excludes an embodiment described in the specification or imposes a limitation
based solely on a particular embodiment.
The first portion of Polygroup’s proposed construction, “a substantially sleeveshaped hollow structure for joining two trunk portions,” excludes an embodiment that
appears in the specification—namely, a coupling mechanism that “comprises a
substantially plug-shaped hollow structure.” But aside from that omission, this first

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portion of Polygroup’s proposal is consistent with both the specification and the claim
language. Indeed, the claims themselves describe the coupling mechanism as being a
hollow structure by reference to an “inner cavity” with an “inner wall” and a “terminal
lip.” And the parties appear to agree that the purpose of the coupling mechanism is to
join two trunk portions, which also is consistent with the claims and the specification. By
contrast, the first portion of Willis Electric’s proposed construction, “a sleeve or plug for
mechanically aligning two trunk portions,” does not identify the coupling mechanism as a
hollow structure or clearly describe its purpose to join two trunk portions. As such, if
“plug-shaped” were added to the beginning of Polygroup’s proposal, this first portion of
Polygroup’s proposal would most naturally align with the patent’s description of the
invention and would aid a jury’s understanding of the claims.
The middle portion of Polygroup’s proposed construction describes the coupling
mechanism as follows: “whose outer surface is configured to fit snugly inside a first trunk
portion and whose inner surface is shaped to securely fit with an insertable portion at the
end of the second trunk portion body.”8 The claims clearly require the outer surface of a
coupling mechanism to fit inside the trunk portion, providing that the coupling
mechanism includes a “male body portion” that “inserts into the trunk cavity of the first
trunk portion.” Similarly, claim 2 of the ’617 Patent provides that an “insertable portion
of the second trunk portion is inserted into the inner cavity of the coupling mechanism.”
Willis Electric disputes, however, Polygroup’s characterization of these fits as “snug”
8

Willis Electric’s proposal has no analogue to this middle portion of Polygroup’s
proposal.
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and “secure.” Indeed, the claims do not address the nature of the “fit” between the
coupling mechanism and the trunk portions. Although the specification includes such
details, it would be improper to import such limitations from the specification when those
limitations find no support in the claim language. As such, if the descriptors “snugly”
and “securely” were removed, this middle portion of Polygroup’s proposal would most
naturally align with the patent’s description of the invention and would aid a jury in
understanding the claims.
Finally, the last portion of Polygroup’s proposed construction provides that the
coupling mechanism is designed “to prevent rotational movement of the two trunk
portions.”

By contrast, the last portion of Willis Electric’s proposed construction

provides that the coupling mechanism is designed “such that the trunk portions have
limited rotational movement relative to one another about a common axis.” As addressed
in Part II.B. of this Order, nothing in the claim language addresses rotation, let alone
requires the trunk portions to be strictly prevented from rotating. As such, this last
portion of Polygroup’s proposal is inconsistent with the claim language. Instead, the last
portion of Willis Electric’s proposal most naturally aligns with the patent’s description of
the invention and would aid a jury’s understanding of the claims.
For these reasons, the Court rejects in part and adopts in part both parties’
proposed constructions of the term “coupling mechanism,” as modified. The Court
construes the term “coupling mechanism” to mean “a substantially sleeve-shaped or plugshaped hollow structure for joining two trunk portions, whose outer surface is configured

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The parties next dispute the meaning of the term “plurality of recesses,” which
appears in asserted claim 11 of the ’617 Patent. Claim 11 of the ’617 Patent provides, in
its entirety, as follows:
The multi-positional interlocking artificial tree assembly of
claim 1, wherein the coupling mechanism comprises an outer
surface of the male body portion, the outer surface defining a
plurality of recesses.
(Emphasis added.) The parties’ dispute pertains to the breadth of the term “recesses,”
which Polygroup contends should be limited to “areas between rib like projections.”
Nothing in the claim language or specification of the ’617 Patent reflects that
“recess” has a specialized or technical meaning in the relevant art that deviates from its
commonly understood meaning.9 The ’617 Patent provides sufficient context from which
the meaning of a “recess” can be understood by a lay juror. Moreover, nothing in the
claim language supports Polygroup’s narrowing of the term “recesses” so as to limit it to
“areas between rib like projections.” Polygroup’s basis for doing so is by reference to the
figures in the specification, which depict several projections on the outside wall of the
coupling mechanism, between which appear to be indentations or clefts.

The

specification describes this figure as follows: “In an embodiment, outside wall 150 may
also form multiple longitudinal rib-like projections 159 along a length of body portion
144.” (Emphasis added.)

But these portions of the specification depict and describe

only one particular embodiment of the invention. And “it is improper to read limitations
9

See, e.g., Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 1038 (11th ed. 2014)
(providing one definition of a “recess” as an “indentation” or “cleft”).

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from a preferred embodiment described in the specification—even if it is the only
embodiment—into the claims absent a clear indication in the intrinsic record that the
patentee intended the claims to be so limited.” Dealertrack, Inc. v. Huber, 674 F.3d
1315, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2012). Polygroup has not persuasively demonstrated that the
patentee intended the term “recesses” to be limited to “areas between rib like
projections.”10
Accordingly, the term “plurality of recesses” has its plain and ordinary meaning
and requires no construction.

10

Polygroup contends that the figures and descriptions in the specification are
limiting because Willis Electric added the term “recesses” during prosecution of the ’617
Patent and represented that no new matter was being added. It is true that “[n]o
amendment [to a patent application] shall introduce new matter into the disclosure of the
invention.” 35 U.S.C. § 132. “Thus, to avoid the new matter prohibition, an applicant
must show that its original application supports the amended matter.” Schering Corp. v.
Amgen Inc., 222 F.3d 1347, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2000). Typically, arguments pertaining to
alleged “new matter” are not resolved during claim construction. See, e.g., Pliant Corp.
v. MSC Mktg. & Tech., Inc., 416 F. Supp. 2d 632, 643 n.5 (N.D. Ill. 2006); Revlon
Consumer Prods. Corp. v. L’Oreal S.A., 170 F.R.D. 391, 400 n.13 (D. Del. 1997).
Moreover, here the parties appear to agree that the cited figures and descriptions in the
’617 Patent’s specification support the added “recesses” claim language. But Polygroup
has not established that, consequently, the figures and descriptions in the specification
must limit the claim language to something narrower than its plain and ordinary meaning.
Nor has Polygroup demonstrated that Willis Electric somehow implicitly disavowed
embodiments with recesses that differ from those depicted in the specification, see, e.g.,
Omega Eng’g, Inc. v. Raytek Corp., 334 F.3d 1314, 1324–25 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (providing
that disavowal of claim scope in prosecution history must be unequivocal), or that Willis
Electric must be estopped from asserting a broader construction, see, e.g., Wang Labs.,
Inc. v. Mitsubishi Elecs. Am., Inc., 103 F.3d 1571, 1577–78 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (explaining
that prosecution history estoppel precludes a patentee from “regaining, through litigation,
coverage of subject matter relinquished during prosecution”). As such, Polygroup’s
“new matter” argument is unavailing.
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covered).” As such, the Court adopts both parties’ proposed constructions, thereby
construing “exposed” to mean “visible and/or not covered.”
The parties’ remaining dispute as to this phrase pertains to when the terminal end
and lip of the coupling mechanism must be exposed. Willis Electric asserts that these
components must be exposed when the trunk portions are not coupled, whereas
Polygroup asserts that those components must be exposed when the trunk portions are
coupled.
When construing patent claims, if “some claims are broad and others narrow, the
narrow claim limitations cannot be read into the broad [claims] . . . to escape
infringement.” Uniroyal, Inc. v. Rudkin-Wiley Corp., 837 F.2d 1044, 1054–55 (Fed. Cir.
1988) (internal quotation marks omitted); accord N. Am. Vaccine, Inc. v. Am. Cyanamid
Co., 7 F.3d 1571, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (“The dependent claim tail cannot wag the
independent claim dog.”). Significantly, independent claim 1 of the ’617 Patent—which
is the claim in which the disputed phrase appears—does not describe an assembled
artificial tree.

Rather, claim 1 merely describes the uncoupled components of the

artificial tree and provides that, when the coupling mechanism is joined with the first
trunk portion, the terminal end of the first trunk portion and the lip of the coupling
mechanism are exposed. Only later, in dependent claim 2, is the coupling of a second
trunk portion to a first trunk portion described. As Willis Electric correctly asserts, it
would be improper to read a limitation from dependent claim 2 into independent claim 1.

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According to Polygroup, the prosecution history of the ’617 Patent establishes that
Willis Electric added the “exposed” limitation to overcome a rejection based on prior art
that involved a coupling mechanism that was exposed when assembled. “Prosecution
history estoppel” prevents a patentee “from regaining, through litigation, coverage of
subject matter relinquished during prosecution of the application for the patent.” Wang
Labs., Inc., 103 F.3d at 1577–78. “Arguments and amendment made to secure allowance
of a claim, especially those distinguishing prior art, presumably give rise to prosecution
history estoppel.” Id. at 1578.
The prosecution history belies Polygroup’s argument, however. The prior art
involved a coupling mechanism in which the terminal end of the bottom trunk portion is
not exposed when it is joined with the coupling mechanism. In other words, in the prior
art, the terminal end of the bottom trunk portion was not exposed when joined with the
coupling mechanism even before the bottom trunk portion was coupled to the top trunk
portion. In overcoming a rejection based on this prior art, Willis Electric asserted that
claim 1 of the ’617 Patent—unlike the prior art—requires the terminal end of the first
trunk portion to be exposed when joined with the coupling mechanism, before the second
trunk portion is coupled to the first trunk portion. Willis Electric’s argument during
prosecution did not involve a fully assembled tree and, contrary to Polygroup’s argument,
is not inconsistent with the construction Willis Electric proposes now.
The only other asserted basis for Polygroup’s proposed construction is the
specification of the ’617 Patent, which depicts an assembled tree in which the terminal

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end of the first trunk portion and the lip of the coupling mechanism are exposed. But, as
addressed above, the disclosure of a particular embodiment of the claimed invention in
the specification does not narrow the patent claims. Laitram Corp., 163 F.3d at 1347.
For these reasons, the Court rejects Polygroup’s proposed construction of this
disputed phrase and adopts Willis Electric’s proposed construction, as modified. In doing
so, the Court construes “the lip and terminal end are both exposed” to mean “the terminal
end and the lip are visible and/or not covered when the second trunk portion is not
coupled to the first trunk portion.”
ORDER
Based on the foregoing analysis and all the files, records and proceedings herein,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the disputed claim terms of United States Patent Nos.
8,454,186, 8,454,187, 8,936,379, 8,974,072 and 9,066,617 are construed as addressed
herein.

Dated: December 6, 2021

s/Wilhelmina M. Wright
Wilhelmina M. Wright
United States District Judge

44