Disability Support Alliance et al v. CCRE, LLC

Filing 46

MEMORANDUM OF LAW & ORDER. IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 1. Plaintiff Scott Smith and Defendant CCRE, LLC;s Joint Motion to Dismiss 22 is GRANTED and Plaintiff Disability Support Alliance is DISMISSED as a Plaintiff in this case. 2. Smith's Mot ion for Sanctions Against Jennifer Urban Pursuant to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 35 is GRANTED. Attorney Jennifer Urban shall pay Rule 11 monetary sanctions to Plaintiff Scott Smith in the amount of Smith's reasonable atto rneys' fees and costs incurred in bringing his Rule 11 motion and in responding to Urban's filings in this case. Within ten days from the date of this Order, Smith shall submit a detailed accounting of the attorneys' fees and costs in curred. Urban shall submit her objections, if any, to the amount of those fees and costs within five days from the date of Smiths filing. 3.Plaintiff Disability Support Alliance's request for Rule 11 sanctions against attorney Padraigin Brow ne, contained within its Response Opposing Plaintiff Scott Smith's Motion for Sanctions 30 , is DENIED. 4. The following documents (including all attachments thereto) shall be sealed and remain sealed until further order of the Court: D ocket Number 27 (Plaintiff Disability Support Alliances Response Opposing Joint Motion to Dismiss and attached exhibits); Docket Number 29 (Affidavit of Exhibits and attached exhibits); Docket Number 30 (Plaintiff Disability Support Alliances Response Opposing Plaintiff Scott Smiths Motion for Sanctions); Docket Number 31 (Affidavit of Exhibits and attached exhibits); Docket Number 41 (Plaintiff Disability Support Alliances Response Opposing Plaintiff Scott Smiths Motion for Sanc tions); Docket Number 42 (Affidavit of Exhibits and attached exhibits). 5. The Clerk of Court shall send a copy of this Order to: Office of Lawyers Professional Responsibility 1500 Landmark Towers 345 St. Peter St. St. Paul, MN 55102-1218 (Written Opinion) Signed by Judge Michael J. Davis on 4/11/17. (GRR)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA

DISABILITY SUPPORT ALLIANCE,
on behalf of its members, and
SCOTT SMITH,
Plaintiffs,

v.

MEMORANDUM OF LAW & ORDER
Civil File No. 15-3713 (MJD/DTS)

CCRE, LLC,
Defendant.
Jennifer L. Urban, Legal for Good PLLC, Counsel for Plaintiff Disability Support
Alliance.
Padraigin Browne, Browne Law LLC, Counsel for Plaintiff Scott Smith.
Peter M. Waldeck, Waldeck Law Firm P.A., Counsel for Defendant CCRE, LLC.
I.

INTRODUCTION
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff Scott Smith and Defendant

CCRE, LLC’s Joint Motion to Dismiss [Docket No. 22] and Smith’s Motion for
Sanctions Against Jennifer Urban Pursuant to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure [Docket No. 35]. Also, within Plaintiff Disability Support
Alliance’s Response Opposing Plaintiff Scott Smith’s Motion for Sanctions
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[Docket No. 30], it has requested Rule 11 sanctions against attorney Padraigin
Browne. The Court heard oral argument on March 30, 2017. For the reasons that
follow, the motion to dismiss and Smith’s motion for sanctions are granted and
Disability Support Alliance’s request for sanctions is denied.
II.

SUMMARY OF THE DECISION
Attorney Jennifer Urban filed a brief containing unsupported, irrelevant,

and inflammatory allegations against Plaintiff Scott Smith, his attorney Padraigin
Browne, and former members of Plaintiff Disability Support Alliance (“DSA”).
Urban accused them of criminal activity, but provided no admissible evidence to
support her claims. She made these irrelevant allegations with the intent to
harass. Urban also failed to conduct a reasonable inquiry by lodging the baseless
allegation that Smith was still a member of DSA, when documentary evidence
showed that DSA acknowledged Smith’s termination of his membership in
November 2015. In order to deter such behavior in the future and to preserve the
integrity of the judicial process, the Court grants Smith’s motion for Rule 11
sanctions. Urban is ordered to pay Smith’s attorneys’ fees incurred in
responding to improper allegations made for an improper purpose and in
bringing a Rule 11 motion to stop Urban’s unethical behavior.

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DSA’s request for sanctions is baseless and was filed in violation of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure’s safe harbor provision. Its request for
sanctions against Browne is denied.
Finally, DSA lacks standing, so it is dismissed from this case.
III.

BACKGROUND
A.

Allegations in the Complaint

The Complaint alleges as follows:
Plaintiff Disability Support Alliance (“DSA”) is a Minnesota nonprofit
corporation. (Compl. ¶ 8.) Each member of DSA is a person with a disability
who lives in Minnesota. (Id.) DSA’s purpose “is to ‘eliminate discrimination on
the basis of disability’ and ‘promote the betterment of the lives of those living
with disabilities.’” (Id.)
Plaintiff Scott Smith is a member of DSA and resident of Minnesota.
(Compl. ¶ 9.) Smith uses a wheelchair for mobility. (Id. ¶ 10.)
Defendant CCRE, LLC (“CCRE”), is a Minnesota limited liability company.
(Compl. ¶ 11.) CCRE owns the Cedar Cliff Shopping Center located in Eagan,
Minnesota. (Id.)
On April 22, 2015, Smith visited the Cedar Cliff Shopping Center and
found 5 accessible parking spaces marked with paint and signage and
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accompanied by adjacent access aisles, although the parking lot had more than
200 parking spaces. (Compl. ¶¶ 12-13.) Additionally, the access aisles were not
level and had ramps that bridged the change in level between the parking lot and
the sidewalk adjacent to the shopping center. (Id. ¶ 14.) Smith uses a vehicle
with a car-top wheelchair carrier, which he cannot operate if a vehicle is parked
in the adjacent parking space and there is no access aisle. (Id. ¶ 15.)
Furthermore, access aisles with slopes may cause his wheelchair to become
unstable during transfer between the chair and his vehicle. (Id.)
Because of the architectural barriers at the Cedar Cliff Shopping Center,
Smith and other DSA members were deterred from visiting the Cedar Cliff
Shopping Center, although they intended to return to patronize the center and its
tenant business. (Compl. ¶ 16.) Smith attempted to access the Cedar Cliff
Shopping Center, but could not do so due to the barriers. (Id. ¶ 17.) There is no
allegation that any DSA member other than Smith visited the Cedar Cliff
Shopping Center.
B.

Procedural History

On September 23, 2015, DSA and Smith sued CCRE in this Court. The
Complaint asserts Count 1: Violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42
U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq. (“ADA”); Count 2: Violations of the Minnesota Human
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Rights Act, Minn. Stat. § 363A (“MHRA”) 1; and Count 3: Civil Damages for Bias
Offenses. In filing the lawsuit, both DSA and Smith were represented by
attorney Paul Hansmeier of Class Justice PLLC.
On August 22, 2016, attorney Padraigin Browne substituted for Hansmeier
as counsel for Smith. [Docket No. 16] On September 12, 2016, the Minnesota
Supreme Court suspended Hansmeier from the practice of law in Minnesota. In
re Disciplinary Action against Hansmeier, 884 N.W.2d 863 (Minn. 2016). On
September 15, 2016, the District of Minnesota suspended Hansmeier from
practicing in the District of Minnesota, effective September 26, 2016. In the
Matter of the Petition for Disciplinary Action against Paul Robert Hansmeier,
Miscellaneous Case No. 16-53 (JRT) (D. Minn. Sept. 15, 2016). After September
26, 2016, DSA was unrepresented in the current case.
On November 30, 2016, Smith and CCRE filed a joint motion to dismiss
DSA and noted that Smith and CCRE had reached a settlement. [Docket No. 22]
They argued that DSA should be dismissed because it had been proceeding pro
se for several months since Hansmeier’s suspension. Alternatively, they claimed
that DSA lacked standing to continue prosecuting its claims in this lawsuit.
The Court notes that, after the commencement of this lawsuit, the Minnesota legislature amended the
MHRA in order to address what the legislature judged to be the possibility of abusive lawsuits regarding
architectural barriers. See Minn. Stat. § 363A.331.

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On December 28, 2016, attorney Jennifer Urban filed a notice of appearance
on behalf of DSA in this lawsuit. [Docket No. 28] Also on that date, DSA filed a
Memorandum of Law Opposing Joint Motion to Dismiss. [Docket No. 27] This
brief contained 12 pages of inflammatory allegations of criminal wrongdoing
such as tax evasion, disability benefits fraud, and theft against DSA by Smith,
Browne, and former DSA members Melanie Davis, Zach Hillesheim, and Aaron
Dalton. The Court will not compound this harassment by repeating the
allegations here. Significantly, DSA has submitted no affidavits to support its
allegations. Although Urban has filed three documents entitled “Affidavit of
Exhibits” with attached exhibits, none are affidavits. [Docket Nos. 29, 31, 42]
Each “affidavit” is a list of exhibits and a signature line signed by Urban. There
is no statement of personal knowledge, no statement that the attached exhibits
are what the list says they are, no sworn statement, no declaration under penalty
of perjury, and no notarization. Cf. 28 U.S.C. § 1746. Moreover, many of the
allegations in the brief are made with no citation to the record at all.
In the Memorandum of Law Opposing Joint Motion to Dismiss [Docket
No. 27], DSA also claimed that Smith was still a member of DSA because Eric
Wong, DSA Chair, had never received a written resignation from Smith. (Id. at

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16, 18.) DSA also asserted that all DSA members had signed Member
Assignment of Litigation Proceeds Agreements (“Assignment Agreements”),
which assigned to DSA any proceeds from ADA or MHRA litigation in which
the members participated, after deduction for attorneys’ fees and costs.
According to Urban, within 4 hours of filing the Memorandum of Law
[Docket No. 27] on December 28, she was contacted by the Star Tribune and the
attorney for a defendant from another case in which Browne is the plaintiff’s
attorney. On December 29, 2016, the Star Tribune published an article based on
DSA’s Memorandum of Law, repeating some of the criminal allegations against
Smith and the other former DSA members. Fox 9 then ran its own similar story.
Other media then published additional articles. Urban claims that she did not
contact any media outlets to request coverage; rather, they contacted her.
In a subsequent brief filed January 6, 2017 [Docket No. 30], Urban asserts
that she received an envelope postmarked December 30, 2016, from Smith and
Dalton, which contained copies of 1) Smith’s written resignation from DSA
membership, dated November 3, 2015, and addressed to Wong; 2) Smith’s
Assignment Agreement termination, dated December 29, 2016, and addressed to
Urban; 3) Dalton’s written resignation from the DSA membership, dated

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November 3, 2015, and addressed to Wong; and 4) Dalton’s Assignment
Agreement termination, dated December 29, 2016, addressed to Urban.
In the January 6 brief and a February 1, 2017, brief, DSA claimed that
Smith had filed a motion for Rule 11 sanctions on December 30, 2016. (See
[Docket No. 30 at 4; [Docket No. 41] DSA Brief at 4.) However, the docket
reflects that Smith filed no motion for sanctions until January 26, 2017. [Docket
No. 35]
In DSA’s January 6 brief, it stated that it was giving 21-day notice for Rule
11 sanctions against Browne. [Docket No. 30] At that time, Smith had not filed a
motion for sanctions against Urban; however, DSA sought sanctions based on
Smith’s alleged motion for sanctions and claimed that “Smith provided zero
notice – much less 21-days’ notice – sent no letter, e-mail, or other written
correspondence to Attorney Jennifer Urban or DSA detailing any alleged
improper conduct and / or any perceived evidentiary defects. “ (Id. at 10.)
DSA’s request for sanctions against Browne was only contained within its brief.
On January 10, Smith filed his Reply in Support of Joint Motion to Dismiss
[Docket No. 32] and the Smith Affidavit [Docket No. 33], to which he attached
emails demonstrating that he had resigned from DSA on November 5, 2015, and

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that Wong had emailed back on November 9 and 10, 2015, acknowledging that
Smith had resigned.
On January 12, Smith filed his Opposition to the Document Filed by
Disability Support Alliance at Docket No. 30, opposing DSA’s request for
sanctions, and pointing out that Smith had not yet filed any motion for sanctions.
[Docket No. 34]
On January 26, Smith filed a Motion for Sanctions Against Jennifer Urban
Pursuant to Rule 11. [Docket No. 35]
On February 1, DSA filed a brief in opposition to Smith’s Motion for
Sanctions. [Docket No. 41]
IV.

DISCUSSION
A.

Standing
1.

Standing Standard

“[N]o principle is more fundamental to the judiciary’s proper role in our
system of government than the constitutional limitation of federal-court
jurisdiction to actual cases or controversies. One element of the case-orcontroversy requirement is that plaintiffs must establish that they have standing
to sue.” Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1146 (2013) (citations
omitted). “The law of Article III standing, which is built on separation-of-powers
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principles, serves to prevent the judicial process from being used to usurp the
powers of the political branches.” Id. (citations omitted). “To show Article III
standing, a plaintiff has the burden of proving: (1) that he or she suffered an
injury-in-fact, (2) a causal relationship between the injury and the challenged
conduct, and (3) that the injury likely will be redressed by a favorable decision.”
S.D. v. U.S. Dept. of Interior, 665 F.3d 986, 989 (8th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted).
[A]n association has standing to bring suit on behalf of its members
when: (a) its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their
own right; (b) the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the
organization’s purpose; and (c) neither the claim asserted nor the
relief requested requires the participation of individual members in
the lawsuit.
Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Advert. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977).
2.

Standing Discussion

Discovery is closed and DSA has not and cannot assert facts to satisfy the
Hunt test. As in Disability Support Alliance v. Heartwood Enterprises, LLC,
The extent of injury to individual DSA members requires
individualized proof, because some disabled people may be able to
access [the subject property] without the need for removal of
architectural barriers. Plaintiffs have not asserted that all DSA
members depend on a wheelchair for mobility, nor whether all
members are physically disabled, rather than disabled in some other
way that does not affect mobility. The DSA has failed to meet the
requirements for associational standing, and therefore has no right
to sue [the defendant].
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No. 15-CV-529 (PAM/FLN), 2016 WL 740411, at *4 (D. Minn. Feb. 24, 2016).
Moreover, it is undisputed that Smith is no longer a member of the DSA.
(It appears only Wong remains as a member.) “Most standing cases consider
whether a plaintiff has satisfied the requirement when filing suit, but Article III
demands that an actual controversy persist throughout all stages of litigation.”
Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2661 (2013). See also E. Iowa Plastics, Inc.
v. PI, Inc., 832 F.3d 899, 903 (8th Cir. 2016) (“[S]tanding must persist throughout
all stages of litigation, and must be demonstrated separately for each form of
relief sought.”) (citations omitted). Despite DSA’s protestations to the contrary,
there is no “equitable” exception to the standing requirement.
Additionally, whether or not DSA is entitled to any proceeds that Smith
receives from this case is irrelevant. There is no claim that Smith assigned his
cause of action to DSA, only any proceeds that he receives. There is no basis to
claim that this assignment of proceeds gives DSA standing in this lawsuit. To the
contrary, the submitted Assignment Agreement explicitly provides that it does
not give DSA a right to participate in any litigation. (See Dec. 28, 2016 Urban
Aff., Ex. D, Assignment Agreement (“I recognize and agree that I am in no way
attempting to direct or allow DSA or anyone acting on its behalf to direct, advise,
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consult, manage or in any other way participate in any litigation proceedings
which may now or in the future be undertaken on my behalf, by making this
assignment. I acknowledge and agree that neither the DSA nor anyone acting on
its behalf, has any right or ability to in any way affect, alter, modify or influence
the result of any litigation which is now pending or which may be undertaken in
the future.”).) If Smith fails to pay proceeds to DSA that DSA is allegedly owed
under the Assignment Agreement, such a claim would properly be addressed in
a breach of contract action in state court; such a claim is not currently before this
Court.
B.

Sanctions

On January 6, 2017, DSA filed a “Response Opposing Plaintiff Scott
Smith’s Motion for Sanctions Against Jennifer Urban and Notice of Motion for
Sanctions Against Padraigin Brown Pursuant to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.” [Docket No. 30] At that time, Smith had not filed a Rule 11
motion against Urban.
On January 26, 2017, after the 21-day safe harbor expired, Smith did file a
Rule 11 motion for sanctions against Urban. [Docket No. 35] Smith requests an
award of costs and attorneys’ fees expended in bringing the Rule 11 motion and
in responding to DSA’s filing in this case.
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1.

Rule 11 Standard

Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires an attorney to
certify that, for any pleading or motion:
(1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to
harass, cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of
litigation;
(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted
by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending,
modifying, or reversing existing law or for establishing new law;
(3) the factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if specifically
so identified, will likely have evidentiary support after a reasonable
opportunity for further investigation or discovery; and
(4) the denials of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence
or, if specifically so identified, are reasonably based on belief or a
lack of information.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b). Rule 11 requires attorneys to “conduct a reasonable inquiry
of the factual and legal basis for a claim before filing.” Coonts v. Potts, 316 F.3d
745, 753 (8th Cir. 2003). “To constitute a reasonable inquiry, the prefiling
investigation must uncover a factual basis for the plaintiff’s allegations, as well as
a legal basis.” Id. A claim is subject to sanctions if a “reasonable and competent”
attorney would not “believe in the merit of an argument.” Id. (citation omitted).
“A motion for sanctions must be made separately from any other motion
and must describe the specific conduct that allegedly violates Rule 11(b).” Fed.
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R. Civ. P. 11(c)(2). The motion must be served but must not be filed or presented
to the Court if the challenged paper is withdrawn or corrected within 21 days
after service. Id. A district court abuses its discretion if it awards Rule 11
sanctions based on a motion that does not comply with the safe harbor provision
in that the motion “was not made separately from other motions or requests and
[the moving party] did not serve a prepared motion on [the opposing party] [21
days] prior to making any request to the court.” Gordon v. Unifund CCR
Partners, 345 F.3d 1028, 1030 (8th Cir. 2003).
2.

Rule 11 Motion for Sanctions Against Urban
a)

Safe Harbor

Urban and DSA argue that Smith provided no notice before filing a Rule
11 motion on December 30, 2016. ([Docket No. 30] DSA Sanctions Brief at 4.)
This is demonstrably false. Smith did not file his Rule 11 motion or otherwise
provide it to the Court until January 26, 2017, more than 21 days passed after
Urban received the Rule 11 motion on December 30. Smith complied with the
safe harbor provision by serving the motion on Urban, waiting to file it with the
Court for more than 21 days, and filing the motion in a separate document
clearly stating the basis for the motion.

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b)

Whether Urban’s Conduct Was Improper

DSA’s brief in opposition to the motion to dismiss [Docket No. 27] violated
Rule 11 because it was submitted for an improper purpose and because its
factual contentions lack evidentiary support. Additionally, Urban continued to
assert these unsubstantiated and inflammatory allegations in subsequent filings
and even attempted to continue to offer inadmissible evidence into the record
during oral argument.
First, DSA materially misrepresented facts in its filing. DSA claimed that
Smith was a current member and argued that it had no notice that he had
resigned, when, in fact, documentary evidence shows that Wong received and
acknowledged Smith’s resignation in November 2015. Additionally, DSA’s
original brief contains extensive facts alleging criminal wrongdoing by all DSA
members except for Wong, and these are wholly irrelevant with regard to the
issues in this ADA public access lawsuit against CCRE. Many of the allegations
are made with no citation to the record. Moreover, despite Smith’s opposition
briefing alerting Urban to the lack of evidentiary support, Urban continued to file
briefs with unsupported allegations and “affidavits” that are not based on
personal knowledge and were not sworn, notarized, or submitted under penalty
of perjury. In fact, even during oral argument, Urban acknowledged that certain
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allegations were “obviously . . . hearsay” and then continued to assert the truth
of those incendiary allegations. Thus, at this point, Urban has still failed to
submit any admissible evidence to support DSA’s allegations.
Given that, for example, DSA’s brief asserted that Smith is currently a
member of DSA, yet he resigned from DSA more than one year ago, in writing,
as acknowledged, in writing, by Wong, the allegation that Smith was a current
member could not have been the product of reasonable pre-filing inquiry.
Second, DSA’s brief was submitted for an improper purpose of harassing
Browne and DSA’s former members. The first 12 pages of DSA’s brief accuse all
of its former members, apart from Wong, of participating in a criminal scheme to
defraud DSA. These allegations have no relevance to the issues before this Court
in an ADA discrimination case against CCRE. In fact, many of the allegations
involve individuals who are in no way associated with this case. The only issue
relevant to the current motion is whether DSA has associational standing.
Urban’s brief was widely publicized in the local media, and news stories
repeated the allegations contained her brief. Urban’s true purpose in filing and
refusing to withdraw the brief was to land a public relations blow on DSA’s
former members rather than to advocate in good faith the issue of whether DSA

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should be dismissed for lack of standing. Such purpose supports imposition of
Rule 11 sanctions. See, e.g., Danvers v. Danvers, 959 F.2d 601, 604 (6th Cir. 1992);
Lukas v. Nasco Int’l, Inc., 128 F.R.D. 619, 623 (D.N.J. 1989).
The Court exercises its discretion to award sanctions against Urban. Smith
has requested that the Court award him the attorneys’ fees and costs he has
incurred in bringing his Rule 11 motion against Urban and in responding to
Urban’s filings. After careful consideration, the Court concludes that the
requested sanctions are appropriate in this case to deter such behavior in the
future and to preserve the integrity of the judicial process. Because Urban’s
original and subsequent briefs contained a variety of allegations, many of which
were irrelevant, unsupported, and inflammatory, and some of which were
blatantly false, Smith was required to incur attorneys’ fees responding to
improper allegations made for an improper purpose and in bringing a Rule 11
motion to stop Urban’s unethical behavior. Requiring Urban to pay sanctions
equal to that sum will require Urban to bear the consequences of her actions and
deter her, and other attorneys, from being tempted to take similar actions in the
future.

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Within ten days of the date of this Order, Smith shall submit evidence of
the attorneys’ fees and costs incurred in bring his Rule 11 motion against Urban
and in responding to Urban’s filings. Urban shall have five days from the date of
Smith’s filing to submit her objections, if any to the amount of those fees.
Furthermore, in order to avoid compounding Urban’s violations and
exacerbating the harassment of those accused in her filings, the Court shall seal
the following documents, including all attachments thereto: Docket Numbers 27
(Plaintiff Disability Support Alliance’s Response Opposing Joint Motion to
Dismiss and attached exhibits); 29 (Affidavit of Exhibits and attached exhibits);
30 (Plaintiff Disability Support Alliance’s Response Opposing Plaintiff Scott
Smith’s Motion for Sanctions); 31 (Affidavit of Exhibits and attached exhibits); 41
(Plaintiff Disability Support Alliance’s Response Opposing Plaintiff Scott Smith’s
Motion for Sanctions); and 42 (Affidavit of Exhibits and attached exhibits).
3.

Rule 11 Request for Sanctions Against Browne

On January 6, 2017, DSA gave notice that it planned to file a Rule 11
motion for sanctions against Browne. It improperly included this “notice” in its
brief filed with the Court. It asserted that Smith’s Rule 11 motion was brought
for harassment purposes, without factual support, and because Browne
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continues to engage in litigation to DSA’s detriment. DSA further argues that the
Court should sua sponte impose Rule 11 sanctions on Browne based on Smith’s
filings.
The Court denies DSA’s request for sanctions. DSA failed to comply with
the safe harbor requirements. First, the motion was filed with the Court before
the expiration of the 21-day safe harbor. Second, the request was not filed in a
separately prepared motion. Third, it requested sanctions based on a Rule 11
motion that Smith had not yet filed with the Court. Fourth, a basis for DSA’s
request was that Smith and Browne failed to follow Rule 11’s safe harbor
provision. The record demonstrates that, in fact, Smith and Browne did follow
Rule 11’s safe harbor provision.

Accordingly, based upon the files, records, and proceedings herein, IT IS
HEREBY ORDERED:
1. Plaintiff Scott Smith and Defendant CCRE, LLC’s Joint Motion to
Dismiss [Docket No. 22] is GRANTED and Plaintiff Disability
Support Alliance is DISMISSED as a Plaintiff in this case.
2. Smith’s Motion for Sanctions Against Jennifer Urban Pursuant to
Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure [Docket No. 35] is
GRANTED. Attorney Jennifer Urban shall pay Rule 11
monetary sanctions to Plaintiff Scott Smith in the amount of
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Smith’s reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs incurred in bringing
his Rule 11 motion and in responding to Urban’s filings in this
case. Within ten days from the date of this Order, Smith shall
submit a detailed accounting of the attorneys’ fees and costs
incurred. Urban shall submit her objections, if any, to the
amount of those fees and costs within five days from the date of
Smith’s filing.
3. Plaintiff Disability Support Alliance’s request for Rule 11
sanctions against attorney Padraigin Browne, contained within
its Response Opposing Plaintiff Scott Smith’s Motion for
Sanctions [Docket No. 30], is DENIED.
4. The following documents (including all attachments thereto)
shall be sealed and remain sealed until further order of the Court:
Docket Number 27 (Plaintiff Disability Support Alliance’s
Response Opposing Joint Motion to Dismiss and attached
exhibits);
Docket Number 29 (Affidavit of Exhibits and attached
exhibits);
Docket Number 30 (Plaintiff Disability Support Alliance’s
Response Opposing Plaintiff Scott Smith’s Motion for
Sanctions);
Docket Number 31 (Affidavit of Exhibits and attached
exhibits);
Docket Number 41 (Plaintiff Disability Support Alliance’s
Response Opposing Plaintiff Scott Smith’s Motion for
Sanctions);
Docket Number 42 (Affidavit of Exhibits and attached
exhibits).
5. The Clerk of Court shall send a copy of this Order to:
Office of Lawyers Professional Responsibility
1500 Landmark Towers
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345 St. Peter St.
St. Paul, MN 55102-1218

Dated: April 11, 2017

s/ Michael J. Davis
Michael J. Davis
United States District Court

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