Christianson v. Markquart

Filing 43

ORDER denying 26 Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. (Written Opinion) Signed by Chief Judge John R. Tunheim on 1/17/2018. (JMK)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Civil No. 16-1034 (JRT/KMM)

ERIK DANIEL CHRISTIANSON,
Plaintiff,
v.

ORDER
JEFFREY MARKQUART, in his official
capacity as Martin County Sheriff,
Defendant.
Bradford W. Colbert, LEGAL ASSISTANCE TO MINNESOTA
PRISONERS, MITCHELL HAMLINE SCHOOL OF LAW, 875
Summit, Room 254, St. Paul, MN 55105, for plaintiff.
Andrew Allen Wolf and Jason M. Hiveley, IVERSON REUVERS
CONDON, 9321 Ensign Avenue South, Bloomington, MN 55438, for
defendant.
Plaintiff Erik Christianson brings this action against Jeffrey Markquart, in his
official capacity as Martin County Sheriff, for assessing pay-for-stay costs against
Christianson during his stay at Martin County Jail. In 2013 and 2014, Christianson was
incarcerated at the Martin County Jail on four separate occasions. In total, Christianson
accrued $7,625 in pay-for-stay costs. He subsequently sent three letters to Markquart
stating that he does not have the ability to pay the costs and requesting that the jail waive
payment of the costs pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 641.12, subd. 3(b). Markquart did not
respond, and Christianson initiated the present action.

Christianson argues that

Markquart violated Minn. Stat. § 641.12, subd. 3(b), and the Due Process Clauses of the
United States and Minnesota Constitutions by failing to assess whether Christianson
qualifies for a waiver of payment of the pay-for-stay costs.
summary judgement.
31

Markquart moves for

Because the Court finds that the there is no genuine issue of material fact and
concludes that Markquart violated Minn. Stat. § 641.12, subd. 3(b), the Court will deny
Markquart’s motion for summary judgment. Instead, the Court will sua sponte enter
judgment for Christianson.

BACKGROUND
I.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND
A.

Pay-for-Stay Costs

Minn. Stat. § 641.12, subd. 3(a), authorizes county jails to require “a person
convicted of a crime and confined in the county jail” to “pay the cost of the person’s
room, board, clothing, medical, dental, and other correctional services.” The statute
provides the county with broad authority to collect these pay-for-stay costs, permitting
the sheriff to “use any available civil means of debt collection in collecting costs” and to
collect the costs “at any time while the person is under sentence or after the sentence has
been discharged.” Id.
But the sheriff’s discretion to impose pay-for-stay costs is not unfettered. Minn.
Stat. § 641.12, subd. 3(b), requires the sheriff to determine whether an inmate qualifies
for a waiver from payment of the pay-for-stay costs. Specifically, the statute provides:
The chief executive officer of the local correctional agency or
sheriff shall waive payment of the costs under this
subdivision if the officer or sheriff determines that the person
does not have the ability to pay the costs, payment of the
costs would create undue hardship for the person or the
person’s immediate family, the prospects for payment are
poor, or there are extenuating circumstances justifying waiver
of the costs.
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Minn. Stat. § 641.12, subd. 3(b) (emphasis added).
Martin County Jail charges inmates $25 for each day they are jailed. (Compl. ¶
11, Apr. 20, 2016, Docket No. 1.) Pay-for-stay costs do not begin to accrue until the
inmate is sentenced. (Aff. of Jeffrey Markquart (“Markquart Aff.”) ¶ 4, Aug. 1, 2017,
Docket No. 30.) At the end of their stay, Martin County Jail provides the inmate with a
pay-for-stay statement of the accrued costs. (See id. ¶ 11, Ex. 1 at 2.) The statement
notifies the inmate of the costs per day and the jail’s statutory authority. (See id.) The
statement also explains collection procedures and how to dispute the charges:
Accounts not paid in full following release from jail will be
turned over to an independent billing company. Accounts
without satisfactory payment activity will be referred to
collections in accordance with the policies of the billing
company. Any disputes regarding the amount owed must
be presented in writing to the Jail Administration for
resolution.
(Id. (emphasis added).)

Markquart admits that the jail does not inquire about the

individual’s financial situation but claims individuals are informed that “any disputes
must be brought in writing, and it is up to the inmates themselves to follow the process to
receive a waiver.” (Markquart Aff. ¶ 7.)

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B.

Christianson’s Stay in Martin County Jail

Throughout 2013 and 2014, Christianson was incarcerated at the Martin County
Jail on four separate occasions. (Compl. ¶¶ 6-7.) He was given a pay-for-stay statement
at the end of each stay. (Markquart Aff. ¶¶ 11-14, Exs. 1-4.) In total, Christianson
accrued $7,625 in pay-for-stay costs. (See id. ¶¶ 11-14, Exs. 1-4.)
In an effort to collect these pay-for-stay costs, the Martin County Jail forwarded
Christianson’s debts to Grand American Resources, Inc. (“Grand American”), which has
sent Christianson three letters and has called Christianson between 18 and 20 times.
(Decl. of Christopher Winkelman (“Winkelman Decl.”) ¶ 3, Aug. 1, 2017, Docket No.
32.) Grand American has not collected any money from Christianson. (Id. ¶ 4.)
In June 2015, Christianson’s attorney sent two letters to Markquart stating that
Christianson does not have the ability to pay the pay-for-stay costs and requesting that the
Markquart waive payment of the costs. (Aff. of Bradford Colbert (“Colbert Aff.”) ¶¶ 2,
6, Exs. 1-2, Aug. 21, 2017, Docket No. 36.) Neither Christianson nor his attorney
received a response to either letter.

(Colbert Aff. ¶ 4.)

On March 28, 2016,

Christianson’s attorney sent a third letter with an enclosed summons and complaint. (Id.
¶ 6, Ex. 3 at 6.) The third letter requested that Markquart either consider Christianson’s
eligibility for a waiver or accept service of the summons and complaint. (Id.)

Rather

than responding to the letter, Markquart filed a notice to remove the case to federal court.
(Id. ¶ 5.)

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II.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Christianson’s complaint alleges three claims against Markquart.

First,

Christianson alleges that Markquart violated the Due Process Clause of the United States
Constitution and the Minnesota Constitution by failing to provide Christianson with a
hearing before levying pay-for-stay costs against him. (Compl. ¶¶ 16-20.) Second,
Christianson alleges that the assessment of pay-for-stay costs violates the Equal
Protection Clause of the United States Constitution and the Minnesota Constitution.
(Compl. ¶¶ 21-25.)

Third, Christianson alleges that Markquart violated Minn. Stat.

§ 641.12, subd.3(b), by failing to make any determination regarding Christianson’s
ability to pay the pay-for-stay costs. (Compl. ¶¶ 26-30.) Christianson has since dropped
his equal-protection claim. (Mem. Opp. Summ. J. (“Opp.”) at 6 n.2, Aug. 21, 2017,
Docket No. 35.)
Markquart moves for summary judgment.

DISCUSSION
I.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment is appropriate where there are no genuine issues of material

fact and the moving party can demonstrate that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is material if it might affect the outcome of the suit,
and a dispute is genuine if the evidence is such that it could lead a reasonable jury to
return a verdict for either party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248
(1986). A court considering a motion for summary judgment must view the facts in the

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light most favorable to the non-moving party and give that party the benefit of all
reasonable inferences to be drawn from those facts. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith
Radio Corp., 474 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). The nonmoving party may not rest on mere
allegations or denials, but must show through the presentation of admissible evidence that
specific facts exist creating a genuine issue for trial. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256. But
“where the moving party fails to satisfy its burden to show initially the absence of a
genuine issue concerning any material fact, summary judgment must be denied even if no
opposing evidentiary matter is presented.” Foster v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 787
F.2d 390, 393 (8th Cir. 1996).
The Court may grant summary judgment sua sponte so long as the party against
whom judgment will be entered was given sufficient advance notice and adequate
opportunity to demonstrate why summary judgment should not be granted. See Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(f); Madewell v. Downs, 68 F.3d 1030, 1048-49 (8th Cir. 1995); see also
Eisenrich v. Minneapolis Retail Meat Cutters & Food Handlers Pension Plan, 544 F.
Supp. 2d 848, 858 (D. Minn. 2008).
“A court presented with both statutory and constitutional grounds to support the
relief requested usually should pass on the statutory claim before considering the
constitutional question.”

Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 692 (1979).

When

considering issues of state law, the Court is bound by the decisions of the state’s highest
court. Cassello v. Allegiant Bank, 288 F.3d 339, 340 (8th Cir. 2002). To the extent that
the Minnesota Supreme Court has not decided a question, the Court must “apply the rule
of decision that [it] believe[s] the state’s highest court would apply.” Id.
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Under Minnesota law, the goal of statutory interpretation is to ascertain the
intention of the legislature. Marks v. Comm’r of Revenue, 875 N.W.2d 321, 324 (Minn.
2016); see also Minn. Stat. § 645.16 (2016). The Court reads and interprets the statute as
a whole. Am. Family Ins. Grp. v. Schroedl, 616 N.W.2d 273, 277-78 (Minn. 2000).
When the plain language of the statute is unambiguous, “the letter of the law shall not be
disregarded under the pretext of pursuing the spirit.” State v. Peck, 773 N.W.2d 768, 772
(Minn. 2009); see also Minn. Stat. § 645.16. A statute is ambiguous if it is susceptible to
more than one reasonable meaning. Am. Family Ins. Grp., 616 N.W.2d at 277. If the
Court determines that the statute is ambiguous, it applies “other canons of construction to
discern the legislature’s intent.” Brua v. Minn. Joint Underwriting Ass’n, 778 N.W.2d
294, 300 (Minn. 2010).

II.

IMMUNITY
The Court must first decide whether Markquart is entitled to any form of

immunity in this case. 1 Markquart argues that Christianson’s claims brought against him
his official capacity should be dismissed based on (1) qualified immunity and (2) the
common-law doctrine of official immunity. The doctrine of qualified immunity applies
to Christianson’s § 1983 claims; the common-law doctrine of official immunity applies to
Christianson’s state-law claims. Elwood v. Cty. of Rice, 423 N.W.2d 671, 676-79 (Minn.
1

Christianson has not brought any claims against Markquart in his individual capacity.
The complaint explicitly names “Jeffrey Markquart, in his official capacity as Martin County
Sheriff” as the sole defendant. (Compl. at 1.) There are no individual-capacity claims against
Markquart for the Court to dismiss.

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1988) (recognizing that the federal doctrine of qualified immunity is distinct from
Minnesota’s common-law doctrine of official immunity).

Both of these immunity

doctrines apply only to claims for damages and not claims for equitable relief, such as
declaratory or injunctive relief. 2 Christianson is seeking only equitable relief. Markquart
is therefore not immune from suit in the present action.

III.

VIOLATION OF MINN. STAT. § 641.12
The Court must consider whether Markquart violated Minn. Stat. § 641.12, subd.

3(b), before considering Christianson’s constitutional claims. See Califano, 442 U.S. at
692.
There is no dispute that the Martin County Jail has the statutory authority to
collect pay-for-stay costs. Minn. Stat. § 641.12, subd. 3(a). But with this authority
comes an obligation to assess whether the inmate can afford to pay the assessed pay-forstay costs. Minn. Stat. § 641.12, subd. 3(b) states that the sheriff “shall waive payment
of the costs under this subdivision” if the sheriff determines that the inmate “does not
have the ability to pay the costs.” “The canons of statutory construction provide that
‘shall’ is mandatory.” State v. Humes, 581 N.W.2d 317, 319 (Minn. 1998). Under the
plain and unambiguous meaning of Minn. Stat. § 641.12, subd. 3(b), a sheriff must
determine an inmate’s eligibility for a waiver from payment for the pay-for-stay costs.

See Curtiss v. Benson, 583 F. App’x 598, 599 (8th Cir. 2014); Grantham v. Trickey, 21
F.3d 289, 295 (8th Cir. 1994); Guite v. Wright, 976 F. Supp. 866, 869 (D. Minn. 1997); State by
Beaulieu v. City of Mounds View, 518 N.W.2d 567, 569 (Minn. 1994).
2

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There is no dispute that Markquart or the Martin County Jail never determined
whether Christianson qualifies for a waiver under Minn. Stat. § 641.12, subd. 3(b).
Markquart did not assess Christianson’s eligibility at the time of release or even after
receiving three letters. Markquart did not even respond to Christianson’s letters. 3 The
Court is left to ask: When did Markquart intend to determine whether Christianson
qualified for waiver of the pay-for-stay costs?
Minn. Stat. § 641.12, subd. 3(b) requires Markquart to determine whether
Christianson qualifies for a waiver of payment of pay-for-stay costs at some point. The
3

At oral argument, Markquart’s attorney asserted that the reason Markquart did not
respond to the letters is because they came from Christianson’s attorney. This proposition is
absurd.
Nothing about the first two letters suggests that Markquart was being sued. The letters
kindly ask Markquart “revisit and waive the pay for stay charges.” (See Colbert Aff. ¶ 6, Ex. 1.)
The third letter even states that “[i]n the event that you will not reconsider, it is our intent to
bring a lawsuit in district court.” (Id., Ex. 3.) Markquart was first given the option of
responding to the letters. Markquart could have even chosen to consult with an attorney in
drafting a response to the letters. Instead, Markquart chose to ignore these letters in hopes that
Christianson and his claims would disappear without further complaint.
By seeking the advice of an attorney, Christianson simply sought to protect his rights.
The attorney serves a fundamental role in the legal system by protecting the rights of all citizens.
This is not a principle that the Court should need to teach Markquart. Markquart is an officer of
the court. Zillgitt v. Goodhue Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 202 N.W.2d 378, 380 (Minn. 1972). As an
officer of the court, Markquart knows the importance of protecting individuals’ rights – whether
statutory or constitutional. He also knows the role that attorneys serve in protecting these rights.
Markquart’s decision to ignore Christianson’s letter accomplishes only one thing: it
engenders a belief among citizens that our legal institutions cannot be trusted. Markquart was
presented with a perceived violation of an individual’s rights: He did not evaluate whether
Christianson should have received a waiver. Markquart did not even respond to Christianson’s
complaint by stating why Christianson would not qualify for a waiver. He simply chose to
ignore the perceived violation of Christianson’s rights. All Markquart has done is lead
Christianson and others to believe that Martin County does not care enough about the legal rights
of its citizens to even respond to their concerns.

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Court need not decide at this stage whether the statute (or the United States Constitution
or the Minnesota Constitution) requires this determination before the assessment of payfor-stay costs or whether the statute permits the sheriff to wait until the inmate has filed
an objection to the costs. The issue is not when Markquart chose to determine whether
Christianson qualifies for a waiver; the issue is that Markquart never made such a
determination.
It is apparent to the Court that Martin County Jail has no procedures to assess
whether an inmate qualifies for a waiver under Minn. Stat. § 641.12, subd. 3(b). The
pay-for-stay statement given to inmates in Martin County Jail instructs them to contact
Jail Administration in writing to dispute the costs.

Then what?

Christianson sent

Markquart three letters and never received one response. When pressed at oral argument
what procedures Martin County Jail uses to comply with Minn. Stat. § 641.12, subd. 3(b),
Markquart evaded the question. Not once did Markquart attempt to explain to the Court
what Christianson should have done to seek his waiver. Markquart argues that the statute
does not require him to evaluate whether an inmate qualifies for a waiver before
assessing the pay-for-stay costs. True. Markquart also argues that the statute does not
provide any procedures for how or when he is supposed to determine whether
Christianson qualifies for a waiver. Also true. But in making both arguments, Markquart
ignores that the statute requires him to make this determination. In effect, Markquart
argues that he cannot fulfill his statutory duties without significant legislative
handholding.

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When the legislature expects a government actor to implement a statute, it rarely
speaks with the specificity of an instruction manual. Markquart has a duty to determine
whether Christianson and other similarly situated inmates qualify for a waiver from
payment of pay-for-stay costs. Minn. Stat. § 641.12, subd. 3(b). Implicit in this statutory
mandate is an obligation to develop the necessary procedures to carry out this task. The
Court expects Markquart – as sheriff of Martin County – to do develop such procedures. 4
There is no genuine dispute of material fact that Markquart did not determine
whether Christianson was entitled to a waiver under Minn. Stat. § 641.12, subd. 3(b).
Markquart violated Minn. Stat. § 641.12, subd. 3(b), by failing to make such a
determination.

The Court will therefore deny Markquart’s motion for summary

judgment. Instead, the Court will enter judgment for Christianson. See Madewell, 68
F.3d at 1048-49. 5 The Court will order Markquart to create such procedures as necessary
to carry out his duty under Minn. Stat. § 641.12, subd. 3(b).

To ensure that

Christianson’s potential rights under Minn. Stat. § 641.12, subd. 3(b) are protected while
he awaits the creation of such procedures, the Court will enjoin Markquart and all those
4

To be clear, the Court is not considering whether Minn. Stat. § 641.12, subd. 3(b),
mandates a particular type of procedure or whether any such procedures would satisfy the Due
Process Clause. If Christianson or any other inmate believes that the procedures ultimately
created by Markquart are statutorily or constitutionally deficient, they are free to bring another
challenge to those procedures.
5

The Court finds that Markquart was given sufficient advance notice and adequate
opportunity to demonstrate why summary judgment should not be granted. See Madewell, 68
F.3d 1030, 1048-49 (8th Cir. 1995). In his opposition brief, Christianson suggested that the
Court could grant summary judgment against Markquart. (Pls.’ Mem. Opp. Mot. Summ. J. at 3,
Aug. 21, 2017, Docket No. 35.) Markquart had an opportunity to respond to this suggestion in
his reply brief and at oral argument.

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acting in concert or participation with him from collecting or attempting to collect from
Christianson any debts resulting from pay-for-stay costs owed to Martin County.

ORDER
Based on the foregoing, and all files, records, and proceedings herein, IT IS
HEREBY ORDERED that:
1.

The Court DENIES Markquart’s Motion for Summary Judgment [Docket

No. 26].
2.

The Court DECLARES that Markquart violated Minn. Stat. § 641.12,

subd. 3(b), by failing to determine whether Christianson qualifies for a waiver from
payment of pay-for-stay costs.
3.

The Court ORDERS Markquart to file an affidavit and supporting

documents within sixty (60) days of this Order certifying that he has created the
procedures necessary to comply with Minn. Stat. § 641.12, subd. 3(b).
4.

The Court ENJOINS Markquart and all those acting in concert or

participation with him from collecting or attempting to collect from Christianson any
debts resulting from pay-for-stay costs owed to Martin County until Markquart has filed
an affidavit with the Court as required by paragraph 3 of this Order.
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.
DATED: January 17, 2018
at Minneapolis, Minnesota.

_______s/John R. Tunheim______
JOHN R. TUNHEIM
Chief Judge
United States District Court

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